

THE
ROMAN
HISTORY,

FROM

The Building of *Rome* to the Ruin of
the *Commonwealth*.

Illustrated with MAPS and other PLATES.

VOL. IV.

By N. HOOKE, Esq;

The FOURTH EDITION.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. and R. TONSON; G. HAWKINS;
and T. LONGMAN.

MDCCCLXVI.

ROMAN HISTORY

The Building of Rome to the Fall of the Empire

Illustrated with Maps and Plans



THE ROBERTS EDITION

Printed by J. G. & J. W. Smith, 10, Old Bailey, London

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TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
HUGH Earl of MARCHMONT.

MY LORD,

PERMIT me to lay hold of this fair occasion, publickly to congratulate your Lordship, upon that *true Glory, the consenting praise of the honest and the wise*, which you have so early acquired. ‘When men have performed any *virtuous* actions, or such as fit easy upon their memories, it is a *reasonable* pleasure’ (says a philosophical * Writer, who speaks contemptuously enough of Renown after death) ‘to have the testimony of the world added to

* Mr. Wollaston.

DEDICATION.

‘ that of their own consciences, that
‘ they have done well.’ My Lord,
you have not only this pleasure, but
another, no less reasonable, and more
exquisite, attending a character like
yours, The being able to do much
good to others. To those whom you
distinguish by particular marks of
your good opinion you give reputa-
tion; and I have happily experi-
enced, that reputation, so derived,
is not meer air and fruitless. Through
that warmth of good will which your
Lordship, on all occasions, expresses
for me, I have profited, greatly pro-
fited, by *your* glory. You, my Lord,
can be no stranger to this truth; yet
I trust, you will forgive me, if, to
draw still more advantage from your
fame, I here take the liberty to tell
your Lordship, *in print*, for the in-
formation

DEDICATION.

formation of others, what you knew before: As a Player, when alone on the stage, speaks aloud to himself, that he may be heard by those who fill the Theatre. I would, by this dedication of my Book to your Lordship, publish, as far as by such means I can, that You, my Lord, are my Patron and my Friend; and that I am, with the greatest respect, esteem and gratitude,

My LORD,

Your Lordship's

Most faithful, and

Most Humble Servant,

N. HOOKE.

DEDICATION

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am, with the greatest respect, esteem
and gratitude,

My Lord,

Your Obedient

Most humble servant

John Hume

NO ONE

THE Roman History.

FOURTH BOOK.

From the Beginning of the FIRST
PUNIC WAR in the Year of
Rome 489, to the End of the
SECOND in 552.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAP. I.

The occasion of the First Punic War.

CERTAIN Italian soldiers, called Marmertines, who had been mercenaries in the service of Agathocles King of Sicily, and had, after his death, treacherously seized upon Messina, being reduced to extremities by the arms of Hiero King of Syracuse, one part of them puts the citadel into the hands of the Carthaginians, and the other sends Embassadors to the Romans, offering them the possession of the city, and imploring their protection. The people of Rome

HIERO,
K. of Sy-
racuse.

- Y. R. 489. *order the Consul Appius Claudius to go with an army to the relief of the Mamertines; who, in the mean time, rid themselves of the Carthaginians, that had been admitted into the citadel.*

C H A P. II.

First, second, and third years of the War.

- The Carthaginians, in conjunction with Hiero King of Syracuse, who had entered into a league with them, besiege Messina. Appius Claudius lands in Sicily, defeats the allies, and forces them to raise the siege. The next year Hiero, for a hundred talents of silver, purchases a Peace with Rome, and the year following assists the Romans in taking Agrigentum from the Carthaginians.*
- 490.
- 491.

C H A P. III.

The fourth and fifth years of the War.

492. *In the Consulship of L. Valerius and T. Otacilius, Rome fits out a fleet of a hundred Quinqueremes and twenty Triremes, in order to dispute with the Carthaginians the dominion of the sea.*
493. *One of the Consuls of the next year, Cornelius Asina, falls into the enemy's hands, together with seventeen of his gallies; but the other Consul, C. Duilius, gains a memorable victory over the Carthaginian fleet, near Mylæ, chiefly by means of a new invented engine for grappling and boarding the enemy's ships.*

C H A P.

CHAP. IV.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth years of the War.

Four thousand Samnites conspire with certain discontented slaves to plunder and burn Rome, but are seasonably discovered, and punished. The Romans invade Corfica and Sardinia with success. A quarrel in Sicily between the Roman army and their Sicilian auxiliaries, gives the enemy some advantages in that island. Next year several towns there surrender to one of the Consuls; and the other surprizes the enemy's fleet in a port of Sardinia, and takes many of the ships; whereupon the Carthaginian sailors mutiny, and crucify their Admiral. The Romans are again conquerors in an engagement at sea near the Tyndaris.

CHAP. V.

The ninth year of the War.

To oblige Carthage to recal her armies from Sicily, Rome undertakes to transfer the war into Africa. In this view both the Consuls are sent out with a fleet of 330 ships of war, and an army of near 140,000 men. They gain a complete victory over the enemy's fleet near Ecnomus, and afterwards land in Africa. One of the Consuls returns to Italy with the greater part of the fleet and the army,

REGULUS. *army, leaving his colleague Regulus to pursue the war. The Roman General, after taking several towns, routs the land-forces of the Carthaginians near Adis, and then offers peace to the Republic, but upon conditions that are rejected with indignation.*

C H A P. VI.

XANTIPPUS. *The Senate of Carthage entrust Xantippus, a Lacedæmonian, with the command of their army. By his excellent conduct he totally defeats the Romans in a pitched battle, and takes Regulus prisoner.*

C H A P. VII.

From the ninth to the fourteenth year of the War.

498. *Rome dispatches her new Consuls into Africa, with a great fleet, to bring off the remains of Regulus's army, which after the late battle had taken refuge in Clypea. The Consuls gain a victory over the Carthaginian fleet, near the promontory of Mercury; they land at Clypea, and take the legionaries on board; but in their passage home meet with so terrible a storm, that, of above four hundred vessels, only fourscore escape destruction.*
499. *The Romans fit out a new fleet, with which the succeeding Consuls pass into Sicily, and there reduce some towns. Next year 150 Roman ships perishing by tempest, the Republic gives over all thoughts*
500. *of*

of naval enterprizes, and resolves to depend entirely upon her land-forces; but those are so much afraid of the Carthaginian elephants, that for two years together they dare not face the enemy in battle, or even appear in the plain field. This terror among the legions, and the advantage which the enemy had of being able, at pleasure, to supply their maritime towns with recruits and provisions, make the Roman Senate resolve to try once more the fortune of Rome at sea. In the mean time, the Roman General in Sicily draws the Carthaginians into a snare, routs their whole army, and kills or takes all the elephants.

501, 502

503.

CHAP. VIII.

Carthage disheartened by her losses sends Embassadors to Rome, and, together with them, the captive Regulus, to treat of a peace. Regulus dissuades the Senate from hearkening to the overture, and even from consenting to an exchange of prisoners. In performance of his word given he returns to Carthage, and there, soon after, dies.

CHAP. IX.

From the fourteenth to the eighteenth year of the War.

The Consuls set sail with the fleet for Sicily, and lay siege to Lilybæum. Himilco, the Carthaginian Commander in the city, makes a vigorous defence. In the mean time a squadron of ships

503.

Hannibal
the Rhodi-
an.

504.
Claudius
Pulcher.

505.

ships from Africa passes through the Roman navy, and lands 10,000 men in the town; which being afterwards straitly shut up, one Hannibal, a Rhodian, undertakes to go thither with a single galley, and bring intelligence to the Senate of Carthage of the condition of the besieged; and he succeeds. The garrison in a sally burn all the towers and engines employed against their town; after which the Romans turn the siege into a blockade. Next year the Consul Claudius Pulcher, attempting to surprize Drepanum, is by the governor of the place defeated at sea, and loses the greatest part of his fleet. The rest of the Roman navy, under the other Consul and his Quæstors, is, by the Carthaginian Admiral, forced upon the south coast of Sicily, where every one of the ships perishing by storm, Rome once more renounces the empire of the seas. Her General in Sicily gets possession of the city of Eryx. The following year produces no remarkable action between the contending parties. The Carthaginian army, for want of pay, mutiny against their General. He is recalled home, and succeeded in the command by Amilcar Barcha, father of the famous Hannibal.

C H A P. X.

From the eighteenth year of the war to the end of it, in the twenty third or twenty-fourth year after its commencement.

AMILCAR
BARCHA.

Amilcar, after quieting the discontents of the army, and making a successful expedition on the coast of

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of Italy, encamps on a mountain between Panormus and Eryx in Sicily, and there maintains his post against all the efforts of the Romans for almost three years. At length (in 508.) he finds means to seize upon the city of Eryx, situated on the side of a high mountain; and though hard pressed by a Roman garrison at the top of the mountain, and a Roman army at the foot of it, yet in two years time they are not able to dislodge him. The Senate of Rome finding it impossible to complete the conquest of Sicily without a naval strength, a considerable fleet is fitted out at the expence of private citizens, the public treasury being exhausted. This new fleet, under the conduct of Lutatius Catulus, obtaining a complete victory over that of the enemy, near the Ægates, the Carthaginians are constrained to yield to the Romans, by a treaty of peace, the whole island of Sicily; which, except the little kingdom of Syracuse, is reduced to the form of a province. At Rome the tribes are augmented to thirty-five, which number they never after exceeded.

506, 507

508.

509, 510

511.

LUTAT-
TIUS CA-
TULUS.

512.

35. Tribes.

CHAP. XI.

The Falisci, a people of Hetruria, rebel against the Romans, but in a few days are forced to submit. Carthage is reduced to great extremities in a war, which for more than three years is carried on against her, by her foreign Mercenaries in conjunction with her African subjects. The conduct of the Romans upon this occasion.

C H A P. XII.

- 512,513 For three years the Romans, having no war to
 514. maintain, employ themselves in establishing good order in Italy, and planting colonies in the neighbourhood of the Gauls and Ligurians. The Republic desires to assist Ptolemy king of Egypt against Antiochus of Syria; but the Egyptian civilly declines the offer. At length the Boian Gauls breaking the peace with Rome, and the Ligurians being in motion, the Romans take the field. The
 515. Consul Valerius is vanquished in a battle with the Boian Gauls. He afterwards defeats them, while his colleague obtains a victory over the Ligurians.
 516. Next year the Romans act entirely on the defensive against the Boians; but offensively against the Ligurians, and with success. At Rome the Secular
 517. Games are celebrated. The new Consuls march against the Boians and Ligurians, who having called in to their assistance an army of Transalpine Gauls, take umbrage at their numbers, fall upon them, and put them to flight. The conquerors weakened by their victory are obliged to make peace with the Romans. The Corsicans in the mean time rebel, with whom Claudius Clycias, being sent against them, enters into a treaty, on terms dishonourable to the Republic. She refuses to adhere to the treaty, delivers up Claudius to the resentment of the Corsicans, and then subdues them by force of arms. The Corsicans, in conjunction with Carthage, stir up the Sardinians to revolt. Hereupon Rome threatens
 the

the African Republic with a war, but is diverted from it by an Embassy from Carthage: And Sardinia being easily reduced the next year, the temple of Janus is shut for the first time since the reign of Numa Pompilius. A few months after, the Ligurians, Corficans, and Sardinians take arms again. The first instance of a divorce at Rome. Marriage settlements introduced. Fabius Maximus the Consul subdues the Ligurians; his colleague triumphs for his exploits against the Sardinians. At the motion of Æbutius, a Tribune of the people, the judicature of the Centumvirs is erected. The following year Flaminius, another Tribune of the people, proposes a law for dividing amongst the poor citizens of Rome some lands lately taken from the Gauls. In obedience to his father he desists from his enterprize; but one of his colleagues carries it on, and succeeds, notwithstanding the opposition of the Senate. Sardinia and Corfica, now entirely subdued, are reduced to the form of a Roman province; and the conqueror of this latter island being refused a triumph, gives the first example of assuming that honour against the will of the Senate.

518.

519.

520.

Centum-
virs.

521.

522.

CHAP. XIII.

The first Illyrian War.

The Romans send ambassadors to Teuta, Queen of a part of Illyricum, to complain of the piracies of her subjects. Teuta, offended at the haughty behaviour

523.

- behaviour of one of the ambassadors, causes them
 524. all to be murdered in their return home. To revenge
 this insult, Rome employs both her Consuls, who,
 assisted by Demetrius of Pharos, successfully begin
 the war; which is finished in the following year by
 525. a treaty of peace, dictated by the Republic. Her
 acquaintance with the Greeks commences at this
 time.

C H A P. XIV.

526. The Gauls on both sides the Po take arms. To
 527. oppose these formidable enemies, the Romans make
 extraordinary preparations; and the next year ob-
 tain a complete victory over them. Yet the follow-
 528. ing Consuls make no progress in the war. Their
 successors, though Rome, terrified by prodigies, had
 529. ordered them to return to the city, hazard a pitched
 530. battle, and gain the victory. Claudius Marcellus
 vanquishes in single combat the General of the Gauls,
 who discouraged by his death, are put to flight.
 531. Insubria and Liguria submit, and are made one
 province, which takes the name of Cisalpine Gaul.
 532. Istria on the Adriatick is subdued by the Republic.

C H A P. XV.

The second Illyrian War.

Demetrius of Pharos, whom Rome had ap-
 pointed guardian to the young Illyrian King, despises
 her orders, and attacks her allies. The present
 Consuls

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Consuls being obliged to abdicate their office, and the season being too far advanced for their successors to begin a new war, Æmilius Paullus, and his colleague Livius Salinator, go the next year with an army into Illyricum. Demetrius flies for protection to the Court of Philip of Macedon. Livius, on his return to Rome, is condemned by the tribes, for having applied part of the spoil to his own use. Roman colonies are planted at Placentia and Cremona, in the territories of the Gauls.

533.

534.

C H A P. XVI.

The second Punic War, or the War of Hannibal. Its causes and commencement.

THE spirit of revenge with which Amilcar left Sicily, and which he communicated to his son Hannibal, is reckoned the First Cause of the second Punic war. The unjust seizure of Sardinia by the Romans, the Second and principal Cause. The successive victories of Amilcar, Asdrubal, and Hannibal in Spain, the Third Cause.

Hannibal attacks the Saguntines, a people in alliance with Rome, and the only Spaniards who, on the south of the Iberus, remain unsubdued to the Carthaginian dominion. He reduces Saguntum, after a siege of eight months. The Romans order Sempronius, one of their Consuls, into Africa, and P. Cornelius Scipio the other Consul, into Spain, and at the same time send an embassy to Carthage,

HANNI-
BAL.

535.

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b

demanding

demanding that Hannibal should be delivered up to them, to be punished for his unjust infraction of the peace between the two Republics : This being refused, and war denounced on both sides, the Carthaginian General settles the Affairs of Spain, leaves his brother Asdrubal to command on the south-side of the Iberus, and crosses that river with a great army.

C H A P. XVII.

Hannibal, after subduing all the country between the Iberus and the Pyrenees, passes those mountains with his army, in his way to Italy. He proceeds to the banks of the Rhone without molestation. There the Gauls in vain oppose his passage ; nor can the Consul Scipio, who, arriving at the mouth of the Rhone, gets notice of the place where Hannibal is, advance expeditiously enough to stop him. Scipio reembarks his forces, sends the major part of them forward to Spain, but returns himself to Italy, that he may meet Hannibal at his descent from the Alps. The Carthaginians with great danger and fatigue pass those mountains, lay siege to Turin and take it. The Romans, astonished at the news of Hannibal's being in Italy, whom they thought to have confined to Spain, dispatch orders to the Consul Sempronius, now at Lilybæum, to hasten to the defence of his country. Scipio, in the mean time, crosses the Po, and advances to meet the enemy.

C H A P.

C H A P. XVIII.

The Roman horse and light-armed infantry under Scipio are defeated at the TICIN by the Carthaginian cavalry. The Consul retires to the neighbourhood of Placentia: Hannibal follows him, and offers battle; which the Roman declines. Scipio distrusting the Gauls, some of whom had gone over to the enemy, removes to the high grounds near the Trebia, and there waits the arrival of his colleague.

Battle of
the TICIN.

C H A P. XIX.

Sempronius having joined Scipio, and being encouraged by a slight advantage he had gained over a party of the enemy, ventures, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his colleague, to fight a pitched battle with them at the TREBIA. The Roman army is totally defeated, and all the nations of the Gauls declare for Hannibal. The Senate make vigorous preparations to support the war. Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius are raised to the Consulate, and the affairs of the Republic prosper in Spain, under the direction of Cn. Scipio. Hannibal to gain friends in Italy, dismisses, without ransom, all those of his prisoners who are of the Roman allies. Dreading the levity of the Gauls, he crosses the Apennines, and enters Hetruria through the marshes, where his army suffers extremely, and he himself loses one of his eyes.

The TRE-
BIA.

536.

CHAP. XX.

The second year of the War.

The Lake
THRASY-
MENUS.

Flaminius, raised to the Consulship by the favour of the people, fears lest the Augurs should declare his election invalid. Neglecting therefore the usual ceremonies of religion, he hastens to Ariminum, where he takes upon him the command of the forces, and from thence, at the head of four legions, marches to Aretium in Hetruria. Hannibal lays an ambush for him on the banks of THE LAKE THRASYMENUS, and routs his whole army. The Consul himself is slain in the action; and, a few days after, a body of four thousand horse, that had been sent to his assistance, fall into the hands of the Enemy. Rome, terrified at these misfortunes, names Q. Fabius Maximus to be Pro-dictator, and appoints Minucius Rufus to be his General of the horse. Hannibal, in the mean time, ravages Italy quite to Apulia. Thither Fabius follows him, but keeps on the hills, and declines a general engagement. The Carthaginian, to provoke him to fight, pillages the fine country of Campania. Hannibal, by a stratagem, deceives Fabius, who imagined that the Carthaginian would not be able to get out of Campania, a country surrounded partly by high mountains and partly by the sea. The cautious circumspective conduct of Fabius giving offence at Rome, the Comitia divide the command of the army between him

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him and his General of the horse. Minucius, now at the head of half the troops, and proud of an advantage he had gained in an encounter with the enemy, descends into the plain, hazards a battle with Hannibal, and is on the point of being totally routed; but Fabius rescues him from danger. The two brothers Publius and Cneius Scipio, in the mean time, carry on the war with success in Spain, where the hostages which Carthage had obliged the Spaniards to give her, are betrayed into the hands of the Romans.

C H A P. XXI.

Third year of the War.

C. Terentius Varro, by the intrigues of a Tribune of the people, is raised to the Consulship, and L. Æmilius Paullus is appointed his colleague. Rome, weary of dilatory arts, sends both her Consuls, at the head of a mighty army, to dispute once more with Hannibal the superiority in the field. The armies approach each other in a plain country near CANNÆ in Apulia. Æmilius, disliking the ground, advises his colleague not to fight; but Varro, on a day when it is his turn to command, gives battle to the enemy, and is totally defeated with the slaughter of almost all his troops. Many of the allies of Rome go over to the conqueror.

537.

CANNÆ.

C H A P.

CHAP. XXII.

Some young Romans of distinction resolving, in despair, to forsake Italy, Scipio (afterwards surnamed Africanus) obliges them to take an Oath never to abandon the Republic. And while the people of Rome are in the utmost consternation and despondency, the Senate preserve their courage, and make all possible preparations for the Defence of their country. They even solemnly give thanks to Varro, for that he had not despaired of the Commonwealth. A DICTATOR is named to govern the State; levies are made with all diligence; the slaves are enlisted for the service; all ranks of men bring their gold and silver into the public treasury, and the silver coin is now first alloyed with copper. In the mean time, by the permission of Hannibal, a deputation from the Roman prisoners in his camp, arrives at Rome, and petitions the Senate to ransom the captives. The Conscrip̄t Fathers deny the request. Capua, resolving to shake off the Roman yoke, demands of the Republic that Rome and Capua should for the future, be upon a perfect equality; this proposal being rejected with disdain, the Capuans deliver up their city to Hannibal. The Carthaginian dispatches his brother Mago to Carthage, with an account of his success; the Senate vote him a supply of men and money, but are very dilatory in sending it. The Roman Dictator takes the field with a considerable army, and Hannibal, after

after making some fruitless attempts upon Naples and Nola, lays siege to Casilinum; the garrison of which place, after a stout defence, at length capitulates. Rome not being in a condition to provide for the fleets and armies in Sicily and Sardinia, her allies in those islands assist her by their contributions. The Senate having lost a great number of their members in the war, a Dictator is chosen for the sole business of filling the vacant places. He names 177 new Senators.

C H A P XXIII.

Fourth year of the War.

Sempronius Gracchus and Posthumius Albinus are raised to the Consulship. The latter being cut off, together with all his army, by the Gauls, the Senate resolve to send no more armies into Gaul. Fabius Cunctator is chosen in the room of the late Consul. Hannibal enters into a treaty with King Philip of Macedon, whose Embassadors, in their return home, are taken at sea, and carried to Rome. The Senate resolve to keep the Macedonian out of Italy, by making war upon him in his own country. The Campaign in Italy passes in expeditions of no great importance, and the Romans, though they have many armies in the field, never hazard a general action against Hannibal. Their arms prosper in Sardinia and Spain. In Sicily, King Hiero being

538.

FABIUS
CUNCTA-
TOR.PHILIP of
Macedon.

dead, his grandson and successor Hieronymus makes an alliance with Carthage, and is soon after assassinated by his own subjects.

C H A P. XXIV.

Fifth year of the War.

539.
MARCEL-
LUS.

When the Comitia at Rome were going to raise T. Otacilius to the Consulate, Fabius, the president of the assembly, knowing the insufficiency of the candidate, hinders his election, and is himself chosen, together with Claudius Marcellus. The Roman citizens remarkably shew their zeal for the Republic. The soldiers serve without pay, and fleets are equipped at the expence of private men. Sempronius is said to have defeated an army of Carthaginians under Hanno, and Marcellus to have gained an advantage over Hannibal. Fabius besieges and takes Casilinum, while the Prætor Lævinus begins the war in Greece against King Philip.

C H A P. XXV.

Hippocrates and Epicydes, two of Hannibal's agents in Sicily, get themselves, by intrigue, chosen Prætors of Syracuse; yet the inhabitants of that city enter soon after into a league with Marcellus, then commander of the Roman army in the island. The Hannibalists, going to Leontini, persuade the Leontines to a rupture with the Romans; Marcellus takes the place at the first assault: Nevertheless the
Hannibalists

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XXV.

Hannibalists not only make their escape, but by artifice and singular boldness find means to return to Syracuse, with an army under their command. They are re-elected Prætors, and become absolute masters of the city. Marcellus lays close siege to it, but by the wonderful engines of Archimedes is constrained to turn the siege into a blockade.

ARCHI-
MEDES.

C H A P. XXVI.

Sixth year of the War.

The following year, the Romans take some towns from the Carthaginians in Italy. Hanno routs a Præfect of the Allies in Bruttium, and cuts off almost all his army. In Spain the two Scipios make considerable progress. They also engage Syphax, a Numidian King, to commence a War with the Carthaginians in Africa. The latter, in conjunction with Gala (another Numidian King) fall upon Syphax, and defeat him with great slaughter. Marcellus continues the blockade of Syracuse, and with part of his forces reduces several towns, while many others declare for Carthage.

540.

C H A P. XXVII.

Seventh and eighth years of the War.

Hannibal, by means of intelligence with some of the inhabitants of Tarentum, gets possession of the city. The Roman garrison retires into the citadel. Hanno, whom the Carthaginian General had sent to supply Capua with corn, is defeated by the Consul Fulvius. Thurium, and the Metapontines,

541.

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submit

submit to Hannibal's officers. The Consuls proposing to besiege Capua, send for Sempronius Gracchus to assist them. In his way he is betrayed into the hands of the enemy, and slain. Hannibal advances to the defence of Capua, and begins a battle with the Consuls, which an accident puts an end to. The Roman Generals decamp in the night; Hannibal follows one of them, but missing him, attacks another commander, Centenius Pænula, and destroys almost his whole army. After this he falls upon the Prætor Fulvius, cuts off 16,000 of his men, and takes his camp. In the mean time the Consuls, in conjunction with the forces of Claudius Nero, besiege Capua in form.

During these transactions, Marcellus makes himself master of a part of Syracuse, and encamps within the walls. An army of Carthaginians and Sicilians come to the relief of the Syracusians. A plague makes great havoc in both camps. Hippocrates and all the Carthaginian soldiers are carried off by it; and the Sicilians disband themselves. Epicydes deserts Syracuse, and the inhabitants begin a treaty with Marcellus; during the course of which, a Spanish officer, corrupted by the Roman General, betrays Ortygia to him; whereupon the Syracusians immediately surrender to him Achradina, and he gives both up to be plundered. Archimedes is slain.

Syracuse
taken.

542.

In the Consulship of P. Sulpicius Galba and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, Hannibal marches to the relief of Capua, now greatly distress'd for want of provisions. After some vain efforts to draw the Romans to a battle, or break into the town, he suddenly marches away, and appears before the walls

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of Rome, in hopes the army before Capua, or part of it, would hasten to the defence of the Capital. The Consuls issue out of the city to oppose him, but keep to the high grounds. Hannibal marches back towards Capua; but finding that none of the besiegers had stirred, he turns upon the Consuls, who were following him, and forces their camp in the night, with great slaughter. Despairing of being able to raise the siege of Capua, he with wonderful rapidity traverses Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium, in the view of surprizing Rhegium, and is very near succeeding in his design. Capua surrenders to the Romans, and is treated with extreme rigour. In Greece, Lævinus draws the Ætolians, and several other States, into a confederacy against Philip of Macedon.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Ninth year of the War.

T. Lævinus and Marcellus are promoted to the Consulship. The latter is accused by the Syracusians of cruelty and injustice, before the Senate, who acquit him. The Campanians in vain complain of the rigorous proceedings of Fulvius Flaccus. Salapia in Apulia is betrayed to Marcellus, who takes two more cities in Samnium. Fulvius Centumalus venturing a battle with Hannibal, is totally defeated. The Consul Lævinus, in the mean time, finishes the reduction of Sicily.

543.

THE

I

A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

CREDIBILITY of the HISTORY of
the first 500 Years of ROME.

THE famous *Turenne*, (as we learn from the history of his life) when he was about 12 years old, sent a challenge to an officer, who had affronted him, by saying, that *Quintus Curtius's* history of *Alexander the Great* was a mere romance. I do not wish, that our young gentlemen, who have begun to delight themselves in the Roman History, should carry their resentments so far against M. de *Beaufort*, author of a work, intitled, *Dissertation sur l'Incertitude des cinq premiers siecles de l'Histoire Romaine* ^a: yet I think they may reasonably look upon him as an enemy, who seeks to deprive them of a considerable part of their pleasures; and that they ought to be upon their guard against him. And, for my own part, I cannot readily consent to have my grave remarks upon certain passages of the history reduced to the importance of those, by which some industrious chronologer should fix the precise year when *Noah's* grand-daughter *Cesara* fled into *Ireland* to escape the deluge. For the sake therefore of us Romanists, I once purposed to have gone through the whole of M. de B.'s Dissertation, and to have

Ramsay's
life of the
Viscount de
Tourenne.

Topog.
Hibern. p.
135, 136.
apud M.
de Pouilli.

^a A Dissertation on the uncertainty of the history of the first five ages of Rome.

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attempted to shew the insufficiency of his citations and his reasonings for discrediting the Roman History of the first 500 years, as to the *main* and *fundamentals* of it: For much of the *embroidery* and *flourishing* may be given up without parting with the *ground-work*^a. But the execution of that design would stretch this Discourse to too great a length; and I conceive, that to those who have perused M. L'Abbé Sallier's^b Defence of the

^a That the *Romans* had, with the neighbouring states, the successive wars which *Livy* has recorded; that these wars followed one another in the order given them by *Livy*, and had the *final* events which he has mentioned, may surely be admitted by a reader, not over credulous, and who at the same time will, in his own mind, naturally abate somewhat of the complete victories and numerous triumphs, with which *Livy* has adorned his history, in compliance with the *vanity* of his countrymen. For, that the *Roman* vanity has now and then prevailed to the misrepresentation of facts, is too manifest, from several passages in the Latin Historian, some regarding the earlier, some the later ages of *Rome*. The fortunate effect of the unsuccessful enterprize of *Mucius* against *Porfenna's* life, and the marvellous exploit of *Camillus* against the *Gauls*, when, at the foot of the Capitol, they were selling a peace to the *Romans*, are remarkable instances of the power of this vanity. And that it had its influence in *Livy's* relations of the war of *Hannibal*, and the *Spanish* war, is shewn in Book IV. Chap. XVI. to Book V. Chap. XVII.

See Memoires de Litterature, &c. Tom. 8. edit. Amsterdam. Pref. p. vii.

^b It was the controversy [in 1722, 23, 24, 25] between these two very learned and very eloquent gentlemen, members of the *Royal French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres*, which gave occasion to M. de Beaufort's *Dissertation sur l'Incertitude des cinq premiers siecles de l'histoire Romaine*. Not content with the efforts made by M. de Pouilli, who, he thinks, *has treated a little too superficially a matter which deserved to be examined to the bottom*; he without neglecting M. de Pouilli's arguments, endeavours to supply his deficiencies, and to prove, even to *Demonstration*, the *Uncertainty*, &c.

[Je

the history against the attacks of M. de Pouilli, any further defence is unnecessary. However, as the discourses of that able champion of our cause have, I think, neither been printed apart from the other pieces in the *Memoires de Litterature*, nor translated into *English*, and therefore may not have fallen into the hands of many persons, who may have met with M. de B.'s Dissertation, which is translated, I shall just mention some particulars, in which I apprehend the chief strength of M. L'Abbé Sallier's arguments to be couched; and then make some brief remarks on M. de B.'s principal positions in his attempt to refute those arguments.

I. IT is beyond all belief, that Varro^b, the most

M.L'Abbé
Sallier 1st
and 3d
Disc.

[Je crois avoir démontré, d'une maniere tres claire, l'incertitude qui regne sur le tems lequel a precedé la prise de Rome par les Gaulois, et la destruction de ses monumens, qui en fut une suite naturelle. Il est vrai, que cela ne prouve rien à l'égard du siecle suivant, sur lequel j'ai cru pouvoir etendre cette incertitude, à cause de la confusion, qui regne encore par rapport à divers evenemens.] In 1738 Mr. de Beauport gave the first edition of his Dissertation; an English translation of which was published in 1740. His second edition of it revised, corrected, and considerably augmented, bears date 1750. 'Tis to the pages of the latter the references are made.

N. B. M. de Beauport gives up one argument, in which M. de Pouilli expatiates, drawn from the work called, *The Parallels of Plutarch*, a work of which M. l'Abbé Sallier has totally destroyed the credit.

^b Of Varro, Cicero thus writes.

Nos in nostra urbe peregrinantes errantesque tanquam hospites, tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui, et ubi essemus agnoscere; tu ætatem patriæ, tu descriptiones temporum, sedem locorum, tu sacrorum jura, tu domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti. Acad. 1. c. 3.

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learned *Roman* of the most learned age of *Rome*, should employ his studies and his labours upon the antiquities of his country, in order to dispel the obscurity cast upon the history of the earliest ages, unless there were means of attaining to certainty, or a high degree of probability, with regard to many things that passed in those ages.

2. It is no less incredible, that *Cicero* should ^a *design*, and *Livy* undertake ^b a history of the earliest

^a *Cicero*, says Dr. Middleton, was meditating a general history of *Rome*, to which he was frequently urged by his friends, as the only man capable of adding that glory to his country, of excelling the Greeks in a species of writing, which, of all others, was at that time the least cultivated by the *Romans*. But he never found leisure to execute so great a task; yet has sketched out a plan of it, which, short as it is, seems to be the best, that can be formed, for the design of a perfect history.

He declares it to be the first and fundamental law of history, that it should neither dare to say any thing that was false, nor fear to say any thing that was true, nor give any just suspicion either of favour or disaffection: that in the relation of things, the writer should observe the order of time, and add also the description of places: That in all great and memorable transactions, he should first explain the councils, then the acts, lastly the events: that in the councils he should interpose his own judgment on the merit of them: in the acts, should relate not only what was done, but how it was done: in the events, should shew, what share chance, or rashness, or prudence had in them: that in regard to persons, he should describe, not only their particular actions, but the lives and characters of all those, who bear an eminent part in the story. That he should illustrate the whole in a clear, easy, natural stile; flowing with a perpetual smoothness, and equability; free from the affectation of points and sentences, or the roughness of judicial pleadings. *De Orator.*

2. 15. Middleton's Life of *Cicero*, Vol. 2. p. 528.

^b *Res immensi operis, ut quæ supra septingentesimum annum repetatur, &c.* Liv. Pref.

ages of Rome, if they had no authentic records, no solid materials for their ground work; and this in an age, of which Cicero says ^a, that it was too knowing, too much enlightened to be imposed upon by fictions and persuaded to believe absurdities.

3. Cicero in six books which he wrote concerning the *commonwealth*, gave a particular and circumstantial ^b account of the customs and maxims of ancient Rome, à primo urbis ortu, its domestic and military discipline.

4. We have the exprefs testimony of Cicero for the existence, in his time, of the PONTIFICAL ANNALS ^d, which were begun almost as early as the

^a *Ut jam doctis hominibus, ac temporibus ipsis eruditis ad fingendum vix quicquam esset loci. Antiquitas enim recipit fabulas, fictas etiam nonnunquam incondite: hæc ætas autem jam exculta præsertim et erudita omne quod fieri non potest respuit.* Frag. Lib. 3. de Repub.

^c *Nec enim hic locus est ut de moribus, institutisque majorum, et disciplina ac temperatione civitatis loquamur: aliis hæc locis accuratè satis dicta sunt, maximèque in his sex libris quos de re publica scripsimus.* Lib. 4. Tusc. c. 1.

^d *Erat enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectio. Cujus rei memorieque publicæ retinendæ causa, ab initio rerum Romanarum usque ad Publium Mucium Pontificem Maximum res omnes singulorum annorum litteris mandabat P. Maximus, referebatque in album, et proponebat tabulum domi ut esset potestas populo cognoscendi, ii que etiam nunc annales maximi nominantur. Hanc similitudinem scribendi multi secuti sunt qui sine ulla ornamentis monumenta solum temporum hominum locorum, gestarumque rerum reliquerunt. Itaque qualis apud Græcos, Pherocydes, Hellanicus, Acusilaus fuit, alique permulti; talis noster Cato, et Piso, et Piso, qui neque tenent, quibus rebus ornatur oratio (modo enim hæc ista sunt importata) et dum intelligatur, quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse, breviter.*

* Lib. 2.
de Orat.
12.

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the birth of the state, and continued to the time of *P. Mucius*, the High Priest, who lived in the 7th century of *Rome*. *Varro*, in his books concerning the Latin tongue, gives us many fragments of these annals.

L. 12. Ep.
25. ad Cor-
nif. L. 11.
Ep. 25. ad
Brut.

5. Since it was the custom in the latter times of the republic to record the *acts of the senate* and *of the magistrates*; it is probable that the same custom was observed in the former. And it seems unquestionable from a passage^a in *Suetonius* [*Vit. Vesp. 8.*] not only that the acts of the senate, and of the people, in the earliest ages, used to be recorded; but that many of those records were preserved from the flames, when the *Gauls* burnt the city.

De leg.
Lib. 1. c. 2.

*Doubtless
jejunius.
See Tay-
lor's Elem.
of Civ.
Law. p. 79.

*Abest enim historia litteris nostris, ut et ipse intelligo, et ex te persæpe audio. Potes autem tu profecto satisfacere in ea, quippè cum sit opus, ut tibi quidem videri solet, unum hoc oratorium maxime. Quamobrem aggredere, quæsumus, et sume ad hanc rem tempus, quæ est a nostris hominibus adhuc aut ignorata, aut relicta. Nam post annales pontificum maximorum, quibus nihil potest esse * jucundius: sit aut ad Fabium, aut ad eum, qui tibi semper in ore est, Catonem, aut ad Pisonem, aut ad Fannium, aut ad Vennonium venias: quamquam ex his alius alio plus habet virium, tamen quid tam exile, quam isti omnes.*

Unde autem facilius quam ex annalium monumentis aut res bellica, aut omnes republicæ disciplina cognoscitur? Unde ad agendum aut dicendum copia depromi major gravissimorum exemplorum, quasi incorruptorum testimoniorum potest? Frag. Cic. in Hortens.

^a Speaking of *Vespasian's* restoring the capitol which had been demolished in the Vitellian sedition. *Ipse* [*Vespasianus*] *ærearum tabularum tria millia, quæ simul conflagraverant, restituenda suscepit, undique investigatis exemplaribus, instrumentum imperii pulcherimum ac vetustissimum confecit; quo continebantur penè ab exordio urbis senatus consulta, plebiscita de societate, et fœdere, ac privilegio cuicunque concessis.*

6. *Dionysius* speaks of the *memorials*^a, *commentaries* or *tables* of the *censors* preserved in families which had been honoured with the censorship, *pieces* which he consulted, and in which he found, that a poll of the people had been taken two years before the burning of Rome, in the consulship of *Valerius* and *Manlius*.

7. *Censorinus*, in his book *de die natali*, insinuates, that the *memorials* of the *duumvirs* and *decemvirs* were antient monuments that used to be consulted, long after the first ages of Rome.

c. 17.

8. *Livy* frequently cites the *Linen books*; which seem to have been of great use for discovering the succession of the consuls and other magistrates.

Libri Lin-
tej.

9. It appears from the historians, that many *treaties* with foreign states were preserved from the flames which consumed the city.

10. *The laws of the twelve tables* were unquestionably preserved, and these would give a thorough insight into the constitution of the state.

11. In *Livy*, *Macrobius* and *A. Gellius* we have the antient invariable forms that were used by the *Roman heralds*, when employed to demand satisfaction for an injury done to the State; declare war; invite the gods to forsake a city besieged; and, before a battle, load with curses the army of the enemy.

Liv. Lib. 1.
Macr. Lib.
3. c. 9.
Aul. Gell.
L. 16. c. 4.

12. The *Rituals* and *Calendars* were of use to history. The very name of a festival is often a brief relation of the fact which gave occasion to its institution.

^a Διηγουται δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων τε πινυλῶν καὶ τῶν καλουμένων τιμητικῶν ὑπομνημάτων, &c. D. Hal. p. 59. Edit. Oxon.

13. Antient *pillars, statues and inscriptions* ^a immortalized the memory of several great men of the early times, and bore testimony to their exploits.

Therefore, though *Livy* complains of the scarcity of men of letters in the early times [*rare per ea tempora litteræ*] and of the loss of a great part, or the greater part ^b of the pontifical annals, and other historical monuments, both public and private, in the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*, yet there remained good memorials and original pieces sufficient for composing a credible history ^c of the earliest ages of *Rome*.

14. *Tradition* alone was sufficient whereon to found a reasonable and full belief of many facts in the *Roman* story; such, for example, as the shameful defeat of the *Romans* near the *Caudine Forks*; and the seditions and secessions of the *Plebeians* on occasion of the cruelties exercised by the rich towards the poor. [This is a concession made by *M. de Pouilli*.]

15. The fables which are found interspersed in the writings of the *Roman* historians ought not to ruin the credit of the history of the first

^a *Suorum vero clypeos in sacro vel publico, privatim dicare primus instituit (ut reperio) Appius Claudius, qui consul cum Servilio fuit anno urbis 259. posuit enim in Bellonæ æde majores suos; placuitque in excelsis spectari et titulos honorum legi.—Quales clypeos nemo non gaudens, favensque aspexit. Pliny L. 35, c. 3.*

^b *Quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliisque publicis, privatisque erant monumentis incensâ urbe pleraque interiit. L. 6. c. 1.*

^c *Quæ ab conditâ urbe ad captam eandem urbem Romani sub regibus primùm, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus, decemvirisque ac tribunis consularibus gessere foris bella, domi seditiones, quinque libris exposui. L. 6. c. 1.*

ages of Rome, as to the essentials of it; though the historians should seem to have adopted those fables for facts. *Livy*^a warns us not to be over credulous with regard to several old stories of the marvellous kind, and *Cicero* ridicules them.

L. 2. de
Divin. &
L. 1. de
leg.

16. And *Atticus*^b had successfully laboured to rectify the mistakes in some family-memoirs, concerning the succession of the magistrates, and the origins of families, mistakes occasioned by ignorance or vanity; and he could have had no success in such an attempt, had he been destitute of all sure guides to the truth.

If any reader desires to see these, and several other particulars, relating to the same subject, learnedly and ingeniously discussed, I shall refer him to the discourses at large of M. *L'Abbé Sallier* in the *Memoires de Litterature*.

BEFORE I take notice of M. de *Beaufort's* positions, I must frankly confess that I am not well qualified to dispute against his opinion, concerning the Roman History; because I cannot, by his Dissertation, discover with certainty what his opinion is.

^a — Omnis expers cura, quæ scribentis animum, etsi non flectere à vero, sollicitum tamen efficere possit. Quæ ante conditam, condendamve urbem, poeticis magis decora fabulis, quam in corruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur, ea nec affirmare nec refellere in animo est. Liv. in Præf.

Speaking of the Curtian Lake, and how it came to be so called. Cura non deesset, si qua ad verum via inquirentem ferret; nunc fama rerum standum est, ubi certam derogat vetustas fidem. Liv. Lib. 7. c. 6.

^b Laborem nobis Attici nostri levavit labor; sic familiarum originem subtexuit, ut ex eo clarorum virorum propagines possimus cognoscere. Cic. in Orat. et Corp. Nep. in Attic.

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I know not whether, in his judgment, we may reasonably *reject the whole* ^a history of the first 500 years of Rome as groundless and fabulous.

Or should reject only *almost all*.

Or may stop when we have rejected *the greater part*.

Or, rejecting some passages of the history as utterly false, should *call in question, doubt of, suspect all the rest*: [le revoquer en question, en douter, le tenir pour suspect.]

This last, from a great number of passages ^a in his

^a Attendu le peu de soin qu'on a eu de transmettre à la posterité la mémoire des evenemens, dans le tems, qu'ils arrivoient, nous sommes fondés, en voyant une histoire suivie de quatre siècles, de *rejeter LE TOUT*, ou du moins *la plus grande partie comme forgée à plaisir*.

Ce n'est pas que je veuille *revoquer en doute* generalement tous les evenemens de ce siècle [le cinquieme,] pour quelques traits fabuleux dont ils se trouvent accompagnés, ou parce qu'il y en a plusieurs qui sont manifestement faux. Mon intention est seulement de faire voir, que *divers faits* des plus marqués, et des plus importans, *se trouvant faux*, et le fruit de la vaine gloire des Romains, *les autres doivent nous être suspects*. J'en tire encore de nouveaux motifs de douter de *l'Histoire des siècles precedens*, laquelle, à plus forte raison, doit *paraître fabuleuse et forgée après coup*. p. 359.

Ces caracteres de fausseté suffiroient à bien des gens pour leur faire *rejeter cette Histoire*, sans plus d'examen; mais je ne veux pas me prevaloir de cet avantage. Ce n'est que sur l'autorité des écrivains les plus celebres, et les plus accredités que je veux m'appuyer pour *en douter*. Et, afin qu'on ne m'accuse pas d'en douter trop legerement, je me retranche à ne trouver cette histoire *obscur* et incertaine, que parce qu'ils la trouvent telle eux-mêmes. p. 10.

^b De-là je conclus—que nous sommes fondés à *tenir pour fort suspect TOUT* ce qu'on nous raconte des quatre ou cinq premiers siècles de Rome.

his Dissertation, one would imagine to be his real opinion. And yet now and then he seems to slide into *belief*, and even into *certainty*, without being aware of it. He has great faith in what *Polybius* relates of the *Romans* in the early times of the Republic; and admits, as indubitable, several facts, for which the other historians are his only vouchers. Thus, for example,

“ It is *certain* ^b that *Servius* [*Tullius*] augmented the number of the “ Tribes.”

Dissert. p. 299.

“ *Certain* it is, that from this time *Porfenna* “ did not treat the *Romans* as enemies, but as “ old allies or as good subjects.”

p. 329.

And M. de B.'s arguments for disbelieving some facts in the *Roman* story, or doubting of them, are frequently drawn from the *certainty* of others, particularly of the *Treaties*.

See p. 33.

I cannot but take notice, that, with regard to

Dissert. part 2. ch. 10.

La seconde partie sera destinée à l'examen de certain faits des plus marqués, et qui figurent le plus dans l'Histoire Romaine: l'incertitude ou la fausseté desquels, étant bien prouvée, donnera une nouvelle force aux raisons que l'on a de *revoquer en doute* TOUTE cette Histoire,—je me flatte, que ceux qui se dépouilleront de leurs préjugés conviendront qu'il n'y a rien de plus incertain que TOUT ce corps d'Histoire des premiers siècles de Rome. p. 11, 12.

Il faut absolument, qu'on en vienne à dire, que ces traités sont supposés, ce qu'on ne peut faire sans de fortes raisons (et je ne vois pas qu'on ait aucune pour douter de leur authenticité) ou que l'on convienne de bonne foi, que TOUT ce qu'on nous debite dans l'Histoire Romaine n'est qu'incertitude, et qu'on n'y peut compter sur rien. p. 43.

^b Il est sur que *Servius* en augmenta le nombre [des tribus.]

Ce qu'il y a de *sur*, c'est que, dès lors, *Porfenna* n'en usa plus avec les *Romains*, comme avec des ennemis, et qu'au contraire il les traita en anciens alliés, ou en bons sujets.

the

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the story of King *Brennus* the *Gaul*, *M. de B.* seems not to doubt of these facts. 1. That the *Gauls* totally routed the *Roman* army in the field. 2. That they presently after possessed themselves of *Rome*. 3. That they burnt the city. 4. That the old historical records and monuments were most of them consumed in the flames. 5. That the capitol was saved. 6. That several antient monuments, being there deposited, were preserved with it. 7. That the *Gauls* sold a peace to the *Romans*, and departed without loss. Here are then, in the history of this one affair, seven important facts which *M. de B.* seems fully to believe. And what is it he objects to? Why, to *Livy's* relation of *Camillus's* wonderful arrival in the critical moment to save the *Romans* from the disgrace of living on the foot of a ransomed people; and his destroying the whole army of the *Gauls*. But this relation, romantic in the air of it, and discovered by *Polybius's* account to be a mere fiction of *Roman* vanity, can never be thought a good reason for questioning the truth of every thing that *Livy* has related of the earliest ages of *Rome*; and much less for regarding the whole *Roman* History of the first 500 years, as fabulous or uncertain. For when *M. de B.* speaks of the uncertainty of the *Roman* History, I suppose he means, or ought to mean, the uncertainty of the best and least exceptionable accounts of the *Roman* affairs, that can be collected from the several antient writers who have treated the subject.

We shall presently see, that one of *M. de B.'s* reasons for his incredulity is, that the *Roman*
Historians

Historians (the earliest of whom lived in the sixth century from the building of Rome) wanted means to know the truth. Yet he gives credit to Polybius's relation of the wars between the Romans and Gauls, from the time of Brennus, to that of Pyrrhus; and if he thinks it reasonable to believe Polybius on this part of the Roman History, he must allow that there were means of coming at the truth of it, whether Livy, and the prior historians whom he followed, made use of them or not.

BUT whatever be the real opinion of M. de B. concerning the Roman History of the first 500 years, he has advanced (if I mistake him not) the following propositions.

I. "THE ROMANS were an obscure people, confined, during four centuries, to a little corner of Italy; and the continual exercise of arms, and husbandry (the only sciences they professed) hindered them from having the Thought of transmitting the memory of events to posterity."

Differ. p. 6.

II. "AND, if they had thought of perpetuating the memory of what passed among them, they were universally so illiterate, that nobody was capable of writing history, or transmitting the events to posterity by sure and exact memoirs^b." Personne n'étoit capable, &c.

p. 15.

III.

"— l'empêcha de songer à transmettre à la postérité des événements, qui dans le fond, ne sont devenus intéressans, que par le haut degré de gloire, auquel ses descendans se sont élevés par leurs conquêtes.

^b M. de * B. cites a passage from Livy, (B. vii. c. 3.) to prove that even in the end of the 4th century, WRITING was very little in use. "Raræ per ea tempora litteræ, on faisait

* p. 16.

" peu

III. "THE PONTIFICAL ANNALS, or historical
 "part of the pontifical books, and the other monu-
 "ments

"*peu d'usage de l'écriture* dit Tite Live en parlant de la fin du
 "quatrième siècle." M. de B. adds, "Indeed they must
 "have been very little solicitous in those times to preserve the
 "memory of events, since, instead of all other Annals, they
 "were content with driving a nail every year into the wall
 "of the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus; and this was the sole
 "expedient they could have for fixing the chronology, [c'étoit
 "là toute la ressource qu'on pouvoit avoir pour fixer la chro-
 "nologie] as the same historian informs us in the same place."

He proceeds; "Had this been practised from the founda-
 "tion of Rome, it might have been of great use for set-
 "tling the true Æra of the city. But the practice could not
 "commence before the temple was dedicated, which was not
 "till after the expulsion of Tarquin; and it had suffered a
 "long interruption. It was renewed in the end of the
 "fourth century of Rome, not because they found it mentioned
 "in any record or ritual, (for they made so little use of let-
 "ters, that they had neither books nor records) but on account
 "of a tradition almost forgotten, *ex seniorum memoriâ repeti-
 "tum*," [it was recall'd to mind by some old men, &c.]

As great use is made of the passage in Livy, referr'd to by
 M. de B. for proving the extremely illiterate state of the Ro-
 mans, during many years after the commencement of the Re-
 public, I shall here transcribe the passage at length. The
 historian is speaking of the year 392 (or, according to the
 Capitoline Marbles, 390) when Rome was grievously afflicted
 with the plague.

Cn. Genucio, L. Æmilio Mamercino secundum consuli-
 bus, quum piaculorum magis conquisitio animos quam cor-
 pora morbi afficerent, repetitum ex seniorum memoria dici-
 tur, pestilentiam quondam clavo ab dictatore fixo sedatam.
 Ea religione adductus Senatus, dictatorem clavi figendi causa
 dicijussit. Dictus L. Manlius imperiosus, L. Pinarium Ma-
 gistratum Equitum dixit. Lex vetusta est prisca litteris, ver-
 bisque scripta, ut qui Prætor Maximus sit, Idibus Septembri-
 bus clavum pangat. Fixus [most of the manuscripts have fixa *]

* Crevier.

fuit dextro lateri ædis Jovis optimi maximi, ea ex parte qua
 Minervæ

“ *ments public and private, which could have*
“ *given some certainty to history, were ALL*
destroy'd ”

Minervæ templum est. Eum clavum, quia raræ per ea tempora litteræ erant, notam numeri annorum fuisse *ferunt*: eo-que Minervæ Templo dicatam legem, quia Numerus Minervæ inventum sit. Volturnis quoque clavos indices numeri annorum, fixos in templo Nortie Etruscæ Deæ, comparere, diligens talium monumentorum auctor Cincius affirmat. M. Horatius CONSUL, ex LEGE Templum Jovis optimi maximi dedicavit, anno post reges exactos: à CONSULIBUS *postea* ad DICTATORES, quia majus imperium erat, solenne clavi figendi translatum est. Intermissio deinde more, digna etiam per se visa est res, propter quam dictator crearetur. Liv. B. vii. c. 3.

NOW I conceive that M. de B. has, through inattention, made no less than four mistakes in his comment upon this passage.

FOR I. First of all, *Livy* does not speak of THE END OF THE FOURTH CENTURY, when he says, *some report, that the Nail was to mark the number of years, because Letters were rare in THOSE DAYS, per ea tempora*; but of the time, when the Practice of driving a nail in the Wall of the Temple of Jupiter, COMMENCED, in pursuance of a LAW directing that it should be done annually, on THE IDES OF SEPTEMBER, by the Chief Prætor, [i. e. by the Chief Magistrate. The CONSULS were, at first, stiled PRÆTORS.] That this Practice commenced long before the end of the fourth century is evident, from the instance then called to mind by the old men, of a Dictator's doing it, and from the words *intermisso deinde more*. And it seems highly probable from *Livy's* words, that the LAW was made, and the PRACTICE commenced in the first year of the Republic, and that HORATIUS, when he dedicated the Temple, struck the First nail into the wall; and that it was a part of the Ceremony, at the Dedication, and performed in conformity to the Law abovementioned. “ There is an old Law, (says “ *Livy*) written in antique characters, and antique words, “ importing, that the Chief Prætor should, on the Ides of “ September, drive the Nail, clavum pangat. The Nail [or “ the Law] was fixed on the right side of the Temple of Ju-

“ piter

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"*pter*, in that part where the Fane of Minerva is." What follows is all Parenthesis, till he thus goes on: "The CONSUL Marcus Horatius, ACCORDING TO THE LAW, dedicated the Temple of *Jupiter*, the year after the expulsion of the Kings: AFTERWARDS, *the fixing the Nail* was transferred from the CONSULS to the DICTATORS, because these were Magistrates of greater power and dignity" [agreeably to the spirit of the Law, expressed in these words, *Qui Prætor Maximus fit.*] Whoever attends to *Livy's* words must surely see, that, when he says, the CONSUL Horatius dedicated the Temple EX LEGE, he refers to the Law, where it was enjoined, that the Chief Magistrate should drive a Nail annually on the Ides of September; and means to tell us, that this CONSUL drove the first Nail, pursuant to that Law, when he dedicated the Temple; (which DEDICATION was on the Ides of September, as Plutarch informs us.) If *Livy* did not mean to say that HORATIUS drove the Nail, when he dedicated the Temple, what connexion between the former and latter part of this period? The "CONSUL Horatius dedicated the Temple the year after the Regifuge; AFTERWARDS, *the fixing the Nail* was transferred from the CONSULS to the DICTATORS."

II. THERE is not one word in the passage referred to, importing that the Romans had no annals except nails. And the written law itself is a proof, that the nails were not used because nobody could write or because these nails were the only expedient they could have to fix the chronology. And, for the same reason, they, of whom *Livy* says *ferunt*, cannot be supposed to have meant, that the nails were used, because nobody could mark the years by words or figures, but because the generality of people could not read what some could write; as was the case in these countries not many hundred years ago. And the interruption of the practice of driving nails [*intermisso deinde more*] if it proves any thing, proves only, that the common people were become less illiterate, and that the nails were not wanted to instruct them in chronology.

III. It appears from the passage referred to, that, in the end of the fourth Century, the Romans had a monument or record mentioning the custom of driving a nail, &c. They had a written law enjoining it; *lex vetusta est prisca litteris verbisque scripta, ut qui Prætor Maximus fit, Idibus Septembribus*

“ a *destroy'd* by the flames which consumed the
“ city, after the *Gauls* had taken it [in 363.]”

How to reconcile this *third* assertion with the
second, or with the *latter part* of the *first*, seems
somewhat difficult; nor seems it very easy to re-
concile it with the following enumeration of the
antient monuments which M. de B. supposes to
have escaped the flames :

“ SOME LAWS of the KINGS.

P. 13.

“ ALL the LAWS of the *Twelve Tables*, by which

P. 32.

bribus clavum pangat : In conformity to which Law the Act
of *fixing the nail* had been transferred from the Consuls to
the Dictators. And this shews that both the Law and
the Practice were anterior to the Institution of Dictators.

IV. THE *thing said to be remembred by the old men*, was
not the *custom of driving a nail into the wall of the*
Temple, but a particular instance of the *plague's being stoppt*
by a Dictator's driving a nail, &c. *repetitum ex seniorum me-*
moria dicitur pestilentiam quondam clavo ab dictatore fixo se-
datam.

“ C'est de ces *ecrivains*, que j'apprens, que *tous les*
monumens publics, qui auroient pû donner quelque certitude
à l'Histoire, *perirent par le feu*, lorsque les Gaulois eurent
pris Rome. p. 10.

Il est sur que la partie historique des livres des Pon-
tifes, ou leurs *Annales* perirent dans la destruction de Rome
par les Gaulois. Tite Live est si exprès là dessus, qu'il
nous ôte tout sujet d'en douter,—lorsque se plaignant de la
peine qu'il a eue parceque tous les memoires, conservez
dans les Archives, *qui estoient entres les mains des particuliers*,
ou *qui faisoient partie des livres des Pontifes*, avoient été
enveloppés dans la ruine de la ville. *Et quod etiam si quæ in*
commentariis Pontificum, aliisque publicis privatisque erant mo-
numentis, incensâ urbe PLERÆQUE interiere. p. 56.

N. B. In this place, *Pleræque*, with M. de B. imports
Tous; in p. 5. 18. *Presque tout*; in p. 20, 27. *La plus part*;
in p. 19. *Grande partie.*

" might be known the constitution of the antient government.

P. 46, 47.

" SOME of the PONTIFFS BOOKS, which discovered the origin of several religious customs or ceremonies. (Under the name of the Pontiffs books, M. de B. comprehends all the books in general, which treated of the religious ceremonies and traditions of the Romans, as the books of the Augurs and Haruspices, the verses, or hymns of the Salii, the Saturnian verses, and a great number of books of that kind.)

103.

" SOME of the books ^a which contained the musters and polls taken of the Roman citizens, which books might be of use to history.

42.

" A considerable number of the Treaties which Rome had made with the neighbouring states. Il est a presumer qu'ils sauroient un assez bon nombre de ces derniers [les traittés] parce qu'ils estoient gardez dans le temple de Jupiter au capitoie, qui demeura a l'abri de la fureur

^a Quoique les anciens Historiens omettent quelques lustres, et quelque fois les noms des censures, ainsi que le nombre des citoyens, qui s'estoit trouvé dans chaque denombrement, je serois assez porté à croire, sur ce qui nous reste de ces revues generales des citoyens de Rome, que c'estoit un des monumens le mieux conservé, et que les historiens avoient le moins negligé de consulter. Ce que Denis d'Halicarnasse en cite remonte jusqu' au premier cens sous Servius Tullius. On seroit un peu mieux fondé, si on nous alléguoit de pareilles pieces en faveur de l'histoire Romaine. Car, si ce que les historiens nous disent des differens cens, où denombrements, qui se sont fait à Rome, est fondé sur le temoignage de ces monumens, qui se gardoient dans les Archives, on ne peut disconvenir, qu'ils n'aient echapé aux flammes, du moins en partie, et qu'ils n'aient été de quelque usage pour l'histoire. p. 102, 103.

" des

“ des Gaulois. *And treaties of peace are the most authentic materials for history.* Les traittés de paix sont les materiaux les plus authentiques pour l'histoire, et on ne peut former aucun doute raisonnable sur des faits appuiés de pareilles preuves.” P. 33.

IV. “ THERE was, at Rome, no book, no writing prior to Pyrrhus's coming into Italy; no piece that could be of use to history, anterior to the end of the fifth century.” 145.
70.

How to make this agree with the foregoing enumeration of *pieces preserved* from the flames, I do not readily perceive.

V. “ THE LATER historians of Rome did but copy^b the earlier with egard to the times preceding the earlier.” 6, 7.

This

^a J'ai deja prouvé que ces Annales des Pontifes n'existoient point : et je prouverai bientôt, qu'il n'y avoit aucune piece qui pût servir à l'Histoire laquelle faut anterieure à la fin du cinquieme siecle de Rome. p. 70.

^b On reconnoitra facilement que ceux qui ont écrit l'Histoire Romaine n'ont fait que se copier les uns les autres pour ce qui regardoit les tems anterieurs. p. 7.

Fabius Pictor et ceux qui le suivirent de près avoient ignoré, &c. On n'avoit fait depuis que les copier sans autre examen. p. 45.

Ils ont été plus de cinq siecles sans avoir d'Historiens—les premiers qu'ils ont eus ont fort mal réussi destitués comme ils l'étoient de monumens anciens et de memoires sur lesquels ils pussent servir de guides—les Historiens, qui depuis ont entrepris de fournir la même carrière, se sont contentés de s'appuyer de l'autorité de leurs Predecesseurs et de les donner pour garans des faits qu'ils rapportoient—ils se sont peu mis en peine d'examiner à la rigueur la verité des faits. p. 6.

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This seems to be a hasty assertion; since both *Livy* and *Dionysius* speak so frequently of the disagreeing accounts given by the authors they cite, with regard to the times anterior to the first historians. And *Livy*, in his preface, says, that each new writer thinks *either to produce something more certain with regard to facts* than his predecessors have done, or to excel them in language and style. *Novi semper scriptores, aut in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se, aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos credunt.*

p. 11.

VI. "THOSE records or monuments which
 " escaped the flames (when *Rome* was burnt by
 " the *Gauls*) were of little use for composing a
 " history. And the *first* historians did not rest
 " upon such monuments, but *founded themselves*
 " wholly upon *traditions and vulgar stories*, as
 " the most celebrated and most esteemed writers
 " inform us, ^a who nevertheless *took all their ac-*
 " counts from those *first* historians.

" What

N. B. Unless with regard to *absurd fictions*, it is hard to guess by what test the *later* historians, if there were no *antient monuments*, no authentic *memorials*, could examine the truth of the facts related by the *earlier* historians.

^a Je recherche ce qui a pu échapper à cet incendie—je trouve que ce qui en échapa fut de peu d'utilité pour la composition de l'Histoire. Ce sont eux mêmes [*les écrivains les plus célèbres et les plus accrédités*] qui m'apprennent, que ce n'est point sur de pareils monumens, que les premiers Historiens se sont appuyés, et que ceux qui les ont suivis (en avouant, que ceux qui les avoient précédés dans cette carrière, ne s'étoient fondés que sur des traditions, et sur des bruits populaires, que d'ailleurs ils n'avoient apporté ni jugement, ni exactitude, dans la composition de leurs histoires, et dans

“ What we have of the *Roman* history [of the first 500 years] was taken out of *family-memoirs*.
 “ Destitute of all other monuments; it was to
 “ these pieces, that the historians, towards the
 “ middle of the sixth century [i. e. the first his-
 “ torians] were obliged to have recourse, and
 “ from no other sources could they have drawn what
 “ they related of those times which, as *they*^a
 “ *themselves* confess, were cover'd with thick-
 “ darkness, and of which there was no speaking
 “ with any certainty ^b.”

P. 142.
143. &
435.

151.
152.

To explain, and, as much as possible, *reconcile* these two paragraphs, we shall have recourse to another passage in the *Dissertation*.

ce qu'ils disoient des premiers siècles de Rome) *n'ont pas laissé de reconnoître que c'étoit d'eux qu'ils tiroient tout ce qu'ils en rapportoient* [i. e. tout ce qu'ils rapportoient des premiers siècles de Rome.] p. 10, 11. Les historiens, qui ont vécu dans des siècles plus polis, et où l'on n'ignoroit aucune des loix de l'Histoire, n'ayant point eu d'autres sources où puiser que ces mêmes histoires, *qui n'étoient fondées que sur la tradition*, ils n'ont pû donner plus de certitude à ce qu'ils rapportoient des premiers siècles de Rome. p. 204.

^a By *they themselves*, I presume M. de B. means the later historians; for they are the only writers he cites as complaining of darkness.

^b C'est des *Memoires des Familles*, qu'est tiré ce que nous avons de l'Histoire Romaine. p. 142.

Destitués de tous autres monumens, ce fut à ces pieces [*Memoires des Familles*] que les historiens, vers le milieu du sixieme siècle, furent obligez d'avoir recours. p. 435.

Dans quelle source ont-ils puisé ce qu'ils ont dit sur des tems, que selon eux-mêmes couvroient d'épaisses tenebres, et dont on ne pouvoient parler avec aucune certitude? *Ce n'a pû être que dans ces Traditions des Familles* puisqu'il n'y avoit point d'autre monument auquel ils pussent avoir recours. p. 152.

P. 150.

“ *The most antient piece known at Rome in Cicero’s time*”, was the speech of *Appius Claudius, the blind*, pronounced in the senate to dissuade them from accepting the terms of peace proposed by *Pyrrhus* in 474. Indeed there were, beside that, some *funeral orations*;

“ I am not aware that M. de B. has any support for this, but a mistake of his own (through inattention) in interpreting a passage of Cicero’s *Brutus* [c. 16.] *Nec verò habeo quenquam antiquiorem* cujus quidem scripta proferenda putem, nisi *Appii Cæci oratio hæc ipsa de Pyrrho, et nonnullæ mortuorum laudationes, fortè delectant: et Hercule, hæc quidem extant.* Cicero is discoursing, not of authors in general, nor of historians, but of *Orators*, and the last he mentions is *Cato* the Censor: and he adds, that “ he is acquainted with none more antient, whose writings he thinks worth speaking of; unless the oration of *Appius Claudius* concerning *Pyrrhus*, and some funeral orations may happen to please. Of these there are indeed enough.” Had Cicero been speaking of Roman historians, or authors in general, he certainly would not have said, that he knew none more antient than *Cato*, that were worth mentioning; because *Fabius* and *Cincius* and several other historians, much esteemed, were prior to *Cato*. Yet on the authority of this passage M. de B. (p. 145.) writes thus, “ On ne pourra pas douter de la vérité de ce que j’avance, dès que j’aurai fait voir, qu’on n’avoit à Rome aucun livre, aucun écrit, qui fût antérieur à la venue de *Pyrrhus* en Italie, événement, qui ne se place que vers la fin du cinquième siècle de Rome. Pour des HISTORIENS, on fait qu’ils ne parurent que dans le siècle suivant, Cicéron, parlant de ce qu’on avoit de plus ancien de son tems, dit que Caton, qui étoit mort il n’y avoit pas plus d’un siècle, étoit considéré comme un Auteur fort ancien *eum nos per veterem habemus.* Certes ajoute t-il, je n’en connois point de plus ancien dont je puisse vous citer les écrits, à moins que l’on ne trouve du goût à la harangue d’*Appius Claudius* sur *Pyrrhus*, et à quelques oraisons funebres.”

“ but

“ but *tradition* must have supplied the rest : so
 “ that the truth of the history of the first five
 “ centuries had no other support but these two
 “ witnesses, *funeral orations* and *tradition*.”

“ Perhaps to these we may add, some songs
 “ or hymns, composed in honour of the heroes
 “ and illustrious men, — pieces not proper to
 “ instruct us in the truth of facts.”

THE CASE then was this ; there were no *writ-*
ten family-traditions nor any other [historical]
writings, aucun livre, aucun écrit, before the year
 474. Between this time and the year 550 (when
Fabius Piſtor became an historian) *funeral orations*
 were *written*. And from these *written orations*
 and from *oral tradition*, the *first historians* com-
 piled their works.

But then we are aground again, by reason of
 an unlucky passage, cited by M. de B. from
Dionysius, who tells us, that *Fabius* [whom all the
 following historians are said to have copied]
 compiled his history of the first 500 years from
 tradition, from *hear-say*, wholly from *hear-say* ; on
 voit que ce qu'il en disoit n'etoit appuié que sur
 ce qu'il en avoit oui dire : ἐξ ὧν ἤκουσε, D. H. Lib.
 7. p. 475. *Fabius* then did not make use of the
funeral orations, nor of any *written* family-tradi-
 tions, (family-memoirs :) Neither were these, ac-
 cording to M. de B., form'd upon *hear-say*. The
 matter of them was *invented* by the vanity of
 private men. And not only the matter of them
 was invented, but the greater number of the *pieces*

p. 150.

p. 164.

p. 154.

themselves were forgeries; * i. e. they were not contemporary with the authors to whom they were ascribed, but forged after their time. And if *Fabius* took his historical accounts from forged *funeral orations*, these forgeries must have been *almost all* made in his own time, and *all* in the space of 76 years; supposing it true, that there were no *writings* of earlier date than the year 474. And then we shall be at a loss to guess how it was possible to impose these forgeries upon *Fabius* for genuine pieces.

But is it not strange that M. de B., who, by admitting that the public monuments and private memorials of the *Romans* were burnt by the *Gauls*, admits that the *Romans* had both ability and disposition to write *before* that time, should yet suppose, that they had neither the one nor the other, for above 100 years *after* that time?

p. 162.

And there is another difficulty arising from another passage cited by M. de B. from *Dionysius* [Lib. 1. p. 59.] who there says, that the earliest *Roman* historians took all their accounts of the birth of *Romulus* and the building of *Rome*, from *the antique narratives in the SACRED BOOKS*,
ἐν ἱερῶν ἀλτοῖς,

And what makes these difficulties the greater

* L'on peut assurer sans temerité que l'Histoire Romaine, pour la plus grande partie, à été forgée sur ces *Traditions des Familles*, et sur des *oraisons funebres*, qui pour la plupart n'étoient que des *pièces supposées*, que des *faussaires* avoient forgées pour favoriser les prétensions, que quelques familles formoient à une *genealogie illustre*,

is,

is, that M. de B. is of opinion, we ^a ought to give full credit to *Dionysius* in what he says concerning the works and merit of the historians who preceded him.

BUT, not to dwell any longer on the *seeming* repugnancies in the argumentation of our ingenious Critic against the credibility of the history of the five first centuries, let us now consider what *Livy* says concerning his own history of the times anterior to the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*.

“ I have, in five books, set forth what, from
“ the building of the city to its being taken, was
“ done by the *Romans*, first under the Kings, then
“ under the Consuls, Dictators, Decemvirs, and
“ Military Tribunes with consular power; the
“ foreign wars and domestic seditions; matters
“ very obscure, *by reason of their antiquity*, (like
“ objects, that at a great distance, are hardly
“ discerned.) For it is only by *writings*, that the
“ transactions and events of remote times can be

^a Denis d'Halicarnasse, aiant entrepris l'Histoire des cinq premiers siecles de Rome, doit etre consideré comme juge competent de ceux qui l'ont precedé dans la meme carriere. p. 168. L'on ne risque rien en s'en rapportant à ce qu'il en dit. p. 163.

I cannot possibly be of M. de B.'s opinion in this particular. *Dionysius* seems, of all writers, to be the man who deserves the least credit when he speaks of the merit of other writers. For (Lib. 1. p. 5.) he says of *Polybius*, “ that
“ he wrote little concerning the *Romans*, and that the little
“ he did write was without any care or accuracy, and *wholly*
“ *founded upon idle reports*.” Nor could even *Thucydides* please *Dionysius*: but, as to what he says by way of censure on *Thucydides*, Mr. *Hobbes* remarks, “ that there was never
“ written so much absurdity in so few lines.”

“ clearly

“ clearly and faithfully transmitted ; and in those
 “ days there were few *writers* ; and the greater
 “ part of the commentaries of the High Priests,
 “ and of the other records, publick and private,
 “ perished in the burning of *Rome* ^a. Hencefor-
 “ ward, matters more clear and certain will be
 “ related ; the civil affairs and military acts of
 “ the *Romans*, after the rebuilding of their
 “ city ^b.”

Now what is the obvious sense of this passage ?

“ The foregoing part of my history, (says
 “ *Livy*) is full of obscurity and uncertainty ; be-
 “ cause the matters, there treated of, are of too
 “ antient date to have been transmitted with
 “ *faithfulness* and *exactness* by *oral tradition*, and
 “ because the contemporary writers were few,
 “ and the greater part of their writings perished
 “ in the fire that consumed the city. But the
 “ transactions and events after that time, are
 “ things more clear and certain, *clariora & cer-*

^a It seems pretty plain from what *Livy* here says of the destruction of public and private Monuments or Records, that he knew nothing of the *peu d'usage de l'écriture*, for which M. de B. contends.

L.6.Cap.1.

^b Quæ ab condita urbe Roma ad captam eandem urbem Romani sub regibus primum, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus decemvirisque ac tribunis consularibus gessere, foris bella, domi seditiones, quinque libris exposui ; res quum vetustate nimia obscuras, veluti quæ magno ex intervallo loci vix cernuntur : tum quod et raræ per eadem tempora litteræ fuere, una custodia fidelis memoriæ rerum gestarum : et, quod etiam si quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis, incensa urbe pleræque interiire. Clariora deinceps certioraque ab secunda origine, velut ab stirpibus latius, feraciusque renatæ urbis, gesta domi militiæque, exponentur.

“ *tiora* ;”

“ *tiora* :” *How so?* “ Because with respect to these, there are not the same causes of obscurity and uncertainty. The times not being so remote, the *traditions* concerning them are more to be depended on; contemporary writers were less rare; and there has not been a like destruction of their writings.”

This is surely the plain meaning of his words, and it ought to be observed to his credit, that his history of the earliest times, is proportioned, for length, to the scarcity of materials he complains of; for notwithstanding his *circumstantial*, and, perhaps in his own opinion, fabulous account of the rape of the *Sabine* women, with the consequences of it; and notwithstanding the frequent display of his skill in adorning a story, as in his description of the combat between the *Horatii* and *Curiatii*, and in several other instances, his whole history of the seven kings, who are supposed to have reigned 244 years, hardly fills seventy pages in *Le Clerc's* small edition; and, of these, twenty are taken up with the reigns of *Servius Tullius*, and his successor *Tarquin the Proud*. Now, the institutions of *Servius*, which were his most important acts, and were the plan, whereon, after the expulsion of *Tarquin*, the new government was established and maintained, cannot easily be called in question; nor, I believe, will any body question the truth of the most material things, related of *Tarquin's* tyranny, which gave occasion to the revolt from him, and the abolition of kingly government. The obscurity and uncertainty therefore, of which *Livy* speaks, must chiefly

chiefly regard the circumstances with which some facts are accompanied in his relations, and not the principal facts and events contained in the history of the early times.

p. 6.

Certainly M. de B. had not duly attended to the accounts given by the antients, of the regal state of *Rome*, when he ventured to say, "It is surprising to find a continued history of five centuries, in which there is scarce any void, any year, that is not distinguished by some considerable event." For very few of the 244 years of the kings are distinguished by any event whatsoever.

It may be further remarked, that *Livy's* history of the 119 years, from the expulsion of *Tarquin* to the burning of *Rome* by the *Gauls*, is above four times as long as his history of the 244 years of the kings; and his history of those 119 years is no longer than his history of the 95 years that follow the rebuilding of *Rome*, and reach to the year 460, with which his tenth book ends. And the next ten books (which are lost) contained but the history of 73 years. Now the reason of these differences in the length of his accounts of the different periods is very obvious, and is contained in the passage above cited.

I proceed now to say something of the value of those materials, which the first *Roman* historians may reasonably be supposed to have had for composing their histories. Without entering into any discussion of the antiquity or contents of the *linnen books*, the *books of the magistrates*, the *tables* and *memorials* of the *censors*, the *books of the*
Decemvirs

Decemvirs and Duumvirs, or the inscriptions on pillars, statues or shields, (from all which, it cannot be questioned but many things, useful to history, might be drawn) I shall confine myself to speak of the other sources of historical matter, that were open to the first historians.

I. THE ANNALS or Commentaries of the High Priests, called the *Great Annals*.

That it was the constant custom from the earliest times, for the High Priests to record in writing the events of each year, and that *antient Annals*, composed by the *High Priests*^a, existed, either entire or in part in *Cicero's* time, is unquestionable from his express testimony.

And from the complaint which *Livy* makes of the loss of the *greater part* of the Pontifical Annals, anterior to the burning of *Rome* [*incensa urbe Pleræque^b interiøre*] it is evident that some *pieces* of those ANNALS were preserved from that fire. His words import this: and his chief ground for saying that the *greater part* perished, was doubtless the preservation of the *smaller*.

L. 6. c. 1.

Rome was burnt by the *Gauls* about the year 363, i. e. about 119 years after the commencement of the republic. The *Romans*, we are told, were very industrious in collecting what monu-

^a — *Ab initio rerum*—*Res omnes singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus*—*ii qui etiam nunc Annales maximi vocantur*, *De orat. Lib. 2. c. 12.* *Servius ad Virg. Æneid. Lib. 1. v. 377.* and *Kopiscus in Tacito cap. 1.* speak to the same effect, as *M. de B.* observes.

^b *M. L'Abbé Sallier* considers *Livy's Pleræque* as a word of exaggeration, to magnify his own labour in compiling a general history of his country.

On the Credibility of the HISTORY

Short
Chron.
P. 7.

ments or records had escaped the fire: and it is natural to suppose that endeavours were used to supply by *memory* (as far as memory could supply) the defects of what remained of the Pontifical Annals. "Before the use of *letters* (says Sir *Isaac Newton*) the names and actions of men could scarce be remembered above 80 or 100 years after their deaths: and therefore I admit of no chronology of things done in *Europe* above 80 years before *Cadmus* brought letters into *Europe*." It seems here to be admitted by this great man, that the names and actions of men, and even the chronology of things done 80 years back, might be preserved by *memory*, and without written records. The defects of the *Great Annals* might therefore, with certainty enough, be supplied, by the help of *memory alone*, as to the principal events during the far greater part of the time, between the beginning of the Republic and the burning of *Rome*. And with regard not only to that time but to the earlier times, it is to be supposed, that those persons, who had read the Annals before they were in part destroyed, remembered nothing of what they had read?

These Annals, thus repaired, would doubtless be very brief and very imperfect, but not useless to history. The great events and the order of them would there be found. And as to the Annals, written after the burning of *Rome* (for the practice was continued) we read of no destruction happening to these either in whole or in part. It must be granted however, that even these,

4

through

through some accident or neglect, were not entire and perfect in the days of *Livy* or of the prior historians. If there had been no chasms, no interruptions in them, how could the historians have been so much at a loss, as we find they sometimes were, concerning the succession of the magistrates?

But granting the Pontifical Annals, mentioned by *Cicero*, to have been very imperfect, and even supposing, that his words, *ab initio rerum*, regard the time when the practice of writing Annals began, and not the *Epoch* whence the relations, contained in those which he had read, commenced; yet (as I said before) certain it is from his testimony, that *antient Records*, called *the Annals of the High Priests*, or *the Great Annals*, did exist in his time: and therefore the silence of *Livy* and *Dionysius*, if they are silent, (as *M. de B.* imagines) concerning these Annals, will not prove what *M. de B.* would infer from it, the non-existence of them in their time. If they did not *then* exist, they must have been lost in the few years between the time when *Cicero* wrote, and the time when *Livy* and *Dionysius* composed their histories; and of this there is no where any hint. *Livy* would doubtless have complained of such a loss, had it really happened, since he complains of the earlier loss suffered by the burning of *Rome*. And for these several considerations it is reasonable to believe, that the *old Annals*, of which *Livy* frequently speaks, and the *ἱερὰ Δίλτοι*, mentioned by *Dionysius* as historical monuments, were *the Great Annals* described by *Cicero*:

Cicero: And I think it may be reasonably asked, How could *Cicero* well know (and he speaks with confidence) that the custom of writing Annals commenced *ab initio rerum*, but from the actual existence, in his time, of fragments of Annals, written in the earliest times; or from their being cited by the first historians as existing in their time?

In Numa.
Dissert. p.
20.

TO PROVE the non-existence of any Annals, or parts of Annals, written before the burning of *Rome*, M. de B. makes great use of the authority of one *CLODIUS* cited by *Plutarch*, and represents this *Clodius* as speaking thus: "ALL the
" ANTIEN T MONUMENTS were burnt when the
" Gauls sacked Rome, and those which the Ro-
" mans now have are forgeries."

* De For-
tuna Ro-
manorum.
p. 21.

M. de B. goes on: "And *Plutarch* himself, or
" whoever was the author of the treatise OF THE
" FORTUNE OF THE ROMANS * after speaking of
" some marvellous events of those early times,
—adds, To what purpose should we dwell upon times
" which have nothing clear, nothing certain, since,
" as *Livy* assures us, the Roman History was cor-
" rupted, and its monuments destroyed?"

Then immediately, (taking for granted, that *Plutarch* was the author of that treatise) he adds,
" What *Plutarch* says, upon the testimonies of
" *Clodius* and *Livy*, of the destruction of those
monuments, gets an additional force in the mouth
" of so grave an author as he. For since he
" does not contradict them, he supports what
they say by his suffrage. The testimony of these
" authors is very express, &c."

Again,

Again, "*Livy, Clodius and Plutarch depose*
 " that the *monuments*, by which the truth of
 " the *Roman History* might have been ascer-
 " tained, and which alone could give it the re-
 " quisite certainty, were destroyed in the sack-
 " ing of *Rome*."

p. 26.

And again, " It is *certain*, that the *historical*
 " part of the books of the Pontiffs or their AN-
 " NALS, if ^a *they ever existed*, perished in the def-
 " truction of *Rome* by the *Gauls*. *Livy* is so
 " express upon this, that he leaves us no room
 " to doubt of it."—For he says, *that ALL the*
 " *memorials (kept in the Archives) that were in*
 " *private hands, or that made part of the books of*
 " *the Pontiffs, were involved in the ruin of the city.*"
 " But where does *Livy* say this? Why, [in B. 6.

p. 56.]

^a *If they ever existed.* Had *Livy* used these words in this place, he would have spoken like a certain gentleman, who, in giving a bad character of a person deceased, after many severe accusations, went on thus, *And he was a very cruel father to most of his children—if he had any.*

That *Livy* did not intend to express a doubt whether any Pontifical Annals existed before the burning of *Rome*, is pretty evident from a passage (in his 4th book, c. 3.) cited by M. de B.

The historian is writing of the year 310, and he puts these words into the mouth of a Tribune, " If we are not ad-
 " mitted to the *Fasti*, nor to the COMMENTARIES of the
 " *High Priests*, are we therefore ignorant of those things
 " which are known even by all strangers? *That the Consuls*
 " *succeeded in the place of the kings, and have no rights or pre-*
 " *rogatives which the kings had not before?*" Si non ad
 Fastos, non ad COMMENTARIOS PONTIFICUM admittimur:
 ne ea quidem scimus, quæ omnes peregrini etiam sciunt:
 Consules in locum Regum successisse: nec aut juris, aut ma-
 jestatis quicquam habere, quod non in Regibus ante fuerit?

c. 1.] where he tells us, that *a great part* or *the greater* part of what was contained in the High Priests commentaries, and in other public and private monuments, perished in the burning of Rome: *Et quod etiam si quæ in commentariis Pontificum, aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis incensâ urbe pleræque interiire.*

NOW as to CLODIUS, *Plutarch* writes thus: " Though the *pedigrees* of *Numa's* family from
" its beginning to this day, be set forth in very
" nice order, there is much dispute concerning
" the time when he lived. One *Clodius*, in a work
" entitled *ἡλεγχος χρόνων*, asserts that the antient
" writings of that sort [*τὰς ἀρχαίας ΕΚΕΙΝΑΣ*
" *ἀναγγραφὰς*] were lost, when the *Gauls* destroyed
" Rome, and that those which now appear were
" framed by flatterers to please the vanity of
" some private families, who would needs be
" thought descended from the most illustrious
" origins, to which they had in truth no relation." We see, that *Clodius* speaks only of genealogical tables, and not of any other historical monuments. Had he asserted, that ALL the antient monuments or records were lost, he would have asserted what was not true, by the confession of *M. de B.*, who allows, that many treaties of peace, the laws of the twelve tables, and several other pieces of antiquity, escaped the flames.

M. L'Abbé Sallier thinks, that *Plutarch* was not the author of the treatise *de Fortuna Romanorum*; and indeed, if he were, he must, how grave soever, have been a very idle man, and condemned by himself in the above-cited passage
from

from that treatise, to spend his time in writing the lives of *Romulus*, *Numa*, *Poplicola* and *Camillus*, without any materials, but what he believed to be forgeries and romance.

But can it be imagined, that either *he* or *Livy* or *Dionysius* believed nothing of what they have written of the first ages of *Rome*, or that they looked upon *all* as *uncertain*? Though *Livy*, in some instances doubts, yet he often says, *it is evident, it is certain*, constat, certum est; and, in his preface, he warns us, with regard to what he is going to write, to distinguish between the stories adorned with fiction, and the traditions supported by authentic monuments.

And it was very singular, and not a little marvellous, if, when *Rome* was burnt by the *Gauls*, the fire did so piously distinguish between sacred writings and prophane. It spared that part of the Pontiffs Books which regarded public worship, and likewise the treaties of peace, and the laws of the twelve-tables, treaties and laws being *religiones**, religious matters, deemed so on account of the religious ceremonies performed at their making; but it destroyed *entirely* the *historical part* of the Pontifical Books, their *Annals*: it spared no writing that was wholly prophane, nothing historical, if not somehow under the protection of religion.

*Livy, L. 6.
c. 1.

II. THE First *Roman* Historians had, among the materials for their works, not only some parts of the High Priests Annals, written before the burning of *Rome*, but some parts of OTHER *public historical*

rical monuments or memorials, preserved from that fire. *Quæ in Commentariis Pontificum ALIIS quæ publicis monumentis erant* PLERÆQUE *interiere*: the greater part, not all, perished.

What those OTHER *public monuments* were, I will not pretend to say. Perhaps they were the *linen books*, the *books of the magistrates*, the *memorials* or *tables* of the *Censors*, and some other ancient pieces referred to by the historians.

p. 98.

M. de B. observes, that *Livy*, who cites the *linen books* pretty often, from *Licinius Macer*, during the space of about ten years, does not cite them for any thing after that time, or before it. Now supposing this to be a proof that the *linen books*, which *Licinius* had consulted, contained nothing but what related to those ten years; yet, as those years were prior to the burning of *Rome*, we may reasonably believe, that the books in question were part of an old public record, a fragment preserved from that fire. And we may reasonably think the same of those parts of the *books of the magistrates*, and of the *Censors books*, which are cited in attestation of matters anterior to the destruction of *Rome* by the *Gauls*. The very imperfection of these pieces carries with it some proof of their antiquity, and of the mischief they had suffered.

III. ORIGINAL Records of many treaties which the *Romans* had made with the neighbouring nations, before the burning of the city. And these must have been of excellent use to the first historians, both for facts and dates in their accounts of the early times. And as to the treaties, after

the rebuilding of *Rome*, there is no question of their preservation.

IV. THE ACTS of the *Senate* and of the *Comitia*, and the LAWS of the *Twelve Tables*, which fully laying open the constitution of the state, the customs and manners of the *Romans*, the rights of the people, and the powers of the magistrates, were a sure guide to the historians in many particulars of their accounts.

V. WHATEVER could be ascertained by antient annals or records, preserved in the other cities of *Italy*, that were fallen under the power of the *Romans*, when *Fabius* and his successors undertook to write history. Why should we suppose, that these were totally neglected by the first historians? That the neighbouring nations had books and records is evident from *Liv.* L. 10. c. 38, where we find, that, in the year 459 of *Rome*, the *Samnites* had a recourse to their *linen books* for direction in forming that legion which they called *legio linteata*.

That treaty with *Porfenna*, (mentioned by *Pliny*) of which M. de B. takes advantage to discredit the *Roman History*, was doubtless found at *Clusium*, or some other city of *Hetruria*, not at *Rome*.

a M. L'Abbé Sallier, in his first discourse, makes this observation; and he adds, Les nations Voisines pouvoient donc offrir des monumens aux recherches des historiens. On pourroit rapporter bien d'autre, preuves, que les peuples Voisins des Romains n'étoient pas sans monumens & sans histoires. Varron, cité par Censorin et Festus, en plusieurs endroits, fourniroit de bons temoignage pour ce que je dis icy.

Livy, in citing the prior historians, does not always tell us from whence they took their matter, yet often enough to make us know, that they cited authorities for what they delivered. And it is evident, that they had recourse to the archives of the conquered cities. From the passage in *Livy*, (L. 7. c. 3.) before referred to, we learn that *Cincius* having examined into the antiquities of *Volfinii*, a town in *Hetruria*, had found it to have been formerly a custom there to mark the number of the years by nails fixed in a temple dedicated to *Nortia*, an *Hetruscan* Goddess; and that *Cincius* was a diligent enquirer into such antiquities, *diligens talium monumentorum auctor Cincius*.

VI. FAMILY-MEMORIALS, and FUNERAL-ORATIONS.

p. 104. &
seq.

M. de B. cites ^b the authorities of *Cicero* and *Pliny* to prove, that it was the general custom at *Rome* for each noble family to preserve *memorials* recording the services which the members of it had done the state in the discharge of those offices, with which they had been intrusted. “ If these *memorials*, says M. de B., had been faithfully written, they would have been of infinite use to history. Should we admit that all the other monuments were lost, we must likewise admit, that the loss might have been supplied by these *memorials*. They were so many histories of the lives of particular men, and contained the principal affairs of the state, in the

^b Cic. in Brut. c. 16. *Plin.* L. 35. c. 2.

“conduct of which those men had had a share.
 “But unhappily, in the composition of these
 “histories, much less regard was had to truth
 “than to heightening the lustre of families.
 “There were so many falsifications, the truth
 “of facts was so frequently corrupted in these
 memorials, that *no use could be made of them with-*
 “*out great precaution.*”

To PROVE the unfaithfulness of the *Family-* p.107,108.
memorials, M. de B. insists chiefly on a passage in
Cicero, and another in *Livy*, charging some *Fune-*
ral-orations with containing false facts invented
 to gratify the vanity of private families. From
 which it would seem that he considers the *Family-*
memorials as consisting *wholly* of *Funeral-orations*.
 Yet, as he ranges certain *records of the Censors*,
 (called by *Dionysius* *τιμηλικὰ ὑπομνήματα*) among p.105,100.
 the *Family-memorials*, and is inclined to think that
 the *linen books* ought to be placed there too, he
 manifestly admits, that *funeral-orations* were not
 the *whole* of the *Family-memorials*.

NOW if the practice of writing *Family-me-*
morials began early, and these pieces were pre-
 served, and transmitted from generation to gene-
 ration, they must have been of excellent use to
 the first *Roman* historians: For how much soever
 those pieces might abound in panegyrical exag-
 geration, and false colourings, they would furnish
 good evidence of the truth of those *facts*, in
 which they agreed, and with which the several
 writers of those pieces were contemporary.

On the Credibility of the History

But as it does not appear, at what time the custom of writing *Family-memorials* began, I shall here leave this matter, and consider what is said of *Funeral-orations*.

DIONYSIUS, speaking of the *Funeral-oration* which *Poplicola* pronounced on his deceased colleague *Brutus*, tells us, it is uncertain whether *Poplicola* introduced this custom among the *Romans*, or found it already established by the kings. Be that as it will, there is no doubt of it's being the constant practice from the beginning of the Republic, to honour the memory of great men by *Funeral-panegyrics*. And, as these were premeditated speeches, and as the glory of the orator was no less concerned in the composition, than the glory of the deceased, it is highly reasonable to believe that the orator wrote down what he purposed to say, and by revising and correcting his speech, put it into the best form he could, before he delivered it. I say, it is natural to suppose, that this method was for the most part, if not universally, observed by the speakers of *Funeral-orations*. Nor can any thing be more probable, than that the families, concerned in these orations, would be very desirous to preserve them.

And indeed there seems to be sufficient ground to conjecture, that from these *Funeral Orations* were taken, into the History of the earliest times of the Republic, many particulars, not to be learnt from Tradition, or the High Priests Annals, or any other public Memorials. But then, for an authentic account of what passed among the

the *Romans*, I would ask, What better materials could an Historian have to work upon, than a series of such Orations? For though in a Funeral Panegyric, the Orator may well enough be supposed to over-rate the private virtues of the deceased, disguise or refine the motives of his actions, ascribe to his remote ancestors exploits which they had not performed, nay give him noble ancestors from whom he was not really descended; yet, as to the high offices which the person himself had filled, and the public acts he had done in those offices, whether civil or military, we can hardly imagine the Orator would attempt to impose upon an audience, who, having been eye-witnesses of the truth, were not capable of being deceived: For the sphere of action, in which the *Romans* moved during more than 200 years after the erection of the Commonwealth, was so very narrow, that nothing considerable, of a public concern, could pass either in peace or in war, but what must be known to almost every individual of the State. The *Roman* citizens were all foldiers, all went to the war in their turns, and they could not, therefore, be imposed upon with regard to the success of the enterprizes formed by their Generals: And the same soldier-citizens were parties in all the civil commotions and struggles, and had a share in establishing those useful laws and regulations, which their magistrates had the merit of contriving and proposing. So that a series of *Funeral Orations* on the great men of *Rome* would contain most authentic Memorials of all the principal transactions and events

events both at home and abroad. It was the business of the Historian, who employed these materials for his work, to separate the *solid* from the *light* and *unsure*; and certainly no task could be more easy.

It does not seem probable, that, during the *Regal State*, Funeral Panegyrics were in use, unless we may suppose that this honour was done to the Kings upon their demise, who, while *Rome* was governed by Kings, had the glory of all victories in war, and all prudent institutions in peace. But certain it is, that the practice prevailed from the very commencement of the Republic. And though much the greater number of these Funeral Orations were unquestionably lost, when *Fabius*, about 300 years after the expulsion of *Tarquin*, undertook a general History of *Rome*, yet, that many of them were preserved, and especially of those posterior to the rebuilding of the City, there seems no reason to doubt. What could *Livy* mean by the *Privata Monumenta*, of which, he says, the greater part was destroyed by the *Gauls*, but these Funeral Orations and other Family Memorials? For he speaks of them as Pieces that would have been useful towards a general and clear History of those times. And indeed we cannot imagine, that private families, in the earliest times of the Republic, were chargeable with that vanity, which ^a *Cicero* and *Livy* complain of, as the source
of

^a Nec verò habeo quemquam antiquiorem [Catone Censore] cujus quidem scripta proferenda putem, nisi quem Appii Cæci Oratio hæc ipsa de Pyrrho, et nonnullæ Mor-

of many inventions in Funeral Panegyrics of the later ages. Till some families could with *Truth* boast of their antiquity, and the long glories of a line of ancestors from whom they were descended, there was no temptation, no opportunity for vain men *falsely* to claim that kind of nobility, and invent pedigrees to do themselves honour. And should we suppose, that at the renovation of the State, upon the departure of the *Gauls*, (*i. e.* about 119 years after the birth of the Commonwealth) the loss of many monuments public and private, might give both temptation and opportunity for fiction in some degree, yet this could reach to nothing very considerable; and it is hardly credible that the Orator at a Funeral would, to raise the glory of the deceased and his family, hazard invented facts, which derogated from the glory of other families, and could be contradicted by the memory of persons living. And when in later times (the brevity and imperfection of the Pontifical Annals and the other public monuments, and the loss of many private ones, through the

tuorum Laudationes fortè delectant: et Hercules, hæ quidem extant. Ipse enim familiæ suæ quasi ornamenta, et monumenta servabant, et ad usum, si quis ejusdem generis occidisset, et ad memoriam laudum domesticarum, et ad illustrandam nobilitatem suam. Quamquam his laudationibus Historia rerum nostrarum est facta mendosior. Multa enim scripta sunt in eis, quæ facta non sunt, falsi triumphi, plures Consulatus, genera etiam falsa, et ad Plebem Transitiones, cum homines humiliores in alienum ejusdem nominis infunderentur genus: ut si ego me à M. Tullio esse dicerem, qui patricius cum Servio Sulpicio Consule, anno decimo post Reges exactos fuit. Cic. in Brut. c. 16.

extinction

extinction or decay of families, giving large scope to inventive vanity) Consulships and Triumphs were falsely ascribed, in Funeral Orations, to the remote ancestors of those whose obsequies were then solemnized; still the accounts, given in those Orations, of what they themselves had performed in the high offices they had filled, would be materials which an Historian might confidently and safely employ.

Livy's complaint sufficiently proves, that he thought the first Historians had made use of Funeral Orations in compiling their Histories, and that some of those writers had very injudiciously adopted what they found delivered in such Orations, concerning the remote ancestors of the persons, in whose honour they were spoken. But neither he nor Cicero charges those Orations, with containing false accounts of facts contemporary with the Orators, nor do they speak of those pieces as *forgeries*. I am not aware of any the least ground M. de B. has for thinking, that the Funeral Orations of which *Livy* and *Cicero* complain, were *pieces supposées que des faussaires avoient forgées*.

It is in writing of the year 432 of the City (*i. e.* the 188th of the Republic) that *Livy* is at a loss to know, whether the Dictator *Cornelius*, or the Consuls of the year, conducted the war against the *Samnites*, and had a Triumph for the success. The Authors, he consulted, differed on this point, all agreeing however in *Cornelius* being then Dictator: they had therefore some unquestionable authority for this particular. Their differences,

differences, in relation to the persons who obtained the Victory and Triumph, he imputes to the differing accounts in Funeral Orations and Inscriptions on Images, made long after the time, and by which he supposes the disagreeing Historians to have been respectively guided. "It is my opinion, says he, that the truth of history has been corrupted by Funeral Orations, and lying Inscriptions on Images, each family, by plausible fictions, assuming to itself the honour of great exploits. Hence, (that is, from this arrogant vanity) it has doubtless happened, that the actions of particular men are confounded (those of one man ascribed to another) and the *Public monuments* are likewise in confusion (disagree, contradict one another.) Nor is there any contemporary writer (contemporary with the Dictator and Consuls of the year 432) extant, by whose authority the truth of the matter in question can be sufficiently ascertained."

What *Livy* means by *Public Monuments* in this place, I will not pretend to say; probably they were the Inscriptions on Statues, erected in the later times, in temples and other public places, which Inscriptions, contradicting one another, had occasioned a disagreement among the Historians, who employed them in their own compositions. That he does not speak of the *High Priests Annals*, as confounded or made inconsistent, is evident from *Cicero's* account of those Pieces. The High Priest's business was not to record the transactions that passed two or three hundred

hundred years before, but the transactions of the present, or immediately preceding year. No Funeral Orations nor Inscriptions on Images, made in after times, could confound those Annals. Contradict them they might, but not make them inconsistent with themselves.

The same may be said of any other monuments, contemporary with the facts recorded in them; no posterior Orations nor Inscriptions could throw them into confusion.

It must indeed be admitted, upon the Credit of *Livy's* words, that, in his time, no authentic record of any sort, contemporary with the Magistrates he is writing of, was extant, *by which the particular point in question could be cleared up*: For otherwise the differences among the prior Historians would not have perplexed him. But he does not say, that *Rome* had no writers so early as the year 432, or that no writing of so early date was extant in his time. His words rather import the contrary, That there were Writers in those days, and that some of their writings were extant, but none whereby the matter in doubt could with sufficient certainty be determined. Nec quisquam æqualis temporibus illis scriptor exstat, quo satis certo auctore stetur.

DEMONSTRATION, or satisfactory proof is not aimed at, by any thing or by all that is said above,

^a Vitiatam memoriam funebribus laudibus reor, falsisque imaginum titulis, dum familia ad se quæque famam rerum gestarum, honorumque fallente mendacio trahunt. Inde certè et singulorum gesta, et publica monimenta rerum confusa. Nec quisquam æqualis temporibus illis scriptor exstat, quo satis certo auctore stetur. Lib. 8. c. 40.

in

in favour of the Roman History of the five first centuries; but only probability. The sum is this. It seems from many passages in *Cicero*, *Livy*, and other antient writers, that the first Roman Historians had a great variety of antient and genuine pieces for the foundation of their Histories; *The High Priests Annals*; *The Acts of the Senate*, and of the *Comitia*; *Records of the succession of the Magistrates*; *The Censors Books*; *Treaties of Peace and Alliance*; *Family Memorials and Funeral Orations*.

Of no one sort of these pieces was there an uninterrupted series, but only parts and fragments. The whole stock of materials was insufficient for a continued thread of History; and accordingly, the History is broken and imperfect; there are many chasms in it; some things are delivered as uncertain, some as fabulous; and many things in it are fabulous or uncertain, which are not delivered as such. *Fabius Pictor* and his nearest followers adopted traditional stories which pleased the national vanity, and of which those Historians had no desire to destroy the belief, even when they could have done it by the means of authentic Monuments; and in many instances they were destitute of those means. The *Circumstantial* Accounts of the exploits of particular men, I conjecture to have been taken from Family Memorials and Funeral Orations; because I cannot conceive from what other source the Historians could have them. For the *Great Annals*, according to the description of them by *Cicero*, must have been too brief, to descend of-
ten

ten to *Circumstances of Actions*; and *Tradition* (as M. de Pouilly observes) never informs us of *Circumstances* any more than of *Dates*. When fiction or uncertainty is apparent in the accounts given us of the heroic deeds of this or that great man, I apprehend, that those accounts were taken from Family Memorials and Funeral Orations, of *low date*, when, the power of the *Romans* growing considerable, and their vanity keeping pace with it, Genealogies became a matter of great moment to private Families.

BUT as to the most memorable of the *National Affairs*, the civil contests and the important changes produced by those contests in the constitution of the government, the foreign wars in which the *Romans* engaged, and the final success of their struggles with each of the neighbouring states, the truth of these events might be assured by Tradition alone; and the very dates of most of them would be ascertained by the LAWS and the TREATIES, that were carefully preserved; the laws consequent to the commotions and the treaties consequent to the wars. And we may well presume that the memory of much more than these principal events was transmitted by the High Priests Annals and the other public Monuments, contemporary with the facts they recorded. Family Memorials and Funeral Orations, composed in the earliest times of the Republic, would be excellent materials for an Historian; and even those of later date, where truth was mingled with fiction, would be good authority with regard not only to contemporary facts, but to facts much earlier than those

Pieces, if many of those Pieces agreed in the same accounts.

M. de B. begins the second part of his Dissertation with these words. " I have given the reasons which make me call in question the History of the first five centuries of Rome. They are founded on the want of contemporary Monuments and Historians. So that the first Historians which Rome produced, could have nothing whereon to ground their relations but Tradition, which is apt to corrupt very much the truth of facts ^a."

Now, granting that *the very short account* of the 244 years of the Kings, contained in *Livy's first Book*, was chiefly taken from Tradition, yet surely it is quite incredible, that such a variety of matter, so many particulars (with that degree of order which they have) as fill the *nine* preserved Books of *Livy* that follow the *first*, and filled *seven*^b Books more that are lost, could all be collected from Tradition alone. Tradition is not so copious and methodical. The earlier Historians, therefore, from whom *Livy* drew the matter of his History of Rome, from the Expulsion of *Tarquin* to the end of the 5th Century, must have had written Records and Memorials of some sort to work upon; and from these they

^a J'ai rapporté les raisons qui me font revoquer en doute l'Histoire des cinq premiers Siecles de Rome. Elles sont fondées sur la disette de Monumens, et d'Historiens contemporains; de sorte que les premiers Historiens ne purent fonder leurs relations, que sur la Tradition, sujette à alterer beaucoup la verité des faits. p. 205.

^b *Livy's* 17th Book ended with the year 495.

On the Credibility of the HISTORY

must have taken *the greater part* of what they related; unless we will suppose that their Histories were romances of their own invention, which is not very probable; there being no indication whatsoever of those writers being great wits. It is probable, that, after *Fabius Pistor* and some others had composed General Histories of their Country, most of the private Memorials, which had served them, in many particulars, for guides and vouchers, were neglected and lost; as was the fate of *Fabius*, and all the Historians prior to *Livy*, after he had published a better written and more entertaining History, comprehending the substance of all that they had collected.

M. de B., in the second part of his Dissertation, produces from the *Roman* story, several facts, which he calls *Principal Events*, and which, from the disagreement among the Antients, in their accounts of them, he considers as wholly uncertain; and from the uncertainty of these *Principal Events* he infers the uncertainty of all the rest. I shall not enter into a particular consideration of the facts referred to; Because, first of all, some of them are spoken of by the Antients as uncertain; and nobody pretends to certainty where they disclaim it. In the next place, because I conceive that very few of the facts mentioned have a title to be called *Principal Events*; and lastly because, if disagreement in some things, among Historians who write of the same People and times, be a sufficient ground for refusing credit to every thing they relate, there is no History which may not with good reason

reason be utterly rejected; and I am not concerned in the defence of History in general.

BUT, in the first part of the Dissertation, there is one particular, which being strenuously insisted upon by the ingenious author, and seeming very much to his purpose of discrediting the accounts, given us by *Livy* and *Dionysius*, of the early times of the Republic, ought not to be passed over unconsidered: I mean THE TREATY which *Polybius* says, was concluded between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* in the first year after the expulsion of *Tarquin*; *Lucius Junius Brutus*, and *Marcus Horatius* being *Consuls*. The Reader may find this piece in the 7th Chap. of B. 3. of this History. If the treaty be genuine, and there be no mistake in the date which *Polybius* assigns to it, it stands in opposition to many things related by the two other Historians.

I. IT APPEARS by this treaty (says M. de B.) "That *Brutus* and *Horatius* were colleagues in the consulship; which, according to *Livy* and *Dionysius*, and all the *Roman Fasti*, they were not:" and he adds, "that every thing the historians tell us of the events of this year, being partly founded on the names of the Consuls, nothing of the whole is, in his opinion, much worthy of credit*."

Dissert. p.
35.

He observes, "that Mr. *Dodwell*, (*de cyclis Rom. Diff. x. p. 104.*) and *Rycquius* (*de capitol. Rom. c. 11.*) chuse rather to accuse *Polybius*

* Je crois qu'il faut avouer de bonne foi, que tout ce que les Historiens nous disent des evenemens de cette année, etant en partie fondé sur les noms de consuls, est peu digne de creance.

† Differt.
vii. N. 8.

“ of falsifying this treaty, than admit the uncertainty which it throws upon antient history ;
 “ and that *Perizonius* † has endeavoured to reconcile *Polybius* with the *Roman Fasti*, by conjecturing, That *Polybius* found only the name of *Horatius* in the original of the treaty, and added, of his own head, the name of *Brutus*, the better to denote the true date of this piece ; and, as the name of *Horatius* alone had been put on the temple of the capitol, so that name alone had been put to this treaty.
 “ This conjecture [says M. de B.] I would let pass, if it removed the other difficulties raised by the piece in question, and reconciled it with the accounts given by the other Historians : yet I think *Polybius* too well versed in the Roman History, to have given *Horatius* a colleague, who never was his colleague ; and too exact and scrupulous to have added any thing of his own to an original piece.”

THAT it is not probable, *Polybius* would falsify a Treaty, add any thing of his own to an Original Piece, I readily grant ; and that *Perizonius*'s conjecture, if admitted, would leave the main difficulties in their full force. But I should be curious to know, what *Roman History* that was, which M. de B. supposes *Polybius* so well versed in, and in which he supposes him to have found, that *Brutus* and *Horatius* were colleagues in the consulship. If, in the days of *Polybius*, there were authentic annals existing, which recorded the transactions of the earliest times of the Republic, M. de B.'s main position in his Dissertation is overthrown.

thrown. If he supposes that *Polybius's* sole authority for joining *Brutus* and *Horatius* in the consulship (contrary to report of the older historians and annalists, whom *Livy* and *Dionysius* are said to have copied) was the piece in question, I would ask, how it appears that the names of *Brutus* and *Horatius* were *certainly* at the head or tail of that antient monument? It is plain they were not in the body of it. When *Livy* and *Dionysius* contradict *Polybius* upon any particular historical fact, I believe there are very few readers who will not be inclined to side with the last, provided there be no reason not to do so, but barely his being contradicted upon *that fact*, by those two historians. But this is not the present case. The fact reported by *him* is highly improbable; and it is inconsistent with a series of not improbable facts, reported by *them*; facts, in regard to which we cannot conceive any temptation they had to *invent, conceal, or disguise*: and, in what *Polybius* himself says, there seems to be good ground for suspecting that he was deceived in relation to the piece in question. He introduces his translation of it with these words: "The first treaty between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* was made in the consulship of *Lucius Junius Brutus*, and *Marcus Horatius* the first Consuls after the *Refuge*, by whom also was consecrated the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, 28 years before the passing of *Xerxes* into *Greece*. Below, you will find the words of the treaty, interpreted in the best manner I was able to do it. For the antient Latin is so different from that now in use, that the most skilful are frequently at a loss, even after close ap-

L. 3. c. 22.

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"plication, to explain it."—And (in c. 26.) after giving us two subsequent treaties, he says, "It is no wonder that *Philinus* knew nothing of these [all the 3] treaties, (though engraven on brass, and preserved in the temple of *Jupiter*, under the custody of the *Ædiles*) for even in my time, the oldest men, both *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, those who were thought the best acquainted with public affairs, were ignorant of these treaties."

NOW, granting that some Consuls names were really found at the beginning or end of the old record in question, yet nobody will suppose, that the Consuls were *there described* in the manner *Polybius* describes them. The *description* is all his own. And (by the way) when he says, that the temple of *Jupiter Capitolinus* was consecrated by *Brutus* and *Horatius*; Who can prefer his authority, in *this particular*, to that of *Livy*, or of the most antient Latin historians whom doubtless *Livy* followed herein; and to the very inscription itself on the temple, where *Horatius* was named as the only consecrator? What motive can we imagine the Roman Historians to have had for denying *Brutus* a share in that honour, if he had any title to it? Besides, it seems pretty evident from many passages in *Livy*, that it was not the custom, in the dedication of any temple, for more than one person to perform that ceremony.

L. 2. c. 8,
L. 4. c. 29.
L. 9. c. 46,

FURTHER; not only the *description* of the Consuls, but their very NAMES, as *Polybius* gives them, cannot well be supposed to have been annexed to this record, *Lucius Junius* with his surname *Brutus*,

Brutus, and *Marcus Horatius* without his surname *Pulvillus*. If the names were entire and legible, we must believe that the historian has either omitted or added something. And supposing, that to this record were found both entire and legible, the names of some Consuls; yet why is it so difficult to believe, that *Polybius* may have been deceived, concerning those names, by the persons to whom he applied himself, for assistance in his attempt to explain a record in old Latin? For it is not to be supposed that he, a stranger, would undertake without assistance to translate a piece so difficult to be translated, even by the most skilful of the natives. He may have given us a false account of the date of this treaty without being guilty of forgery.

AND why may we not suppose, that time had effaced some parts of the Consuls names, and that the defects were supplied by conjecture? The Roman vanity might have a share too in the conjecture; it might prompt the assistants of our historian to fill up the chasms in such a man-

* Suppose the treaty in question to have been made so late as 304, the first year after the Decemvirate, when *Lucius Valerius Potitus* and *Marcus Horatius Barbatus* were Consuls. The matter of the treaty will, in this case, suit better with the times, according to the accounts of them by *Livy* and *Dionysius*, (For *Ardea* was then in alliance with *Rome*, and *Antium* was a Roman colony.) Imagine the names of the Consuls to have been partly effaced, and that there remained of them, (supposing the cognomens to have been originally inserted) only *Lucius — ius — tus*, *Marcus Horatius*. Who will not see, that the Roman vanity of those, whom *Polybius* employed for his decyphers, might tempt them to supply the chasms with *Jun— Bru—*? But I am inclined to think that the piece in question was of much later date than the year 304.

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ner as to form an evidence, that the Roman state was considerable enough, in the first year of the Republic, to have a treaty with the *Carthaginians*.

BUT perhaps there is some reason to doubt, whether any date, or Consuls names were *really* found at the beginning or end of this old record. For it is remarkable, that *Polybius*, who gives us, at large, two subsequent treaties engraven, like the first, on brass, and kept with it under the custody of the *Ædiles*, neither mentions *the names of the Consuls* under whose administration they were made, nor assigns any *certain date* to either of them. Of the *former* of the two he says only, that it was made *after the first*; and of the *latter* he says only, that it was made *about the time of Pyrrhus's coming into Italy*: and for *this* it does not appear, that he had any voucher, but the matter of the treaty itself, where *Pyrrhus* is mentioned. If he had found dates and consuls names to these brazen records, it is wonderful that so exact an historian should omit them; and especially when he is employing these records as evidence against *Philinus's* accounts, and the evidence has no real weight for want of those dates. Seeing then there is so much reason to believe that the records of the two later treaties wanted dates, we may well suspect that the oldest had the like defect; and that the date given to it was by meer conjecture.

Dissert. p.
37.

II. M. DE B.'s second discovery, in this important piece of antiquity, is, "That so early
" as the first year of the Republic, the *Romans*
" practised navigation and *piracy*; of which
" things

“ things (he adds) there is little said in their history, which represents their *marine*, till the first Punic war, as consisting only of some merchant ships, and as not brought to any perfection but on occasion of that war, as Polybius himself remarks.”

I MUST here confess, that I cannot discern, in the treaty, one word importing, that the *Romans*, at the time of its being concluded, practised piracy, or had any *ships of war*. Perhaps M. de B. collects this piracy from Polybius's comment on the treaty, who says, “ That the *Carthaginians* would not suffer the *Romans* to sail to the south of the Fair Promontory with *long ships*, *μακράς ναυσι;*” which are commonly understood to be *ships of war*. But his comment here does not well accord with what he himself asserts, when he writes of the *first Punic war*: For he there tells us, “ That the *Romans*, to that time, had never thought of the sea—and were so far from having decked ships, that they had not so much as one *long ship*, or even a *Lembus*.” In this particular the historian is undoubtedly mistaken; and I mention it, not only to shew its repugnance to his comment on the treaty in question, but to shew likewise that *Polybius* is not always to be followed with a blind deference; and that we ought, in reading him, to observe the rule which he recommends to those who read the historian *Fabius*, “ not to regard so much the great name of the person who writes, as the matter he delivers,” and to consider whether this be probable,

L. 1. c. 20.

L. 1. c. 20.

L. 3. c.

bable, have the appearance of truth, and be consistent with what is unquestionably true^a.

^a *Polybius* (L. 3. c. 26.) quarrels with *Philinus*, not for being ignorant of the three treaties before mentioned, as he supposes he was, but for asserting things contrary to the tenor of them. Now it does not appear, from any proof *Polybius* gives, either that *Philinus* was ignorant of these treaties, or that he asserted any thing contrary to them. *Philinus* affirmed (in speaking of the grounds of the first Punic war) that in some treaty between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, it had been covenanted, that the former should not invade any part of *Sicily*, nor the latter any part of *Italy*. But this assertion does not contradict what is contained in the other treaties. To shew a contradiction *Polybius* should have given us the dates of all the three treaties he has mentioned, and likewise the date, which *Philinus* assigned to the treaty mentioned by him; and this *Polybius* has not done. The treaty, to which *Philinus* refer'd, might have been made after the time of *Pyrrhus's* coming into *Italy*: And *Philinus* might know there was such a treaty, though *Polybius* could find no record of it; which is the second bad reason he gives for denying the fact. What *Philinus* reported is so far from being manifestly false, that it is highly probable. For if the *Romans* before they had subdued all *Latium*, or had even alliances with all the *Latine* states, thought it necessary to bind the *Carthaginians* by treaty not to attempt conquests in any part of *Latium*, it was natural, that when they came to have the same sort of interest in protecting all *Italy* from the *Carthaginians*, which they had before in protecting *Latium* only, they should exclude the *Carthaginians* from every part of *Italy*; and doubtless in that case the *Carthaginians* would exclude the *Romans* for the like reasons, from every part of *Sicily*.

[N. B. In p. 37. of this fourth Volume of this History, where the question, *Whether the first war, undertaken by the Romans against the Carthaginians was justifiable*, is discussed, the reasoning is partly founded on the supposition, that the report of *Polybius* is true; and that no treaty had been concluded between the two states, whereby the *Romans* were barred from meddling in the affairs of *Sicily*.]

BUT further, this treaty, according to M. de B., informs us,

III. THAT so early as the first year of the Republic, "The Romans were masters of all the sea coast as far as to *Tarracina*, and even of the cities of *Antium* and *Ardea*; a point wherein it manifestly stands in opposition to *Livy* * and *Dionysius* †. For these authors tell us, that *Antium* was the capital of the *Volsci*, and that the Romans did not take it till 40 years after, in the consulship of *T. Quinctius* and *Q. Servilius*. The city of *Ardea* §, according to the same historians, was besieged by *Tarquin* the Proud at the time when the Roman people shook off the yoke of his domination. The *Ardeates*, after that, having the same interests with the Romans, made a fifteen years truce with them. After which time *Ardea* continued in alliance with *Rome* to the year 310, when, on account of some particular discontents, they confederated with the *Volsci*; but in the following year the old alliance was renewed.

"This city therefore (adds M. de B.) was, according to those historians, independent, and

It is sometimes urged against the authority of *Livy* and *Dionysius*, with regard to certain important facts related by them, that *Polybius* is silent concerning those facts, tho' he wrote of the same times and on the same subject which they treat. But I shall here observe once for all, That this silence will never alone be a sufficient reason for rejecting the accounts of the other historians. For *Polybius*, though he speaks three times of the taking of *Rome* by the Gauls, does not once mention their burning it; and yet this is an important fact, of which I believe nobody questions the truth.

"only

Dissert.
P. 37.

* Lib. 2.
in fine.
† Lib. ix,
p. 615.
§ D. Hal.
Lib. 4.
p. 277.
Liv. Lib.
i. c. 57.

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“ only in alliance with the Romans; whereas the
 “ treaty, given at large by Polybius, imports, that
 “ this city, and likewise *Antium, Laurentum, Cir-*
 “ *ceii, Tarracina* were SUBJECT to them; and ex-
 “ pressly distinguishes these cities from the cities in
 “ ALLIANCE with Rome. Hence it appears that
 “ the two historians give us a false notion of the
 “ Roman state in the beginning of the republic;
 “ for they represent its domination as extending
 “ little further than the proper territory of Rome;
 “ whereas by this treaty we see, that it extended
 “ over several cities, and over all the sea coast as
 “ far as *Tarracina*.”

WHENEVER THIS treaty was made (supposing it genuine) it is evident, that the main purpose of the Romans in it, was to exclude the *Carthaginians* from all *Latium*, not only those parts of it that were subject to the Romans, or in alliance with them, but those likewise with which they had neither of those connexions. And it is not, I think, clear from the words of the treaty, that all the towns therein mentioned were in absolute subjection to the Romans. It speaks to this effect, “ Let the *Carthaginians* do no hurt to the *Ardeates, Antiates, Laurentini, Circeienses, Tarracineses*, or any other of the *Latines*, if they be ὑπηκοί, nay if any of them be not ὑπηκοί, let not the

ΚΑΡΧΗΔΟΝΙΟΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΤΩΣΑΝ ΔΗΜΟΝ ΑΡΔΕΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙΑΤΩΝ, ΔΑΥΡΕΝΤΙΝΩΝ, ΚΙΡΚΑΙΑΤΩΝ, ΤΑΡΡΑΚΗΝΙΤΩΝ, ΜΗΔ' ΑΛΛΟΝ ΜΗΔΕΝΑ ΛΑΤΙΝΩΝ, ΟΣΟΙ ΑΝ ΤΠΗΚΟΟΙ. ΕΑΝ ΔΕ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΜΗ ΩΣΙΝ ΥΠΗΚΟΟΙ, ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΩΝ ΑΠΕΧΕΤΩΣΑΝ. ΑΝ ΔΕ ΛΑΒΩΣΙ, ΡΩΜΑΙΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΔΙΔΩΤΩΣΑΝ ΑΚΕΡΑΙΟΝ. Polyb. Lib. 3. c. 22.

“*Carthaginians* meddle with their towns. If they take any town of the *Latines* [whether they be ὑπηκοοὶ or not ὑπηκοοὶ] let them restore it unhurt to the *Romans*.” Here is no distinction made of towns *subject* and towns *in alliance*, but of the *Latines* who were ὑπηκοοὶ, and the *Latines* who were *not* ὑπηκοοὶ. What the force of the word ὑπηκοοὶ is, does not fully appear; whether it mean *subject* in the strict sense, or only *dependent allies*. I say *dependent allies*; for these towns might be *in alliance* with the *Romans* and yet *not independent* on them; such being the case of almost all the states of *Italy* at the commencement of the first Punic war. And what the true import was of the old obsolete Latin word, which *Polybius* has rendered ὑπηκοοὶ, who can tell? One would suspect that neither *Polybius* nor his assistants did very well understand the piece they undertook to explain. For it is a very strange covenant, *That in case the Carthaginians seized any town of the Latines, not subject to the Romans, they should restore it to the Romans.*

Further; If this Brazen Monument had, for its date, the names of *Brutus* and *Horatius* (Consuls in the first year of the Republic) and if the words of the treaty import, that the *Ardeates* were *SUBJECT* to *Rome*, and *distinguish* them from *ALLIES*, it is contradicted by an *Original Authentic Record*, which *Livy* mentions of a *Treaty of Alliance and Friendship*, made with the *Ardeates* in the Consulships of *L. Sempronius Atratinus*, and *L. Papirius Mugilanus* (year of *Rome* 309 or 311:)

Lib. 4.
c. 7.

which

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which treaty was a *Renewal of an Alliance* that had long subsisted between the two States *.

Again; it is hardly to be imagined that the *Romans* had *subdued* the maritime towns of old *Latium*, as far as to *Tarracina*, in the remotest extremity of it, without having reduced the intermediate inland towns, and in short, the whole or almost the whole country : Yet this *subjection* of the *Latine* Nation to *Rome* in the first year of the Republic, is incompatible with an Original Brazen Monument existing in *Livy's* time, and recording the *Treaty of Alliance* made with the *Latines* in the second Consulship of *Cassius*, (year of *R.* 260 or 261.)

L. 2. c. 33.

* The *Ardeates*, on occasion of a dispute between them and their neighbours the *Aricini*, about a tract of land, were insulted by a decree of the *Roman* people, to whom the cause had been referred ; who, instead of adjudging the land to either of the claimants, took it to themselves. Hereupon the *Ardeates* broke alliance with the *Romans*, and soon after, by Ambassadors, complained at *Rome* of the injury which had been done them ; but complained in such terms, as shewed, they were willing to renew alliance and friendship with the *Roman* state, provided restitution were made of the land in question. The Senate gave them a soft answer ; and the next year the alliance was renewed by treaty ; the record of which treaty *Licinius Macer* had read. T. Quinctius Barbatus interrex consules creat, L. Papirium Mugilani, L. Sempronium Atratinum. His consulibus cum Ardeatibus fœdus renovatum est. Idque Monumenti est, Consules eos illo anno fuisse qui neque in *Annalibus Priscis*, neque in *Libris Magistratum* inveniuntur, Credo, quod Tribuni Militum initio anni fuerunt, eo perinde ac si totum annum in imperio fuerint, suspectis his Consulibus, prætermis- sâ nomina Consulum horum. Licinius Macer auctor est, et in FOEDERE ARDEATINO et in *Linteis Libris* ad Monetæ inventa.

And,

And, as to *Antium*, the Capital of the *Volschi*, L. 2. c. 65. though *Livy* reports, that it was taken (in 284) forty years after the commencement of the Republic, yet, by the sequel^b of his story, it would seem, that the *Antiates* were not really subdued, not reduced to a state of absolute subjection till

^b The *Latine* Historian relates, that when after the taking of *Antium* in 285. by *T. Quinctius*, the Senate had decreed to place a Colony there, the persons appointed to settle the Colony could prevail with but few of the *Roman* Citizens to go thither, so that they were forced to admit of *Volschi* to compleat the necessary number; and he further tells us, that a multitude of the old inhabitants returning soon after to the City, these alienated the minds of the Colony from the *Romans*, and its fidelity could no longer be depended upon. *Livy* seems not to have known the exact time, when the *Antiates* shook off all dependance upon the Republic; but he represents them in the year 345 at the Head of a Confederacy against *Rome*. In 377, he makes them surrender their town and territory to the *Romans*. Nevertheless, in 407, we find them acting as an Independent people; they had rebuilt *Satricum*, and sent a Colony thither: And they by deputies solicit the *Latines* to take arms against the *Romans*. L. 3. c. 1. And in 413 the *Antiates* make incursions on the lands of *Ostia*, *Ardea* and *Solonium*; and the *Romans* gain no honour in the war against them. But in 415 they are totally subdued, together with the *Latines*, and a new Colony is sent to *Antium*. The *Antiates* are allowed to enrol themselves in the Colony; but they are forbid the sea, and deprived of their *Long Ships*, some of which the *Romans* burn, carrying the *Beaks* of them to *Rome*, where the *Suggestum* or Pulpit, in the Forum, being adorned with them, acquires thence the name of *Rostra*. With the rest of the ships, the *Romans* augment their own navy. L. 3. c. 12. L. 4. c. 56. L. 6. c. 33. L. 8. c. 13, 14.

Supposing the first treaty with *Carthage* to have been made in 244, and the third in the time of *Pyrrhus*, there will have been, according to *Polybius*, 231 years between the first and the third.

the

Liv. L. 8.
c. 13, 14.

the year 415, when the *Latines* also, or at least the much greater part of them, were brought into the like subjection. And even then *Antium* was made a *Roman Colony*, into which the *Natives* were admitted.

It would seem therefore, that the treaty, given by *Polybius*, as made with *Carthage* in 244, was not made till after the year 415, the matter of it perfectly agreeing with the state of things after this year, and not before it.

* Oros. L.
3. c. 7.
calls this
treaty,
Primum
illud ietum
cum Carth.
Foedus.

Livy speaks of a * treaty of alliance and friendship with the *Carthaginians* in the Consulship of *Valerius Corvus*, and *Popilius Lænas*, year of *Rome* (according to the *Fast. Cap.*) 405; and his words seem to import that this was the *first* treaty concluded between the two Republics. Cum Carthaginienſibus Legatis Romæ foedus ietum, quum amicitiam ac societatem petentes veniſſent. Liv. L. 7. c. 27. He speaks of no other till he comes to the year 447, when he ſays a *Third Treaty* was made with *Carthage*; Cum Carthaginienſibus eodem anno foedus *Tertio renovatum*. L. 9. c. 43. So that it would ſeem from hence, and from the matter of that treaty, which *Polybius* calls the *first*, that it was really the *second*, and made between the years 405 and 447, and after the reduction of *Latium* in 415. According to the Epitome of *Livy*, the treaty concluded in the time of *Pyrrhus*, * which is *Polybius's third* treaty, was the *fourth* treaty made with the *Carthaginians*. Iterum adverſus Pyrrhum dubio eventu pugnatum eſt. Cum Carthaginienſibus quarto foedus renovatum eſt.

* Y. of R.
475.
Epit. L. 13.

GRANTING then, that, by the words of this old brazen record, the towns, there mentioned, were absolutely SUBJECT to the *Romans*; what is the conclusion we should naturally draw from it? Not that *Livy* and *Dionysius* have given us a false account of the Roman state in the first year of the Republic, but that the PIECE in question was not genuine, or *that the names of Brutus and Horatius were not annexed to it.* For,

What could tempt *Livy*, a *Roman*, or *Dionysius*, an extravagant flatterer of the *Romans*, wilfully to disguise the extent of the *Roman* domination at the commencement of the Republic? I say *wilfully to disguise*: For is it possible to believe that either the *Romans* or the *Latines* were ignorant of the time when the latter became *Subjects* of the former? And M. de B. seems not to have duly reflected, when he says^a, “It is sufficiently apparent that *Livy* and *Dionysius* knew nothing of the treaty mentioned by *Polybius*.” They could not but meet with this piece in *Polybius*’s work, which they appear to be very well acquainted with, and of which *Livy* makes great use in compiling his own. And is it not evident therefore, from their shewing no regard to what *Polybius* says of his old brazen monument, either that they looked upon it as not authentic, or knew that he had been deceived concerning the date of it? It is remarkable, that *Livy*, who informs us, that some authors differing from the rest,

L. 2. c. 8.

^a Il paroît même assez, qu’ils n’en ont eu nulle connoissance, Dissert. p. 34. Si Tite Live avoit eu connoissance de cette piece, &c. S’il avoit consulté ce monument, &c. p. 39.

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make *Horatius* the immediate successor of *Brutus*, has not thought it worth while to observe, that *Polybius* makes them colleagues in the consulship.

Add to this the great improbability, that, during the unsettled and precarious state of things at *Rome*, in the first year after the expulsion of *Tarquin*, the *Cartbaginians* should enter into any treaty with the *Romans*; and the yet greater improbability, that they should conclude a treaty with them in terms, which suppose them in a settled state, and in a condition to maintain the stipulations therein expressed.

Perhaps we should have found the matter cleared up, and *Polybius's* mistake animadverted upon by *Livy* or *Dionysius*, if those parts of their histories, which treated of the first war with the *Cartbaginians*, had been preserved.

I SHALL close these Observations with the words of *M. de Pouilly*, in the beginning of his *Nouveaux Essais de Critique sur la fidelité de l'Histoire*.

“ It very seldom happens that we avoid one
 “ faulty extreme without running into another,
 “ its contrary: This maxim, true in morality,
 “ is true in criticism. Are men afraid of giving
 “ credit to fables? They sometimes refuse
 “ it to the most certain facts; they look upon
 “ History as a compound of Truths and Fictions,
 “ so intimately united, that it is impossible to
 “ separate them.—Had the Historian no
 “ part in the transactions he relates? They suspect
 “ him of being ill informed.—Had he a
 “ part in those transactions? They accuse him
 “ of prejudice and prepossession.—On the other
 “ hand there are those, who, fearing lest they
 “ should

" should happen to reject true History, give
 " credit to all the Fables which have borrowed
 " its Name.—Let us avoid these opposite ex-
 " travagances: Let us confess, that, in History,
 " *falsehood* is mingled with *truth*; but that there
 " are marks by which they may be distinguish-
 " ed. Love of the *Marvellous*, Interest, Vanity,
 " Spirit of Party, are so many fountains ever
 " open, from whence fiction spreads itself in
 " ample waves over the Annals of all nations.—
 " When we are reduced to seek the truth of a
 " fact in historians biassed by passions, if they
 " are of different parties and interests, let us
 " bring their narrations together; and from this
 " collation, we shall strike out the truth, if I
 " may so speak, in spite of them: I say farther,
 " that those who are of one and the same party,
 " will commonly deserve some credit in facts of
 " such public notoriety, that they durst not dis-
 " guise them; or in which they were too little
 " interested to have sufficient temptation to un-
 " dertake it."

"I should happen to report that I have given
 credit to all the things which have been
 in France. I have not been able to
 investigate; but in looking at the
 report is mingled with words; but that the
 "and many by which may be distinguished
 the love of the human race, justice,
 spirit of liberty, and to many countries
 every room where fiction spreads itself in
 ample waves over the Annals of all nations.
 When we are induced to look the truth of a
 fact in history, divided by nations, in they
 are of different parties and interests, let us
 bring their nations together, and from this
 collision, we shall strike out the truth, if I
 may to speak, in spite of them: I say further,
 that those who are of one and the same party,
 will commonly deliver some words in favor of
 such public notoriety, that they doubt not dis-
 guise them; or in which they were too little
 interested to have sufficient temptation to un-
 derstate it."



THE ROMAN HISTORY.

FOURTH BOOK.

From the Beginning of the FIRST PUNIC
WAR in the Year of *Rome* 489, to the
End of the SECOND in 552.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the close of the preceding volume of this History, we left the *Romans* complete conquerors and quiet possessors of all *antient Italy*, that is, of all the country between the *Adriatic* and the *Mediterranean* from the remotest border of *Hetruria* to the *Ionian* sea. The far greater part of this Dominion, though their state [by the usual reckonings] was now 488 years old, had been of late acquisition: For whatever advantage they might have over their neighbours, in the admirable construction of their ^a *le-*

^a *Vegetius* thinks that the form of the legion was not the product of meer human reason, but that the *Romans* were led to it by a kind of instinct from Heaven: *Non tantum humano consilio, sed etiam divinitatis instinctu, legiones a Romanis arbitror constitutas. De re milit. l. 2. c. 21.*

gion, the discipline of war, or any other respects, they could make but little progress in conquest, during the space of above four centuries from the building of their city. *Rome*, while under the government of Kings was in the weakness of infancy; and if, with *Florus*, we consider her as advanced to sprightly youth, (the second stage of life;) when she became a Republic, yet her natural strength was impaired, and her growth long checked, by the disease of civil discord, a mischief wholly proceeding from the want of that *essential* of a free state, a just equality among its members.

By the revolution which expelled *Tarquin* the Proud, the Commons of *Rome* were delivered from a Tyrant, but not from Tyranny. A short suspension there was indeed of the weight of oppression: This was owing to the honest zeal of that excellent Patriot, *Valerius Poplicola*, and to the temporising lenity and moderation of the Senate, while their fears of *Tarquin's* return were alive and strong. In so perilous a season the indulgent Fathers had the goodness to decree, *That the poorer sort, by only educating their children, paid sufficient tribute to the State, and ought not to be loaded with any other tax.* But it was not long before the Plebeians felt themselves in the chains of servitude; *Livy* makes the death of *Tarquin*, which happened in the fourteenth year after his banishment, to be the precise period when they began ^b to be oppressed by the Nobles.

Livy, B. 2.
ch. 9.

^b Insignis hic annus est nuncio *Tarquinii* mortis.—Eo nuncio erecti patres, erecta plebes. Sed patribus nimis luxuriosa

Chap. I. *The Roman History.*

Nobles. The Commons then became sensible, that, by dethroning their King, they had only cast off the domination of one Tyrant to become slaves to many, an Assembly of Tyrants, whose yoke was no less heavy and insupportable. The *Valerian* * law, to permit appeals from the sentence of the Magistrates to *the People assembled*, was not sufficient to protect the Plebeians from injustice and cruelty. They found it necessary to provide themselves *living* Protectors against the Tyranny of the Great, and therefore extorted from the Senate a consent to the establishment of the *Tribunitian Power*. Another rampart against the overflowings of ambition they raised to themselves by instituting the *Comitia Tributa*, and by the practice of bringing into judgment, before those assemblies, the most exalted of the Nobles, upon accusations of treason against the People. By the publication of the laws of the *Twelve Tables* some check was given to the abuse of that prerogative, which the Patricians tenaciously kept, of being the sole judges in civil causes: And we find, that on several other occasions, the Commons, urged by oppression to fury, exerted their natural strength in such a manner, as seemed to proclaim them the sovereign masters in *Rome*. But those acts of power were only transient flashes, the lightnings of a civil tempest: and, notwithstanding all the advances hitherto made towards liberty and equality, the Patricians were the permanent,

xuriosa ea fuit lætitia: plebi, cui ad eam diem summa opes infervitum erat, injuriæ à primoribus fieri cōperere. B. 2. ch. 21.

* Passed in the Y. of R. 244.

Y. of R. 260.

Y. of R. 262.

Y. of R. 302.

See B. 3. ch.
4. §. 1.

established Lords of the Commonwealth: all the great Offices, Civil, Military, and Sacerdotal, were confined to their body; the public treasure at their disposal: They heaped up riches to themselves; and, while the People, through extreme indigence, fell under a necessity of contracting debts to the Patrician usurers, the laws gave the creditors power to be cruel to their insolvent debtors: And the consequence of all this was, that multitudes of the Plebeians, slavishly dependent by reason of their poverty, durst not concur with the more free, in using even the undisputed rights of the commons. Hence the few instances of Plebeians chosen to the *Military Tribuneship*, even after they were legally qualified for that station.

Y. of R,
386.

The Commonwealth of *Rome* was never truly a free state, till after the publication of the *Licinian Laws*, those laws which, *in their consequences*, made Merit alone the ordinary scale whereby to ascend to the highest offices, and which by admitting the Plebeians to a reasonable share of what was purchased with their blood, delivered them from that servile subjection to the wealthy nobles in which their indigence had so long detained them.

From this period, the *Roman* people, when they made laws, or elected Magistrates for the execution of them, were, generally speaking, free from all undue influence; not over-awed, as before, by the rich and the great, nor constrained by any force, but that of reason and natural justice, in the most absolute subjection to which is

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3

is the most perfect freedom. No citizen, who had shewed superior talents and virtue, stood excluded, on account of the low degree of his birth, from the dignities of the state: The emulation among the individuals was to surpass each other in *deserving* honours.

Indeed the haughty Patricians, as, when vanquished by the Plebeians, they had given ground with an angry reluctance, and retired fighting, so they afterwards, from time to time, shewed a strong disposition to renew the war, in order to regain their unrighteous sovereignty: but their efforts were faint and ineffectual; and at length acquiescing in what they could not undo, there ensued domestic peace and union, and an established liberty.

Union at home gave new strength to the state; and liberty seems to have inspired the people with a more elevated courage, a more unwearied fortitude, than they had hitherto shewn, in their wars abroad. By a series of victories, they, in the space of about 70 years (reckoning from the battle against the *Latines* in 413) enlarged their narrow dominion, of a few leagues about the city, to the utmost extent of *Italy*. And, though destitute of naval strength and naval skill, their next enterprize, as we shall presently find, will be against a rival republic, beyond the continent; a republic that with greater riches, and more ample territories than theirs, had possession of the absolute dominion of the sea. The boldness of the undertaking, and the amazing constancy with which they supported it,

in

in spite of the most terrible adversities, are not to be paralleled in the history of any other nation: But the *Roman* legions were, at this time, legions of free citizens, whose predominant passion was glory, and who placed the highest glory in facing every danger, and surmounting every difficulty, to preserve their Liberty, and extend their Empire.

C H A P. I.

The occasion and commencement of the first Punic or Carthaginian war.

* See B. 3.
ch. 28. §. 3.

THE prophetic * exclamation of King *Pyrrhus*, as he sailed from *Sicily*, is now going to be accomplished, and that island to be the theatre of a bloody war between *Rome* and *Carthage*. The *Epirot*, when he beheld these powerful and ambitious Republics making swift advances in conquest, and by every step approaching nearer to each other, could have no difficulty to foresee that they would soon become enemies; and, as he might with reason believe that the *Romans* would finish the reduction of *Italy*, before the *Carthaginians* could totally subdue *Sicily*, the conjecture was natural, that this country would be the seat of the war between them. He himself had gone thither, on the invitation of the people of *Syracuse*, to guard them against the *Carthaginian* encroachments; and he was, doubtless, persuaded, that, in a short time, they would find themselves under a necessity of suing to the *Romans* for the like succour. The occasion however of the first rupture,

ture, between *Rome* and *Carthage*, was not any distress of the *Syracusians*; it was an event singular and unexpected; and as it has left ground for a dispute, whether the *First Punic* or *Carthaginian War* was justly undertaken by the *Romans*, it may be proper, for the reader's satisfaction, to state the case as fully as possible; and, in order thereto, we must recall some passages of the former * part of this History.

A considerable body of soldiers, *Campanians* by birth, and called *Mamertines*, had been mercenaries to *Agathocles* King of *Syracuse*; upon whose death, finding themselves no longer welcome there, they marched away with all their effects to *Messina*. Admitted here, and kindly entertained as friends, they treacherously massacred one part of the citizens, expelled the rest, and seized, for their own use, upon the lands, houses, and even wives of those unfortunate men.

Some time after this, when *Pyrrhus* was just landed in *Italy*, the inhabitants of *Rhegium*, that their city might neither fall into the hands of the *Epirot*, nor become a prey to the *Carthaginians*, who were masters of the sea, and whose fleets appeared frequently off the coast, requested of the *Roman* Senate, to furnish them with a garrison. A Legion of 4000 *Romans*, raised in *Campania*, was, under the command of *Decius Jubellius*, appointed to that service. At first, they demeaned themselves suitably to the intention of those who employed them: but, at length tempted by the wealth of the place, emboldened by the example of the *Mamertines*, and

* See B.
3. ch. 26.
§. 1. &
ch. 29. §. 5.
Strab. l. 6.
p. 268.
Polyb. l. 1.
c. 7.
Diod. Sic.
in Eclog.
p. 866.

strength-

strengthened by their aid, they acted the same perfidious and cruel part towards the *Rbegians*, which the other had acted towards the people of *Messina*.

As these cities are parted only by that narrow sea (now called the *Faro*) which separates *Italy* from *Sicily*, it was easy for the two bands of robbers mutually to assist each other in the defence of their usurpations; for which purpose they entered into a strict confederacy.

The *Romans*, though they found their honour greatly stained by the outrageous wickedness of the garrison, with which they had furnished their good allies, were then too much engaged in affairs more urgent, to take immediate revenge on the offenders: Nor in truth did they turn their thoughts that way till four years after *Pyrrhus* had left *Italy*, and the old enemies of *Rome* were all subdued. Then they marched an army to *Rbegium*, and besieged it; in which enterprize *Hiero* of *Syracuse* lent his aid. The traitors, hopeless of pardon, defended themselves with an obstinate resolution, yet the town was at length carried by assault: All those who escaped the sword of the assailants, being led in chains to *Rome*, were, by a decree of the senate, first beaten with rods, and then beheaded: And the *Rbegians* were restored to their former liberty and estates.

About six years after this execution of justice, the fame of which had sounded honourably through all quarters of *Italy*, came messengers to *Rome* from the *Mamertines* in *Sicily*, imploring help against the *Syracusians*, under whose
power

power they were ready to fall, and who, they feared, would inflict on them the like punishment for the like crimes: A most impudent request from the thieves of *Messina*, To ask protection of the very judges who had condemned to death their fellow-thieves of *Rbegium*! Nevertheless, from a view of their present situation, we shall perhaps be induced to conclude, that the *Martines* took this step in consequence of sober reflection, and were not without a reasonable hope of assistance from *Rome*.

These usurpers of *Messina*, so long as they could get succours from their friends at *Rbegium*, had not only lived fearless of any danger, but had often been aggressors on their neighbours the *Carthaginians* and *Syracusians*, putting many towns and villages under contribution. The posture of their affairs received a mighty change by the destruction of their *Italian* allies: Of whose wonted aid being deprived, they were overthrown in battle by the *Syracusians* under the conduct of *Hiero*^d, Prætor of that state, and their army almost totally cut off. Humbled and

Polyb. l.
i. c. 8.
and 9.

^d *Hiero*, on his return to *Syracuse*, was elected King. He was the son of *Hierocles*, and by him descended from *Gelo*, who had formerly reigned in *Syracuse*; but his mother was a slave. He distinguished himself early from those of his own years by his expertness in military exercises, and his courage in battle. He gained the esteem of *Pyrrhus*, and was honoured with several rewards from his hand. Extremely handsome, of great bodily strength, smooth and engaging in his address, equitable in business, and gentle in command, he seem'd to want nothing kingly but a kingdom. *Pulchritudo ei corporis insignis, vires quoque in ho-*
mine

Polyb. 1.
1. c. 2.

and reduced by so terrible a blow, they thought themselves no longer in a condition to defend *Messina*,

mine admirabiles fuere; in alloquio blandus, in negotio justus, in imperio moderatus; prorsus ut nihil ei regium deesse, præter regnum videretur. *Justin*, B. 23. chap. 4.

He was chosen Prætor by the soldiers on occasion of a quarrel between them and the citizens: Nevertheless, the latter, on account of the great gentleness and humanity with which he proceeded on his first accession to power, confirmed him in that office. He aspired however to something yet higher, as was easily discerned by the quick-sighted from the very beginning of his administration. For *Hiero* knowing that the citizens, whenever the troops with their leaders went into the field, were apt to fall into factions and seditions, and that *Leptines*, a man in high repute for his probity, had the greatest sway with the people, he made an alliance with him, by taking his Daughter to wife, proposing by this means to secure to himself the fidelity of the *Syracusians* at home, during his expeditions with the army abroad. As to the soldiery, the veteran mercenaries having lost their discipline, and being on all occasions prompt to mutiny, and to raise new commotions, he took the following method to get rid of them. Under colour of a design to extirpate the usurpers of *Messina*, he marched his forces that way, and, when he came up with the enemy, so ordered his battle, as to keep the *Syracusians*, both horse and foot from engaging, while he exposed the mercenaries to the entire shock of the *Mamertines*. The mercenaries were all cut off; and while the enemy were busied in the slaughter, he withdrew his own people in safety to *Syracuse*. After his having formed an army to his own mind, he marched once more against the *Mamertines*, and gave them that total overthrow which is mentioned in the text.

Mr. *Rollin*, who is a Divine, cannot approve this method which *Hiero* took to rid himself of the foreign mercenaries, though he grants, that he had no other way to secure himself from them. *Chevalier Folard*, who is a soldier, seems

Messina, and, being divided in opinion about what measures to take, one party had recourse to the *Carthaginians*, made a league with them, and put the citadel into their hands; the other sent ambassadors, with an offer of the city, to the *Romans*, whose protection they implored, and with whom they pleaded the relation between them, as men of the same country and original.

Polyb. l.
1. c. 10.

The *Romans*, having so severely punished the treachery and cruelty of their own citizens, were very sensible how much their honour might suffer, should they protect villains notoriously guilty of the same crimes: And, when, on the other hand, they considered that the *Carthaginians* had not

c. 31.

to applaud *Hiero* for the action, and says, that it ought to have served for a lesson to the *Roman Emperors*, how to guard themselves against the *Prætorian Cohorts*, when they became licentious.

In the following account of the rise and progress of the *Carthaginian* power, great use is made of Mr. *Rollin's* collections in his *Hist. Ancienne*.

Justin. B.
18. ch. 4.
5, 6.
App. de
Bell. Pun.
p. 1.
Strab. B.
17. p. 832.
Vell. Pa-
térc. B. 1.
ch. 6.
Joseph.
contr. Ap.
B. 1.

THE *CARTHAGINIANS* were originally a colony from *Tyre* (in *Phœnicia*, a country on the east coast of the *Mediterranean*) the most renowned city in the world for commerce, and which had long before sent into *Africa* a colony, that built *Utica*. The foundation of *Carthage* is ascribed to *Elissa*, a *Tyrian* Princess, better known by the name of *Dido*. Her great grandfather *Ithobal* King of *Tyre*, is thought to be the same with *Ethbaal* the father of *Jezabel*, wife of *Ahab*. *Dido* married her near relation *Acerbas* (called otherwise *Sicharbas* and *Sichæus*) a man immensely rich. Her brother *Pygmalion*, King of *Tyre*, put *Acerbas* to death, that he might seize his great riches: but she disappointed the cruel avarice of the tyrant, by conveying them secretly out of his dominions. She put to sea with a considerable number of friends and dependants, and, after stopping a while at *Cyprus*, pursued her voyage, and at length landed on the

African

not only subdued a very long and rich tract of country in *Africa*, and some part of *Spain*, but

were *African* coast, between *Utica* and *Tunis*. Here she is said to have bought of the natives a piece of ground, as much as she could compass with an ox's hide (cut into thongs) and on this spot to have built *Byrsa*, afterwards the citadel of *Carthage*. Many of the *Africans* in the neighbourhood, invited by the prospect of gain, repaired to these strangers to traffick with them, and, in a short time, took up their habitation among them; so that the whole had now something of the appearance of a petty State.

Dido, soon after, by encouragement not only from the people of *Utica* (who looked upon the *Tyrians* as their countrymen) but from the *Africans* also, built a city adjoining to *Byrsa*, and called it *Carthada*, a name that in the *Phœnician* tongue signifies *New City*. The *Romans* called it *Carthago*, the *Greeks* *Carchedon*. It was to pay an annual tribute to the *Africans* for the ground on which it stood.

[It is impossible to fix the time of the foundation of *Carthage*, chronologers both antient and modern, differing widely on the subject. *Appian* and others place it before the fall of *Troy*; others many years later.

Solinus reckons 737 years from the first year of *Carthage* to its total destruction, which if placed in the 607th of *Rome*, *Carthage*, according to him, was built before *Rome* 130 years.

According to *Sir Isaac Newton*, *Carthage* was founded by *Dido* 883 years before the beginning of the Christian *Æra*. This Computation will fall in with that of *Solinus*, as to the age of *Carthage*, but not as to the juniority of *Rome*; which *Sir Isaac* supposes to be younger than her rival by 256 years.]

The new City grew in a short time into a flourishing condition; *Iarbas*, a neighbouring Prince, demanded *Dido* in marriage, threatening the *Carthaginians* with war in case of refusal. *Dido*, to avoid this marriage, without drawing a calamity upon her people, put an end to her own life with a poniard. She was afterwards worshipped as a Goddess so long as *Carthage* subsisted.

were masters of *Sardinia*, and the adjacent isles on the coast of *Italy*, and had even extended their

THE FIRST WAR^a waged by the *Carthaginians* in *Africa* seems to have been on account of the annual tribute they had bound themselves to pay to the *Africans* for the ground on which their city stood. In this war their arms prospered under the conduct of one *Malchus*.

But *Mago* who succeeded *Malchus*, is considered, by *Justin*, as the first builder of the *Carthaginian* empire, because it was he that introduc'd an exact discipline among the troops. After his death his two sons *Hasdrubal* and *Hamilcar* had the command of the army. These brothers left each three sons, who shared among them the chief authority in *Carthage*. They made war against the *Moors* and *Numidians* with success, and obliged the *Africans* to relinquish all claim to the tribute; which they had demanded sword in hand.

[Six commanders out of one and the same family, and who governed all affairs both at home and abroad, seemed dangerous to a free State. It was a jealousy of the exorbitant power of this family of *Mago*, which induced the *Carthaginians* to elect an hundred judges out of the Senators, to whom the Generals were to give an account of their conduct after their return from the war.]

When the *Carthaginians* had made considerable conquests in *Africa*, there arose a^b war between them and the people of *Cyrene* (a powerful city, standing to the East of the greater *Syrtis*) concerning the limits of their respective jurisdictions. After many bloody conflicts by land and sea, it was agreed (as the story is told) that two men should set out from each of the two cities at the same instant, and that the place of their meeting should be the boundary to the two States. The men from *Carthage* (who were brothers of the name of *Phileænus*) either made more expedition than those from *Cyrene*, or, as *Valerius Maximus* relates, began their course before the appointed time. Be that as it will, the

^a *Justin*, B. 18. ch. 7. B. 19. c. 1.

^b *Sallust*, de Bell. Jugurth. *Val. Maxim.* B. 5. c. 6.

their dominion far in *Sicily*, these things gave them very uneasy apprehensions. For they plainly

Cyrenians complained of deceit, and refused to stand to the agreement, unless the two brothers (in proof of their innocence) would consent to be buried alive in the place of meeting. The *Philæni*, readily acquiescing in the proposal, were buried quick in that spot; and the *Carthaginians* erected there two altars to their memory. The place from that time was called *The Altars of the Philæni* [*Aræ Philænorum*] and was ever after the eastern boundary of the *Carthaginian* Empire, which in time comprehended the whole extent of the northern coast of *Africa*, from those Altars to the *Pillars of Hercules*.

History does not inform us at what times the *Carthaginians* first carried their arms into *SICILY*, *SARDINIA*, or *SPAIN*.

SPAIN had sufficient allurements to draw the *Carthaginians* thither. It abounded with mines of gold and silver, enchanting baits to their avarice, and it was peopled by a martial race of men, who (if once reduced to be subjects of *Carthage*) would furnish her with brave troops for the conquest of other nations, and free her, in part, from the necessity of employing foreign mercenaries in her wars. For the genius of the *Carthaginians* being more turned to commerce than war, they had constantly recourse (at least in the latter ages of their state) to that dangerous expedient of hiring strangers to fight their battles.

^c The occasion of the first descent made by the *Carthaginians* on *Spain*, was, to defend the inhabitants of *Gades*, (a colony from *Tyre*, and more antient than those of *Carthage* and *Utica*) against the *Spaniards*.

Encouraged by success in this enterprize, they became aggressors, and made conquests in *Spain*. It is plain however, by what *Polybius* and *Livy* tell us of the wars of *Amilcar Barca*, *Asdrubal*, and *Hannibal*, that, till the times of these generals, (that is, till after the end of the first *Punic War*) the *Carthaginians* did not penetrate far into that country.

^c *Justin*, B. 44. ch. 5. *Dido* B. 5. p. 300.

ly forefaw, that unless they interposed to prevent it, *Messina* would soon fall into the hands of those formidable

[Some account of Spain will be given in a more proper place, when the Romans carry their arms thither.]

Sicily, the largest island in the Mediterranean, was anciently called *Trinacria* and *Triquetra*, on account of its triangular form. Diod. Sic. L. 5.

The eastern side, which faces the *Ionian* or *Grecian* sea, extends from Cape ^c *Pachinum* to ^d *Pelorus*. The chief cities on this coast were *Syracuse*, *Tauromenium*, and *Messina*. e Passaro, d Capo di Faro.

On the northern coast, looking towards *Italy*, and reaching from Cape *Pelorus* to Cape *Lilybæum*, the most noted cities were *Mylæ*, *Hymera*, *Panormus*, *Eryx*, *Drepanum*, *Lilybæum*.

The south-west side, opposite to *Africa*, extends from Cape *Lilybæum* to *Pachynum*. Its principal cities were *Selinus*, *Agrirentum*, *Gela* and *Camarina*. The passage from *Lilybæum* to the promontory of *Mercury* in *Africa* is about 187 miles.

ABOUT the year Ant. Chr. 480. the *Carthaginians*, in consequence of a league made with *Xerxes* King of *Persia*, raised an army of more than 300,000 men, and equipped a fleet of 200 ships of war, and 3000 transports, in order to attack and expel all the *Greeks* who were settled in *Sicily* and *Italy*, while *Xerxes* himself was to invade *Greece*. Diod. Sic. B. 11. p. 1. 2.

This mighty army, which landed at *Panormus*, and under the command of a general named *Hamilcar*, laid siege to *Hymera*, was, before that place, totally routed and destroyed by *Gelo* governor of *Syracuse*; and this on the very day of the famous action of *Thermopylæ*, when *Leonidas* fell with his 300 *Spartans* in defending that pass against the numberless forces of *Xerxes*.

^e AFTER the memorable defeat of the *Athenians* under *Nicias* at *Syracuse*, the people of *Segesta* (a city not far from *Eryx*) who had declared in favour of the *Athenians* against the *Syracusans*, fearing the resentment of the latter, and being attacked by the inhabitants of *Selinus*, implored the aid of the *Carthaginian* Republic, under whose protection they put themselves and their city. The *Carthaginians* al- e B. J. C. 413. Diod. Sic. B. 13. p. 169.

formidable neighbours ; who would then be able speedily to invade *Syracuse*, and all the other parts of

lured by the prospect of possessing a place, very convenient for them, promised succour to the people of *Segesta*.

The conduct of this war was given to *Hannibal*, grandson to *Hamilcar*, who had been killed before *Hymera*. At the head of a great army, he besieged *Selinus*, and took it by assault. He treated cruelly all whom he found in the place, but suffered those, who had fled, to return and possess the city, paying a tribute to the *Carthaginians*. He afterwards took *Hymera* by assault, and, to revenge the death of his grandfather, not only razed the city, but caused 3000 prisoners to be murdered on the very spot where *Hamilcar* had been slain.

Hannibal, after these expeditions, returned to *Carthage*; but his successes having rekindled the ambition of the *Carthaginians* to get possession of all *Sicily*, they, with this view, 3 years after his return, appointed him a second time to be their General, and allotted him an army of 120,000 (some say 300,000) men. On his pleading his great age, to excuse himself from commanding in this enterprize, they gave him for his Lieutenant *Imilco*, son of *Hanno*, of the same family.

The *Syracusians* and their allies prepared themselves to give the enemy a warm reception.

Hannibal opened the campaign with the siege of *Agrigentum*. Imagining that it was impregnable except on one side, he employed his whole force on that one side. He threw up banks and terrasses as high as the walls, and made use of the rubbish and ruins of the tombs which he had found standing round the city, and which he had demolished for that purpose. The plague soon after infecting the army, swept away a great number of the soldiers, and the General himself. The *Carthaginians* interpreted this disaster as a punishment inflicted by the Gods for the injuries done to the dead, whose ghosts they fancied they saw stalking before them in the night. They forbore therefore to demolish any more tombs, and endeavoured to appease the Gods: a child was sacrificed

of the island, not yet in their obedience. They considered likewise, that the *Carthaginians*, when
once

sacrificed to *Saturn*, and many victims thrown into the sea in honour of *Neptune*.

The besieged after eight months were so pressed by famine, that they resolved to abandon the place in the night. Men, women, and children, all but the aged and sick, retired to *Gela*, the nearest city to them.

Imilco entered *Agrigentum*, and massacred all who were found in it. The plunder of the place was immensely rich. It had contained 200,000 inhabitants, and had never before been besieged, nor consequently plundered. An infinite number of pictures, vases, and statues of an exquisite taste were found in it, and among other curiosities the famous Bull of *Phalaris*, which was sent to *Carthage*.

Imilco having quartered his troops during the winter in *Agrigentum*, and totally ruined it, laid siege to *Gela* in the beginning of the spring. He took this place notwithstanding the succours brought to it by *Dionysius* the Tyrant, who had seized the government of *Syracuse*. A treaty, which the *Carthaginians* afterwards made with *Dionysius*, put an end to the war. The conditions of this treaty were, that *Carthage* should remain mistress of her ancient colonies, and of the territories of the *Sicanians*; that the people of *Selinus*, *Agrigentum*, and *Hymera*, should be subject to her; that those of *Gela* and *Comarina* should inhabit their own dismantled cities, but be tributary to *Carthage*; that the *Leontines*, *Messenians*, and all the other *Sicilians*, should enjoy their own laws and liberties, except the *Syracusians*, who were to continue subject to *Dionysius*.

These articles being ratified, the *Carthaginians* returned home, having lost one half of their army by the plague, which raging afterwards in *Africa*, multitudes perished both of the people of *Carthage*, and of their confederates.

Dionysius had concluded the late peace with the *Carthaginians* in no other view, but to get time to establish his new authority, and make the necessary preparations for a vigorous war against them. These things being accomplished, he called the *Syracusians* together, and represented to them

once in possession of *Messina*, might make use of it almost as a bridge to pass into *Italy*, the conquest

the dangerous ambition of *Carthage*, which, he said, aimed at nothing less than the subduing of all *Sicily*, an enterprize which only the havock made in *Africa* by the plague did at present suspend; and he exhorted them to seize the favourable opportunity they had of being the aggressors.

The tyrant was no less odious than his tyranny to the people of *Syracuse*; nevertheless, the implacable hatred they bore to the *Carthaginians* made them receive his harangue with applause. *Dionysius* hereupon, without any previous complaint of treaties violated, or so much as a declaration of war, gave up to the fury of the populace the persons and possessions of the *Carthaginian* merchants, who in great numbers were then residing in *Syracuse*, and were there trading securely on the faith of treaties. These unhappy men were not only plundered of all their effects, but made to undergo the utmost ignominy and cruelties that could be devised, under pretence of retaliation for what the *Carthaginians* had formerly done to the people of *Sicily*: and this example of perfidy and inhumanity was followed in many parts of the island. The Tyrant, after this strange beginning of hostilities, sent deputies to *Carthage*, to demand the restoration of all the *Sicilian* cities to their laws and liberties; and to declare that, in case of refusal, all the *Carthaginians* found in those cities should be treated as enemies.

Dionysius opened the campaign with the siege of *Motya*, the chief magazine of the *Carthaginians* in *Sicily*; and, notwithstanding all that *Imilco* could do to succour it, carried the place by assault. He put all the inhabitants to the sword, except those who took refuge in the temples; he plundered the town, and then leaving a strong garrison in it under a trusty governor, returned to *Syracuse*.

Diod. Sic.
B. 14. Justin, B. 19.
ch. 2 & 3.

The following year *Imilco* came back to *Sicily* with a most formidable army. He landed at *Panormus*, recovered *Motya* by force of arms, and took several other cities. Animated by these successes, he marched his forces towards

Syracuse

quest of which had been long their ambition. All this was well weighed by the *Romans*; and yet,

Syracuse with intention to besiege it, or'ering his fleet under the conduct of *Mago* to sail thither. *Mago*, with two hundred ships of war, that were adorned with the enemies spoils, was quickly seen entring the great port as in triumph, and followed by 500 barks: The *Carthaginian* land-forces consisting, according to some authors, of 300,000 foot and 3,000 horse, appeared at the same time on the other side of the city, and both together threw the *Syracusians* into the utmost consternation. *Imilco* for thirty days successively employed his troops in laying waste the neighbouring country: He afterwards possessed himself of the suburb called *Acradina*, and pillaged the temples of *Ceres* and *Proserpine*, beating down the tombs that stood round the city, to fortify his camp with the materials. But now, when master of almost all the cities in the island, he expected to complete the conquest of it by the speedy reduction of *Syracuse*, a dreadful plague, which with incredible swiftness and destruction spread itself among his troops, put an end at once to all his pleasing hopes, and made the splendor of his anticipated triumph vanish in a moment.

Dionysius did not neglect so favourable an opportunity to attack the enemy. The *Carthaginian* ships were almost all either taken or burnt. The land-forces made but a feeble resistance; but night coming on, *Imilco*, during that short suspension of hostilities, sent to *Dionysius* for permission to carry back to *Carthage* the small remainder of his troops, offering him 300 talents, which was all the money he had left. This permission could not be obtained but for the *Carthaginians* only, with whom he stole away in the night, leaving the *Africans* to the discretion of the enemy. However, to shew that what he had done was purely to preserve those few of his countrymen whom the plague had spared, and not from a cowardly care of his own life, he on his arrival at *Carthage* retired immediately to his house, shut the doors against the citizens, and even his own children, and killed himself.

yet, as *Polybius* reports, the *Conscript Fathers* could not be brought to determine for succouring *Messina* ;

A misfortune far greater than what the *Carthaginians* had just suffered in *Sicily* now threatened them at home : for the *Africans* resenting highly that their countrymen had been left behind in that island, to be slaughtered by the *Syracusians*, flew to arms in the utmost fury, seized upon *Tunes*, and, their numbers increasing to more than 200,000 men, marched directly to invest *Carthage*. Happily for the Republic, this numerous army had no leader, no discipline, no provisions, no engines of war. Disputes and jealousies quickly broke the lawless rabble into factions, and famine soon after entirely dispersed it.

Carthage, not yet despairing of the entire conquest of *Sicily*, made a new effort in that view. A General named *Mago* had the conduct of the enterprize. He lost 15,000 men and his own life in a battle against *Dionysius* ; and those of the *Carthaginian* army, who escaped the slaughter, were constrained to sue for peace. *Dionysius* insisted on their evacuating *Sicily*, and defraying all the expences of the war.

The *Carthaginians* pretended to accept the peace on these terms ; but representing that it was not in their power to deliver up the cities they possessed in *Sicily* without the express orders of their Republic, they obtained a truce, which was to last till the return of an express sent to *Carthage*. During this interval they chose the son of *Mago* to be their General. This new commander, tho' very young, yet by his great ability and conduct so improved the short time he had to manage, that at the return of the express he was in a condition to take the field, and give the enemy battle. He gained a victory over the *Syracusians*, so considerable, as to produce an honourable peace for the *Carthaginians*. By the conditions of the treaty, they not only kept all their possessions, but acquired some additional places, and had also a thousand talents from *Dionysius*.

Diod. Sic.
B. 15.

After the death of this the elder *Dionysius*, and in the time of the younger (his son and successor) *Carthage* took part in the troubles wherein *Syracuse* was involved, endeavouring to make advantage of them for establishing there her own domination.

Chap. I. *First Punic War.*

21

sina; because they judged, that the benefit which they should draw from it would not be greater than

mination. *Timoleon* from *Corinth* rescued the *Syracusians* from this danger, and reduced the *Carthaginians* to sue for peace, which was settled on the following terms: The river *Halycus* (or *Lycus*) near *Agrigentum* was to be the boundary of the *Carthaginian* territory in *Sicily*; all natives of the cities subject to the *Carthaginians* were to be allowed to withdraw, if they pleased, to *Syracuse* with their effects; and lastly, the *Carthaginians* were not to assist, or to have any correspondence with the several tyrants who at this time pretended to the lordship of that city.

Plut. in
Timol. a-
bout the Y.
ant. Chr.
346.

It was probably about the same time that *Hanno*, one of the most considerable citizens of *Carthage*, formed the design (but without success) of making himself Tyrant of his country, by poisoning the whole Senate at a banquet. His stratagem being discovered, he was put to death by torture; and his children, and all his relations, were at the same time cut off without mercy, tho' they had no share in his guilt.

Justin, B.
21. ch. 4.

Some years after this, the *Carthaginians* were terribly alarmed for their possessions in *Sicily*, by the growing power of the formidable *Agathocles*. This man, who is said to have been the son of a potter, owed the wonderful rise of his fortune in a great measure to the beauty of his person, his distinguished courage, and his enterprising genius; but chiefly to his consummate wickedness, the arts of treachery, and the practice of the most unbounded cruelties. He was now absolute lord of *Syracuse*. Not content with this elevation, he aspired to be King of all *Sicily*, and had made so swift a progress in subduing the island, that *Carthage* was obliged, in self-defence, to dispatch a very numerous army thither, to put a stop to his conquests. *Hamilcar* commanded it; he gave the Tyrant a total overthrow near the *Hymera*, pursued him even to *Syracuse*, and closely besieged him in that capital of his dominion.

About the
Y. ant. Ch.
317.

Justin, B.
22. Dio.
Sic. B. 19.
ch. 1. Poly.
B. 15. p.
1003.

The cruelties of *Agathocles* had made him universally detested by the *Sicilians*; he was now therefore deserted by all his allies, and he knew at the same time that his own forces were too weak to preserve the place. In these distress-

ful

than the reproach they should suffer for so inconsistent a conduct. But the people having been

ful circumstances he formed an enterprize worthy of the most accomplished Hero; To make a descent upon Africa, invade the dominion of his victorious enemies, and transfer the war to the very seat of their empire. His great foresight and judgment to discern that this design was practicable, and also the courage and prudence he displayed in the execution of it, are much admired by the historians, but cannot be enlarged upon here. Let it suffice to mention, that leaving under the command of his brother *Antander* a sufficient number of his troops to defend the city for some time, he put to sea with the remainder, without letting any body know his design, or what course he intended to steer: But, before his departure, to encourage the *Syracusians* to behave themselves with constancy during his absence, he assured them, that the siege would be but of short duration, and that he had found an infallible way to victory.

The forces which *Agathocles* took with him in this expedition amounted to about 14,000 men. Having landed these troops safely in *Africa*, he immediately called them together, opened to them his design, with the motives of it, and made them understand, that the only way to deliver their own country from its present distress was to carry the war into that of their enemies. He represented to them, that the citizens of *Carthage* were a luxurious and effeminate people, utterly unable to cope with the *Syracusians*, inured to the toils of war; that the unexampled boldness of his enterprize would alone disconcert and terrify them; that they were wholly unprepared to repel an enemy at their gates; that the *Africans*, always hating the *Carthaginians*, would infallibly join him upon the first notice of his landing; and, in a word, he promised them the whole wealth of *Carthage* as the certain reward of their courage in the present expedition. The soldiers received his harangue with applause and acclamations, and fancied themselves already in possession of that rich city. Taking advantage of their present sanguine temper, and the high hopes he had inspired them with, he then persuaded them to burn all their ships in honour to *Ceres* and

been greatly impoverished by the late wars, and it being represented to them by those who were to

and *Proserpine*, pretending, that in the passage to *Africa* he had secretly made a vow so to do, if those deities would grant him a prosperous voyage. When by thus destroying his fleet he had brought his soldiers under a necessity of placing all their confidence in their courage, he led them on to action.

Two considerable cities he successively attacked, and carried by assault in a short time; the latter was *Tunes*, not many miles from *Carthage*. The *Carthaginians*, terribly alarmed at the swift progress of this unexpected invader, hastily armed their citizens, to the number of above 40,000, and sent them out under the command of *Hanno* and *Bomilcar*, men who had been long at variance about family-interests. A pitched battle quickly ensued; *Hanno* was slain in it, the *Carthaginians* routed, and their camp taken. It is said, that *Bomilcar* might have restored the battle after the death of *Hanno*, if for private reasons of self-interest he had not chose rather to quit the field to *Agathocles*. After this victory many fortified places surrendered to the conqueror; and great numbers of the *Africans* revolted to him.

It was at this time that an embassy came to *Carthage* from the *Tyrians*, to implore succour against *Alexander* the Great, who besieged their city; a request which the *Carthaginians*, how willing soever, could by no means comply with in the present melancholy situation of their affairs.

Dio. Sic. B.
17. Q. Curt.
B. 4.

The unhappy condition, to which the *Carthaginians* were reduced, they ascribed to the anger of the Gods, provoked at some neglect of duty. It had been a custom from the very infancy of *Carthage*, and was become a part of their religion, to send annually to *Tyre* (the mother-city) the tenth, or what was so called, of the public revenue, as an offering to *Hercules*, the patron and protector of both *Tyre* and *Carthage*. But from the time that this revenue grew considerable, the whole tenth was not fairly remitted: Remorse seized the *Carthaginians*; and, to expiate their guilt, they now sent to *Tyre*, presents of a prodigious value.

Diod. Sic.
B. 20.

Another custom had prevailed at *Carthage* of a most barbarous and bloody superstition, that of sacrificing great numbers

to command the army, in case of an expedition into *Sicily*, how profitable it would be, not only to

bers of children to *Saturn*. Anciently those children were chosen out of the best families ; of late the children of slaves and beggars had been substituted in the room of the nobly born ; a fraudulent impiety, for the expiation of which, two hundred children of the first rank were now thrown into the fire, an offering to the God : And, as *Diodorus Siculus* reports, three hundred of the citizens voluntarily sacrificed themselves on this occasion to pacify the same Deity.

After these expiations expresses were dispatched to *Hamilcar* in *Sicily*, with the news of what misfortunes had befallen the Republic in *Africa*, and to urge him to send speedy succours to *Carthage*. *Hamilcar* commanded the deputies not once to mention the victory of *Agathocles*, but on the contrary to report, that his forces had been all cut off, and his whole fleet taken by the *Carthaginians*. The Senate of *Carthage* had sent to *Hamilcar* by the messengers all the beaks of *Agathocles's* ships which had been burnt, that by shewing them he might the more easily gain credit to this report. The stratagem had like to have proved successful. *Hamilcar* summoned the besieged to surrender, and shewed the beaks. The ruin of *Agathocles* being generally believed in *Syracuse*, the majority of the citizens, and *Antander* himself, were disposed to capitulate. But *Eurymnon*, an *Ætolian*, whom *Agathocles* had left behind him to counsel his brother, by much persuasion prevailed with them to hold out till they had certain intelligence of the truth. A galley of thirty oars arrived soon after in the port, and brought the news of *Agathocles's* victory, which at once restored life and resolution to the inhabitants. *Hamilcar* made a last effort to carry the city by assault, but without success. He then raised the siege, and sent 5000 men to the relief of his distressed country. Returning afterwards in hopes to surprize the city in the night, his design was discovered, his army defeated, and he himself taken prisoner. The *Syracusians* cut off his head, and sent it into *Africa*, a welcome present to *Agathocles*.

The confusion, into which all these disasters threw the *Carthaginians*, encouraged *Bomilcar* their General to attempt the

to the public in general, but to each man in particular, they passed a decree in favour of the enter-

the execution of a design he had long harboured in his breast; it was to make himself monarch of the *Carthaginian* state. He had gained over some of the citizens to his interest, and had secured a body of the foreign mercenaries to assist him. The conspiracy nevertheless proved abortive; he was overpowered, and being made prisoner, was crucified for his rebellion.

While *Bomilcar* was pursuing his wicked design against the liberties of his country, *Agathocles* was busy in a treachery of another kind. He had won over to his cause *Ophellias*, King of *Cyrene*, by pretending that he would leave him the empire of *Africa*, and that he had no view in his present expedition, but to draw the *Carthaginians* out of *Sicily*. *Ophellias* brought a considerable army to the assistance of the *Syracusians*. *Agathocles*, to get the absolute command of these troops, slew their leader by surprize, after which by fair words and large promises he engaged the *Cyrenians* to follow him.

His affairs being now in a flourishing condition, he thought it proper to leave them a while under the conduct of his son *Archagathus*, and return into *Sicily*, to take some care of his interests at home. His renown and the report of his victories flew before him. On the news of his arrival in *Sicily* many towns revolted to him; but it was not long before ill news recalled him into *Africa*. His absence had entirely changed the face of things in that country, and all his arts and endeavours proved ineffectual to restore them to their former condition. His army had been defeated, his strong holds had surrendered to the enemy, and his troops were mutinous for want of pay. He attacked the *Carthaginians* after his landing, but was repulsed and routed; he lost 3000 men in the action. After this defeat, and another disaster, by which he lost 4000 of his men, the *Africans* of his army all deserted him. Not thinking himself therefore in a condition to maintain the war any longer, he resolved to leave *Africa*; and not having ships sufficient to transport his troops into *Sicily*, he would have stole away with only a few of his friends,

Y. of R.
489. Bef.
J. C. 263.

b His colleague was
Fulv. Flaccus.

enterprize; and *Appius Claudius*,^b one of the Consuls, was ordered to conduct an army into *Sicily* to the relief of *Messina*.

Appius,

friends, and his younger son *Heraclides*; for he feared lest his elder son *Archagathus*, being a daring man, and having been too familiar with his step-mother, would attempt something against his life. *Archagathus* discovered his design, caused him to be arrested and put in chains. A sudden panic soon after seized the army, believing that the enemy was just ready to fall upon them. The guard, who had the King in custody, being in the same consternation with the rest, and in their fright coming out with their prisoner bound, the soldiers were so moved at this sight, that they all cried out, *Unloose him, let him go*. *Agathocles* was no sooner freed from his chains, but, consulting only his own safety, he got on board a small vessel, and set sail for *Sicily*, leaving his two sons to the fury of the enraged soldiers, who slew them both upon the first discovery of his departure. The *Syracusan* troops, tho' thus forsaken by their leader, made an honourable treaty for themselves with the *Carthaginians*, with whom also *Agathocles*, after his return into *Sicily*, concluded a peace upon equal terms, notwithstanding his late disasters and disgrace.

After the death of *Agathocles*, and when *Syracuse* was again involved in civil war, the *Carthaginians* renewed their attempt once more to subdue the whole island of *Sicily*. They possessed themselves of many cities belonging to the *Syracusians*, and invested *Syracuse* itself. This common danger obliged the contending parties in the city to unite, and call in King *Pyrrhus* to their aid. *Pyrrhus*, by repeated victories over the *Carthaginians*, deprived them in short time of all their possessions in *Sicily*, except the city of *Lilybæum* only. By his own misconduct he afterwards lost all the fruit of his successes, being abandoned by his *Sicilian* allies, and obliged to quit the island to preserve himself and his *Epirots* from total destruction. The *Carthaginians*, who before his departure had brought a mighty army into *Sicily*, not only recovered all their ancient possessions, but endeavoured to en-

large

Appius, to learn the posture of the enemy and the true state of things in that place, is reported

large their dominion by new conquests. *Hiero* being chosen to the government of *Syracuse*, opposed the progress of their arms, till the affair of *MESSINA* united the two powers in one enterprize, drew the *Romans* into *Sicily*, and gave commencement to the first *PUNIC WAR*.

The Form of the CARTHAGINIAN GOVERNMENT.

The government of *Carthage*, like that of *Rome*, was composed of three different authorities, which balanced each other; the authority of the two supreme magistrates, called *Suffetes* (from the *Phœnician* word *Sophetim*, which signifies *Judges*) that of the Senate, and that of the Assembly of the People: To these was afterwards added the Council of the Hundred.

The SUFFETES.

The *Suffetes* were annual magistrates, and their authority much the same with that of the Consuls at *Rome*. By the antient writers they are frequently styled Kings, Dictators, Consuls. History does not inform us of the manner of their election. Their office was to convene the Senate, to preside there, propose the matters for debate, and collect the voices. They also sat as chief Justices in private causes of importance: Nor was their authority confined to civil affairs, they sometimes commanded the armies.

The SENATE.

The number of which the Senate of *Carthage* consisted is not known; it must certainly have been very considerable, seeing an hundred persons were selected from it to form a separate council. In the Senate all public affairs were debated, the letters from Generals read, the complaints from the Provinces heard, Ambassadors admitted to audience, Peace and War determined. When the Senators were unanimous, there lay no appeal from their decision; but whenever they were divided in opinion, the affair devolved to the People; a regulation which seems well contrived to prevent divisions, and a factious opposition to reasonable counsels;

ed^a to have ventured over thither in a fisher-boat, and to have so happily conducted himself there,

counsels; for it was not to be supposed, that any member of an assembly, which had the prerogative of judging decisively in affairs, would willingly suffer them to be carried before another tribunal.

The PEOPLE.

Arist. B. 2. de Rep. ch. 11. It appears from *Aristotle's Elogium* on the Government of *Carthage*, that, so low as to his time, the People spontaneously left the chief administration of public affairs to the Senate. And *Polybius* remarks, that, while the Senate governed, the *Carthaginians* were successful in all their enterprizes. But at length riches and extensive conquests made the people insolent; and then forgetting that they owed their prosperity to the wise conduct of that venerable body, they not only interfered in the government of the State, but arrogated to themselves almost the whole power. From that period the public affairs were transacted wholly by cabals and factions; and *Polybius* assigns this as one of the chief causes of their ruin.

The TRIBUNAL of the HUNDRED.

Y. of Carthage 487. This Council was composed of 104 persons, though for brevity sake they are called *the Hundred*, and was instituted to be a check upon the *Carthaginian* Generals, who had used before to exercise an absolute and uncontrollable power when at the head of armies in the field; they now became accountable to these judges for their actions, on their return from the campaign.

Of these 104 Judges, five had a particular jurisdiction superior to that of the rest, and were like the Council of *Ten* in the *Venetian* Senate. A vacancy in their body could be filled by none but themselves. They had also the power of choosing those who composed the Council of *The Hundred*.

• *Primò ad explorandos hostes fretum piscatoria navi trajecit [Appius Claudius Caudex] et cum duce Carthaginensium egit, ut præsidium arce deduceret. Rhegium regressus, &c. Aurel. Viâ. ch. 37.*

That the Consul in person went over privately to *Messina*, seems to be supported by the words of *Polybius*, who speaks of

there, as by some means to make the *Carthaginian* officer and his soldiers evacuate the citadel; after

of the *Mamertines* sending for *Appius*, and surrendring their city to him, as of a transaction previous to the passage of the *Roman* army to *Messina*. But, according to this author, they had either by art or force rid themselves of the *Carthaginian* officer, before they called over *Appius*. Polyb. l. 1.

C. 11.

If we may believe *Zonaras*, the person who went over privately to *Messina* to learn the state of affairs in that city was not *Appius Claudius* the Consul, but one *Claudius* a Legionary Tribune, whom the Consul dispatched on that commission.

Zonaras differs in some particulars from *Polybius* concerning the origin of the first *Punic* War, and has many circumstances which are not mentioned by any writer but himself. He tells us, that the two Republics were mutually jealous of each other; each thought its own safety depended on subduing its rival. This was the true cause of the war. Thus far he agrees with other writers. But he adds, that the *Romans* assigned, for their motive to the war, some assistance which the *Carthaginians* had formerly given the *Tarentines* against *Rome*. The *Carthaginians* on the other hand alledged as their ground of quarrel, that the *Romans* had made a friendship with *Hiero* when he was at war with *Carthage*.

As to the affair of *Messina*, his relation is, in substance, as follows. The *Mamertines*, being besieged by King *Hiero*, ask succour from the *Romans*. The *Romans* knowing that, if this request should be refused, they would give themselves to the *Carthaginians*, who might then be able to pass into *Italy*, readily promise to send the succour desired. This promise however not being speedily performed, and the *Mamertines* being straightly pressed by the enemy, they apply for aid to the *Carthaginians*, who thereupon make peace with *Hiero*, both for themselves and for the *Mamertines*, as the most effectual means to hinder the *Romans* from coming into *Sicily*; and under a leader named *Hanno* they take upon them the guard of the city and of the straits. In the mean while

after which the Consul returned to *Italy* to prepare for the embarkation of his troops.

C H A P.

Claudius, a Legionary Tribune, whom the Consul had sent before him with a few ships, comes to *Rbegium*, but finding that the enemy has a much stronger fleet at sea, and the refore not daring to attempt the passage with his ships, he steals over privately in a small boat to *Messina*, and has a conference with the *Mamertines*; but through the opposition of the *Carthaginians* is obliged to return without effecting any thing. Afterwards, when he hears that the *Mamertines* are in some commotion (for tho' they would not consent to be subject to *Rome*, they were weary of the *Carthaginians*,) he goes over again, and promises that the *Romans*, if admitted into the place, shall return home as soon as they have restored *Messina* to a state of security. He then bids the *Carthaginians* quit the place, or give a good reason for staying. The *Mamertines* are silent through fear; the *Carthaginians* make him no answer, because they hold the city by force, and despise him. The silence of both, cries *Claudius*, shows that the *Carthaginians* act unjustly, and that the *Mamertines* desire liberty; for if these cared for the *Carthaginians*, they would promise to stand by them. The *Mamertines* applaud his words. He then returns to *Rbegium*, and endeavours to pass from thence to *Messina* with his fleet. In this attempt he loses some of his ships by stormy weather, others are taken by the *Carthaginians*, so that he is forced to return once more to *Rbegium*. The *Carthaginian* Admiral coming on the coast of *Italy* offers to restore the ships he had taken, but at the same time declares, that the *Straits* belong to the *Carthaginians*, and that he will not suffer the *Romans* even to wash their hands in them. *Claudius* hearing this, rejects the offer with indignation, repairs his fleet, and seizing a favourable opportunity, passes safely with his troops to *Messina*. *Hanno* was now retired into the citadel; he had quitted the city thro' a distrust of the inhabitants. *Claudius* persuades the *Mamertines* to invite *Hanno* to an amicable conference. The *Carthaginian*, tho' with great reluctance, comes to the assembly, lest the *Mamertines*, who already complained of his injustice, should begin hostilities against him. After much

C H A P. II.

First, second, and third Years of the War.

The Consul Appius Claudius Caudex transports an army into Sicily to the relief of Messina, besieged by the Carthaginians and Syracusians. He forces them to raise the siege. His successors make peace and an alliance with Hiero, King of Syracuse. The next year's Consuls, assisted by Hiero, take Agrigentum from the Carthaginians.

THE people of *Carthage*, upon the news of their officer's having quitted the citadel of *Messina*, were so highly offended, that

Polyb. B.
I. c. 11.

much altercation between him and *Claudius*, he is seized by a *Roman* officer, and carried to prison, the *Mamertines* approving of the action. Thus *Hanno* is reduced to the necessity of entirely abandoning *Messina*. The *Carthaginians* punish him for his ill conduct, and send a herald to signify to the *Romans* to quit *Messina* and all *Sicily* by a certain day; which demand not being complied with, they in the first fury of their resentment murder all the *Italian* mercenaries in their service; and then, assisted by King *Hiero*, lay siege to *Messina*.

Such is the account given us by *Zonaras*, of what passed in relation to *Messina* before the Consul went thither. But I do not find the least mention of the voyages or management of the Tribune *Claudius* in any other author. Only that the *Romans* sent some troops to *Messina*, as *Zonaras* relates, before *Appius* went thither with the main army, is supported by a fragment of *Diodorus Siculus*, who speaks of an agreement between *Hiero* and the *Carthaginians* to make war upon the *Romans*, unless they would immediately withdraw all their forces out of *Sicily*; and this is previous to the arrival of the Consul with the Legions.

they condemned him to be crucified, as both a traitor and a coward. They ordered at the same time a fleet and a land-army to besiege the place. *Hiero*, the new King of *Syracuse*, having now a fair prospect of exterminating the usurpers of *Messina*, entered into a league with the *Carthaginians*, and joined his forces to theirs: so that the *Mamertines* were entirely closed up within their city, the *Carthaginians* lying with a navy at sea, and with an army on one side of the place, while the *Syracusians* lay before it on the other.

In this their great danger came *Appius Claudius* the Roman Consul to *Rbegium* with an army appointed for their relief: but how to pass from thence to *Messina* was a difficulty that seemed insurmountable. Not that he wanted transports; for he had borrowed from the *Tarentines*, *Neapolitans*, and other neighbours, a sufficient number of *triremes* and boats of fifty oars, wherein to waft over his men: but the *Carthaginian* fleet was in the way, and was by much superior in strength to that of the Consul. He was obliged therefore to have recourse to stratagem. He pretended to give the enterprize entirely over as a thing impracticable, and, the better to deceive the enemy, steered his course towards *Rome*. This motion made the *Carthaginians* watch the *Straits* less narrowly; and then the Consul tacking about on a sudden, and being favoured by a dark night, passed to *Messina* without opposition^a. His

Frontin.
de Strat.
B. 1. ch. 4.

^a *Polybius* (from whom this account of the origin of the first *Punic War* is chiefly taken) tho' he does not directly charge the *Romans* with injustice in their beginning this war, yet declares

His arrival, however, did not discourage the besiegers; for they far exceeded him in number of

clares (L. i. c. 10.) that it would be difficult to justify them. Sir *Walter Raleigh* is clearly of opinion, that the *Romans* in this enterprize were unjust. His words are these. "Now

B. 5. ch.

1. §. 3.

"in this place I hold it seasonable to consider of those grounds whereupon the *Romans* entered into this [the first *Punic*] war; not how profitable they were, nor how agreeable to rules of honesty (for questionless the enterprize was much to their benefit, tho' as much to their shame) but how allowable in strict terms of lawfulness, whereupon they built all their allegations in maintenance thereof. That the *Mamertines* did yield themselves, and all that they had, into the *Romans* hands (as the *Campanes*, distressed by the *Samnites*, had done) I cannot find; neither can I find how the messengers of those folk, whereof one part had already admitted the *Carthaginians*, could be enabled to make any such surrendry in the public name of all.

"If therefore the *Mamertines*, by no lawful surrendry of themselves and their possessions, were become subject to *Rome*, by what better title could the *Romans* assist the *Mamertines* against their most ancient friends the *Carthaginians*, than they might have aided the *Campanes* against the *Samnites*, without the same condition? which was (as they themselves confessed) by none at all. But let it be supposed, that some point serving to clear this doubt is lost in all histories, doubtless it is, that no company of pyrates, thieves, outlaws, murderers, or such other malefactors, can by any good success of their villainy, obtain the privilege of civil societies, to make league or truce, yea to require fair war, but are by all means, as most pernicious vermine, to be rooted out of the world. I will not take upon me to maintain that opinion of some Civilians, that a Prince is not bound to hold his faith with one of these; it were a position of ill consequence. This I hold, that no one Prince or State can give protection to such as these, as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance against them, without becoming accessory to their crimes. Wherefore we may esteem this action of the *Romans* so far from being

of men, and the whole island was ready to relieve them in their wants ; and they were strong enough

“ justifiable by any pretence of confederacy made with them,
 “ as that contrariwise, by admitting this nest of murderers
 “ and thieves into their protection, they justly deserved to be
 “ warred upon themselves by the people of *Sicily*, yea altho’
 “ *Messina* had been taken, and the *Mamertines* all slain, ere
 “ any news of the confederacy had been brought unto the
 “ besiegers.”

To this reasoning of our learned countryman I take leave to answer :

WHETHER the messengers, who went to *Rome* from *Messina* from one part only of the *Mamertines*, could be enabled to treat in the name of all, or whether the *Mamertines* made such an absolute surrendry of their possessions to the *Romans*, as the people of *Capua* had formerly done, seems not material to the present purpose. Neither the *Romans* nor the *Carthaginians* could acquire any right to *Messina* in virtue of any such surrendry, whether made by a part or by the whole body of the *Mamertines*, these having themselves no right to the town, if they are to be considered as a nest of pirates, murderers, and outlaws, which is the light in which Sir *Walter* considers them.

In the next place, tho’ it be granted, that no one Prince or State can give protection to pirates, thieves, and murderers, as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance against them, without becoming accessory to their crimes ; I say, tho’ this be granted, it will not affect the present question, For that the *Romans* did not grant their protection to the *Mamertines*, in the circumstance above described, is evident from what our author himself relates. He tells us, that the *Carthaginians* (and they were the principals in the present war, *Hiero* was only an auxiliary) upon the news of their officer’s being driven out of the citadel of *Messina*, sent a fleet and an army to besiege the place, as a town that had rebelled, having once been theirs. These preparations were to punish rebellious subjects, not to punish the *Mamertines* as pirates and murderers, not for the injuries they had done to the lawful proprietors of *Messina*. It would indeed have been shameless

enough at sea to hinder any supplies from getting into the town. All this *Appius* well understood;

shameless in the *Carthaginians* to pretend the latter after they had made a league with the usurpers, treated them as a civil society, and consented to protect them against King *Hiero*.

From the whole then it would seem, that our author has not assigned sufficient reasons for passing so rigorous a sentence of condemnation against the *Romans*.

CHEVALIER FOLARD, who in his Comment upon *Poly-* B. 1. ch. 1.
bins entirely differs in opinion from Sir *Walter*, makes very §. 3.
short work with the present question.

A necessary war (says he) is always just. A war, without which the rights and liberties of a people must be greatly endangered, is a necessary war: This was the case of the *Romans* at the present juncture; and he cannot therefore believe, that the Senate of *Rome* were really so scrupulous as *Polybius* represents them to be, about accepting the offer made them by the *Mamertines*.

Nay the Chevalier declares, that not only the consideration of a present danger to our liberties, but even the prospect of a distant one, an allowable motive to begin a precautionary war; and that the too great power of any Prince will justify the neighbouring powers in making war upon him; because Liberty is a thing, which by both divine and human laws we are allowed to have so tender a concern for, that the apprehension of being deprived of it justifies whatever we do for its preservation.

As I shall not contend with the force of this argument, so neither can I think it necessary to have recourse to it to justify the *Romans* in the present war.

If the *Mamertines* are to be considered as a civil society, the *Romans* acted nothing contrary to justice in making an alliance with them, or in succouring them when in that alliance. *Rome* (if we may believe *Polybius*) had made no treaty with the *Carthaginians*, or with *Hiero*, whereby she was bound not to concern herself in the affairs of *Sicily*. *Polyb.* B. 3. c. 26.

If the *Mamertines* are not to be considered as a civil society,

Polyb. B.
I. ch. II.

Diod. Sic.
in Eclog.
p. 874.

derstood; and therefore apprehending both danger and dishonour in the enterprize, he dispatched ambassadors to the *Carthaginians* and *Hiero*, to treat of an accommodation, and obtain peace for the *Mamertines*. The answer^b from King *Hiero* was, that the *Mamertines* for their cruelty and wickedness in getting the possession of *Messina*, and for diverse other barbarities committed in *Sicily*, were most justly besieged; and that it did not become the *Romans*, so famed for their justice and faithfulness, to protect such bloody villains, who had contemptuously broken all the ties of faith and truth among men: That if the *Romans* began a war in defence of such wicked invaders, it would be evident to all the world,

but as a gang of robbers and pirates, *Messina* would then belong to the first civil society that should get possession of it; and the *Romans* having acquired the right of first possession, the *Carthaginians* must be considered as the aggressors; for I presume, that the latter cannot be deemed to have acquired the right of first possession even of the citadel, by the bare admission of their officer with a few men into it, since they did not enter the citadel as taking possession of it for themselves, but to guard it for the usurpers against King *Hiero*.

As to the conduct of the *Romans* in protecting the *Mamertines*, who had been guilty of the same crimes for which the Senate had punished the *Campanian* Legion, it must undoubtedly at first, as *Polybius* observes, have a strange appearance; but certainly, when by sparing the most notorious offenders a national good is to be obtained, much greater than could accrue from punishing such offenders, there is no doubt but the arm of vengeance may wisely and lawfully be stayed. And this appears plainly to have been the motive on which the *Romans* acted in the case now before us, even according to *Polybius's* relation of the matter,

^b According to *Diodorus Siculus*, the Consul's embassy was sent from *Rhegium* before he passed the *Straights*.

that

that *succour to the distressed* was but a pretence to cloke their covetousness, when in truth their aim was to gain *Sicily*.

The Consul finding his negotiation fruitless, and that he was under a necessity of fighting, took at length the bold resolution to sally out into the field, and make the enemies know, that his coming to *Messina* was to drive them from the town, and not to be by them besieged within it.

In executing this determination it was very advantageous for him, that the confederate armies lay incamped in such a manner, as not to be well able to assist one another in distress. *Appius* sallied out first against *Hiero*, and drawing up the Legions in order, presented him battle. This brave Prince (says a learned writer, well skilled in military affairs) must certainly have wanted good advice on the present occasion; otherwise he would not have hazarded all his power against an enemy, of whom he had made no trial, when it had been easy for him, and as much as was requisite, to defend his own camp. With great readiness and gallantry he accepted the challenge, and met the enemy; but after a long and bloody conflict, the *Syracusians* were defeated, and driven to save themselves within their intrenchments. The *Romans* returned triumphantly with the spoils of the dead into *Messina*.

The King, by this disaster, learnt a point of wisdom very useful both to him and his kingdom during the remainder of his life. Had *Messina* been taken by the *Carthaginians*, *Syracuse* itself must have sought help from *Rome* against those friends whom it now so diligently assisted,

Polyb. B.
I. C. II.

Sir W.
Raleigh.

Polyb. B.
3. C. 11.

ed. *Hiero* had (in respect of those two mighty States) but a small stock, which it behoved him to manage frugally; such another loss would have almost ruined him. He therefore quietly broke up his camp in the night, and retired home; intending to leave those to try the fortune of the war, who had hopes to be gainers by the event of it^c.

c. 12.

Appius receiving intelligence of the King's retreat, and finding the courage of his men greatly raised by their success in the late action, resolved to attack the *Carthaginians* without loss of time. Having caused the soldiers to take their repast at a very early hour, he sallied out by break of day, surprized the enemy, and routed them with great slaughter; those who escaped flying for refuge to the neighbouring towns. The *Romans* after this action made inroads upon the country as far as to the territory of the *Syracusians*, and at length set down before *Syracuse*. It does not appear, however, that the Consul made any progress in the siege: remitting the conduct of this enterprize to his successors, he returned to *Rome*^d.

§. II.

^c *Diod. Siculus* writes, that when the Consul landed at *Messina*, *Hiero*, suspecting that the *Carthaginians* had made way for him, fled himself to *Syracuse*.

Florus says, that *Hiero* confessed he was conquered before he saw the enemy.

Zonaras, B. 8. makes *Appius* to land with his forces, not at *Messina*, but some place near it, and to attack the *Syracusians* before he entered that town.

^d According to *Eutropius*, B. 2. and *Silius Italicus*, B. 6. *Appius Claudius* had a triumph for his victories; but the *Capitoline Marbles* say nothing of it.

He

Chap. II. *First Punic War.*

39

§. II. THE Romans being animated by the victories of *Appius* to pursue the war with more than ordinary vigour, it was decreed, that the Consuls for the new year, *Manius Valerius* and *Manius Otacilius*, should both go into *Sicily*, and should

Polyb. B. I.
c. 16.
Y. R. 490
Bef. Chr.
262.
189 Conf.

He acquired his surname of *Caudex*, if we may believe *Seneca*, (*de Brev. Vit.*) from his having transported the Roman army from *Italy* to *Sicily* in small boats, which the ancients called *Caudices*.

Mr. *Vertot*, perhaps on no other authority, says, that this General was the first who by the means of some Rafts transported troops into *Sicily*, which got him the surname of *Caudex*, as having found the art of fastening planks together, so as to make transports of them.

Chevalier *Folard* rallies the Abbot on this passage of his history, and wants to know his voucher. Doubtless the Chevalier has good reason to dispute the fact. It would have been madness for the Consul to have attempted to waft an army cross those straights on such transports; neither had he any occasion to have recourse to that dangerous expedient, all the ships in the ports of *Italy* being at his disposal; and *Polybius* expressly tells us, that *Appius* embarked his men on vessels of fifty oars, and on *triremes* borrowed of the *Tarentines*, *Locrians*, &c. This relation of *Polybius* is decisive also against *Seneca*.

The Chevalier will have it, that *Appius's* surname of *Caudex* was on account of a dull, stupid air, the word *Codex* signifying a blockhead.

Father *Catrou*, in the large Roman History, speaking of *Appius's* surname, keeps clear of Mr. *Vertot's* Rafts and *Seneca's* little Boats; but then he wants a reason for *Claudius's* surname of *Caudex*. He says, that when *Appius* undertook to cross the *Straights* with his fleet, he went himself on board a sorry galley, hastily and clumsily built (*une mauvaise galere tumultuairement construite & sans art.*) This enterprize happily executed, the Romans thought it so fine an exploit, that they gave the Consul the surname of *Caudex*, which word, adds the Father, signified then un mauvais bateau fait de planches mal arrangées & précipitemment réunies.

But

|| Diod. Siculus (p. 275.) makes the number to be 67.

should take with them four Legions, each consisting of 4000 foot and 300 horse. Upon the arrival of these forces in *Sicily*, most of the || towns, and castles, that had submitted to the *Carthaginians* and *Syracusians*, gave themselves up to the *Romans*; insomuch that the King of *Syracuse* found it high time for him to endeavour after a peace with an enemy so formidable, and that came now to besiege him in his capital. He perceived, says *Polybius*, that the designs and hopes of the *Romans* were better founded than those of the *Carthaginians*, and in conclusion therefore sent ambassadors to the Consuls to treat of peace and an alliance with *Rome*. *Valerius* and *Otacilius* readily embraced the overture, and the more readily, on account of the difficulties they were under with regard to their convoys. The *Roman* troops had the last year been driven to great straits, and there was good reason to apprehend lest the *Carthaginians*, who were masters of the sea, should be able totally to debar them of all supplies of provision. The Consuls nevertheless

But what reason in the world can be imagined why *Appius* should make choice of such a transport, wherein to convey his own person to *Sicily*, when he might have chosen the best *Triremis* in the fleet? I cannot find, that the Reverend Father has any authority for this fact.

If *Appius* did really acquire the surname in question, from the bad built and fashion of any vessel in which he crossed the Straights, I should conjecture it was from that fisher boat (which might be a *Caudex*) wherein, as *Aurelius Victor* reports, he courageously ventured over to *Messina*, to learn the state of things there before he transported his army thither.

made

Chap. II. *First Punic War.*

41

made the King purchase the alliance which he sought, with an hundred talents of silver.

Diodorus Siculus reports, that *Hannibal* the *Carthaginian* General was by this time come with a fleet to *Xipbonia* (not far from *Syracuse*) to the assistance of the King, but that hearing of what was done, he instantly retired^e.

Hiero after this treaty continued ever a firm and useful friend to the *Romans*; and being a Prince who not only made the prosperity of his subjects his chief aim, but always pursued that aim by measures honest and noble, he enjoyed a long and happy reign, dear to his people, be-

^e We find by the *Capitoline* Marbles, that a Dictator was created this year at *Rome* to drive the *Nail*, probably on account of some prodigies, or to stop the plague; from the same Marbles we learn also, that *Valerius* at his return to *Rome* was decreed a triumph, and that he acquired the surname of *Messala*; which § *Seneca* and † *Macrobius* tells us was given him for the conquest of *Messina*, (then called *Massana*.) It is hard to reconcile this with *Polybius*'s account, unless we suppose that the enemy got possession of that place after the return of *Appius Claudius* into *Italy*. The *Jesuits* believe rather, that *Valerius* performed some notable exploit in the defence of *Messina*, while *Otacilius* was other ways employed, and that this occasioned the distinction with which he was afterwards honoured above his colleague. *Pliny* authorizes this conjecture, when he tells us, (*B.* 35. ch. 4.) that *Valerius* brought with him from *Sicily* a picture representing the battle wherein he had vanquished *Hiero* and the *Carthaginians* before *Messina*. He fixed it up in the old palace of King *Tullus Hostilius*, where the Senate used to assemble.

The same author reports also, (*B.* 7. ch. ult.) that *Valerius* brought with him from *Sicily* another novelty, an horizontal sundial, and that he placed it on a pedestal in the *Comitium* near the *Rostra*.

In Eclog.
p. 875.

§ De Brev.
Vit.
† Saturn
B. 1,

loved

loved of his allies, and universally esteemed by all the *Greek* nations.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 17.

Y. R. 491.
Bef. Chr.

261.
190 Conf.

§. III. THE treaty with the *Syracusan* King being ratified by an ordinance of the *Roman* People, it was now thought adviseable to abate of the number of troops in the service, and to send into *Sicily* under the command of the new Consuls (*L. Posthumius Megellus* and *Q. Mamilius Vitulus*) only two Legions; which, through *Hiero's* friendship, they trusted, would live in plenty of all things necessary.

As for the people of *Carthage*, when they learnt that *Hiero*, of a friend was become an enemy, and when they considered that the *Romans* were now superior to them in strength, they turned their thoughts to provide a force that might be sufficient to preserve those acquisitions which they still possessed in the island. To this end they hired a great number of troops in *Gaul* and in *Liguria*, but principally in *Spain*; and having resolved to make *Agrigentum* † (a strong place, distant about eighteen furlongs from the sea, on the south coast of *Sicily*,) the rendezvous of their armies, and their chief magazine, they transported the mercenaries to that city.

† Called
also Agra-
gas, now
Gergenti.

The Consuls *Posthumius* and *Mamilius* were now arrived in *Sicily* with the Legions, and having got intelligence of the designs of the *Carthaginians*, and of the preparations they were making in *Agrigentum*, came to a resolution to march directly with their forces towards that place, and invest it. They pitched their camp about a mile from the town, and totally blockaded it up.

It happening to be the time of harvest, the *Roman* soldiers, who foresaw that the siege would be a long one, dispersed themselves abroad to forage; and this they did in so unguarded a manner, that it tempted the besieged one day to sally out upon them. The *Carthaginians* not only fell upon the reapers in the fields, but made a furious attack upon the *Roman* advanced guards, not without hopes to force the very camp. And here (says *Polybius*) the *Romans*, as on many other occasions, owed their preservation to that discipline in which they excelled all nations; for being accustomed to see those punished with death who deserted their post, or fled in battle, they diligently rallied, and bravely sustained the shock of the enemy, though superior in number. And though many of the *Romans* fell, the loss was much greater on the enemies side, who being at length surrounded when they had almost forced the *Roman* entrenchment, were with great slaughter driven back to their works. After this action the *Romans* became more wary in their foraging, and the *Carthaginians* less forward to make sallies. The Consuls however, the better to secure themselves, cut a deep trench between the walls of the city and their camp, and another on the side towards the country, to prevent any surprize that way; which double fortification also hindered the besieged from receiving any supplies whatsoever. At the same time provisions and all necessaries were brought to the besiegers by their *Sicilian* allies to *Erbesus*; and from that town, which lay not far from their camp, their convoys passed without impediment.

Affairs

Diod. Sic.
in Eclog. p.
875. Polyb.
B. 3. c. 18.

Affairs continued five months in this posture, neither party gaining upon the other any considerable advantage, their engagements being for the most part only in slight skirmishes. The besiegers received daily reinforcements from the *Sicilians*, and, in all, amounted to above 100,000 men. In the mean time the city being stuffed with a garrison of 50,000 soldiers began to be much straitned for provisions, *Hannibal*, who commanded there in chief, dispatched frequent advices to *Carthage*, representing the extremities to which they were reduced, and demanding speedy succour. The *Carthaginians* therefore embarking on board their fleet what soldiers and elephants they could readily muster, sent them into *Sicily* to *Hanno*, their other General in that country. *Hanno* having assembled all his forces at *Heraclea*, a maritime town a little to the west of *Agrigentum*, marched directly to *Erbesus*, where he had a secret correspondence, and which was put into his hands by treachery. By this loss the *Romans* not only were deprived of their wonted supplies, but became themselves almost as closely besieged by *Hanno*, as *Agrigentum* was their by their troops; and they must unavoidably have quitted their enterprize, if King *Hiero* had not relieved them in their distress. He found means to convey provisions to their camp, tho' not in great quantity, nor sufficient to prevent those distempers among the soldiers, which are the usual consequences of scarcity.

Polyb. P.
1. c. 19.

Hanno having intelligence of the bad condition of the *Roman* army, that the soldiers were enfeebled

feebled by want, and their number diminished by diseases, believed he might now be able to cope with them. He marched with fifty elephants, and all the rest of his forces from *Heraclea* (whether he had returned after the affair of *Erbesus*) sending his *Numidian* horse before, with orders to approach to the enemies camp, and endeavour to draw the *Roman* cavalry to a battle, in which they were to retreat till they joined the main body. The *Numidians* punctually performed their instructions. They marched up to the entrenchment of the enemy, and being attacked by the *Roman* horse, retired before them till they joined *Hanno* with the army, which almost encompassing the *Romans*, slew many of them, and drove the rest back to their camp. After this exploit, the *Carthaginian* made no other attempt for two months, but lay strongly encamped on an eminence about ten furlongs from the *Romans*, waiting for some opportunity to fight with advantage.

In the mean time *Agrigentum* was reduced to the utmost extremity by famine. *Hannibal* gave notice to *Hanno*, as well by signals from the town as by frequent expresses, that the garrison were no longer able to sustain the wants they laboured under, and that many of the soldiers were compelled by hunger to desert. This brought *Hanno* to resolve upon a decisive action, to which the *Romans* were no less disposed, on account of their inconvenient situation. The two armies therefore drawing out, came to an engagement on the ground between their camps. The suc-

Y. R. 491.
Bef. Chr.
261.
190 Conf.

cess was long doubtful; but *Hanno's* elephants being at length disordered by his own vanguard, which the *Romans* had broke and put to flight, those unruly beasts threw his whole army into confusion. *The Carthaginians* suffered a great slaughter; some few got into *Heraclea*, but the *Romans* took most of the elephants, and all the enemies baggage.

And now *Hannibal* turned all his thoughts to make his escape from *Agrigentum*, which he despaired of holding any longer; and perceiving that the *Romans* after their victory, wearied with labour, and grown secure by their good fortune, kept negligent watch, he rushed out of the place at midnight with all his foreign troops, and filling the *Roman* trenches with faggots, passed over their works unhurt and unperceived. The *Romans* saw not their error till the morning, when they contented themselves with a short pursuit, and presently returned to take possession of the town; which they entered without resistance, unmercifully despoiling the inhabitants both of their riches and of their liberty.

C H A P. III.

The fourth and fifth Years of the War.

The Romans, to accomplish their designs upon Sicily, find it necessary to provide themselves with a naval force. They build a considerable fleet, and by the help of a new-invented engine for grappling and boarding the enemies ships, gain a memorable victory over the Carthaginians at sea near Milæ, (now Milazzo.)

GREAT joy there was at *Rome* on the news of the taking of *Agrigentum*, and every body's courage and hopes were raised. They now thought it not enough to have rescued *Messina*, and enriched themselves by the war; they proposed nothing less than the entire expulsion of the *Carthaginians* out of *Sicily*; nay, and this was to be done the very next year by *L. Valerius* and *T. Otacilius*, their newly elected Consuls. However, they soon became sensible, that the task was too difficult to be accomplished in so short a time. For tho' a great number of the inland towns of *Sicily* had, after the reduction of *Agrigentum*, readily submitted to the *Romans*, who were evidently superior to their enemies by land; yet many places situate on the coast had revolted from them through fear of the *Carthaginian* strength by sea. And indeed this advantage on the side of *Carthage* made the success of the war still doubtful; which being well considered by the *Romans*, as also that the coast of

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 20.

Y. R. 492.
Bef. Chr.
260.
191 Conf.

Italy lay exposed to the depredations of the *Carthaginians*, who made frequent descents upon it, whilst *Africa* felt none of the calamities of war, they at length resolved to apply themselves diligently to maritime affairs, and even, at their first essay, to make provision for such a fleet, as should be able to contend with the naval power of *Carthage*.

Polybius, in speaking on this subject, cannot forbear to express his admiration of the magnanimity of the *Romans*, so void of fear in enterprizes of the greatest hazard and moment; and it is in truth an astonishing instance of the resolute bravery of this people, that being hitherto extremely ignorant in all the arts relating to navigation, they should now at once determine upon a naval battle with the *Carthaginians*, who had held uncontested, from time immemorial, the dominion of the sea.

The same author tells us, that the *Romans* were not at this time masters ^f of one single galley,

^f Doubtless *Polybius* goes too far, when he affirms that the *Romans* had no ships before the first *Punic* war; the ancient treaties between *Rome* and *Carthage*, which he himself presents us with, evince the contrary; nay, it appears by the former part of this history, that they had ten ships of war at the time of the rupture with the *Tarentines*. And as to what he says of the loss the *Romans* would have been at to build a fleet, if they had not seized a *Carthaginian* vessel, which chanced to be stranded, his meaning, to be consistent with himself, must be, either that without this accident they would have had no good model whereby to build any ship of war, or would have had no model at all of a *quinqueremis*. For he tells

Chap. III. *First Punic War.*

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ley, no not even of a bark, and were so little skilled in ship-building, that if fortune had not favoured them, it would have been almost impossible for them to put their design in execution. A *Carthaginian* galley cruizing on the coast of *Italy*, and venturing too near the shore, happened to be stranded; the *Romans* seized her before the crew could get her off, and, by the model of this galley, their first fleet, which consisted of 100 *quinqueremes* and 20 *triremes*, was built.

While these vessels were upon the stocks, the men appointed to be the rowers were taught the use of the oar in the following manner. Seats were raised on the sea-shore in the same fashion and order as they were to be in the galleys, and the mariners being placed thereon, an officer

C. 21.

tells us in the very same part of his history, that some of the vessels in which they transported their troops the first time to *Messina* were *triremes* (and these were ships of war) borrowed from their neighbours the *Tarentines*, &c.

Of the ancient ships of war the most considerable were the *naves longæ* (long-ships, or galleys) so named from their form, which was the most convenient to wield round or cut their way; whereas the ships of burden were generally built rounder and more hollow, that they might be more easy to load, and might hold the more goods. The most remarkable of the *naves longæ* were the *triremis*, the *quadriremis*, and the *quinqueremis*, exceeding one another by one bank of oars, which banks were raised sloping one above another. Some indeed fancy a different original of these names, as that in the *triremes*, for example, either there were three banks one after the other on a level, or that three rowers tugged all together at one oar; but this is contrary not only to the authority of the classics, but to the figures of the *triremes* still appearing in ancient monuments. *Kenner's Antiq.* part 2. b. 4. ch. 20.

who stood in the midst of them, instructed them, by signs with his hand, how at once and all together to dip their oars, and in like manner to recover them out of the water. They afterwards spent some time in practising upon the water what they had been learning at land, adventuring first along the coast of *Italy*.

Y. R. 493.
Bef. Chr.
259.
192d Conf.

Before the finishing ^h of this naval armament, the Consular *Fasces* were transferred to *Cn. Cornelius Asina* and *C. Duilius*. It fell to *Cornelius* to be the *Roman* Admiral. Leaving orders with the pilots to make the best of their way to the *Straights* so soon as all the new vessels should be equipped, he with only 17 of them repaired to *Messina* to give directions for the reception and security of the main fleet. He had not been long there, when, deceived by some false intelligence, he thought he had a fair occasion of surprising *Lipara* ⁱ. Thither he went with his squadron, and drew up under the walls of the town. *Hannibal*, who commanded at sea for the *Carthaginians*, and was now at *Panormus*, having notice of this design, immediately dispatched away 20 galleys under the command of one *Boodes* a Senator, who arriving in the night, blocked up *Cornelius* in the harbour. As soon as day appeared, the *Roman* mariners, in their first fright,

Polyb. B. 1.
ch. 21.

^h According to *Florus*, B. 2. and *Orosius*, B. 4. ch. 7. the *Romans* were but sixty days in building and equipping their fleet, reckoning from the time that the necessary timber was prepared.

ⁱ A town in a small island of the same name, not far from *Sicily*, to the north.

to save themselves, got with all diligence ashore. The Consul in this distress seeing no remedy, yielded himself prisoner; and the *Carthaginians* possessing themselves of the 17 vessels, and the principal *Roman* officers, made the best of their way back to *Hannibal*.

Y. R. 493.
Bef. Chr.
259.
192d Conf.

Such is *Polybius's* account of this affair: But according to *Livy's* Epitome, B. 17. *Cornelius* was made prisoner by treachery, being decoyed from his ship by the pretence of a parley, to which the *Carthaginian* commander invited him in order to a peace.

Not long after this adventure of *Cornelius*, *Hannibal* himself was very near falling into a like disaster by an equal indiscretion. For having received advice that the *Roman* fleet was at sea, and coasting along *Italy*, he would needs be himself a witness of the number and posture of the enemy; and to that end went in search of them with only fifty of his galleys. The *Romans* happened to be nearer than he was aware of, and just as he doubled a promontory on the *Italian* coast, surprized him with their whole fleet in order of battle. In this encounter he lost the greater part of his squadron, and escaped narrowly himself, when every body despaired of his safety.

The *Romans* continued their course towards *Messina*, pursuant to the instructions they had formerly received from *Cornelius*, of whose defeat and captivity having got advice, they immediately sent the news of it to *Duilius* (who then had the command of the land-forces in the island).

Y. R. 493.
Bef. Chr.

259.
192d Conf.

|| The
Crow.

island) and while they waited the coming of the Consul, they prepared for a new engagement with the enemy, whose fleet they heard was not far off. And considering that their own ships were heavy and slow, not having been built with great art, they turned their thoughts to contrive some new invention which might compensate for this disadvantage; and then was devised that famous machine which they afterwards called the || *Corvus*.

The learned cannot agree concerning the exact form of this engine. *Polybius's* description of it has not been found sufficient to make it clearly understood. It appears to have been a kind of draw-bridge, so framed on the prow of the vessels, that being let fall upon an enemy's ship, it served both to grapple her and to render the boarding her more easy.

6. 23.

Duilius, upon the first notice of what had happened to his colleague, remitting the conduct of the land-army to his Tribunes, hastened to the fleet; where hearing, on his arrival, that the enemy were cruising on the coast near *Mylæ*, which was not far from *Messina*, he made the best of his way with all his galleys to encounter them. Their fleet consisted of 130 ships, and was commanded by the same *Hannibal* who had escaped with his army by night from *Agrigentum*. His own vessel was a *septiremis*, or galley of seven banks of oars, belonging formerly to *Pyrrhus* King of *Epirus*.

The *Carthaginians* greatly rejoiced when they descryed the *Romans*, whom they held in such
extreme

extreme contempt, that they advanced with their prows directly upon them, careless of any order of battle, and dreaming of nothing but certain victory. But when they drew near, they became much astonished at the sight of the engines before mentioned, having never seen the like before, and not being able to conjecture the design of them. However, they staid not long in suspense, nor did the novelty of what they beheld lessen their presumption. The headmost of their vessels made a furious attack upon the *Romans*, who grappling with them by means of their engines, entered them at once, fighting upon deck hand to hand with their enemies, as upon firm ground. And now neither the lightness of the *Carthaginian* galleys, nor the skill of their mariners, availed any thing; all was carried by the advantage of weapon and superiority of valour, and both these were on the side of the *Romans*. The *Carthaginians* lost in this first encounter thirty of their vessels, of which *Hannibal's* galley was one, he himself escaping in a small boat, when he was by all given for lost. At length the rest of the fleet came up; but having perceived the terrible effect of the new engines in the defeat of their first squadron, they used all their endeavours to avoid them, nimbly rowing round the *Roman* galleys, to find an opportunity of attacking them with safety; but when they observed, that which way soever they approached, those machines were traversed and opposed to them, they were at length compelled to yield the ho-

Y. R. 493.
Bef. Chr.
259.
192d Conf.

Val. Max.
B. 7. ch.
3. in Ex-
tern.

nour of the day to the *Romans*, retiring with the loss of fifty more of their ships.

Hannibal with the remainder of his fleet stood away for *Africk*, but fearing lest crucifixion should be his fate, he sent before him one of his friends, a man well chosen for the commission, who being introduced into the Senate, *Your Admiral*, said he, *desires to know your opinion, whether, in case the Romans appear at sea with a numerous fleet, he should give them battle? Doubtless he ought to fight,* they all cried out, unanimously. The messenger then added, *He has fought, and is vanquished.* And thus *Hannibal* escaped the danger that hung over him; for they were no longer free to condemn an action which they had already approved.

Polyb. B. 1.
ch. 24.

As for *Dulius*, the courage of whose men was greatly raised by their late surprising victory, he landed his forces on the island, and marched to the relief of *Segesta*, which the enemy at that time closely besieged. He not only forced them to raise the siege of this place, but took from them *Macella* by assault. After these exploits leaving the land-army behind him, he returned to *Rome*, to receive the recompence due to his valour and conduct. A victory at sea so unexpected, so complete, and so important, made all former victories at land to be in a manner forgot. The conqueror, beside the usual honour of the *Triumph*, which was decreed him, was suffered to assume a new one of his own invention. During the rest of his life, whenever he had supped abroad in the city, he caused himself to be attended home with flambeaux and music. Medals were struck

Cic in Cat.
maj.
Florus, B.
2.

by

Chap. IV. *First Punic War.*

55

by the *Romans* to perpetuate the memory of his exploit; and to the same end they erected in the *Forum* a † *Rostral Pillar* of white marble. This pillar was in the last century accidentally dug up out of the ground, in that part of *Rome* which was formerly the *Roman Forum*. There are yet the figures of six *Rostra*, or *Prows* of *Roman* galleys sticking to it, and a long, but imperfect inscription on the pedestal,

Y. R. 493.
Bef. Chr.259.
192d Conf.† Columna
Rostrata.

C H A P. IV.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth Years of the War.

The Romans invade Corsica and Sardinia with success, reduce some places in Sicily, and come to an engagement at sea with the Carthaginians near Tyndaris.

THE Consuls for the following year were *L. Cornelius Scipio* and *C. Aquilius Florus*. While the former employed himself on the coast in getting the fleet ready for new enterprizes, the latter was detained at *Rome* on occasion of a conspiracy then on foot to plunder and burn the city. Four thousand *Samnites* being appointed, contrary to their inclination, to serve as rowers in the galleys, had united with three thousand discontented slaves in this design; but a certain commander of auxiliaries, whom they had chosen to be their leader, and who seemed at first to go heartily into their measures, had no sooner learnt their whole secret, than he discovered it to the Senate,

Y. R. 494.
Bef. Chr.258.
193d Conf.Orosius, B.
4. ch. 7.
Zon. B. 3.

Y. R. 495.
Bef. Chr.
257.
194 Conf.

Senate, who took effectual care to avert the mischief and punish the offenders.

Before this domestick disturbance was quite over, *Cornelius* weighed anchor and put to sea. Ambitious of signalizing himself by some exploit yet unattempted, he made a descent first upon *Corfica*, and then upon *Sardinia*, and in a short time made considerable progress in the conquest of those islands, the possession of which was of great importance to the *Romans*, who now aspired to the empire of the seas.

Aquilius went late into *Sicily*. The affairs of the *Romans* had suffered much in that island since the departure of *Duilius*. For a dispute had arisen between the *Roman* and *Sicilian* troops about the post of honour; which dispute was carried so far as to produce a separation. *Hamilcar* (the *Carthaginian* General by land) who was then at *Panormus*, having intelligence of this division, surprized the *Sicilians* as they were about to encamp between *Paropus* and *Thermas*, and slew four thousand of them. He had also taken *Enna* and *Camarina*, and had fortified *Drepanum*.

Aquilius staid in the island all the winter in quality of Pro-Consul, and by his able conduct brought affairs into a better posture.

In the mean time his colleague held the *Comitia* for the new elections, where *A. Atilius Calatinus* and *C. Sulpicius Paternulus* were chosen Consuls. The command of the land-army fell to the former, the fleet to the latter. Soon after the arrival of *Calatinus* in *Sicily*, *Misistratum*, which the Pro-consul

Polyb. B.
1. c. 24.

consul *Aquilius* had reduced to the last extremity, surrendered to him. From thence he marched towards *Camarina*; but in his way, not taking sufficient precaution, he brought his army into a valley, where he was shut in, and surrounded by the *Carthaginians* under the command of *Hamilcar*. In this desperate situation *Calpurnius*^b *Flamma*, a legionary Tribune, undertook, with the Consul's consent, an action of bravery much extolled by the historians. With three hundred chosen men, he, to make a diversion, seized an eminence, where he knew the *Carthaginians* would soon attack him, and from whence he could have little hope to escape. He promised himself, that by this motion he should give the enemy so much employment, that they would not be able to obstruct the Consul's march. The stratagem succeeded. The *Carthaginians*, in their attempt to dislodge him, met with so obstinate a resistance, that they were forced to bring almost the whole body of their army to the charge; and in the mean time the Consul with his legions got safely through the pass with little opposition. Of the three hundred *Romans* *Calpurnius* was the only person that escaped: He was found miserably wounded, but still breathing, under a heap of dead bodies, and his wounds being carefully dressed, he recovered. A *Crown of Gramen* was the reward of his exploit.

Calatinus after this escape continued his march towards *Camarina*, and by the help of engines,

^b He is called by some writers *Caditius*, by others *Laberius*.
sent

Y. R. 495.
Bef. Chr.
257.
194 Conf.

Zon. B. 8.
Orosius,
Florus,
Aurel.
Victor, c.
39.
Livy, epit,
B. 17.
Livy, B. 22,
c. 60.

Pliny, B.
22. c. 6.
and Diod.
in Eclog. p.
876.

Y. R. 495.
Bef. Chr.
257.
194 Conf.

sent him by King *Hiero*, made himself master of it. *Enna* betrayed her garrison, and opened her gates to him. He took *Sittanum* by assault, and then many other towns surrendered without standing a siege, and, among the rest, *Erbesus* in the country of the *Agrigentines*. Flushed with this success he undertook the siege of *Lipara*, expecting for the future to meet with no resistance wherever he appeared: But *Hamilcar* having got notice of his design, had stolen with some troops into the place; and when the *Romans*, who saw none but citizens upon the ramparts, confidently began to scale the walls, they were on a sudden surprized by a sally of the *Carthaginians*, and shamefully repulsed with considerable loss. And thus *Calatinus* finished his campaign, which by the mixture of good and bad success, gained him but little honour.

Zon. B. 8.

As for the other Consul, *Sulpicius*, he had conducted the fleet like an able commander. He had not only assisted his colleague in the reduction of the maritime towns of *Sicily*, but had much advanced the conquest of *Sardinia* and *Corfica*. However, this did not satisfy his passion for glory; he burnt with a desire of distinguishing himself by a naval victory: And because no *Carthaginian* fleet appeared at sea, he spread a report, that he intended to go and burn the ships of the *African Republic* in their harbours. This news alarmed the *Carthaginians*, and they trusted *Hannibal* once more with the command of a considerable fleet. He found *Sulpicius* with his not far from the coast of *Africa*. But when both sides

were preparing for an engagement, a storm separated them, and drove the ships of both fleets into the ports of *Sardinia*. After this, *Sulpicius* surprized the *Carthaginian* admiral in a harbour of that island, and took many of his galleys; which misfortune begetting a mutiny in the remainder of his fleet, the mariners seized on his person, and crucified him.

Y. R. 495.
Bef. Chr.
257.
194 Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 24.

The year following, when *C. Attilius Regulus* and *Cn. Cornelius Blasio* were Consuls, the former being with the fleet at *Tyndaris*, descryed the *Carthaginian* fleet standing along the coast in a confused and careless manner, whereupon he hastened with a squadron of ten gallies to give them chase, directing at the same time the rest of his ships to follow him. The *Carthaginians* observing that the detached squadron was advanced a good distance from the enemies main fleet, tack- ed about on a sudden, and surrounding the ten ships, quickly sunk them all, except the admiral's galley, which escaped only by her lightness, and the force of her oars. But the rest of the *Roman* fleet coming up soon after in order of battle, amply revenged this disgrace; for the *Carthaginians* were forced to fly to the island of *Lipara* with the loss of eighteen of their vessels, of which eight were sunk, and the other ten taken.

Y. R. 496.
Bef. Chr.
256.
195 Conf.

c. 25.

Little was performed this year by land, the armies engaging in no action of importance, and the contending powers being chiefly solicitous about the increase of their naval strength, which for good reason, as we shall presently see, was by each side deemed to be more than ever its principal affair.

C H A P.

C H A P. V.

The ninth Year of the War.

The Romans, under the conduct of Marcus Attilius Regulus and L. Manlius, defeat the Carthaginians in the memorable sea-fight of Ecnomus; after which they make a descent upon Africa. Carthage, though reduced to great extremity, rejects the hard conditions of peace proposed by Regulus.

Y. R. 497.
Ref. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

Polyb. B.
I. c. 26.

|| 2d time.

THE struggle between the rival Republics for the dominion of *Sicily* had now lasted eight years, and *Carthage* had already lost the greater part of her acquisitions in that island, when the *Romans*, to make her relinquish the rest, undertook to transfer the war into *Africa*. They imagined, that they should hereby reduce the *Carthaginians* to the necessity of calling home all their forces for the defence of their own country. The naval preparations of the *Romans* the last year had been wholly in view to the execution of this design; and the fleet which they now put to sea under the command of their new Consuls, *Marcus Attilius* || *Regulus* and *L. Manlius*, was suitable to the importance of the enterprize; for it consisted of no less than 330 ships of war.

On the other hand the *Carthaginians*, who well knew how easy it was for an enemy, who had once got footing in their country, to subdue the inhabitants on the coast, and to march even to the

walls of *Carthage*, had determined to exert their utmost strength in opposing the intended descent. Fully bent upon a sea-engagement, they had equipped a fleet that was still more numerous than that of the *Romans*. They arrived at *Lily-beum* with 350 galleys. From this place they went afterwards to *Heraclea Minoa*, where they staid at anchor, waiting the motions of the enemy.

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

The *Roman* fleet had touched at *Messina*, and had thence steered its course along the coast of *Sicily* that lay to the right, and having doubled the promontory of *Pacbinum*, was come to *Ecnomus*, where their land-forces then were. From these the Consuls selected the ablest of the soldiers for the present service, providing all things necessary either for a battle with the enemy by sea, if it should be offered, or to make an irruption into *Africa*, if their voyage thither should not be obstructed. Each galley in the *Roman* fleet had 300 rowers and 120 soldiers, so that the whole army amounted to near 140,000 men. As the *Carthaginians* exceeded their enemies in number of ships, so was their army proportionably greater, consisting of above 150,000 mariners and soldiers. And now, says *Polybius*, who could behold, or but barely hear of such fleets and armies, and of the hazard to which these contending States were exposed, without being astonished at the mightiness of their power, and without taking part in the danger with which they threatned each other?

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.

255.
196 Conf.

Ecnomus was not far from *Heraclea* ; the two parties were obstinately determined, the one to invade, the other to defend ; it was easy therefore to foresee they would soon come to a battle.

The *Romans* considering the advantage which the *Carthaginians* had over them in the lightness and ready working of their galleys, took especial care to draw up their fleet, that it should be difficult to break its order. They divided their ships into four squadrons, to three of which they gave the names of *the first*, *the second*, and *the third fleet* ; and these, in three lines, composed the form of a wedge or triangle, pointing towards the enemy.

The *first fleet* to the right, and the *second* to the left (keeping the prows of their vessels turned outwards) made the sides of the triangle ; and at the head of these two lines, that is, at the point where they met, were the Consuls *Regulus* and *Manlius*, in two galleys abreast of each other. The *third fleet* made the base of the triangle, and towed the vessels of burden, which carried the horses and baggage.

In the rear of all was the fourth division, which they called the *Triarians*, a term taken from the land-forces. This squadron was drawn up in a line parallel to the base of the triangle, but was stretched so far in length, that its two extremities extended a good way beyond those of the base.

The several divisions of the *Roman* fleet being thus disposed, the whole, says *Polybius*, was fit for action, and very difficult to be broken.

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The *Carthaginian* fleet was commanded by *Hanno*, who had succeeded so ill during the siege of *Agrigentum*, and by *Hamilcar*, who had fought near *Tyndaris*. These admirals observing how the *Roman* galleys were drawn up, and rightly conjecturing the intention of such a disposition, turned their thoughts to disappoint it, by the order in which they should dispose their own vessels, and by stratagem. Having divided their whole fleet into four squadrons, they drew three of them up in one long line frontways, their prows pointing directly on the enemy. *Hanno* was with the squadron which formed the right of this line, and which stretched a great way out into the sea. He had with him all the best rowing galleys, such as were proper to attack and retreat, and could row round the *Romans* at pleasure. *Hamilcar* was with the squadron in the left of the line. The third squadron, which made the center, was designedly drawn up very thin, that the *Romans* might be tempted to begin the attack there, in which case this squadron had orders to retreat, thereby to engage the *Roman* galleys, which made the two sides of their triangle, in a pursuit, which would separate them from the base.

The fourth division of the *Carthaginian* fleet, in form of a Tenail, kept close under the shore which lay to the left of their long line of battle.

The stratagem above mentioned, and which *Polybius* imputes to *Hamilcar*, succeeded. The *Romans* began their attack on the *Carthaginians* in the middle of their line. The galleys that were attacked pretended to fly through fear, and the

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.

255.
196 Conf.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 27.

Y. R. 497.
 Bef. Chr.
 255.
 196 Conf.

assailants, that is to say, the first and second fleets of the *Romans*, pursuing them warmly, disjoined themselves from their third fleet (which towed the baggage) and from the *Triarians* in the rear of all.

When the *Carthaginians* judged that the first and second fleets of the *Romans* were sufficiently distanced from the rest, the signal was given from *Hamilcar's* galley; whereupon those that were chased by the *Romans* immediately tacked, and made head against the pursuers, *Hamilcar* with his squadron charging them at the same time. And now the battle grew warm; for though the *Carthaginians* had the advantage in the lightness and ready working of their vessels, yet the *Romans* lost not their assurance of success in the end; they found themselves better men when they came to the sword's point, and they had great trust in their engines, with which they grappled and boarded the enemy; besides, the soldiers were animated by the presence of their Generals, in whose eye they fought, and who themselves engaged in equal hazard with the rest.

Polyb. B.
 I. c. 28.

During this conflict, *Hanno*, who commanded the squadron which had formed the right of the *Carthaginian* line, bearing down upon the *Roman Triarians* attacked them vigorously, and succeeded so well, as to reduce them to very great extremities.

At the same time the fourth squadron of the *Carthaginians*, which in form of a Tenaïl had been posted close under the shore, ranged themselves into a front, and advanced against that squadron

dron of the *Romans* which they called their *third fleet*, and which had made the base of their triangle. This fleet was therefore obliged to cast off the vessels they had in tow, which having done, they received the *Carthaginians*, and fought them with great bravery. So that now might be seen three naval battles at one and the same instant.

The fortune of the day was for some time doubtful, and would at length have infallibly declared for the *Carthaginians*, if *Hamilcar's* courage had been equal to his skill in stratagem, and if, with his two squadrons of the left and the center, he had only maintained the fight against the *first* and *second fleets* of the *Romans*, so as to hinder them from going to the assistance of their other fleets; but he, after some loss, shamefully fled out of the battle. And now while *Manlius* employed himself in towing away such ships as had been taken, *Regulus*, who perceived the great danger the *Triarians* were in from *Hanno's* attack, advanced with all diligence to their relief, taking with him those ships of his colleague's squadron which had not suffered any thing in the engagement with *Hamilcar*. The *Triarians* hereupon, though now almost quite vanquished, recovered heart, and renewed the battle with alacrity. *Hanno* seeing himself thus assaulted, contrary to all expectation, both in front and rear, betook himself to his oars, and made off to sea, yielding the day to the *Romans*.

About the same time *Manlius* coming up, and joining *Regulus*, they both hastened to the suc-

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

Y. R. 497.
 Bef. Chr.
 255.
 196 Conf.

cour of their *third fleet*, which had been forced under the shore by the *fourth squadron* of the enemy, and was in a manner besieged there. This *third fleet* would have been in great danger of destruction, before the Consuls could have come to its rescue, if the *Carthaginians* had had the courage to push their advantage; but their dread of being grappled by the *Corvi*, and of coming to a close fight with the *Romans*, was so great, that they contented themselves with driving their enemies against the shore, and there keeping them beset. And now they were themselves entirely surrounded by the *Romans*, who took fifty of their ships with all their equipage. Such was the event of this last combat in particular. The *Romans*, every where victors, took in all sixty-four of the *Carthaginian* galleys, and sunk thirty. Of their own fleet they lost but twenty-four galleys, and these perished against the shore, not one was taken.

Polyb. B.
 1. c. 29.

The Consuls, after this victory, returned into the ports of *Sicily* to take in provisions and fresh troops, and prepare anew for a descent upon *Africa*.

Whilst they were thus employed, *Hanno* made no scruple to go in person to amuse them by conferences about peace, which *Hamilcar* had refused to do, for fear he should be treated as the *Carthaginians* had treated *Cornelius Asina* five years before. *Hanno's* confidence was founded upon a different judgment of the temper of the *Romans*; and experience on the present occasion shewed that he judged rightly. For when a cer-
 tain

tain legionary Tribune cried out, *That he ought to be detained prisoner by way of reprisal for the treachery practised towards Cornelius*, both the Consuls immediately ordered him silence; and then turning to *Hanno*, *The faith of Rome secures thee from that fear.* The Carthaginian was dismissed in safety, but his proposals were rejected, and the Consuls pursued their enterprize.

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

The Romans had a fortunate voyage, and landed in the neighbourhood of *Clypea*, near the promontory of *Mercury*. Having made themselves masters of that town, they would not advance any further till they had received fresh instructions from *Rome*: For such was the dependance of the Consuls upon the Senate at this time, that they did little more than execute the orders of the Fathers; most of whom being experienced soldiers, and having commanded armies, were very capable of directing the conduct of their Generals. The Consuls however did not continue in a perfect inaction; they fortified *Clypea* after the *Roman* manner, and detached parties to ravage the rich territory all around, and plunder the fine houses of the *Carthaginian* nobles. These detachments, meeting no opposition, brought away an immense booty, besides 20,000 prisoners, who were made slaves.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 29.

When the Consuls messenger came back from *Rome*, he brought orders for *Manlius* to return to *Italy* with the fleet, and for *Regulus* to continue in *Africa* with a sufficient number of troops to carry on the war. The people of *Rome* depended greatly on the courage and abilities of

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

Val. Max.
B. 6. c. 6.

Polyb. B.
1, c. 29.

Flor. B. 2.
Zon. B. 8.

Val. Max.
B. 1. A.
Gell. B. 6.
Plin. B. 8.

Regulus, and the city was in universal joy upon the publishing of this regulation. But when the news of it came to *Regulus*, he was much afflicted. His pretext was, the bad condition of his little farm of seven acres of land. He represented to the Senate, that upon the death of the husbandman, to whom he had committed the care of his farm, the management of it had fallen to a day-labourer, who had since stolen his instruments of husbandry, and carried off all his stock; so that his presence was necessary at home to provide for the subsistence of his wife and children. Upon this the Senate gave orders that his losses should be repaired, his farm taken care of, and his family maintained at the public expence; but he himself was directed to stay in *Africa*. *Manlius* leaving behind him forty ships, 15,000 foot, and 500 horse, returned to *Italy* with the rest of the army, and with all the prisoners which had been taken upon the continent of *Africa*.

Regulus made incursions into the country, and pushed on his conquests with prodigious ^a rapidity.

^a *Regulus*, in the progress of his conquests, encamping on the banks of the *Bagrada*, a river that discharged itself into the sea not far from *Carthage*, is said by many authors to have met therewith a monstrous serpent of 120 feet long, which much infested his army, seizing his men, and swallowing them whole when they went to draw water. The skin of this animal was so tough, and its scales so thick, as to be impenetrable by the *Roman* weapons, insomuch that they were forced to employ their battering-engines, called *Ballista*, to destroy it. And even when they had killed it, the stench of its

dity. All the towns in his way, that were unfortified, he took by assault, and those that were fortified, by siege; and now at length he sat down before *Adis*, a city of great importance, and pressed the siege of it with vigour.

Hitherto the *Carthaginians* had brought no army into the field to oppose his progress. Upon the first notice of their terrible defeat at sea, apprehending a sudden invasion from the *Romans*, they had dispatched away some troops to keep guard upon the coast; but this care was over, so soon as they learnt that the *Romans* were landed. They proceeded therefore with all possible application to reinforce their army with new levies, and make due provision both for strengthening the city, and securing the country. They named two Generals to command their forces, *Bostar*, and *Asdrubal* the son of *Hanno*; they afterwards sent orders to *Hamilcar*, who was then at *Heraclea*, to return home with all expedition. *Hamilcar* brought with him to *Carthage* 5000 foot and 500 horse, and being there named third General of the Republic, and having consulted with *Asdrubal*, it was determined no longer to endure that the *Romans* should make such spoil upon the country, and to hasten to the relief of *Adis*. They advanced with their army,

its carcase infected the air and the water to such a degree, that the *Romans* were forced to decamp. Many other extraordinary things are related by the historians of this serpent, which was probably nothing more than an overgrown crocodile, a creature common in *Africa*, but to which the *Romans* were at this time strangers. *Catrou.*

and

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 30.

Y. R. 497.
 Bef. Chr.
 355.
 196 Conf.

and encamped upon an eminence, which, tho' it overlooked the *Roman* camp, was a very incommodious situation; for, as their greatest strength lay in their horse and elephants, to abandon the plain country, and post themselves in high and steep places, where neither elephants nor horse could be of any use to them, was in effect to point out to their enemies the method to destroy them. *Regulus*, who saw their mistake, gave them no time to rectify it. At break of day he marched against the enemy, his troops ascending the hill on both sides. The mercenaries of the *Carthaginians* behaved themselves gallantly on this occasion, and repulsed the first legion of the *Romans* which charged them in front; but being presently after attacked in the rear by the soldiers who had got up the hill on the other side, they could no longer maintain the fight. The whole army disbanded itself, and in the utmost confusion fled out of the camp. The elephants and the horse, which had been wholly useless during the action, gained the champaign country and escaped. The *Romans* having pursued the foot for some space, returned and pillaged the camp; after which they proceeded to make incursions as before, spoiling the country, and taking towns without opposition. Among others, they seized upon *Tunes*, and there they pitched their camp within the walls of it; this being of all places the most commodious for distressing *Carthage* itself, and the country about it.

The *Carthaginians*, who had so unfortunately managed their affairs both by sea and land, not

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so much through the cowardice of their armies, as the insufficiency of their chiefs, began now to despair. For over and above the calamities that have been related, the *Numidians*, their implacable enemies, taking advantage of the present troubles, had entered their provinces with fire and sword, and compelled the inhabitants to fly for refuge to the capital, whither they brought both fear and famine, a mighty multitude of all sorts flocking at once thither.

It is not surprizing therefore, if in such extremity the *Carthaginians* were overjoyed to receive a message from the *Roman* General, exhorting them to think of an accommodation. What moved *Regulus* to make this step was the apprehension lest a successor, who was expected from *Rome*, should deprive him of the glory of putting an end to the war. The Senate of *Carthage* with great readiness dispatched away some of their principal citizens to confer with him; but these were so far from yielding to his proposals, that they could not with patience even hear them mentioned. For *Regulus* would have had them esteem it as a singular grace and benefit, that he granted them peace upon any terms whatsoever; and those he demanded were so infamous for the *Carthaginians*, that in their imagination nothing worse could befall them, should they be entirely conquered. The deputies therefore returned to *Carthage*, not only without having consented to any thing, but full of indignation at the intolerable insolence of the *Roman*. The Senate likewise, when the report was made to them

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.

255.
196 Conf.

Polyb. B.
I. C. 31.

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.

255.
396 Conf.

them of what had passed at the conference, shewed so much courage and greatness of mind, that tho' they were almost at the brink of despair, they determined rather to abide any adversity which their worst fortune could bring upon them, than stain the nobility of their name and actions by so shameful a treaty.

C H A P. VI.

Xantippus, a Commander of Greek mercenaries in the service of Carthage, by his excellent advice and conduct gives a wonderful turn to affairs in Africa. The Roman army is totally defeated, and Regulus taken prisoner.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 32.

IN the height of this distress, to which the victories and obdurate pride of *Regulus* had reduced the *Carthaginians*, there fortunately arrived at *Carthage* a body of recruits which they had hired in *Greece*. Among these was a certain *Lacedæmonian* named *Xantippus*, an officer well skilled in military affairs according to the *Spartan* discipline. This man having informed himself of the circumstances of the late overthrow, and of the number of horse and elephants which yet remained, concluded within himself, and freely said it among his friends, that the *Carthaginians* had not been vanquished by the enemy, but by the ignorance of their own leaders. This discourse, being spread among the people, came at length to the ears of the magistrates, who thereupon commanded him to be brought before the

great council. *Xantippus* offered such strong reasons in support of what he had advanced, that it was impossible to resist the force of them. He shewed plainly, that if instead of encamping upon the high grounds, they would keep in the open champaign country, they might not only banish all fear of the enemy, but even be assured of victory. The whole assembly, the Generals not excepted, applauded what he said, and it was unanimously agreed to place him at the head of their troops; the only example of the kind in all history, and a sure proof that the *Carthaginians* were in the utmost perplexity and consternation.

The soldiers had already begun to conceive a favourable opinion of this stranger, and to hope for some advantage from him: but when, after he had led them without the walls of the city, they saw in what manner he drew them up, and the new exercise he taught them according to his rules, displaying such a skill in the art of war, as they had never seen in any of their former Generals, they were quite transported with joy; they pressed earnestly to be led against the enemy, being assured that they could not fail of success under the conduct of *Xantippus*. The army in a few days began to march. It consisted of 12,000 foot, 4000 horse, and about 100 elephants.

The *Romans* were at first a little struck with the novelty, to see their enemies boldly marching in the open flat country, but having no doubt as to the event, they advanced with all expedition to meet them, and incamped within about 1200 paces

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 33.

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.

255.
196 Conf.

paces of them. Next day, the *Cartbaginians* held a council of war, to determine how they should proceed, while the soldiers assembling in great numbers, and proclaiming every where the name of *Xantippus*, demanded with much earnestness to be led against the enemy. The officers observing this forwardness of the army to fight; and being urged by the pressing instances of *Xantippus* not to let the ardour of the soldiers cool without action, directions were presently given to prepare for battle, and the whole conduct of it was committed to the *Spartan*, who disposed his troops in the following manner.

He drew up all his elephants in one rank, and behind these, at a reasonable distance, he placed the *Cartbaginian* infantry in one phalanx. The foreign troops were posted one part of them in the same line with the phalanx, to the right of it; the other part, composed of light-armed soldiers, was placed in the intervals of the squadrons of horse, which made the two wings of the army.

On the part of the *Romans*, as the chief care of *Regulus* was to guard against the elephants, he to this end placed in front his *Velites*, or light-armed soldiers, that these with their darts or other missive weapons might drive back those huge beasts upon the enemy, or at least hinder them from rushing with their usual violence upon the legions. It was also out of fear of the same animals, that he made his battalions deeper in file than he had been accustomed to do; an excellent precaution, says *Polybius*, against the shock
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of the elephants; but then, by narrowing his front, he left himself more exposed to be attacked in flank by the enemies cavalry, which greatly outnumbered his.

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.

255.
196. Conf.

It does not appear of what number of men *Regulus's* army consisted; but supposing him to have lost none of those which his colleague left him, they amounted but to 15,000 foot and 500 horse.

The two armies being thus drawn up, and the signal being given by *Xantippus*, the first onset was made by the elephants, which met with so little resistance from the *Velites*, that they presently broke into the *Roman* main body, making great destruction amongst the foremost ranks of it. However the rest of that body stood firm for some time, by reason of its depth. But the *Cartbaginian* horse, having quickly driven those of *Regulus* out of the field, began now to charge his battalions both in flank and rear, which put them into great distress, for they were forced to face every way, and could neither pass forward, nor yet retire, and had much to do, to make good the ground on which they stood. In the mean while such of the *Romans*, as with great difficulty had made their way through the elephants, and had left them at their backs, met with the *Cartbaginian* phalanx, which not having yet engaged, and being therefore quite fresh and in good array, obtained an easy victory over a body of men already in disorder, and wearied with wounds and labour. These being entirely

Polyb. B.
l. c. 34.

cut

Y. R. 497.
 Bef. Chr.
 255.
 196 Conf.

cut off, and the phalanx advancing, there was no longer any resource for the *Romans*. Surrounded on all sides, the greater part of them were crushed to death by the enormous weight of the elephants, or slain in their ranks by the arrows of the horse. Some attempted to escape by flight, but being in an open country, they were easily overtaken by the cavalry, and either cut off, or made prisoners. Five hundred who followed *Regulus* fell alive with him into the enemies hands^b.

Of the whole *Roman* army there escaped only 2000 men, who had been posted in the left point of their main body, and who in the beginning of the action, to avoid the shock of the elephants, had wheeled round them, and charged the mercenaries that were to the right of the enemies phalanx, putting them to flight, and pursuing them even to their intrenchments. These 2000, as it were by miracle, got safely to *Clypea*, when the rest were all slain or taken.

On the enemies side were killed but 800 men, of whom the greater part were of those mercenaries that had been attacked by the 2000 *Romans*.

^b Chevalier *Folard* is of opinion, that the loss of this battle was wholly owing to the mistake of *Regulus*, in not leaving (as *Scipio* did afterwards at the battle of *Zama*) sufficient spaces between the columns of his main body, for the elephants to pass freely through them. That if, by this precaution, the *Roman* infantry had shunned the mischiefs, which for want of it they suffered from the elephants, they would have had nothing to fear from the *Carthaginian* horse, which could have made no impression on them, (formed as they were) even after the *Roman* cavalry were driven out of the field.

The

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The *Carthaginians*, having spoiled the dead, marched back to their city, leading in triumph the *Roman* General and the 500 other prisoners.

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

Whoever, says *Polybius*, reflects seriously on this adventure, will gather from it excellent instruction for the conduct of human life. The misfortune of *Regulus* affords us an admirable lesson of moderation, and teaches us to be always on our guard against the inconstancy of fortune. We see him who but a few days before was so elated by success, so haughty and inexorable, reduced at once to be the scorn of a people whom he had despised and insulted, and to stand in need of that clemency from his enemies, which he had with pitiless pride refused them in their misery. We learn wisdom, says our author, two ways; by our own experience, and by the experience of others. The first is the more convincing, but the other is the easier and safer. And this is the great benefit we reap from the study of History. Without any peril to ourselves, we gather rules of conduct from a view of the miscarriages and misfortunes of other men.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 35.

Polybius also observes, that the event which has been just related, confirms that saying of *Euripides*, *That one wise Head is of more value than a great many Hands*. For it is manifest in the case now before us, that the counsel and abilities of one single person subdued the *Roman* legions that were esteemed invincible, restored a sinking and despairing Commonwealth, and revived the courage of a spiritless army, grown stupid by their defeats.

Vol. IV.

G

The

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.

255.
196 Conf.

Polyb. B. I.
ch. 36.

The *Carthaginians*, whose affairs had prospered to their wish, expressed their joy by solemn thanksgivings to the Gods, and by congratulations and mutual good offices to one another. As for *Xantippus*, who had had so great share in restoring the Commonwealth, he shortly after (an admirable example of judgment and wisdom) took his leave and departed from *Carthage*, well foreseeing that his services, too great for a reward, would draw upon him both envy and calumny, against which a native perhaps might have been able to guard himself by the means of relations and friends, but which would in all probability bring ruin upon a stranger, who had nothing to support him but his merit.

Ap
De B. II.
Pun. c. 3.

Polybius tells us, that some authors give a different account of *Xantippus's* departure, and promises to take notice of it in another place: but that part of his history has not been transmitted to us. According to *Appian*, the *Carthaginians*, fearing lest the honour of the victory should be ascribed to the *Lacedæmonians*, feigned a gratification of their General, made him magnificent presents, and appointed a convoy of their own ships to conduct him to *Sparta*, but with secret instructions to the commanders of the galleys to throw him and his *Lacedæmonians* overboard, so soon as they could come into the open sea. Such, says our author, was the end of *Xantippus*, and such the recompence he received for so noble an exploit. But surely this is a very senseless account, or the *Carthaginians* must have been a very senseless as well as ungrateful people, first to do public honour to the *Spartan*,

as

as the known and undoubted author of the victory, and then to imagine they could rob him of that glory, and conceal their obligation to him, by treacherously throwing him into the sea.

Y. R. 497.
Bef. Chr.
255.
196 Conf.

C H A P. VII.

From the 9th to the 14th Year of the War.

The Romans, after the misfortune of Regulus, vanquish the Carthaginians in a sea-engagement on the coast of Africa; but withdraw their forces from that country. In their return home they lose their own fleet by tempest. They build a new one, and this is also destroyed by the like misfortune. Hereupon they resolve to think no more of naval enterprizes; but after two years, in which their land-forces perform nothing of moment, they change that resolution, and, while a third fleet is building, they gain a signal victory at land over the Carthaginians, near Panormus.

THE Romans, having received an account of the miserable condition of their affairs in *Africa*, applied themselves with all diligence to repair and equip their fleet in order to rescue out of danger the 2000 soldiers, who after the late battle had escaped to *Clypea*. In the mean time the *Carthaginians*, to reduce those remains of *Regulus's* army, laid siege to that place, and used their utmost efforts to carry it; but so brave and so obstinate was the resistance they met with, that they were forced at length to abandon the enterprize and retire. And now hearing of the naval preparations of the *Romans*, for a new expedition

Poyb. B.
1. c. 36.

expedition to *Africa*, they fitted out in a short time about 200 gallies, and put to sea to watch the arrival of the enemy.

Y. R. 498.
Bef. Chr.
254.
197 Conf.

Early in the summer, the new Consuls *Fulvius* and *Æmilius*, with a fleet of 350 sail appeared off the promontory of *Mercury*, and there came to an engagement with the *Carthaginians*, who, not being able to sustain the very first shock, were entirely defeated, and lost 114 of their vessels. The *Romans* pursued their course, arrived at *Clypea*, took the garrison on board, and then steered back towards *Sicily* ^a.

They

^a There are two parts of the *Roman* conduct in this war, which Mr. *Rollin* and Chevalier *Folard* think very hard to be accounted for.

1. Why did the *Romans*, after their victory at sea near *Ænomus*, and the fortunate descent made in *Africa* in consequence of that victory, leave so small a number of troops under *Regulus* to carry on the war in that country?

Mr. *Rollin* says, it was a manifest renouncing of the advantages gained by sea; and the Chevalier declares, that it is enough to distract a commentator, and wonders that *Polybius* makes no remark on this strange proceeding.

Again, 2. Why did the *Romans* just after this new victory at sea, near the coast of *Africa*, entirely abandon that country, instead of attempting to complete the conquest of it? *Polybius* relates this fact also without any remark upon it, to the great amazement of Chevalier *Folard*.

But as to both these difficulties, may it not be answered, that the only object of the *Romans* in this war, was the conquest of *Sicily*? To alarm *Carthage*, and induce her to withdraw her forces out of that island, are the reasons assigned by *Polybius* for the descent made by the *Romans* on *Africa*. But they were disappointed as to the effect of this measure; for the *Carthaginians* judging by the small army left with *Regulus*, that the enemy, in making their descent, had no farther view,

They had a prosperous voyage till they came near the *Sicilian* coast, in the territory of *Camarina*; but then so terrible a tempest overtook them, as no words are able to describe. Of above 400 vessels, only fourscore escaped destruction; the

Y. R. 498.
Bef. Chr.

254.
197 Conf.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 37.

view, than to cause a diversion, did not recall their troops out of *Sicily*; but seeing, as *Polybius* says, that the war would go on slowly, named two Generals, *Bostar* and *Asdrubal*, to command the forces they had at home; and when afterwards *Hamilcar* was sent for from *Sicily* to join those Generals, he brought with him but 5500 men.

It is plain therefore from the conduct of both the contending powers, that neither the *Romans* intended, nor the *Carthaginians* feared, any serious attempt upon *Carthage* by *Regulus*, when he began the war in *Africa*.

But why did not the *Romans* resolve to attempt *Carthage* after the victory at *Ecnomus*? I answer: Because from their knowledge of its great strength, and of the many resources its prodigious wealth furnished, they judged the conquest of it impracticable at this time, and before *Sicily* was subdued. And that they judged right, one may fairly conclude from *Polybius's* not reproving their policy, and from the difficulties they afterwards met with in that enterprize, even when masters of *Sicily*, and of all the islands between *Italy* and *Africa*.

But after the total defeat of *Regulus's* army by means of the elephants, the difficulty of succeeding in an *African* war was become infinitely great. We find, that the legions were possessed with such a dread of those animals, that for some years they durst not come to a pitched battle with the *Carthaginians* even in *Sicily*, where the *Romans* had many advantages which they must have wanted in *Africa*.

In a word, *Sicily* was the present object of the *Roman* ambition, and the only reasonable object it could now have; and we shall see by what follows, that they had need of all their forces for the reduction of this island: so that their leaving *Africa* after the victory at sea by *Fulvius* and *Ami-*

Y. R. 498.
 Bef. Chr.
 254.
 197 Conf.

the rest either foundered at sea, or were dashed to pieces against the rocks; so that the whole coast from *Camarina* to cape *Pachynum* was covered with dead bodies and fragments of ships. History affords no example of a more deplorable shipwreck. And this calamity was owing, not to fortune, but to the obstinacy of the Consuls. For the pilots had often represented to them, that the season was come when it was no longer safe to navigate on that coast of *Sicily* which looks towards *Africa*: but they being full of expectation, that the towns situate thereon, terrified by the late victory, would readily submit to them on their first appearance, despised the admonition, to pursue an interest that was by no means worthy of the hazard. But such, as *Polybius* tells us, was the character of the *Romans*; impetuous, presumptuous, and obstinate, they would carry every thing by mere violence; they would force all nature to their will: to them nothing was impossible which they could desire; nay, it

lius, ought not perhaps to have so greatly astonished the Chevalier *Folard*.

If we may credit some authors, we have a shorter way of getting rid of the Chevalier's difficulties, which is, to deny the facts that give occasion to them. According to these writers, *Regulus's* army was not so inconsiderable, as from *Polybius's* account it seems to have been. *Appian* and *Orosius* make it 30,000 strong; and *Eutropius* reckons 47,000 men, of whom 30,000 were slain, and 15,000 taken prisoners in the battle with *Xantippus*.

And as to the *Romans* quitting *Africa* after the victory at sea by *Fulvius* and *Æmilius*, the last named author [*Eutropius*] represents them, not as making this retreat by choice, but as being constrained to it by famine.

must

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must of necessity come to pass, if they had once decreed that it should be done. And indeed, adds our author, in their enterprizes by land, and where they had to do only with men and the works of men, this inflexible audaciousness of spirit for the most part (not always) carried them through every obstacle to the end proposed; but in their naval expeditions, when they foolishly imagined that the winds and the seas must be complaisant to their wishes and projects, they were sure to be chastised for their overweening presumption; and of this they had frequent experience.

Y. R. 498.
Bef. Chr.
254.
197 Conf.

The *Romans*, though extremely afflicted, were not discouraged by the ruin of their fleet; they ordered a new one of 220 sail to be speedily built; and, which is almost incredible, this powerful armament was completely equipped in three months time.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 38.

The Consular *Fasces* had been transferred to *A. Atilius* and *Cn. Cornelius Asina* (the same *Cornelius* who was formerly made prisoner at *Lipara*, and had lived some time in captivity.) These commanders having passed the *Streights* with the new fleet, and touched at *Messina* to take with them the eighty vessels which had escaped the late storm, shaped their course for *Cephaledium*, which was delivered to them by treachery; thence they sailed to *Drepanum*, and began to besiege it; but upon succours being brought thither by *Carthalo* the *Carthaginian* General (who had retaken *Agri- gentum*, and demolished the walls of it) they drew off and sailed to *|| Panormus*, which, according to *Polybius*, was then the capital city of the

Y. R. 499.
Bef. Chr.
253.
198 Conf.

Diod. Sic.
in Eclog.
P. 877.

|| Palermo.

Y. R. 499.
Bef. Chr.

253.
198 Conf.

Carthaginians in *Sicily*. The Consuls besieged this place, and having carried the out-works by assault, the besieged capitulated, and surrendered the town. The inhabitants of *Selinus*, *Tyndaris*, and other places, did the like, having first driven out the *Carthaginian* garrisons. After these conquests, the *Romans* leaving a strong body of troops in *Panormus*, returned to *Rome*.

Y. R. 500.
Bef. Chr.

253.
199 Conf.

Early the next summer the succeeding Consuls, *Cn. Servilius* and *C. Sempronius*, sailed over to *Sicily* with all their naval force, and from thence soon after stood for the coast of *Africa*, where they made several descents, and brought away some booty, but performed nothing of moment. Coming at length near the island of the *Lotophagi*, (which was called *Meminx*,) not far from the lesser *Syrtis*; and, being unacquainted with the coast, they ran upon some banks of sand, and there stuck fast: the sea ebbing left them dry, and they were utterly at a loss what to do, apprehending the destruction of the whole fleet. But the flood returning some hours after, and they lighting the vessels by throwing their booty over-board, made a shift to get off. Immediately they stood away for *Sicily*, as if they were flying before an enemy, and, having doubled the cape of *Lilybaeum*, arrived safely in the port of *Panormus*. But from thence steering their course homewards at a time unskilfully chosen, they lost 150 of their vessels by a storm that overtook them in the passage.

Polyh. B.
1. c. 35.

So terrible a destruction of two fleets by tempest totally discouraged the *Romans* from all naval enterprizes. No more than sixty vessels were to be

be equipped for the future, and these were to be employed only to transport the troops with the baggage and ammunition into *Sicily*. Their thirst of glory and empire was not abated, but they determined to rely wholly on their land-forces for the atchievement of the conquest they had in view. This conquest however could not be effected by land-armies alone, while the maritime towns in the possession of the *Carthaginians* were open to receive provisions and recruits by sea, as occasion should require. Nay, ever since the defeat of *Regulus* by means of the elephants, the *Roman* soldiers were afraid of coming to any engagement by land, where they should have to do with those huge and furious animals.

The *Carthaginians* had dispatched *Asdrubal* with 140 elephants to *Lilybæum*, and had strengthened the army which was there with troops drawn from other places; and they had sent after him 200 ships of war. *Asdrubal*, after his arrival, having first applied himself diligently to discipline his soldiers and elephants, had boldly taken the field with a resolution to offer the enemy battle. But though the armies were on several occasions encamped within five or six furlongs of each other, sometimes in the territory of *Selinus*, sometimes about *Lilybæum*, the *Romans* for the space of two years together had not once the resolution to come to an engagement with the enemy; nor durst they descend into the open champaign country. So that during the Consulship of *C. Aurelius*^b and *P. Servilius*, and that of

Y. R. 500.
Bef. Chr.
252.
199 Conf.

^b In this Consulate *Tib. Coruncanius* was chosen *Pontifex Maximus*, the first instance of a Plebeian raised to that high station,

Y. of R.
501.

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.

249.
202d Conf.

Y. of R.
502.

Y. of R.
503.

|| A 2d

time.

† A 2d

time.

Polyb. B. 1.

c. 40.

L. Cæcilius Metellus and *C. Furius*, no progress was made in their affairs, except the taking of two towns, which they could besiege, still keeping themselves posted in high and inaccessible places. This terror among the legions made the Senate of *Rome* at length change their measures, and resolve to try their fortune once more at sea. And accordingly, after the election of *C. || Atilius* and *L. † Manlius* to the Consulate, they ordered the building of fifty new vessels, and that suitable levies should be made of men fit for that service.

In the mean time *Asdrubal* having observed the dread that possessed the *Roman* army, whenever he presented them battle; and having intelligence that *Furius* was returned to *Rome* with one half of the army, and that *Cæcilius* with the other was at *Panormus* to protect his allies while they gathered in their harvest, he marched from *Lilybæum*, and came with all his forces to the borders of the territory of *Panormus*, hoping to provoke *Cæcilius* to fight. But the *Roman*, who well understood his own business, kept close within the town, and pretending fear, suffered the *Carthaginians* to advance, and pillage the country without opposition, till with all their elephants they had passed a river which ran within a mile of the place. He then sent out some light-armed troops, to skirmish and draw the enemy farther on, supporting his first detachment by others, as occasion required, till by this management he had brought the whole *Carthaginian* army as near the town as he wished them to be. At a proper distance from the walls he had caused a trench to be cut, which the elephants could
by

by no means pass; and he had given his dartmen orders, in case those animals advanced against them, to retire by slow degrees till they came to that trench, into which they were then to leap down, and from thence to gaul the elephants with their darts as much as possibly they could. He ordered the town's people at the same time to furnish themselves with great quantities of darts, and post themselves at the foot of the walls. *Cæcilius* himself, with the main body of his forces, remained in readiness at a certain gate of the town, which was opposite to the left wing of the enemy. When the battle grew warm, the leaders of the elephants, being desirous to have the chief honour of the victory, advanced in order upon the *Romans*, whom, retiring before them, they pursued to the very brink of the trench above mentioned. There they were at a stand, and the elephants being terribly gauled with the darts both of those who leaped into the trench, and of those who were on the other side of it, began presently to grow unruly, and turning back furiously upon their own infantry, utterly disordered them. And now *Cæcilius*, who saw his advantage, sallied out with all his troops, fresh and in good order, and charging the enemy in flank, easily put them to the rout. The *Carthaginians* suffered a great slaughter; some of their elephants^c were killed, and the rest were all taken.

The news of *Cæcilius's* exploit caused great rejoicings at *Rome*, not so much on account of

^c *Cæcilius*, according to *Pliny*, B. 8. ch. 6. caused the elephants to be transported to *Italy*, where they were baited to death in the *Circus* at *Rome*.

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 41.

the

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

the taking the elephants, though that was a very terrible blow to the enemy, as because by the victory obtained against those formidable animals, the courage of the *Roman* soldiers was entirely restored, and they no longer feared to keep in the open country. It was resolved therefore diligently to pursue the design of sending the new Consuls into *Sicily* with a naval force, and by vigorous efforts both by land and sea, to put an end, if possible, to this destructive war.

C H A P. VIII.

Regulus is sent to Rome with some Ambassadors from Carthage to negotiate a peace. His behaviour on this occasion, and the consequences of it.

Appian. in
Punic.
Bell. c. 3.
Livy Epitom. B. 18.
Eutrop.
B. 2.
Cic. de Offic. B. 3.
Sil. Ital.
B. 6.
Val. Max.
B. 1. c. 1.
& B. 9. c. 2.
A Gell. B.
6. c. 4.
Aurel.
Vict. c. 40.
Zon. B. 8.

THE defeat of *Asdrubal*^b before *Panormus* threw the people of *Carthage* into discouragement; they began now to think seriously of peace; and believing that if *Regulus*, a man so much esteemed by his countrymen, engaged in the affair, an accommodation might be easily effected, they sent him to *Rome* with the ambassadors appointed for this negotiation; having first taken an oath of him to return to *Carthage*, in case there should neither be peace nor an exchange of prisoners. When after his landing in *Italy* he came to the gates of *Rome*, he would by no means enter the city, alledging, that he was no longer a *Roman* citizen, but a slave of a foreign power, and that he did not come to in-

^b This General, according to *Zonaras*, was crucified for his misconduct.

fringe the laws and customs of his native country, which forbade the Senate to give audience to strangers within the walls; nor, when his wife *Marcia* with her children ran to meet him, did he shew any signs of joy, but fixed his eyes upon the ground, as one ashamed of his servile condition, and unworthy of their caresses. So extraordinary a behaviour raised the admiration both of the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, and all were impatiently curious to know how he would conduct himself in the Senate. The *Fathers* being at length assembled without the walls, the ambassadors were admitted to an audience, and made their proposals; and then *Regulus*, whose turn it was to speak next, only added, *Conscript Fathers, being a slave to the Carthaginians, I come on the part of my masters to treat with you concerning a peace and an exchange of prisoners.* He said no more; and when he had uttered these few words, sought to withdraw and follow the ambassadors, who could not be present at the deliberations. In vain the Consuls pressed him to stay, and give his opinion as a Senator and Consular Person; he absolutely refused to take his place among the *Conscript Fathers*. However, he obeyed his *African* masters, who directed him to continue in the assembly. There he remained in a modest silence till the oldest Senators had declared their opinions, and then he expressed himself to the following effect: "*Romans*, I am sensible, that the
" fatigues and expence of so difficult a war put
" your virtue to a severe trial; but what great
" enterprize can ever be atchieved without a
" steady fortitude? I am an eye-witness of the
" distress

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.

249.
202d Conf.

“ distress of *Carthage*. 'Tis nothing but the im-
 “ possibility of maintaining the war that makes
 “ the *Carthaginians* solicit for a peace. You have
 “ lost one battle, (it was when I commanded)
 “ a misfortune which *Metellus* has repaired by
 “ a notable victory. Except two cities, *Sicily* is
 “ entirely yours; and your new fleet spreads
 “ a terror throughout the seas. You govern
 “ your allies in tranquillity, and they serve
 “ you with zeal. *Carthage*, drained of her wealth,
 “ can depend but little on the provinces of her
 “ dominion. With how much ease did I bring
 “ them into a revolt! Your armies are com-
 “ posed of soldiers of one and the same nation,
 “ united by mutual esteem and affection: the
 “ troops of *Carthage* are chiefly made up of
 “ strangers, who have no tie to her but their
 “ pay, and whom the example of *Xantippus* will
 “ deter from engaging in her service. My opi-
 “ nion therefore is absolutely against a peace
 “ with our Enemies; nor do I think it for your
 “ interest to make an exchange of prisoners.
 “ Among the *Carthaginian* captives you have
 “ thirteen considerable officers, young, and ca-
 “ pable of commanding one day the armies of
 “ the enemy. As for me, I grow old, and my
 “ misfortunes have made me useless; add to
 “ this that the number of *Carthaginian* captives
 “ of an inferior rank infinitely exceeds that of
 “ the *Roman* prisoners, so that the exchange
 “ must be to your disadvantage. And after all,
 “ what can you expect from soldiers who have
 “ been vanquished and reduced to slavery? Will
 “ they serve the Republic with the courage of
 “ men

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

"men whose reputation is entire and untouch-
"ed? No, they will rather be like timorous
"deer, that have escaped out of the toils of the
"hunter, ever ready to fly at the approach of
"danger."

This discourse filled the Senators with admiration and compassion, and tho' they approved his advice concerning the proposals made by the *Carthaginians*, yet they knew not how to consent to the ruin of a man whose contempt of life made him the more worthy to be preserved. The *Pontifex Maximus* being consulted, declared, that his oath having been extorted from him, he might without perjury continue at *Rome*. They pressed him therefore not to return to *Africk*, but *Regulus* was offended with these solicitations.

"What! have you then resolved to dishonour
"me? I am too well acquainted with the in-
"constancy of the people's favour, to trust them
"with the care of my reputation. At my first re-
"turn they are full of good will, touched with a
"fresh remembrance of my misfortunes; this
"fit of joy once over, and I am no longer
"thought of. Nay, I doubt not but my stay
"here would be reproached me by those who
"have seemed the most afflicted for my absence.
"How often shall I be called Slave! May not
"*Rome* herself disdain to own me for one of her
"Citizens? I am not ignorant, that death and
"the extremest tortures are preparing for me;
"but what are these to the shame of an infam-
"ous action, and the wounds of a guilty mind?
"Slave as I am to *Carthage*, I have still the spi-
"rit of a *Roman*; I have sworn to return, it is

Y. R. 503.

Bef. Chr.

249.

202d Conf.

“ my duty to go ; let the Gods take care of the
“ rest.”

The Senate, by the same decree which refused the *Carthaginian* ambassadors both peace and an exchange of prisoners, left *Regulus* at liberty to continue at *Rome*, or return to *Carthage*, as he should think fit. This was all that *Marcia* could obtain from the *Fathers* by her tears and solicitations. *Regulus*, to free himself from all farther importunity of his friends, assured them that before his departure from *Africk* the *Carthaginians* had given him a slow poison, and that he could not long survive the negotiation. As soon as it was ended, he quitted his native country, to go and resume his chains at *Carthage*, with the same serenity as if he had been going to a country seat for his recreation.

Those authors who have celebrated the heroism of *Regulus* on this occasion, tho' they all concur in reporting that he suffered at his return into *Africa* some cruel death from the revenge of the *Carthaginians*, yet are by no means agreed concerning the particular kind of torment he was made to undergo.

The most current opinion is, that they cut off or sewed back his eye-lids, and then bringing him out of a dark dungeon, exposed him to the sun at mid-day : That after this they shut him up in a kind of chest or press stuck full, on the inside, with iron spikes, and there left him to die in torment *.

The

* Although this story of the cruel revenge which the *Carthaginians* took of *Regulus* after his return to *Carthage* be found

The news of this barbarity no sooner reached Rome, but the Senate, by way of retaliation, gave

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

found in many of the best *Roman* authors, and although it be not expressly contradicted by any ancient writer; yet the reasons that are offered by some moderns against the truth of it may perhaps excuse our incredulity, should we look upon it as a meer fiction.

Palmerius, in a note upon *Appian*, offers two very weighty arguments for rejecting the account as fabulous.

1. The total silence of *Polybius* concerning every thing that happened to *Regulus* after his defeat and captivity.

How can we account for that author's silence upon matters of so interesting a nature, in his History of the First Punic War; a History, which in many parts of it is written rather with prolixity than brevity; I say, how can we account for this, but by supposing, that *Polybius* for good reasons disbelieved the tradition which had been greedily embraced by the *Romans* concerning *Regulus's* death, and therefore disdained to record it; and that nevertheless he was unwilling to offend them by contradicting such a favourite story? It was hence, doubtless, that he avoided saying any thing of *Regulus's* voyage to *Rome*, his behaviour there, and his return to *Carthage*; because had he mentioned these, without speaking of his death, (the supposed immediate consequence of them,) an affected silence in this particular only, would have amounted to a direct condemnation of the prevailing opinion.

2. A fragment preserved by *Valesius*, of the 24th book of *Diodorus Siculus*.

This fragment (speaking of *Regulus's* wife and sons, into whose custody *Bostar* and *Hamilcar*, two captive *Carthaginian* Generals, had been given) begins thus:

“ — But the mother of the young men [the *Atilii*] grievously laid to heart the death of her husband, and thinking [or imagining] that he had lost his life [*δι' ἀμέλειαν*] for want of good looking after, stirred up her sons to use the captives cruelly.”

Then it relates, that the captives being thrust together

Y. R. 503.
 Ref. Chr.
 249.
 202d Conf.

gave up the chief of the *Carthaginian* captives to be treated at the discretion of *Marcia*, (the widow

into a close place, where they could hardly stir, and being kept from food, *Bostar*, after five days of extreme misery, expired: That *Hamilcar*, who yet held out, telling the wife of *Regulus* how careful he had been of her husband, with tears implored her compassion; but that she, far from being touched with the least sense of humanity, kept him five days after this in the same hole, shut up with the carcass of his companion, giving him only so much sustenance as would serve to prolong his life in misery: That by means of some servants in the house, a report of this horrible cruelty came to the ears of the Tribunes of the people: That the magistrates having well assured themselves of the fact, summoned the *Atillii*, and threatened them with the severest punishments, if for the time to come they did not take all due care of the prisoners; nay, that they were very near pronouncing sentence of death upon the young men, for having brought a dishonour upon the *Roman* name: That the *Atillii*, to excuse themselves, laid the blame upon their mother: That they burnt the body of *Bostar*, and sent the ashes to his relations, and for the future cherished *Hamilcar*, whom they had so barbarously treated.

Palmerius's conjecture from the whole is this:

That *Bostar* and *Hamilcar* being taken prisoners, [probably in that sea-fight on the coast of *Africa*, where the *Carthaginians* lost 114 ships, because no mention is made of them in the war after that time,] the Senate, to console the wife and sons of *Regulus*, put those captive Generals into their hands, that they might have the price of his ransom in their possession.

That *Regulus* died of some distemper in captivity, whereat the wife being extremely vexed, as having lost the pleasing hope of recovering her husband by exchange, treated the captives cruelly; that the magistrates being angry at this conduct, she, to give a colour of justice to her cruelty, told this fable of her husband's perishing by hunger, want of sleep, and other torments, to her neighbours and gossips; that

dow of *Regulus*,) who condemned them to the same kind of death her husband had suffered.

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

C H A P.

that hence the story by degrees spread far, gathering strength as it went, and easily obtained credit through the hatred born to the *Carthaginians*.

Palmerius might have added, That as some women have imaginations very creative, and as, especially where their passions are concerned, they easily believe the real existence of what meer imagination exhibits, the wife of *Regulus* might possibly have persuaded herself without any ground, that her husband had lost his life through the hardships of his imprisonment. And this is conformable to the fragment of *Diadorus*, which says, that she *thinking* that he had lost his life through *neglect*, stirred up her sons, &c.

3. A third argument against the story of *Regulus's* death by torture may be drawn from the disagreement among those who report it, concerning the kind of torture he was made to undergo. Did he perish by being kept from sleep? Was he starved to death? Was he crucified? Or did he end his life in a chest or barrel stuck with spikes? All these are reported by different authors. If it were certain that the *Carthaginians* put him to death by torture, is it not strange that the kind of torture should not be more certainly known? *Florus* doubts whether he died by the hardships of his imprisonment, or upon a cross.

4. Where there is any good reason to suspect the evidence to a fact, the improbability arising from the situation of things makes strongly against the belief of such fact. Now it seems highly improbable, that the *Carthaginians* should treat *Regulus* in the manner pretended, at the very time when two of their Generals and many of their inferior Officers, as well as multitudes of their common Soldiers, were in the hands of the *Romans*.

5. We may observe, that the Senate's giving up the *Carthaginian* prisoners to be treated at the discretion of *Regulus's* sons, upon the news of the cruel death he had suffered, a fact reported by *A. Gellius*, and which, if true, would be the strongest argument in favour of the common opinion, is absolutely inconsistent with what *Diadorus* relates of the anger

C H A P. IX.

From the 14th to the 18th year of the war:

The Romans, flushed with their late victory at land, imagine, that, with the assistance of their new fleet, they shall now be able to take Lilybæum, and thereby put an end to the war in Sicily. After considerable progress made in the siege, they are forced to turn it into a blockade: And, not long after, their whole navy is utterly destroyed. More fortunate by land, they take Eryx from the enemy. Amilcar Barcha is sent from Carthage to command the forces of that republic in Sicily.

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.

249.
202d Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 41.

WHEN the Consuls *Attilius* and *Manlius* had got all things ready for their expedition into *Sicily*, they put to sea with a fleet of

of the Roman magistrates at the conduct of the *Atillii* with regard to the captives.

Thus much concerning the credibility of the story of *Regulus's* sufferings. Before we take leave of him, let us see *Sir Walter Raleigh's* judgment of that part of his behaviour, which is supposed to have drawn upon him the *Carthaginian* resentment, and brought him to so miserable an end. *Sir Walter's* words are these:

“ The death of *Attilius Regulus* the Consul was very memorable. He was sent from *Carthage* to *Rome* about the exchange and ransom of prisoners on both sides, giving his faith to return if the business were not effected. When he came to *Rome*, and plainly saw that his country should lose by the bargain, so far was he from urging the Senate unto compassion of his own misery, that he earnestly persuaded to have the prisoners in *Africk* left to their ill destinies. This done, he returned to *Carthage*, where for his

of 200 sail, and arrived on the coast of *Lilybæum*, in the neighbourhood of which place their land forces were already assembled.

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

It was the strongest, and except *Drepanum* (about 15 miles from it northward) the only city of importance, which the *Carthaginians* possessed in the island; and the *Romans* had therefore resolved to besiege it, as knowing that, could they make this conquest, it would be easy for them afterwards to transport the war into *Africa*.

Lilybæum stood almost at the extremity of the cape of the same name, and was surrounded by a strong wall, and a deep ditch, filled with water from the sea. The *Romans* sat down before it, and having fortified themselves by an en-

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 42.
Diod. Sic.
in Eclog.
p. 879.
Zon. B. 8.

"his pains taken he was rewarded with an horrible death.
"For this his constancy and faith all writers highly extol
"him. But the *Carthaginians* seem to have judged him an
"obstinate and malicious enemy, that neither in his prosper-
"ity would hearken to reason, nor yet in his calamity
"would have the natural care to preserve himself and o-
"thers, by yielding to such an office of humanity as is com-
"mon in all wars (not grounded upon deadly hatred) only
"in regard of some small advantage. Whatsoever the *Car-*
"*thaginians* thought of him, sure it is, that his faithful ob-
"servance of his word given cannot be too much com-
"mended. But that grave speech which he made in the
"Senate against the exchange of prisoners, appears, in all
"reason, to have proceeded from a vain-glorious Forward-
"ness, rather than from any necessity of State. For the
"exchange was made soon after his death; wherein the *Ro-*
"*mans* had the worse bargain, by so much as *Regulus* him-
"self was worth. As for the authority of all Historians,
"that magnify him in this point; we are to consider that
"they lived under the *Roman Empire*: *Philinus*, the *Cartha-*
"*ginian*, perhaps did censure it otherwise."

Y. R. 303.
Bef. Chr.

240.
202d Conf.

trenchment which ran from sea to sea, made their first approaches against some towers of defence. These they soon beat to the ground; after which they filled up the town ditch, and by their battering engines, and by mining, so weakened the wall in many parts of it, that the besieged began to be extremely terrified; although the garrison, without reckoning the inhabitants, consisted of more than 10,000 men. *Himilco*, who commanded in the place, performed the part of a gallant and able officer. He repaired the breaches, made countermines, and was in a manner every where present, watching an opportunity to set fire to the enemies wooden towers, and engines of battery; and, in this view, making frequent sallies by night and by day with a boldness little short of temerity, on which occasions the slaughter was sometimes not less than what commonly happens in ranged battles, in the field.

Polyb. B.
7, c. 44.

In the mean while, though they were ignorant at *Carthage* of what passed at *Lilybaeum*, yet concluding that the garrison must be sorely distressed, they dispatched an officer, named *Hannibal*, with 10,000 men on board a fleet of 50 gallies to their relief. *Hannibal* being arrived at the island of *Aegusa*, lying a little off of *Lilybaeum*, waited there for a favourable and brisk gale, which no sooner presented, but crowding all his sails he came to the entrance of the port, having ranged his soldiers in a fighting posture on the decks of the vessels. The *Romans*, (whose ships were stationed on each side of the mouth of the haven) partly through surprize, and partly through fear of

Chap. IX. *First Punic War.*

99

of being forced by the wind into the port with the enemy, made no motion to attack them, but contented themselves to look on and wonder at their hardy attempt. Thus *Hannibal* without any opposition made his way into the haven, where he landed his men, to the great joy of the besieged, who were yet more pleased with the consternation, in which they beheld their enemies, than with the succour they themselves received.

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

Himilco observing the alacrity and good dispositions, both of the inhabitants, whose courage was raised by the reinforcement, and of the new comers, who had yet suffered nothing of the hardships incident to a town besieged, resolved now to make a general sally and attempt what he had long meditated, the burning of the enemies towers and engines. The conflict on this occasion was extremely bloody, all the forces on both sides being engaged in it, and fighting with the utmost obstinacy and emulation. In conclusion the *Romans* happily preserved their works; for at the very instant when they were beginning to despair of it, *Himilco*, seeing great numbers of his men slain, and his purpose not effected, founded a retreat, and put an end to the fight.

Polyb. B.
I. C. 45.

After this action, *Hannibal* sailing away in the night, went with his fleet to *Drepanum*, there to consult with *Adherbal*, who was his intimate friend, and who commanded in that place for the *Carthaginians*.

c. 46.

But now the *Romans* kept *Lilybæum* so straitly shut up, and watched the entrance of the haven

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

so narrowly, that no body durst make an attempt to come out of it. In the mean while they were very impatient at *Carthage* to have some account of the condition of the besieged; and at length a certain *Rhodian*, named *Hannibal*, a man of distinction, undertook to satisfy their desire. Having prepared a light galley expressly for this enterprize, he put to sea from *Carthage*, (or perhaps from *Drepanum*) and got under covert of one of those islands lying off of *Lilybaeum*. Early the next morning, with a fair and fresh gale, passing in view of the enemy, who could not thrust from the shores on either side time enough to stop him, he got by ten o'clock into the Port. The *Romans* doubted not, but this bold adventurer would soon attempt to return. The Consul therefore, to keep a better guard, posted at the entrance of the Port ten of his nimblest vessels (on each side five) which with their oars displayed like wings kept themselves ready to fly upon the expected prey. The *Rhodian* nevertheless in broad day light made his passage safely through these guards, and not only so, but when he was got out to sea, turned about, and, lying upon his oars, with an insulting mockery, challenged any one of them to come and fight him. In this manner he passed and repassed several times, bringing orders and carrying intelligence, to the great encouragement of the besieged, and the amazement of the *Romans* at so successful a temerity. But the boldness of the *Rhodian* was founded on his perfect knowledge of the channel, and how to keep clear of the rocks

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 47.

rocks and sand-banks on each side. His success so often repeated, encouraged others, who had the same skill, to follow his example: which the *Romans* finding to be of very ill consequence, they undertook to choak up intirely the mouth of the haven. For this purpose they filled a great number of round ships (or ships of burden) with huge stones, and sunk them in the channel; but the force of the stream carried the most of these away. However they grounded so many of them in the best of the entrance, as at last it made a manifest rising and heap, like a ragged island, in the passage. A certain *Carthaginian* galley coming out of the port in the night, and not suspecting any such impediment, ran herself aground upon it, and so fell into the enemies hands. The *Romans* immediately manned her with chosen soldiers and their best rowers, and then placed her on the watch to catch the *Rhodian*. He had happily got into the port by night, and was returning in open day, when he found himself chased by a galley that gathered upon him. He soon perceived what she was by her form and her swiftness, and as he was not able to run from her, he had no way left but to turn about and fight with her. This he resolutely did, but she being too well manned for him, he was presently taken; after which no more attempts were made to go in or out of the port of *Lilybæum*.

The besieged however were not so disheartened by this disadvantage, as to remit any thing of their attention to a vigorous defence; and tho' they

Y. R. 603.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 48.

Y. R. 303.
Bef. Chr.

249.
262d Conf.

they had lost all hope of destroying the works erected against their fortification, they continued indefatigable in repairing the breaches made in it. And now a favourable accident, when they least expected such good fortune, delivered them at once from the fear of those wooden towers which overtopped their walls, and of all the battering engines of the besiegers. So violent a tempest arose on a sudden, as made the galleries of the *Romans* totter, and threw some of their towers to the ground. This was thought by some *Greek* soldiers, in the service of *Carthage*, an opportunity which ought not to be neglected, to attempt once more the burning of the enemy's works of battery. Having communicated the project to their commanding officer (who both approved it, and prepared every thing necessary for its execution) out they rushed and set fire to the works in three places. The flames spread themselves with great swiftness, by reason of the violence of the wind and the dryness of the timber, the works having been long erected. The *Romans*, all in confusion and surprize, knew not which way to turn themselves; for they were blinded by the smoke and the sparks of fire which the wind drove in their faces, so that many of them were slain before they could approach the places where help was wanted. On the other hand, the wind favouring the *Carthaginians*, not only they could see clearly, and so take their aim, but whatever they threw either against the enemy, or against their batteries, was carried with the greater violence to the mark, while the

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the darts of the *Romans* could take no effect. In a word, the fire became irresistible, and spreading every way, it consumed to ashes all the *Roman* works, and even melted the brazen heads of their battering rams.

Y. R. 505.
Bef. Chr.
249.
202d Conf.

The besiegers by this blow were totally discouraged from the thoughts of renewing their attacks. They turned therefore the siege into a blockade, encompassing the place with a rampart and a ditch, and patiently hoping to obtain by some happy turn of fortune, or by starving the enemy, what they now despaired of carrying by assault.

But when the news came to *Rome* that great numbers both of the sea and land forces had been lost in fighting to defend the works, and in the other service of the siege, the people were only the more animated by it to pursue the enterprize with vigour, insomuch that 10,000 of them voluntarily offered themselves to go and serve before *Lilybæum*. Upon the arrival of these troops at the camp, *Claudius Pulcher*, who was then in the Consulate, (with *L. Junius Pullus*) and had the command of the forces in *Sicily*, having called his officers together, proposed to them instantly to embark and sail with all the fleet to *Drepanum*. To engage their approbation of this project, he represented to them, that *Adherbal* the Governor of that place had not a sufficient strength to resist them; that he knew nothing of the reinforcement they had received, and would never imagine they could be masters of a naval army, after the losses they had sustained

Polyb. B.
1. c. 49.

Y. R. 504.
Bef. Chr.
248.
203d Conf.

ed

Y. R. 504.
Bef. Chr.

248.

203d Conf.

ed in the siege. The design being generally approved, the seamen, both old and new comers, were ordered forthwith to embark, together with the bravest soldiers of the legions, who readily offered themselves for this expedition, not doubting but they should enrich themselves with the plunder of *Drepanum*.

For this place then the fleet, consisting of 124 gallies, set sail about midnight; and at break of day the headmost of the vessels were descried from the town. *Adberbal* was at first struck with the unexpected appearance of the enemy, but, soon recovering himself, he determined to run any hazard, rather than endure a siege, with which he plainly saw that he was threatened. Instantly he called together, upon the sea shore, all his seamen and soldiers, both those that were on board his gallies and those that were in the town, and set before them in few words how easily they might be victors in a naval battle, if they would but resolve to behave themselves with courage; and, on the other hand, what dreadful calamities (the consequences of a siege) they must unavoidably undergo, if on the present occasion they let themselves be intimidated by the apprehension of danger. The army unanimously declared their readiness to follow him, whithersoever he should please to conduct them. Hereupon he instantly ordered them all on board, and embarking himself, directed them to keep their eyes on his galley (which should lead the van,) and to do as she did. Then putting to sea he brought his fleet out of the port, and hid

hid them behind some rocks which lay on the side of the haven opposite to that by which the *Romans* were going to enter.

Y. R. 504.
Bef. Chr.
248.
203d Conf.

The headmost of the *Roman* vessels were already entered into the port, other gallies were entering, and others were not far off, when *Adberbal*, quitting his concealment, appeared on a sudden with his fleet out at sea, and in a posture to give battle. At this sight *Claudius*, extremely surprised and disappointed, made a sign to his foremost gallies to tack and stand back again; but when those that had entered the port, or were in the haven's mouth, began to hasten back, they encountered with others that were yet standing in, so that falling foul of one another, many of the ships received great damage, and were in danger of perishing. At length, in such manner as they could, they drew out; and as fast as they got clear and obtained room, put themselves in order of battle along the shore, with their prows pointing towards the enemy. *Claudius*, who had been in the rear of all his fleet, now placed himself in the left of his line. He had it once in his power (as some report) to sheer off, but was obstinately bent to try an engagement; insomuch that when the sacred chickens were consulted and refused their meat, he threw them cage and all into the sea; *If they wont eat*, said he, *let them drink*, not reflecting that such a contempt of religion might discourage those who were witnesses of it.

Cic. B. 2.
de Nat.
Deor. Val.
Max. B. 1.
c. 4.
Polyb. B.
1. c. 50.

In the mean while *Adberbal*, having with five great vessels passed the left wing of the *Romans*,
turned

V. R. 504.
Bef. Chr.
248.
203d Conf.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 51.

turned the prow of his own galley upon the enemy, making a signal for the rest of his fleet, which followed, on the same line, to do the like. And now the whole *Carthaginian* fleet being drawn up in front, advanced against the *Romans*, who, as was before said, were drawn up along the shore, a situation than which none could be more dangerous. As soon as the two fleets were near each other, the flags of defiance were hoisted by the two admirals, and the battle began. At first the conflict was equal on both sides, each fleet having on board the hardiest men they could pick out of their land forces. But victory by degrees began to declare for the *Carthaginians*, who indeed had many advantages above the *Romans*, by the lightness of their vessels, the expertness of their rowers, and especially by the wise precaution they had taken to have sea room, wherein to work their vessels as occasion required; for at any time when they were pressed by the enemy, they could at pleasure retire, spread themselves, or draw close together, in which movements the lightness of their gallees greatly availed. Moreover when any of the *Roman* gallees (heavily built and unskilfully managed) chased any of theirs, and thereby separated themselves from their own fleet, those who were chased could tack upon the pursuers, and intercept them, or rowing round them, come upon their flank with their prows and sink them. All these benefits were wanting to the *Romans*; but their greatest evil was their situation; because when any of their vessels were hard pressed,

pressed, they could by no means retire for the shore; they must either run aground upon the flats, or bulge against the rocks.

V. R. 504.
Bef. Chr.
248.
203d Conf.

The Consul at length, observing the distress of his fleet, that some were split upon the rocks and others stranded, stood away to the left, and with only thirty vessels that were the nearest to him, escaped out of the battle. The rest, to the number of ninety three, fell into the enemies hands, together with all the men, except a few soldiers who had got ashore, after their vessels were run aground or broken to pieces. Eight thousand of the *Romans* are said to have been slain, and 20,000 taken prisoners.

Orosius,
B. 4. c. 10.

This was a glorious action for *Adherbal*, to whom the *Carthaginians* did very great honour, ascribing the success to his sole virtue and bravery; while on the other hand, *Claudius* was recalled to *Rome*, where he was reproached with his shameful defeat, and with the loss his country had sustained, as entirely owing to his folly and temerity. Nevertheless when he was ordered to name a Dictator, he, to insult the senate, nominated to that supreme dignity one *Claudius Glycia*, a mean fellow who had been his viator or tip staff: but this mock dictator^c did not hold the place; *M. Attilius Calatinus* was substituted in his room. After which the Consul (now deposed) was brought to a formal trial for his misconduct, and was loaded with a rigorous sentence.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 52.

Suet. life
of Tib.
Fast. Cap.

^c According to *Liv. Epit.* he was suffered afterwards to wear the *prætexta* at the publick shows.

Y. R. 504.
Bef. Chr.

248.
203d Conf.

Polyb. B. I.
c. 52.

As for the other Consul, *Junius Pullus*, he had been dispatched over to *Sicily* with order to supply the camp before *Lilybæum* with provisions and all necessary stores; for the safe convoy of which, he had a squadron of 60 gallies. Being arrived at *Messina*, he there augmented his fleet with what ships had been sent thither from *Lilybæum*, and from other places in the island, and then set sail for *Syracuse*; his whole fleet now consisting of 120 ships of war and 800 storeships. From *Syracuse* he dispatched his Quæstors with one half of his vessels of burthen, and some of his gallies, that they might without delay furnish the camp with necessaries, while he himself staid at this port, waiting the arrival of that part of his fleet which had not been able to keep him company, and was not yet come up, as also to receive the corn which the Islanders, in the alliance of *Rome*, had provided for him.

c. 53.

About this time *Adberbal*, studious to make the best advantage of his victory, and having sent away to *Cartbage*, the ships and the prisoners taken in the battle, delivered 30 of his gallies to *Cartbalo*, who had already under his own command 70, with which he was lately arrived, and sent him to try what mischief might be done to the *Roman* fleet in the harbour of *Lilybæum*. *Cartbalo* suddenly entered the mouth of the haven, and finding the *Romans* more attentive to the keeping in of the besieged, than to the defence of their fleet, without difficulty seized and towed away some of the gallies and set fire to others. The *Roman* camp took the alarm, and the

the soldiers hastened to the rescue: but *Himilco* governor of the town fallying out at the same time, and putting the *Romans* in great distress, gave *Carthalo* leisure to go through with his enterprize. After this exploit the *Carthaginian* ran all along the south coast of *Sicily*, with a view to obstruct, what in him lay, the succours that were coming to the *Roman* army. And receiving advice by his scouts, that a great fleet of all sorts of vessels was approaching, and was not far off, he advanced with much joy to encounter them; for both he and his men were full of courage by reason of their late victories. The fleet which had been descried was that under the conduct of the *Roman Quæstors*; who when they got notice that the *Carthaginians* were at hand, not conceiving themselves of sufficient strength to hazard an engagement, presently made for the coast, and drew up their vessels under covert of a poor town belonging to their party. Here was indeed no safe harbour, yet they found some sort of shelter in certain coves, and small retreats among the rocks; and the town having furnished them with engines for casting stones and shooting arrows, they waited here, in a posture of defence, the attack of the enemy. But *Carthalo* knowing that they could not long ride under those rocks, but would be forced by any great change of wind either to put out into the deep, or to abandon their ships in order to save the men, he, after he had taken some few of their vessels, would not pursue the assault any further, but retired into the mouth of a neighbouring river,

Y. R. 504.
Bef. Chr.

248.

203d Conf.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 54.

and there lay waiting for an opportunity to seize the rest, without hazard to himself.

In the mean while the Consul *Junius*, having dispatched those affairs which had detained him at *Syracuse*, departed thence, and doubling the cape of *Pachynus*, shaped his course for *Lilybæum*, totally ignorant of what had happened to his Quæstors. The *Carthaginians* perceived his approach, and quitting their station sailed away to attack him before he could join the other part of his fleet. *Junius* was yet a great way off when he first descried the enemy; yet finding himself too near to fly, and too weak to fight, he also, like his Quæstors, ran in close on a part of the coast that was quite harbourless and full of rocks, imagining no danger so great as that of the enemy. *Carthalo* did not care to attack him in a place where it was difficult to work a ship with safety; he betook himself therefore to a station between the two fleets, and there watched to see which of them would first stir, resolving to assault that which should first dare to put out to sea. Thus all the three fleets were on the south coast of *Sicily*, between the cape of *Pachynus* and *Lilybæum*, a tract exceedingly dangerous when the wind stormed at south. The *Carthaginians*, who knew the times of tempest and their signs, and who now perhaps observed some swelling billow, or some other such like indication of an approaching storm, immediately weighed anchor, and made all haste to double the cape of *Pachynus*, thereby to cover themselves from the rage they feared. This, though with great

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great difficulty, they effected, and secured their ships. But the *Romans*, who knew better how to fight than how to navigate, remaining exposed on that rocky coast, were so terribly assaulted by a boisterous south-wind, that not a single ship of either fleet escaped being dashed to pieces.

Y. R. 504.
Bef. Chr.
248.
203d Conf.

In this manner was *Rome* once more deprived of all her naval force; and, thus deprived, she renounced once more the empire of the seas.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 55.

Notwithstanding all these disasters the *Romans* were still superior to their enemies by land, and though driven to hard shifts for provisions, they continued the blockade of *Lilybæum*, firmly fixed to abide the utmost extremity rather than abandon their enterprize. As for the Consul *Junius*, who had not lost his men when his ships were destroyed, he repaired with all expedition to the camp, full of anxious thoughts, how to retrieve his honour, by some remarkable service. Between *Panormus* and *Drepanum*, on the side of a mountain, the highest in all *Sicily*, except *Ætna*, stood the city of *Eryx*; and on the top of the mountain was the temple of *Venus Erycina**, the fairest and richest temple in the whole island. *Junius* formed a design upon these, and, being assisted by the treason of some of those who had been appointed to defend them, got possession of them by sur-

* It does not appear at what time the *Carthaginians* made themselves masters of these places; it was probably after the defeat of *Claudius Pulcher*, for according to *Polybius* they had nothing in the island but *Drepanum* and *Lilybæum* at the time when the latter was first besieged by the *Romans*.

Y. R. 503.
Bef. Chr.

249.

202d Conf.

Zon. B. 8.

prize. The city was difficult of access, the only way to it being steep and narrow; and the Consul, the better to secure his conquest, built a fort at the entrance of the passage to it, where he placed a garrison of 800 men. He also posted another body of men on the top of the mountain, not doubting but by these precautions he should keep quiet possession both of the city, and of the whole mountain.

Zonaras reports, that *Junius*, after this, was taken prisoner by *Carthalo*; but *Cicero* and *Val. Maximus* tell us that he killed himself to avoid an ignominious sentence at *Rome*, for his losing the fleet.

Upon the death or disgrace of the two Consuls, the Dictator *Calatinus* passed into *Sicily* to command the army, the first instance of a *Roman* Dictator appearing out of *Italy*. He performed no exploit.

Y. of R.
505.

In the following year^b nothing very memorable was done by either party. *Zonaras* relates, that *Carthalo*, to draw one of the Consuls out of the island, made a descent on the *Italian* coast, but without success: for hearing that the Prætor of *Rome* at the head of an army was advancing against him, he presently reembarked and returned to *Sicily*. Here his troops, (whom he had not been able to satisfy with the plunder of the *Roman* territories) began to murmur for want of their pay. To put a stop to the mutiny he punished the most clamorous with rigour; but

^b *C. Aurelius Cotta,*
P. Servilius Geminus, } Consuls.

this exasperating even those who were more peaceably inclined, a general sedition would probably have ensued, to the ruin of the *Carthaginian* cause, if he had not been seasonably recalled, and a captain of much greater credit and abilities appointed to succeed him. This was *Amilcar Barcha*, the father of the famous *Hannibal*.

Y. R. 305.
Bef. Chr.
247.
204 Conf.

C H A P. X.

From the 18th year of the war to the end of it, in the 23d or 24th year after its commencement.

Amilcar Barcha, by his masterly conduct, hinders the Romans, during five years, from making any progress in the conquest of Sicily. They at length provide themselves, once more, with a naval force as the only means to accomplish their enterprize; and this new fleet, under the conduct of Lutatius Catulus, obtaining a complete victory over the fleet of Carthage, (commanded by Hanno) the Carthaginians are constrained to yield to their enemies the whole island, by a treaty of peace.

IT was in the eighteenth year of the war, that *Amilcar Barcha* became commander in chief of the *Carthaginian* forces by sea and land. Having quieted the discontents of the army, he began his expeditions by sailing with the fleet to the coast of *Italy*; where making a descent he pillaged and laid waste the territories of the *Locrians* and *Bruttians*. After this he landed his

Pliny, B.
1. c. 56.
Y. R. 306.

Y. R. 506.
Bef. Chr.
246.
205 Conf.

troops in *Sicily*; and, because the *Cartbaginians* were not masters there of any walled town so situated, as he could from thence infest the *Romans*, he took possession of a commodious piece of ground near the sea coast, between *Panormus* and *Eryx*. It was a mountain invironed on all sides with rocks and precipices, and on the top of it was a plain of at least twelve miles in compass, the ground yielding both good pasture and good corn. To this mountain the avenues were only three, one from the sea, and two from the land; and being by nature strait and difficult, it required but little fortification to secure them.

Here ^b then the brave *Amilcar* encamped his forces to confront as well those of the enemy, who were in *Panormus*, as those who were posted about *Eryx*, putting himself between the two armies with admirable resolution. And though he was thus in the midst of his enemies, and had no ally from whom he could hope for succour, he nevertheless gave the *Romans* great and frequent alarms, obliging them to a constant exercise of all their courage, vigilance and severest discipline. For, as the place he was in had the command of a port ^c, he made use of the opportunity,

^b *Chevr. Folard* understands the words of *Polybius* to mean that *Amilcar* posted himself in the avenue from the sea to the mountain.

^c *Frontinus* (in lib. 3. *Strat.*) reports, that *Amilcar*, in order to supply *Lilybæum* with provisions, made use of a stratagem to draw the *Roman* fleet out of the harbour. But according to *Polybius*, the *Romans* had no fleet at this time, or if any,

portunity, with which this furnished him, to scour all the coast of *Italy* with his fleet, as far as to the territory of *Cuma*: and, when afterwards in *Sicily*, the *Romans* had brought their camp within five furlongs of his army, on the side towards *Panormus*, he gave them battle so often, and had such variety of encounters with them, that (as *Polybius* tells us) it would be scarce possible to relate all the particular actions. We must judge, *says he*, of this war, as we do of a combat between two strong and vigorous gladiators, who in close conflict have been incessantly giving and receiving wounds. Neither the spectators nor the combatants themselves would be able to recount every feint and every stroke, and to say how and why they were made: but we judge of the skill, strength, and resolution of the parties, by their perseverance in maintaining the fight, and by the event. So with regard to the war in question, a minute detail of the various stratagems, surprizes, advances, attacks, which were daily practised on both sides, would be very difficult to an historian, and not very useful to the reader. A general relation of what was performed, with the success of the whole, will suffice to make us know the worth and abilities of the commanders.

In a word then, no stratagem which could be any, none that was able to contend with *Amilcar*, and oblige him to have recourse to stratagem.

Polybius tells us, that the *Romans* abstained from all naval preparations for five years. And therefore when *Florus* speaks of a battle gained at sea by the *Romans* during this time, it seems to be a tale without foundation.

Y. R. 506.
Bef. Chr.
246.
205 Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 57.

Y. R. 506.
Bef. Chr.
246.
205 Conf.

learnt from history, no new one which present circumstances and opportunity could suggest, none that required even the utmost hardiness and impetuosity to execute it, was neglected: and yet, all this while, nothing decisive was done. The strength on both sides being equal, the camps impregnable, and the space between them very small, it hence came to pass that there were every day skirmishes and encounters between parties, but a general action never. For in all the engagements, so soon as one party found themselves hard pressed by the other, the weaker instantly threw themselves behind their entrenchments, where they knew they had a secure shelter; and from whence they presently returned to the charge,

In this manner was the war carried on for almost three years^d; till at length (as our author speaks)

| | | |
|---------------|---|-----------------------|
| Y. of R. 506. | { | L. Cæcilius Metellus, |
| | | 2d time. |
| | | N. Fabius Buteo. |
| Y. of R. 507. | { | M. Otacilius Crassus, |
| | | 2d time. |
| | | M. Fabius Licinus. |
| Y. of R. 508. | { | N. Fabius Buteo. |
| | | C. Atilius Balbus. |

A. Gell.
B. 10. ch.
6. Val.
Max. B. 8.
ch. 1.
Sueton. life
of Tib.
Liv. Epit.
B. 19.

¶ In the year 507 there happened at Rome an accident, which serves to shew how much it behoved even persons of the highest rank to avoid all petulancy of speech, and not by any indecent words to violate the dignity of Roman discipline, *Claudia*, the daughter of the famous *Claudius the Blind*; and sister to that *Claudius Puleher*, who lost the battle of *Drepanum*, wherein many thousand Romans perished, returning in her chariot from the public show, happened to be stopt in her way by the multitude that thronged the street,

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speaks) Fortune, who presided as an impartial umpire at this contention, transported the combatants to another theatre, where shutting them up in yet closer lists they were engaged in a more perilous conflict.

Y. R. 506.
Bef. Chr.

246.

205 Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 58.

The *Romans* (as has been before observed) had placed garrisons on the top and at the bottom of mount *Eryx*. *Amilcar* nevertheless found a way, lying towards the sea, by which he conveyed his men (before the enemy had the least notice of it) into the city of *Eryx*, that was about the middle of the ascent. By this means the *Romans*, who held the top of the mountain, were in a manner besieged, and it is wonderful with what resolution and constancy they sustained all the hardships to which their situation exposed them: but it is yet more wonderful, that the *Carthaginians* should be able to defend themselves, when hard pressed by the enemy both from above and from below, and when deprived of all means of subsistence, except by one avenue from the sea. And here again on this new stage of action were exerted, on both sides, all the art and vigour that can possibly be conceived, in an infinite variety of stratagems and assaults. Nor was an end put to this fierce struggle (as the

street. The Lady proud and impatient, cried out, *Gods, how this city is over-crowded! I wish my brother Claudius were alive again, and had the command of another Fleet!* These words, even from a woman, were thought unpardonable. She was brought into judgment for them by the *Ædiles*, before the *Tribes*, and was there fined 25,000 asses of brass, [80 l. 14 s. 7 d. *Arbutnot.*]

historian

Y. R. 506.
Bef. Chr.
246.
205 Conf.

historian *Fabius* falsely reported) by the failure of strength in the contending parties, exhausted by the sufferings they underwent; for they sustained famine, fatigue, and all the hardships incident to sieges, with so unwearied a fortitude, that they scarcely seemed to feel them: but a conclusion was given to the war after a different manner, and before either party in *Sicily* had gained any superiority over the other. *Polybius* compares the rival powers to two valiant birds, that, weakened by a long combat, and unable any more to make use of their wings in the fight, yet support themselves by their sole courage, and with joint consent coming close together, peck and maul each other with their bills, thus mutually striving by these last efforts to obtain the victory.

Polyb. B. I.
c. 59.

Two whole years were wasted by the *Romans*, in fruitless attempts to dislodge the invincible *Amilcar* from *Eryx*. And now the Senate of *Rome*, who had hoped every thing from the bravery of their land forces, became perfectly convinced that they should never achieve the conquest of *Sicily* without the help of a naval strength. If, by means of a fleet, they could once get the mastery of the sea, it would then be impossible for the *Carthaginian* General to hold out much longer, because his supplies of provision would be totally obstructed. But where to find money

* Y. of R. 509. { *A. Manlius Torquatus*.
 { *C. Sempronius Blaesus*,
 2d time.
 Y. of R. 510. { *C. Fundanius*.
 { *C. Sulpicius*.

at

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at this time for a naval armament of sufficient strength, was a difficulty that seemed not easy to be surmounted; for the expence would be great, and the public treasury was exhausted. On this pressing occasion the richest of the citizens shewed a laudable zeal for their country's service. They built each of them a *Quinqueremis* at his own cost; and this example had so good an effect, that those, who were not able singly to do the like, yet concurring, two or three of them fitted out a galley at their joint expence. In short, a fleet of 200 ^f *Quinqueremes* was thus put to sea by private citizens, who required no other condition, but to be reimbursed when the state of the public affairs would allow of it. And this armament was vastly better than any of the former, in as much as all the new galleys were built upon the model of that light vessel, which had been taken from *Hannibal* the *Rhodian*.

The Consuls chosen for the new year were *C. Lutatius Catulus*, and *A. Posthumius*. The latter being at the same time High-Priest of *Mars*, the *Pontifex Maximus* declared it unlawful for him to abandon his priestly functions; nay, he absolutely forbid it, accompanying his prohibition with threats, and *Posthumius* was obliged to submit. But this religious scruple occasioned the creation of a new magistracy in the republic. The senate and people, not thinking it advisable to trust the command of their army to one general alone, nor yet to expose themselves to the in-

^f Three hundred, according to *Eutropius*, B. 2. c. 27.

Y. R. 511.
Bef. Chr.

241.

210 Conf.

conveniences which might arise from the too long absence of the *Prætor of Rome*, to whom it naturally fell to supply the place of *Posthumius* in the field, they created a second *Prætor* for that purpose. This officer they stiled *Prætor Peregrinus*; and he was not only to assist the general abroad, but to judge or appoint judges in all civil causes between *Roman* citizens and strangers. The former *Prætor* took the title of *Prætor Urbanus*; and it was now regulated, that his residence should be at *Rome*, and his jurisdiction confined to the cognizance of causes between *Roman* citizens only. It was also decreed, that the persons who were to fill these offices should be chosen annually in the *comitia by centuries*, but their different provinces be determined by lot.

Orof. B. 4.
c. 10.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 59.

Valerius Falto, the first *Prætor Peregrinus*, embarked with the Consul *Lutatius*, on board the new fleet for *Sicily*. They began the campaign with the siege of *Drepanum*, and they very soon made a breach in the wall; nevertheless they did not carry the place; for as the Consul at the head of his men was mounting to the assault, he received a dangerous wound in his thigh; whereupon the soldiers quitted the enterprize, to take care of their general, whom they carried back to the camp. After this the siege was discontinued; for *Lutatius* being persuaded, that the *Carthaginians* would soon appear with a fleet upon the coast, and that a victory over them at sea, would contribute much more than any other exploit towards the entire conquest of *Sicily*, turned all

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all his thoughts to discipline his men, and prepare them for a naval engagement.

Y. R. 511.
Bef. Chr.

241.
210 Conf.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 60.

The *Carthaginians* greatly surprized at the news of a *Roman* navy at sea, had dispatched away a ^b fleet, with all expedition, under the conduct of an eminent commander named *Hanno*; of whose character, because of the share he will have in several important events of this history, it may not be improper to give some features: An able pen, on the present occasion, has thus described him.

“ — A man wise in picture, exceedingly formal, and skilful in the art of seeming reverend. How his reputation was first bred, I do not find, but it was upheld by a factious contradiction of things undertaken by men more worthy than himself. This Quality procured to him (as it has done to many others) not only approbation among the antient sort, whose cold temper is averse from new enterprizes, but an opinion of great foresight, opinion confirmed by every loss received. More particularly he was gracious among the people, for that he was one of the most grievous oppressors of their subject provinces; whereby he procured unto the *Carthaginians* much wealth, but therewithal such hatred, as turned it all to their great loss. He had before this been employed against the *Numidians*, and wild *Africans*, who, in making war, were more like rovers than soldiers. Of those fugitive nations

Sir W. R.

^b Of 400 sail according to *Eutropius*.

“ he

Y. R. 511.

Bef. Chr.

241.

210 Conf.

“ he learned to neglect more manly enemies,
 “ to his own great dishonour, and to the great
 “ hurt of *Carthage*; which lost not more by his
 “ bad conduct than by his malicious counsel,
 “ when having shewed himself an unworthy cap-
 “ tain, he betook himself to the long robe.
 “ Yet is he much commended in *Roman* histories
 “ as a temperate man, and one that studied
 “ how to preserve the league between *Rome* and
 “ *Carthage*: In which regard how well he de-
 “ served of his own country, it will appear
 “ hereafter; how beneficial he was to *Rome*, it
 “ will appear hereafter, and in his present voyage,
 “ wherein he reduced the *Carthaginians* to a mi-
 “ serable necessity of accepting, upon hard con-
 “ ditions, *that* PEACE, which he thenceforth
 “ commended.”

Hanno

“ It is proper to inform the reader, that though Sir *W. R.* is here followed, in supposing that the *Hanno*, who now commanded the *Carthaginian* fleet, was the same with that *Hanno*, who afterwards headed the faction against *Amilcar Barca* and his son *Hannibal*, there is some reason to doubt it. *Polybius*, indeed, says nothing from which we can infer, that they were different persons; and the importance of the present expedition makes it probable, that the *Carthaginians* would not commit the charge of it, but to a man in the highest reputation and esteem, as he, whom Sir *W. R.* characterises, was at this time. Yet by some words which *Livy* (as we shall see hereafter) puts into the mouth of that *Hanno*, who signalized himself by his opposition to *Hannibal*'s measures, one would think that the speaker could not be the person who lost the battle at sea against *Lutatius*. For the historian makes the enemy of *Hannibal*, on two several occasions, remind the *Carthaginians* of that

shameful

Hanno had well furnished his navy with all necessary provisions for the soldiers at *Eryx* (for dexterity in making such preparations, was the best of his qualities) but he had neglected to man his galleys with able mariners, trained to the practice of sea fights; he had taken the first that presented themselves; and his soldiers were raw men that knew nothing of service. He had been careless in these matters, through a foolish contempt of his enemies; not remembering that it was the resistless force of tempests, rather than any other strength of opposition, which had made them forsake the seas. Yet in one thing he judged right, or at least had been well instructed; for his intention was, first of all to sail to *Eryx*, and there to discharge his ships of their loading, and when he had thus lightened them, to take on board the choice of the land-forces together with *Amilcar* himself; and then to offer the enemy battle. This was an excellent course if it could have been performed. But the Consul *Lutatius*, who, on the first notice of *Hanno's* being at sea, had sailed from *Drepanum* to the island of *Ægusa*, (one of the *Ægates*¹) used all possible diligence to prevent the execution of the enemies design; not that he was informed of their design, but that he knew it was, for them,

shameful and fatal overthrow, as an event which they ought never to forget.

And if we may believe *Zonaras*, the *Hanno* who suffered the defeat at the *Ægates*, was crucified at his return home for his misconduct.

¹ Islands lying off of *Lilybæum* and *Drepanum*.

the

Y. R. 511
Bef. Chr.

241.

210 Conf.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 60.

Y. R. 511.
Bef. Chr.

241.

210 Conf.

the best which they could have, and because he feared no danger so greatly as an encounter with *Amilcar*. For these reasons, though he was not yet cured of his wound, and though the weather was very rough, and the seas went high, when, the next morning he descried the *Cartbaginian* fleet, coming with a flown sheet from the island of *Hiera**, (where they had put in) he chose rather to fight with the enemy, who had the wind of him, than upon unlikely hope of better opportunity, to suffer their convoy to pass to *Eryx*.

Polyb. B. 1.
c. 91.

All that *Hanno* should have done, *Lutatius* had performed. He had carefully exercised his men in rowing; he had lightened his gallies of all unnecessary burthens, and he had taken on board the best men of his land-forces. The *Cartbaginians* therefore, at the very first encounter, were utterly broken and defeated: Fifty of their gallies were sunk and seventy taken, the rest by a sudden change of wind escaping to the island of *Hiera*. The Consul after the battle stood away with the fleet for *Lilybæum*, there to dispose of his prizes and prisoners; of which latter the number amounted to near ten thousand.

When, at *Cartbage*, they received the news of *Hanno's* defeat, so contrary to all expectation, they were greatly at a loss what measures to take. If, to have their revenge, nothing had been necessary but courage and emulation, they were never better provided than at this juncture, to prosecute the war. But what could they do?

* Another of the *Ægates*.*Amilcar,*

Amilcar, on whose valour and judgment the honour and safety of the commonwealth depended, was surrounded by his enemies, and could not be relieved. For as the *Romans* were now masters of the sea, it was not possible for the *Cartbaginians* to send either provisions or reinforcements to their armies in *Sicily*. In this extremity they could fix upon nothing better than to send by an express full powers to the General himself, to take what course he should think most proper; and this they did, leaving all conclusions to his election and sole counsel.

Amilcar, who had done every thing that could be expected from the most intrepid courage, and the most consummate wisdom, and whom no adversity, accompanied with the least hope or possibility of recovery, had ever vanquished, but who yet knew when to yield as well as when to resist, began now to turn his thoughts wholly to the preservation of the army under his conduct; for he plainly saw, that *Sicily* was lost. He dispatched therefore an Ambassador to the Consul, with an overture of peace. *Lutatius*, having well considered it, gathered so many arguments from the present poverty of the *Roman* state, exhausted beyond expectation by the war, that he readily listened to the proposal. At first he demanded, that *Amilcar* and his soldiers should deliver up their arms; but this the *Cartbaginian* absolutely refused, declaring that he would rather perish than undergo so great an infamy; and the Consul acquiesced. In short, a treaty was concluded on terms to this effect.

Y. R. 511.
B. C. Cht.
241.
210 Cons.

Corn. Nep.
in *Amilc.*
c. 1.

Y. R. 511.
Bef. Chr.

241.

216 Conf.

Polyb. B. I.
c. 62.

“ There shall be peace between *Rome* and
“ *Carthage* (provided the *Roman* people approve
“ of it) on the following conditions.

“ The *Carthaginians* shall evacuate all *Sicily*.

“ They shall deliver up all the *Roman* pri-
“ soners ransom free.

“ They shall pay to the *Romans*, within the
“ space of twenty years next following, 2200^b ta-
“ lents of silver, whereof one thousand shall
“ be paid immediately.

“ They shall not make war upon King *Hiero*,
“ nor upon any of the allies of *Rome*; nor shall
“ the *Romans* molest any of the allies of *Carthage*.

“ Neither of the contracting powers shall raise
“ any fortress, or levy any soldiers in the domi-
“ nions of the other.

“ Nor shall either of them enter into con-
“ federacy with the allies of the other.”

c. 63.

These articles being brought to *Rome*, and
not being entirely approved there, ten com-
missioners were sent into *Sicily* to terminate the
affair. These added 1000 talents to the former
sum, and shortened the time for payment to ten
years; and they also required, that the *Cartha-*
ginians should not only leave *Sicily*, but with-
draw their troops from all the Islands between
Sicily and *Italy*. *Amilcar* not thinking it advis-
able to break off the negotiation for the sake
of these new demands, the treaty was ratified in
form: but (probably) not in the Consulate of
Caius Lutatius, but of his successors *Q. Lutatius*
and *A. Manlius* in the year of *Rome* 512.

Livy, B.
30. c. 44.
Y. R. 512.

^b 437250 l. *Arbutnot.*

Such

Chap. X. *First Punic War.*

127

Such was the end of the First Punic War, after it had lasted 23^c or 24 years: A war (*says Polybius*) the longest, the least interrupted, and the greatest (that is, the most abounding with great actions and events) of any to be met with in history. The *Romans* in the course of it lost 700 ships of war, and the *Carthaginians* about 500^d; the greatness of which losses sufficiently prove the greatness of the two states, and of the war itself, wherein, (according to the same author) the *Romans* in general shewed themselves the braver nation, and *Amilcar* the ablest Captain.

Y. R. 512.
Bef. Chr.
240.
211 Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 64.

^c *Polybius* makes this war to have lasted 24 years, and so do others: But *Entropius* puts a conclusion to it in the 23d year; which reckoning agrees with the *Capitoline Marbles*, since, according to them, *Appius Claudius Caudex*, who began the war, was Consul in the year 489, and *C. Lutatius Catulus*, who made the treaty with *Amilcar*, was Consul in 511.

Livy, towards the close of his 30th book, says, the First Punic War ended when *Q. Lutatius* and *A. Manlius* were Consuls. These were the successors of *C. Lutatius*; and perhaps their Consulship was begun when the ten Commissioners came into *Sicily* and the peace was ratified.

^d How came it to pass, that in *Polybius's* time, when the *Romans* were arrived at almost universal empire, they could not fit out such fleets, and make such naval preparations, as in the time of the first Punic War? This question is on the present occasion started by *Polybius* himself; who adds, that a plain and satisfactory reason may be assigned for the change, but defers giving it, till he shall come to speak of the form of the *Roman* commonwealth, His discourse on this latter subject not being transmitted to us, we are at a loss to know how the difficulty may be resolved.

B. 1. c.
64.

Y. R. 512.
Bef. Chr.

240.
311 Conf.

Solinus.

AND now the great affair at *Rome* was to determine the fate of *Sicily*, the manner in which it should be governed, and the emoluments which the republic should draw from so fine a conquest. The whole island, excepting the little kingdom of *Syracuse*, was declared a *Roman Province*, that is to say, a province that should be ruled by *Roman* laws and *Roman* magistrates. A Prætor was to be annually sent thither to be its Governor; and a Quæstor to take charge of the revenues. These revenues were either fixed or casual. The fixed were called *tributes*, and were a certain sum, which the province was obliged every year to pay into the publick treasury. The casual were the tenths of the product of the lands, and the duties upon merchandize exported and imported. And these tenths and customs were generally farmed by the publicans^c.

^c Among the advantages which *Rome* gained from her wars in *Sicily*, may be reckoned an improvement of her taste for letters, and juster notions of poesy. *Sicily* abounded with excellent poets. In the first year after her peaceable possession of this island, when *C. Claudius* and *M. Sempronius* were Consuls, appeared *L. Livius Andronicus*, the reformer of the Latin theatre. He introduced upon the stage connected fables after the *Greek* manner, instead of the buffooneries, and rambling discourses, with which the people were before entertained.

About this time was born at *Rudes*, a city of *Calabria*, *Ennius*, the famous poet and historian. He was the inventor of Hexameter verses among the *Latins*; but his *Life of Scipio Africanus*, which was his master-piece, he wrote in Choraicks. He is thought to have eclipsed the poet *Nævius*, his contemporary.

Caius

Caius Lutatius the Consul, and *Q. Valerius* the Prætor, had both of them the honour of the triumph at their return to *Rome*. The Consul indeed disputed the pretensions of the latter to it, because *Valerius* had not acted in a post of equal authority with him; and upon a reference to the arbitration of *Atilius Calatinus*, the point was decided against the Prætor; nevertheless, as his conduct in the war had been uncommonly meritorious, he obtained his suit by a decree of the people.

But the public joy at *Rome*, for the late important conquest, was greatly damped by two misfortunes, which about this time followed close upon one another. The *Tiber* on a sudden overflowed with such violence, as to overturn a great number of houses in the lower grounds; where the water continuing a considerable time, it much damaged also the foundations of many others.

After this there happened a greater calamity by fire, which breaking out in the night destroyed not only numberless houses, but an incredible multitude of people. It consumed all the buildings within the circumference of the forum. *Cæcilius Metellus* the *Pontifex Maximus* signalized his pious zeal on this occasion: For when the fire had seized the temple of *Vesta*, and when the Virgins in a fright had all deserted it, he ventured his life to save the *Palladium*: Making his way through the flames, he brought it safely out of the sanctuary. One of his arms was much hurt in the attempt, and he entirely lost his sight. To reward so heroic an action of piety, it was decreed by the people, that he should have the

Y. R. 512.
Bef. Chr.

240.
211 Conf.

Val. Max.
B. 2. c. 3.

Val. Max.
B. 1. c. 4.

Y. R. 512.
Bef. Chr.

240.

211 Conf.

privilege of being carried to the senate house in a chariot, as often as he went thither; a distinction which had never been granted to any man before.

Liv. Epit.
B. 19.

It is probable that the *Roman* tribes (by the addition of those called *Velina* and *Quirina*) were about this time augmented to 35, which number was never after increased.

C H A P. XI.

The Falisci in Hetruria rebel against the Romans, but are quelled in a few days. Carthage is reduced to great extremities in a war, which for more than three years is carried on against her by her foreign mercenaries, in conjunction with her African subjects. The conduct of the Romans on this occasion.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 65.

THE peace between *Rome* and *Carthage* was hardly ratified, when both these states found themselves on a sudden engaged in new and unexpected wars at home, by the rebellion of their own subjects.

Y. R. 512.
Eutrop. B.
2. Liv. Ep.
B. 19. Zonaras.

The *Falisci* in *Hetruria*, through some unaccountable levity or madness, rose up in arms, and declared war against the *Roman* power. This intestine commotion caused a great alarm and terror throughout all *Italy*; and it occasioned no less wonder, by the speedy issue to which it was brought. The Consuls *Q. Lutatius* and *A. Manlius*, at the head of the legions, are said to have quelled the rebels in six days. Two battles were

Chap. XI. *The Roman History.*

131

were fought. In the first, the success was doubtful; but in the second, the *Romans* obtained a complete victory. The *Falisci* having lost 15,000 men in the action, humbly submitted themselves, and sued for peace. They were despoiled of their arms, horses, household-goods, slaves, and half their territory. Their city, strongly situated in a steep craggy place, was ordered to be demolished; and the inhabitants to build a new one for themselves in the flat open country. Nay, the people of *Rome* were meditating a more severe revenge against a nation that had so often rebelled; but they restrained their wrath by the advice of a venerable *Roman* named *Papirius*, whom the Consuls had employed to draw up in writing the form of the rebels surrendry. He represented to the multitude, that the *Falisci* had yielded themselves, not to the *power* but the *faith* (or honour) of the *Romans*^b; and this sacred name of *public faith* had such a prevalency on the minds of the people, that they readily acquiesced in what had been agreed upon.

CARTHAGE, not so fortunate as *Rome*, had a much longer and more dangerous conflict to sustain at the very gates of the capital.

The avarice of a republic of merchants, who better understood the value of money, than the merit of brave soldiers, was the source of this intestine mischief. They would needs persuade those foreign troops, who had fought so gallantly

^b *Faliscos non potestati, sed fidei se Romanorum commisisse.*
Val. Max. B. 6. ch. 5.

Y. R. 512.
Bef. Chr.
240.
211 Conf.

Y. R. 512.
Bef. Chr.

240.
217 Cons.

under *Amilcar* in *Sicily*, and had endured so steadily all the hardships of war, in the defence of a state, to which they had no tie but their wages; they would needs, I say, persuade these strangers to remit, *out of affection to that state*, some part of what was due to them from it, by compact, for their services: whereas in truth they ought rather to have rewarded them with rich gratuities beyond their stipulated pay. In the pursuit of this penurious project they fell into strange imprudences. It could not be well imagined, that a proposal to foreign mercenaries, to contribute out of their pay to the expences of the war, would be very chearfully received or easily digested. Nevertheless, that they might hear the grave oratory of *Hanno* on this head, the *Carthaginians* suffered these strangers, amounting to 20,000 men, to assemble all in one place, in the neighbourhood of the capital; and this at a time, when *Carthage* had not, on foot, a sufficient body of her own people to resist such an army in case of a mutiny. And they committed a yet greater mistake, as *Polybius* observes, in constraining the soldiers to take with them from the city, to the place of rendezvous, their wives and children; because these, had they remained in *Carthage*, would have served as hostages for the good behaviour of the fathers and husbands.

In a word, the rhetoric of *Hanno* had no effect but to kindle the highest resentment. The mercenaries turned their arms with fury against their late masters; the *African* subjects of *Carthage*, easily drawn into rebellion, because greatly oppressed,

pressed, took this opportunity to attempt the recovery of their freedom; and the *Numidians*, the old enemies of the republic, and greedy of her destruction, joined their forces to the rebels.

Y. R. 512.
Bef. Chr.
240.
211 Conf.

In this war *, which lasted three years and almost four months, it was not with the *Carthaginians*, as in former times, when they fought for glory, or to give a wider extent to their empire; it was no sportive enterprize of ambition; all was at stake; the very being of their government, their estates, their lives, were all in the utmost peril, from the desperate fury and close attacks of the most cruel and implacable enemies they had ever contended with. *Amilcar* saved his country. Superior by his skill and courage, not only to the impetuous force of multitudes, but to the cautious bravery of an army, which he himself had trained, and disciplined, it was through his abilities, that his republic remained victorious in the conclusion of this *inexorable* war; a war that was never to be ended but by the total destruction of one of the contending parties.

The African War, or War of the Carthaginians with their Mercenaries.

* This war being a very curious part of history, and serving greatly to give us a more perfect knowledge of the character of that Rival State, whose destruction alone could establish the *Roman* greatness, it may neither be unseasonable, nor disagreeable to the reader, if the sub-

stance

stance of *Polybius's* account of it be here inserted.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 66, &
seq. and Sir
W.R.B. 5.
ch. 2.

‘ **W**HEN *Amilcar* had finished the treaty,
‘ which put an end to the *First Punic War*,
‘ he led his troops from *Eryx* to *Lilybæum*, and
‘ there committed to *Gisco* (Governor of the
‘ place) the care of transporting them into *Africa*.
‘ *Gisco*, as foreseeing what might happen, acted
‘ in this affair with great caution. For, instead
‘ of embarking the forces all at once, he shipped
‘ them off successively, and in small parties, al-
‘ lotting so much time between the embarka-
‘ tions, as might suffice for his prudent purpose;
‘ which was, that those who were first sent might
‘ be paid off and dismissed to their own countries,
‘ before the others should arrive. The *Cartbagi-*
‘ *nians*, however, whose treasury was much ex-
‘ hausted, did not correspond to the intention of
‘ *Gisco*, but hoping they should be able to ob-
‘ tain from the whole army, when assembled, a
‘ remission of some part of what was due to them,
‘ detained at *Cartbage* the several divisions as they
‘ came.’

Polybius does not assign any reason, nor does
any reason readily occur, why it should have
seemed more easy to obtain this *remission* from
the whole army together, than from the parts
when disjoined. “ One would think, (as a judi-
“ cious historian * observes,) that to persuade
“ any small number of men, lodged in so great
“ a city as *Cartbage*, to have some consideration
“ of the distress and poverty of the state, would
“ have

* Sir W.R.

“ have been no hard matter; and if the first
 “ comers had been thus persuaded, and had
 “ been friendly discharged, it would have left a
 “ good precedent to the second and third, whilst
 “ their disjunction had made them unable to re-
 “ cover their whole due by force.” Perhaps the
 best conjecture towards accounting for the con-
 duct of the *Carthaginians* in this particular, is,
 That they had really no intention to disband
 these troops, and yet were unwilling, for good
 reasons, to let their design of keeping them on
 foot be known, before they were all safely arrived
 in *Africa*. And though avarice had determined
 the senate to try whether the soldiers could be
 persuaded to remit some part of what was due to
 them, there was no design to refuse them their
 full payment in case they insisted upon it. They
 never dreamt that the bare proposal of such a
 remission as they desired would have the sudden
 and fatal consequences, which it had.

That the leading men at *Carthage* had resolved
 to continue these troops in the service, may, I
 think, be fairly collected from *Polybius*, who as-
 sures us that *Amilcar* left *Sicily* with firm reso-
 lution to renew the war against *Rome* without
 delay; and that he would have executed his pur-
 pose, if it had not been hindered by the revolt of
 the mercenaries. Now is it in the least probable,
 that the *Carthaginian* General, with this project
 of speedy revenge at his heart, would consent
 to break a veteran army, which he himself had
 disciplined, legions animated with the same spirit
 as himself?

Polyb. L. 3,
c. 9.

Corn. Nep.
Amilc. c. 1.

‘ Be

‘ Be this as it will, the *Cartbaginians* did not
‘ follow the scheme of *Gisco*. They detained the
‘ first and second comers, telling them, that
‘ they would make a fair reckoning with all to-
‘ gether. Thus every day the number increased,
‘ and many disorders (incident among soldiers)
‘ were committed, which much disquieted the
‘ city, not accustomed to the like. It was thought
‘ fit therefore to remove them all to some other
‘ place, where they might be less troublesome;
‘ and *Sicca*, a little town at no great distance, be-
‘ ing pitched upon for this rendezvous, the of-
‘ ficers were civilly requested to conduct all their
‘ men thither, who, while they there waited the
‘ coming of their fellow soldiers from *Sicily*,
‘ should receive, each of them, a piece of gold to
‘ bear his charges.

‘ This motion was accepted, and the soldiers
‘ began to dislodge; leaving behind them their
‘ wives, their children, and all their baggage, as
‘ intending very soon to fetch all away when
‘ they came back for their pay. But the *Car-
‘ thaginians*, who wanted to rid the city entirely
‘ of these ungovernable guests, and who feared,
‘ that if the women and children remained there,
‘ it would be difficult to hinder some of the sol-
‘ diers from staying behind, and others from re-
‘ turning, which would frustrate the intention of
‘ the measure now taken, they prevailed with
‘ them to march away with all that belonged to
‘ them, wives and children, bag and baggage.

‘ To *Sicca* then they all removed, and there
‘ lay waiting for news of their fellows arrival,
‘ and

‘ and their own pay. Business they had none to
 ‘ do, and therefore might easily be drawn to
 ‘ mutiny, the whole argument of their discourse
 ‘ inclining them to nothing else. Their daily
 ‘ talk was, how rich they should be, when all
 ‘ their money came in; how much would fall
 ‘ to every single share, and for how long a time
 ‘ the city was behind hand with them in reckon-
 ‘ ing. They were all grown Arithmeticians;
 ‘ and he was thought a man of worth, who
 ‘ could find most reason to encrease their de-
 ‘ mands to the very highest, even beyond their
 ‘ due. No part of their long service was for-
 ‘ gotten; but the encouraging words and pro-
 ‘ mises of their Captains leading them forth to
 ‘ any dangerous fight, were called to mind as so
 ‘ many obligations, not to be cancelled, without
 ‘ satisfying their expectation by some extraordi-
 ‘ nary bounty.

‘ In this manner passed the time away, till at
 ‘ length, the whole army, being arrived and
 ‘ united, *Hanno* (chief magistrate of *Carthage*)
 ‘ appeared at *Sicca* to clear the accompt. Now
 ‘ was the day come, when they were all to be
 ‘ made rich, especially if they could hold toge-
 ‘ ther, in maintaining resolutely the common
 ‘ cause. Full of these thoughts and expectations
 ‘ they assembled themselves to hear what good
 ‘ news this messenger had brought; with firm
 ‘ purpose to help his memory in case he should
 ‘ happen to forget any part of the many pro-
 ‘ mises made to them, which were all to be con-
 ‘ sidered in the reckoning.

‘ *Hanno*

‘ *Hanno* begins a very formal oration, wherein
 ‘ he bewails the poverty of *Carthage* ; tells them
 ‘ how great a sum of money is to be paid to the
 ‘ *Romans* ; reckons up the excessive charges the
 ‘ commonwealth had been at, in the late war,
 ‘ and in conclusion desires them to be contented
 ‘ with *part of their pay*, and out of *the love which*
 ‘ *they bore to the city*, to remit the rest. Few of the
 ‘ hearers understood this Orator’s discourse : For
 ‘ the *Carthaginian* army was composed of sundry
 ‘ nations, as *Greeks, Africans, Gauls, Ligurians,*
 ‘ *Spaniards*, and others, all of different languages.
 ‘ But when such as conceived the whole tenor of
 ‘ his speech had informed the rest what message
 ‘ he brought, they all broke out into such a storm
 ‘ of rage, that nothing would serve to appease
 ‘ them. The insurrection and revolt were uni-
 ‘ versal, each nation at first caballing apart, and
 ‘ then all the several nations joining together in
 ‘ a general sedition ; of which the difference of
 ‘ languages greatly encreased the tumult and-
 ‘ confusion.

‘ *Hanno* would fain have asswaged their fury,
 ‘ but he knew not how : for he less understood
 ‘ their dissonant loud noises, than they did his
 ‘ oration. An army, collected out of so many
 ‘ countries, that have no one language common
 ‘ to all, is neither easily stirred up to mutiny,
 ‘ nor easily pacified, when once it is broken into
 ‘ outrage. The best that *Hanno* could do, was
 ‘ to use the help of their own officers as his inter-
 ‘ preters and messengers ; but these interpreters
 ‘ mistook his meaning, some for want of skill,

others

others on purpose ; and such as delivered his
errands in the worst sense were the best believ-
ed. In short, nothing was to be seen but fluctuation of mind, jealousies, distrusts and caballing. Among the other causes of the soldiers anger, was this also, that the *Carthaginians*, instead of sending to them some one of those officers, under whom they had served in *Sicily*, who knew their merits, and who so often had promised them rewards, had sent a man who had not been present in any of those actions where they had signalized their courage. In short, they considered themselves as not only wronged, but insulted. Full of indignation therefore they hastily left *Sicca*, and to the number of 20,000 men advanced towards *Carthage*, as far as *Tunes*, where they took up their quarters, about 15 miles from the capital. And now when it was too late, the *Carthaginians* became convinced of their mistakes ; for it was a mighty fault in them to permit such a body of strangers to assemble all in one place ; and it was yet a greater error to turn out of their city the wives, children, and goods of these poor soldiers, which had they retained them in shew of kindness, they might have used as hostages for their own safety, and as means to bring the army to their own terms : But now the terror they were in from the neighbourhood of these mutineers carried them to yield to every demand, though never so unreasonable. They furnished a market at *Tunes* for the soldiers, whom they suffered to buy
what

‘ what they pleased, and at what price they pleased. Deputies out of the body of the senate were from time to time dispatched to them, to assure them, that all their demands, if possible to be performed, should be satisfied. The soldiers easily perceived the cause of this change; and taking advantage of the fright the city was in, they every day invented some new article to insist upon; and their insolence was the greater from the persuasion, that having served with honour against the *Romans* in *Sicily*, neither the *Carthaginians* nor any other people would have the courage to face them in the field. No sooner therefore had they adjusted their demands of pay, but they proceeded further to exact satisfaction for the horses they had lost in the service. When that was agreed to, the next demand was on account of short allowance of provisions for many years. They would be paid for the deficiency; and, in this reckoning, the corn should be valued at the highest price it had at any time born during the whole war.

‘ In short, as there were many factious and seditious spirits in the army, these incited the multitude to make new and exorbitant demands, such as it was impossible for the republic to comply with; nevertheless, as the *Carthaginians* promised to do every thing in their power to satisfy them, it was at length agreed, that the difference should be referred to some one of the Generals who had been in *Sicily*, and that the soldiers should chuse the arbitrator.

‘ bitrator. Accordingly they pitched upon *Gisco*,
 ‘ partly out of affection to him, who had shewn
 ‘ himself at all times a friendly man to them,
 ‘ and careful of their good, especially when they
 ‘ were to be transported into *Africa*; and partly
 ‘ out of a dislike they had conceived of *Amilcar*,
 ‘ because he had not visited them in all this busy
 ‘ time. [It is probable that *Amilcar* had no de-
 ‘ sire to be used as an instrument in defrauding
 ‘ his own soldiers of their wages; especially
 ‘ considering, that as he could best bear witness
 ‘ of their merits, so was he not ignorant, that
 ‘ means to content them were not wanting, had
 ‘ the citizens been willing to do it.]

Sir W. R.

‘ *Gisco* then embarks and comes among them,
 ‘ and to please them the better brings money
 ‘ with him. He calls to him first of all the
 ‘ principal officers, and then the several nations
 ‘ apart, rebuking them gently for what had pass-
 ‘ ed; advising them calmly concerning the pre-
 ‘ sent, and exhorting them to continue their
 ‘ affection to a state, which had long entertained
 ‘ them in its pay, and would be always mindful
 ‘ of their good services. He then offered to give
 ‘ them their whole pay in hand, proposing to de-
 ‘ fer the consideration of other reckonings to a
 ‘ more convenient time. This might have been
 ‘ well accepted, and might have served to re-
 ‘ store things to quiet, if two seditious ringlead-
 ‘ ers of the multitude had not opposed it.

‘ Among the mutineers there happened to
 ‘ be one *Spendius* a Campanian, who had been a
 ‘ slave to a *Roman* master. He was strong of
 VOL. IV. L body,

body, and in all occasions of danger very forward; this fellow fearing to fall into the hands of his master, (for by the custom of *Rome* his fault was punished with death) laboured both with words and actions, to trouble and perplex the treaty they were upon; and to hinder by all means possible their agreement with the *Cartbaginians*. Another there was, whose name was *Matbo*, an *African*, of free condition, and a soldier among them, who having been an active stirrer in this conspiracy, and fearing punishment, joined with *Spendius* to obstruct the accommodation, possessing the *Africans* with the belief, that as soon as the strangers should be paid, and dispatched to their own countries, it would be their lot to pay for all; and that the *Cartbaginians* would take such revenge on them, for what they had done, that all *Africa* should tremble at it. The soldiers grew hereupon enraged anew, and in regard they were not likely to receive of *Gisco* any other satisfaction than their arrears of pay, what was due for their horses and bread being respited to another time, they therefore took thence occasion of fresh disorders, and ran together in a mutinous manner. To *Spendius* and *Matbo* they lent a willing ear, who railed both against *Gisco* and the *Cartbaginians*, and if any one presumed to offer them temperate counsel, he was forthwith stoned to death, even before it could be understood what the purport of his discourse was, whether for or against *Spendius*; and now great slaughter was made both of officers and
private

‘ private foldiers, and nothing was heard during
 ‘ the tumult but *throw, throw, down with him*;
 ‘ and what greatly augmented the rage of those
 ‘ people, was the excess of wine they had drank,
 ‘ having newly risen from their repast. So that
 ‘ the word *throw* was no sooner heard, but the
 ‘ person against whom it was designed, was
 ‘ immediately slain. At length there appearing
 ‘ no one who presumed to open his mouth to
 ‘ divert their determinations, they chose *Spendius*
 ‘ and *Matbo* for their Leaders and Commanders
 ‘ in chief.

‘ *Gisco* was not without a due sense of the
 ‘ danger he was in among these people, but he
 ‘ let that consideration give place to the duty he
 ‘ owed his country. He foresaw that if this
 ‘ mutiny once came to a head, the common-
 ‘ wealth would be driven to great straits; to
 ‘ prevent which, he was willing to be exposed
 ‘ to any hazard. He therefore with great con-
 ‘ stancy of mind pursued his purpose of reduc-
 ‘ ing them to their duty by all means possible:
 ‘ Sometimes treating with the officers, sometimes
 ‘ with the sundry nations apart. It happened,
 ‘ that the *Africans* coming rudely to *Gisco* to de-
 ‘ mand the corn-money, which they pretended
 ‘ was due to them; he to reprove their inso-
 ‘ lence, bid them in a contemptuous manner go
 ‘ ask their captain *Matbo* for it. This answer put
 ‘ all into a flame. Without any hesitation they
 ‘ tumultuously ran, and seized on the money,
 ‘ which had been brought in order to their
 ‘ payment.

‘ *Matbo* and *Spendius* fomented with all their
‘ art and industry this audacious proceeding of
‘ the multitude, being persuaded, that to do
‘ some outrageous act, in violation of the treaty
‘ they were upon, and contrary to the law of na-
‘ tions, would be the surest way to put things
‘ past accommodation, and to kindle the war
‘ they so much desired. Thus therefore, not
‘ only the money and baggage of the *Carthagi-*
‘ *nians* were seized by the mutineers, but *Gisco*
‘ and all the *Carthaginians* who accompanied him
‘ were arrested, put in irons, and thrown into
‘ prison; and these violences were immediately
‘ followed by an open declaration of war against
‘ *Carthage*.

‘ AND now *Matbo* dispatched deputies to the
‘ cities round about, exhorting them to lend
‘ him succours, enter into confederacy with him,
‘ and bravely recover their liberty. It was not
‘ needful for the deputies to use much persua-
‘ sion, the very fame of this rebellion sufficing to
‘ draw the whole country into it. The merciless
‘ impositions of the *Carthaginians* upon their *Af-*
‘ *rican* subjects, were the cause of this universal
‘ proneness to a revolt. They had taken from
‘ the country people during the late war one
‘ half of their corn, and had doubled the tri-
‘ butes paid by the inhabitants of the cities, not
‘ exempting even the poorest from these exac-
‘ tions. When new magistrates were to be elec-
‘ ted for the provinces, the choice never fell on
‘ those who were likely to govern the people with
‘ lenity and moderation, but on such whose ri-
‘ gour

‘gour promised the Electors the richest fruits of
‘oppression. *Hanno*, for example, was of this
‘fort, and therefore a great favourite at *Carthage*.

‘All these things considered, it is no wonder
‘that the *Africans* were not backward to rebel.
‘Not only such as could bear arms readily ten-
‘dered their service in this commotion, but the
‘very women (who had seen their husbands and
‘fathers dragged to prison by the tax-gatherers)
‘brought forth their jewels and other ornaments,
‘offering all to sale for the maintenance of so just
‘a quarrel. And by this great forwardness, and
‘liberal contribution, *Matbo* and *Spendius* were
‘supplied with a strong reinforcement of 70,000
‘*Africans*, and were moreover furnished with
‘money, not only to give the soldiers the ar-
‘rears of their pay, (which to engage them in
‘the revolt they had promised) but sufficient to
‘carry on the war begun, though it should be
‘of long continuance,

‘The Mercenaries using the advantage of their
‘present strength, laid siege to *Utica* and *Hippo*,
‘two maritime cities of great importance, ly-
‘ing to the west of *Carthage*, and not far from
‘it; nor did they abandon their camp at *Tunes*,
‘which on the other side, lay commodiously to
‘hinder the *Carthaginians* from passing up into
‘the country that way.

‘*Carthage* was situate on a Peninsula, which
‘is bounded on one side by the sea, and on
‘the other by a lake. The *Isthmus* that joins
‘this Peninsula to the continent is about three
‘miles broad, *Utica* stood on that side of *Carthage*

‘ which regards the sea, *Tunes* on the other side
‘ upon the lake: so that the enemy, from those
‘ two posts, marching sometimes by day, and
‘ sometimes by night, to the very walls of the ca-
‘ pital, filled the inhabitants with extreme ter-
‘ ror. The *Carthaginians*, in this distress, ap-
‘ pointed *Hanno* to be their General. He had
‘ gained some reputation in that capacity, when
‘ employed to conquer that part of *Africa* which
‘ lay towards *Hecatompolis*. *Hanno* did not fail to
‘ make with diligence all needful preparations
‘ (for that was his talent:) He got together
‘ whatever was necessary, as well to relieve a
‘ town besieged, as to batter and assail any place
‘ defended against him. With these provisions
‘ and with a hundred elephants he came to
‘ *Utica* so suddenly, that the mercenaries, as men
‘ surprized, forsook their trenches and retired to
‘ a rising piece of woody ground, where they
‘ might be safe against the violence of his huge
‘ beasts.

‘ *Hanno*, having been accustomed to make war
‘ with the *Africans* and *Numidians*, who upon
‘ any defeat were wont to fly for two or three days
‘ together, imagined that the enemy he had only
‘ routed, were utterly ruined even beyond a pos-
‘ sibility of recovery; neglecting therefore to
‘ keep guard, and leaving his men at liberty, he
‘ immediately entered the town, there to recreate
‘ and divert himself. But those old soldiers, with
‘ whom he was now at war, had learned of *A-*
‘ *milcar* to sustain such shocks as they had just
‘ suffered, without being discouraged, and to re-
‘ tire

‘ fire and to fight again many times in one day,
 ‘ as occasion required. Wherefore as soon as they
 ‘ perceived that *Hanno* knew not how to make
 ‘ use of a victory, they instantly rushed down
 ‘ from their retreat, assailed their own camp, and
 ‘ with great slaughter drove the *Carthaginians*
 ‘ out of it, forcing them to hide themselves
 ‘ within the walls of *Utica*; and they also got
 ‘ possession of all the stores that *Hanno* had
 ‘ brought for the relief of the town. Nor was
 ‘ this the only occasion wherein *Hanno* gave
 ‘ marks of his insufficiency. Twice he might have
 ‘ defeated the enemy in pitched battle, and twice
 ‘ by surprize, yet he unaccountably neglected
 ‘ these opportunities, and even suffered the ene-
 ‘ my to take possession of all the passes in the
 ‘ *Isthmus*, which joins the Peninsula, whereon
 ‘ *Carthage* stood, to the firm land.

‘ The *Carthaginians*, dissatisfied with the con-
 ‘ duct of *Hanno*, had now recourse to the undif-
 ‘ puted abilities of *Amilcar*, whom they sent into
 ‘ the field with 10,000 men and 70 elephants.
 ‘ *Amilcar* was for some time at a loss how to meet
 ‘ with the enemy upon equal ground. For, be-
 ‘ side the other places of advantage, which the
 ‘ mercenaries had seized, *Hanno* had suffered
 ‘ them to get possession of the only bridge by
 ‘ which the river *Macar* or *Bagradas* was passa-
 ‘ ble to those who were to travel from *Carthage*
 ‘ into the Continent. This river had not many
 ‘ fords, and the few it had were so well watched,
 ‘ that it was not easy for even a single man to
 ‘ get over without being seen. As for the bridge
 ‘ itself,

' itself, the enemy guarded it with the utmost
 ' vigilance, and had built a town close by it, for
 ' the more commodious lodging of the troops
 ' that were appointed to that service. *Amilcar*,
 ' having in vain tried all means possible to force
 ' a passage, at length bethought himself of an
 ' expedient to gain one by stealth. He had ob-
 ' served that upon the blowing of certain winds,
 ' the mouth of the *Macar* used to be choaked up
 ' with sand and gravel, which formed a kind of
 ' bar across it. Marching therefore to the mouth
 ' of the river, he there waited, without com-
 ' municating his design to any body, the blow-
 ' ing of those favourable winds; which no sooner
 ' happened, but he passed the stream with his
 ' army by night unperceived, and the next morn-
 ' ing appeared in the plain, to the great astonish-
 ' ment both of the *Cartaginians* and of the ene-
 ' my.

' *Spendius* and his followers were extremely
 ' troubled as well as amazed at this news, as
 ' knowing that they had no longer to deal with
 ' the improvident gravity of *Hanno*, but with
 ' an able captain, even their own master in the
 ' art of war, whom they still admired though
 ' they hated him. *Amilcar* marched directly to-
 ' wards those of the enemy, who guarded the
 ' bridge. *Spendius* advanced to meet him with
 ' 10,000 men, whom he drew out of the town
 ' that was near it. He had ordered 15,000 to
 ' come from before *Utica* and join him. Upon
 ' the arrival of this reinforcement, the fear with
 ' which the mercenaries had been struck was
 ' changed

changed into presumption. They thought to surround *Amilcar*, and bear him down by numbers. *Amilcar* had disposed his elephants in the front, his cavalry and light armed infantry in the second line, and his heavy armed foot in the rear of all. He had || probably expected that the 15,000 men from *Utica* would have fallen upon his rear, instead of joining the forces with *Spendius*; and this expectation was the reason of his placing his main strength in the rear. But when he saw, that the enemy, neglecting their advantage, had joined their two bodies of troops together, he immediately changed the order of his battle, making his horse wheel about and go to the rear, and his infantry advance. This sudden retreat of the *Carthaginian* cavalry was mistaken by the mercenaries for a real flight and a mark of fear. They advanced therefore briskly to the attack without observing any order, and in full confidence of victory. But no sooner did they perceive that cavalry, which they had thought routed, appear again in good array, covering the whole body of the *Carthaginian* foot, (for by the general's order, the horse wheeling from the rear to the right and left, had now placed themselves in the same line with the infantry) than their astonishment at this movement quite took away their courage. They instantly turned their backs and fled, and being warmly pursued by the horse and elephants of *Amilcar*, suffered a very great slaughter. In this overthrow, 6000 of the

|| Chev.
Folard.

' the mercenaries were slain, and 2000 taken
 ' prisoners; the rest escaped, some to the camp
 ' before *Utica*, others to the town by the bridge,
 ' whither *Amilcar* followed them so fast, that he
 ' easily possessed himself of that place, the enemy
 ' not having sufficiently recovered their spirits to
 ' make a defence, but flying thence to *Tunes* at
 ' his approach. After this he speedily reduced
 ' several other towns, partly by force, partly by
 ' composition, and by this happy progress gave
 ' the *Carthaginians* some better hopes of their
 ' affairs.

' As for *Matbo*, he still continued the siege of
 ' *Hippo*, advising *Spendius*, and *Autaritus*, chief
 ' captain of the *Gauls*, to follow *Amilcar* so as
 ' never to lose sight of him, yet always to keep
 ' the higher grounds, or the foot of some hill,
 ' where they might be safe from the horse and
 ' elephants of the *Carthaginians*. He also sent in-
 ' to *Numidia* and *Africa*, admonishing the peo-
 ' ple to furnish those two commanders with sup-
 ' plies, and to exert themselves on this occasion
 ' for the recovery of their freedom. *Spendius*
 ' with six thousand men, chosen out of the sever-
 ' al nations encamped at *Tunes*, and with 2000
 ' *Gauls*, that followed *Autaritus*, (these being all
 ' that remained of those who had served under
 ' this captain in *Sicily*, the rest having deserted
 ' to the *Romans* at *Eryx*) pursuant to the counsel
 ' of *Matbo*, continually coasted the *Carthagini-*
 ' *ans*, but always keeping the foot of the hills.
 ' One day, when *Amilcar* was encamped in a
 ' plain encompassed on all sides with hills, the

' succours

‘ succours which *Spendius* had waited for arriv-
‘ ed, and the *Carthaginian* general was not a lit-
‘ tle embarrassed thereby; for he had now to
‘ deal with a body of *Africans* in front, and an-
‘ other of *Numidians* behind him, while the army
‘ of *Spendius* lay on his flank. In this difficulty
‘ the fame of *Amilcar*’s personal worth was of
‘ great benefit to his country. In the enemies
‘ troops there happened to be a certain *Numi-*
‘ *dian*, named *Naravasus*, a man of distinction
‘ both for his birth and courage. He had in-
‘ herited from his father an inclination to the
‘ *Carthaginians*, and it was much increased by
‘ what he had heard of *Amilcar*’s merit. Think-
‘ ing that he had now an opportunity of gain-
‘ ing the friendship of this people, he came to
‘ the camp attended by about 100 *Numidian*
‘ horse. Having halted near the lines without
‘ any shew of fear, he there made a sign with his
‘ hand. *Amilcar* not a little wondering at the
‘ hardiness of the action, sent out to him a horse-
‘ man; to whom *Naravasus* signified, that he de-
‘ sired a conference with the general. The lat-
‘ ter not readily complying with the motion,
‘ the *Numidian* no sooner perceived his distrust,
‘ but dismounting, he gave his horse and arms
‘ to those who were with him; and with a noble
‘ confidence, entered the camp alone. Every
‘ body wondered at the bravery of the man, but
‘ received him amicably. Being conducted to
‘ *Amilcar*, he told him, he wanted not good in-
‘ clinations for the *Carthaginians* in general; but
‘ that his principal motive of coming there was
‘ to

' to engage in a friendship with *him*; which if
 ' he approved, he should find him for the fu-
 ' ture a faithful friend, both in counsel and in
 ' action. This discourse, together with the man-
 ' ly assurance and ingenuous simplicity with
 ' which it was spoken, filled *Amilcar* with un-
 ' speakable joy; insomuch, that he not only con-
 ' sented to make him his companion in all his
 ' enterprizes; but, to purchase his fidelity to the
 ' *Cartbaginians*, promised him his daughter in
 ' marriage.

' After this conference and treaty, *Naravasus*
 ' brought to the camp 2000 *Numidians*, that were
 ' under his command; with which reinforcement
 ' *Amilcar* offered the enemy battle. *Spendius*, on
 ' his part being strengthened by the *Africans*, ad-
 ' vanced boldly into the plain, where the battle
 ' was obstinately fought. *Amilcar*, in the end,
 ' had the day: the elephants did great service;
 ' and *Naravasus* signalized himself most eminent-
 ' ly. *Spendius* and *Autaritus* escaped by flight, a-
 ' bout 10,000 of their men being slain, and 4000
 ' taken prisoners. *Amilcar* received kindly all
 ' those of the prisoners, that were willing to take
 ' his pay, and serve under him, and he armed
 ' them with the spoils of the dead. As for those
 ' that were not willing to serve, he assembled
 ' them all, and then told them, that he freely
 ' pardoned their past fault, and gave them their
 ' liberty; but bid them remember, that if ever
 ' they were taken again in arms against the *Car-*
 ' *thaginians*, they were to expect no mercy.

' During

‘ During these transactions, the mercenaries
 ‘ that were in garrison in *Sardinia* mutinied, after
 ‘ the example of *Matbo* and *Spendius*; and having
 ‘ shut up *Bostar* their chief commander in the
 ‘ citadel, they at length murdered both him and
 ‘ all the *Carthaginians* with him. Hereupon the
 ‘ republic, in order to quell these mercenaries,
 ‘ dispatched from *Carthage* into that island a body
 ‘ of troops, which, if we may judge from their
 ‘ proceedings, were also mercenaries (a strange
 ‘ policy of the magistrates.) These soldiers no
 ‘ sooner arrived, but they entered into the views
 ‘ of the mutineers, and joined the revolt. The
 ‘ united forces seized on the leader of the new
 ‘ comers and crucified him; they likewise in the
 ‘ most cruel manner murdered all the *Carthagini-*
 ‘ *ans* they could meet with, possessed themselves
 ‘ of the towns, and remained masters of the whole
 ‘ island; until at length a quarrel happened be-
 ‘ tween them and the natives, who prevailing,
 ‘ constrained them to leave the country, and fly
 ‘ for refuge into *Italy*. But thus *Sardinia* became
 ‘ entirely lost to the *Carthaginians*.

‘ To return to the mercenaries in *Africa*.

‘ *Matbo*, *Spendius* and *Autaritus* having ad-
 ‘ vice of the clemency which *Amilcar* exercised
 ‘ towards the prisoners, and fearing the effect
 ‘ it might have upon the *Africans*, and their other
 ‘ troops, resolved to engage them in some new
 ‘ act of villainy, such as should put them past all
 ‘ hopes of indemnity. With this view they as-
 ‘ sembled the whole army. A messenger pre-
 ‘ sently arrives with a pretended letter from
 ‘ those

‘ those who had followed their steps in *Sardinia*.
‘ This letter admonishes them to be careful in
‘ guarding *Gisco*, and the rest of the prisoners
‘ (whom they had seized at the treaty of *Tunes*)
‘ there being some persons in the army, who
‘ held secret intelligence with the *Carthaginians*
‘ for their release. *Spendius* took occasion from this
‘ letter to warn the soldiers not to rely on the
‘ specious humanity of *Amilcar* towards those
‘ who had fallen into his hands; whose real in-
‘ tention, he said, was not to spare them, but by
‘ a feigned clemency to draw the rest to submis-
‘ sion; to the end, that having all at his mercy,
‘ he might at once take vengeance upon all. He
‘ likewise counselled them, to be especially watch-
‘ ful not to suffer *Gisco* to escape; who being a
‘ principal leader, and in great authority, would
‘ prove one of their most dangerous enemies.
‘ *Spendius* had hardly ended his discourse, when a
‘ second courier, pretending to come from *Tunes*,
‘ arrived with a letter pressing the same matter
‘ that was contained in the other. Upon this
‘ *Autaritus*, the *Gaul*, immediately stepped forth
‘ and declared to the assembly, that their safety
‘ and success could only be found in renouncing
‘ all hopes of reconciliation with the *Carthagini-*
‘ *ans*; and that whoever should appear to have
‘ turned his thoughts that way, ought to be dis-
‘ trusted as a traitor to the common cause, and as
‘ being in secret correspondence with the enemy;
‘ and he advised them to be guided wholly by
‘ those, who were for carrying things to the ut-
‘ most extremity against the *Carthaginians*. After
‘ this

‘ this he gave it as his opinion, that they ought
‘ to put to death by torments, not only *Gisco* and
‘ all the *Carthaginians* then in their custody, but
‘ all those that should hereafter fall alive into
‘ their hands. *Autaritus* was always in these as-
‘ semblies of the soldiers a leading man, having
‘ the advantage, by his knowledge of several
‘ languages, of being able to make himself un-
‘ derstood by the greatest part of his hearers.
‘ His proposal was received with almost universal
‘ applause; nevertheless there were some of eve-
‘ ry nation, who joined in one common request,
‘ that in regard of the many benefits they had
‘ received from *Gisco*, he might at least have the
‘ favour to suffer only death, and not be put to
‘ torment. As they spoke in several languages,
‘ and all at once, it was not presently understood
‘ what they demanded; but no sooner was their
‘ intention known, and some one in the assembly
‘ had cried out, *down with them, knock them all*
‘ *on the head*, but these intercessors were stoned
‘ to death by the multitude. Then, by order
‘ of *Spendius*, was *Gisco* with the other *Carthagi-*
‘ *nian* prisoners, to the number of 700 persons,
‘ brought out to suffer the sentence pronounced
‘ against them. The executioners (beginning
‘ with *Gisco*, that same *Gisco*, whom but a little
‘ before the whole army had owned for their be-
‘ nefactor, and whom they had made choice of
‘ to be arbitrator of their differences with the re-
‘ public) cut off their hands, broke their legs,
‘ and then threw them alive into a ditch, there
‘ to expire in misery. The *Carthaginians* receiv-
‘ ing

' ing intelligence of this cruelty, and being deep-
 ' ly affected with the sad fate of so many of their
 ' citizens, sent orders to *Amilcar* and *Hanno*, to
 ' use their utmost diligence to revenge it. They
 ' likewise dispatched heralds to the mercenaries,
 ' to demand the bodies of the dead; but the vil-
 ' lains were so far from complying with this de-
 ' mand, that they threatened to treat whatever
 ' messengers should hereafter be sent to them, in
 ' the same manner they had treated *Gisco*. And
 ' in fact it became an established law among
 ' them, that all *Carthaginian* prisoners they took
 ' should be tormented to death; and that those
 ' who were allies of the *Carthaginians* should have
 ' their hands cut off, and in that condition be
 ' sent back to them; and this law was after-
 ' wards rigorously executed.

' *Amilcar*, seeing no means left to put an end
 ' to the unbounded audaciousness of the enemy,
 ' but by utterly exterminating them, sent to
 ' *Hanno* to come and join him with the forces,
 ' which, without performing any thing worthy of
 ' notice, he had hitherto separately commanded.
 ' It was hoped that with their united strength
 ' they might be able to give a happy issue to the
 ' war. And in the mean time it was resolved,
 ' that in return for the barbarity practised by the
 ' enemy, all those of them, who should fall alive
 ' into the hands of the *Carthaginians*, should be
 ' thrown to wild beasts to be devoured.

' But now when affairs began to have a promif-
 ' ing aspect, a dispute, that arose on a sudden
 ' between the two generals, was carried so far,
 ' that

‘ that by it they lost many fair occasions of beating the enemy, and even gave them, frequent advantages in the war. Upon the news of this division, the magistrates of *Carthage* came to a resolution, that one of the two should quit his command, and that the option should be left to the army.

‘ This quarrel so unseasonable, and its consequences above-mentioned, were not the only misfortunes that befel the *Carthaginians* at this time. A convoy from *Emporium* with provisions, and other stores, much wanted for the army, was lost by tempest at sea: and to fill the measure of their adversity, the towns of *Utica* and *Hippo*, that had hitherto stood firm to the *Carthaginian* party, not only in this war, but even in the time of *Agathocles*, and when the *Romans* made their descent on *Africa*, now abandoned them on a sudden, without any plausible motive; and not only entered into a league of friendship with the *Africans*, but conceived an implacable hatred against the *Carthaginians*; which they sufficiently testified by murdering all those they had of that nation in garrison, and throwing their bodies over the walls, without suffering them to be buried. These events encouraged *Matbo* and *Spendius* to think of laying siege even to *Carthage* itself.

‘ The *Carthaginian* army having declared in favour of *Amilcar*, *Hanno* was constrained to relinquish his authority, and was succeeded by *Hannibal*, whom the Senate appointed to command in his stead. Assisted by this new colleague,
Vol. IV. M and

and especially by *Naravasus*, who was eminently useful in all expeditions, *Amilcar* scoured the country, and endeavoured to cut off all means of subsistence from the enemy, who now invested *Carthage*.

The city, blocked up on all sides by land, was forced to have recourse to her allies. *Hiero* king of *Syracuse*, who had all along had a watchful eye upon the events of this war, and had supplied the republic with every thing she had desired of him, was now, in her greatest distress, more than ever diligent to assist her; as being well aware, that to maintain his own authority in *Sicily*, and his alliance of friendship with the *Romans*, it was necessary that *Carthage* should be preserved in a condition to balance their power; otherwise he himself might soon be at their mercy, and instead of their friend become their subject.

L. 1. c. 83.

In this, says *Polybius*, he acted wisely, for it greatly behoves a Prince not to neglect a mischief of this kind, in the beginning, nor to suffer the exorbitant growth of a neighbouring power, till he is no longer able to contest with it for his own indisputable right.

Not only king *Hiero*, but the *Romans* also, (faithfully observing their treaty of peace) supplied the *Carthaginians* with such provisions and stores as they wanted; so that the city, being thus succoured, was in a condition to defend itself against the efforts of the besiegers.

In the mean time *Amilcar* was so active and diligent in preventing any supplies from going

‘ to the camp of *Matbo* and *Spendius*, that he at
‘ length reduced them to great straits for pro-
‘ visions, and in the end constrained them to
‘ raise the siege. And now *Spendius*, assisted by
‘ one *Zarxas* an *African* leader, and by *Autaritus*
‘ the *Gaul*, issued into the field, at the head of
‘ 50,000 chosen men, to try the fortune of war
‘ against *Amilcar*. (*Matbo* was left at *Tunes*, to
‘ negotiate with their friends, and take a general
‘ care of the business.) The elephants of *Car-*
‘ *thage* and the horse of *Naravasus* made *Spendius*
‘ afraid of descending into the plains, so that
‘ he betook himself to his former method of
‘ keeping the hills and rough grounds, or oc-
‘ cupying the streight passages, wherein the
‘ desperate courage of his men might shew itself
‘ with little disadvantage. But *Amilcar*, having
‘ more skill than he in the trade of war, artfully
‘ contrived to draw him to many skirmishes; in
‘ all which the success was such, as added cou-
‘ rage to the *Carthaginians*, and abated the
‘ strength and spirit of their enemies. Thus he
‘ continued alarming and provoking them by
‘ night and by day; and, through his skill in lay-
‘ ing ambushes, never failed to entrap some of
‘ them when they engaged in small parties, nor
‘ to cut off great numbers when the action was
‘ more general; and those that fell alive into
‘ his hands he gave to be devoured by wild
‘ beasts.

‘ At length he surprized them in a place that
‘ was very commodious for his own army, and
‘ very disadvantageous to theirs. They present-

ly saw their disadvantage, and therefore had not heart to fight. *Amilcar* prudently foreseeing that necessity might draw them to attempt the most desperate enterprizes, took the opportunity of their present fear, and shut them close up with a trench and rampart. There they waited miserably and in vain for succour from *Tunes*; and having spent all their provisions were so pressed with hunger, that they fed upon the bodies of their prisoners. This they suffered patiently, as knowing they had not deserved any favour from *Carthage*; and hoping still that their friends at *Tunes* would not neglect them. But when at length they were driven to such extremity, as to be forced to devour their own companions, and yet saw no appearance of relief, then was their obstinacy quite broken, and they began to threaten their captains. *Spendius*, *Zarxas* and *Autaritus* having therefore consulted together, came to a resolution to yield themselves to *Amilcar*, if required, as the condition of peace. They sent a herald to demand a pass, which being granted them, they came in person to the *Carthaginian* general. What they could say to him is hard to conjecture; yet by the conditions that *Amilcar* granted, it would seem that they took the blame upon themselves, and begged pardon for the multitude. The conditions were, *That the Carthaginians should chuse out of the whole number of these enemies, any ten whom they pleased, to remain at their discretion; and that the rest should all be dismissed, each in one single coat.* When the
treaty

' treaty was thus concluded, *Amilcar* told *Spendius*,
' and those who were with him, that he chose
' them as part of the ten; and then immediately
' ordered them to be seized and secured. The ar-
' my receiving intelligence that their leaders were
' detained, and not knowing that a treaty was
' concluded for them upon such gentle terms,
' presently imagined they were betrayed. In
' amazement therefore they all ran to arms. But
' now they wanted captains to order and con-
' duct them; and the same astonishment that
' made them break the covenants of peace, of
' which they were ignorant, gave *Amilcar* both
' colour of justice in accomplishing revenge,
' and facility in doing the execution. They were
' all slain, being 40,000 or more in number.

' The news of this exploit, (as may well be
' supposed) gave new life and spirit to the peo-
' ple at *Carthage*, and was terrible to the revolt-
' ed cities. *Amilcar*, with *Naravasus* and *Han-
' nibal*, carried the war from town to town, and
' found all places ready to yield, except *Utica*,
' *Hippo*, and *Tunes*, the two first standing out
' through fear of deserved vengeance, and the
' last being held by *Matbo*, with the remainder
' of the rebel army. It was thought fit to begin
' with *Tunes*, where lay the chief strength of the
' enemy. Coming before this town, they brought
' forth *Spendius* with his fellows, and, in view of
' the garrison, crucified them under the walls, to
' terrify those of his old companions, that were
' still in arms. With this rigour the siege be-
' gan, as if speedy victory had been assured.

‘ *Hannibal* quartered upon that side of *Tunes*,
 ‘ which lay toward *Cartbage*; *Amilcar* on the
 ‘ opposite side; too far asunder to help one an-
 ‘ other in sudden accidents. It behoved them
 ‘ therefore to be more circumspect. Neverthe-
 ‘ less, *Hannibal* secure, as if all danger were past,
 ‘ neglected to keep good guard. *Matbo* per-
 ‘ ceived it, and, using his advantage, sallied out
 ‘ with unexpected fury against that part of the
 ‘ *Cartbaginian* army, and so successfully, that,
 ‘ after a great slaughter of the enemy, he put
 ‘ the rest to flight, forced their camp, pillaged
 ‘ it, and took *Hannibal* himself prisoner. After
 ‘ the victory, having caused the dead body of
 ‘ *Spendius* to be taken down from the cross, he
 ‘ ordered *Hannibal* to be fixed alive in his place,
 ‘ and executed him with unspeakable torments,
 ‘ The rest also of the noblest of the *Cartbaginians*,
 ‘ who had fallen into his hands, were by his
 ‘ command slain round the body of *Spendius*. Of
 ‘ all this *Amilcar* knew nothing, till it was too
 ‘ late; neither had he strength enough remain-
 ‘ ing, after this great loss, to continue the siege;
 ‘ but was obliged to break it up, and remove to
 ‘ the mouth of the river *Bagradas*, where he
 ‘ encamped.

‘ The terror in *Cartbage*, upon the news of
 ‘ this disaster, was not less than had been the
 ‘ joy for the late important victory. All that
 ‘ could bear arms were sent into the field under
 ‘ *Hanno*; and the Senate commissioned thirty
 ‘ principal men of their body to labour with all
 ‘ the force of persuasion, to bring *Amilcar* and
 ‘ him

‘ him to a reconciliation. This could not be ef-
 ‘ fected presently. *Amilcar* was perhaps nearly
 ‘ touched in his honour, that the carelessness of
 ‘ *Hannibal* seemed to be imputed to him, by
 ‘ sending his enemy to share with him the con-
 ‘ duct of affairs, and be a check upon his pro-
 ‘ ceedings. Nevertheless, after many conferen-
 ‘ ces, the authority of the Senators prevailed;
 ‘ and the two Generals passed their words to live
 ‘ in friendship, and act in concert for the public
 ‘ good. And thenceforward all affairs were suc-
 ‘ cessfully managed to the satisfaction of their
 ‘ fellow citizens.

‘ *Matbo*, during these transactions, was come
 ‘ abroad into the field, wisely purposing to make
 ‘ advantage of the reputation of his late success,
 ‘ while it gave some life to his cause. But this
 ‘ *African* Leader wanted the necessary skill to
 ‘ cope with *Amilcar*, who in all skirmishes and
 ‘ encounters between parties never failed to worst
 ‘ him, and thereby to diminish both his strength
 ‘ and his credit. *Matbo*, sensible of this grow-
 ‘ ing mischief to his affairs, resolved therefore to
 ‘ try the fortune of one battle, whereby either
 ‘ his ambition should be accomplished, or his
 ‘ cares at an end. The *Carthaginians* were no
 ‘ less disposed to a general action, having many
 ‘ advantages above their enemies, and especially
 ‘ (which was worth all the rest) such a comman-
 ‘ der, as was not easily to be matched in that
 ‘ age. Both parties being thus agreed, the con-
 ‘ federates and friends of both were called to-
 ‘ gether, and the towns drained of their garri-

sons to augment the armies. At length with joint consent, in time and place, the battle was fought. The *Carthaginians* won the day. The greatest part of the *African* army was slain upon the spot; the rest fled to a town, that not being defensible quickly surrendered; *Matbo* himself was there taken alive. Immediately upon this victory all the *African* cities which had been in the rebellion, submitted to their old masters, *Utica* and *Hippo* only excepted, these, by their treacherous and outrageous proceedings, having cut off from themselves all hopes of pardon. However, these also were constrained to surrender at mercy. *Matbo* and his companions, being led in triumph to *Carthage*, were put to death by all the torments that revenge could devise.

Thus was a period given to this *inexpiable* war, which had lasted three years and near four months, and had abounded with more acts of wickedness and cruelty, than any other to be met with in story.

Y. R. 515.
Bef. Chr.
237.
214 Conf.

ROME during all this time took no advantage of her rival's distress to promote her ruin, but continued faithfully to observe the treaty of peace with her; and even assisted her as a friend in many instances. Once indeed there seemed to be

Part of the Y. of R. 512, *Q. Lutatius*, and *A. Manlius*.

Y. of R. 513. *C. Claudius*, and *M. Sempronius*.

Y. of R. 514. *C. Mamilius*, and *Q. Valerius*.

Part of the Y. of R. 515. *Tib. Sempronius*, and *P. Valerius*.

some

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Y. R. 515.
Bef. Chr.
237.
214 Conf.

some danger of a rupture. For as the *Carthaginians* at the beginning of this war, made prize of all vessels that came on the coast of *Africa* to supply the rebels with provisions, it happened that they had at one time in custody 500 *Italians*, whom they had taken carrying on this traffic for the profit of private merchants. The *Romans*, offended at the detaining of these traders in prison, began to turn their thoughts to revenge; but they were soon appeased by a respectful embassy from *Carthage*, who restored the prisoners in so frank a manner, that the *Romans*, not to be behind her in courtesy, enlarged, without ransom, all the *Carthaginian* captives, that yet remained of those who had been taken during the *Sicilian* war. They also permitted their merchants to supply *Carthage* with whatsoever she stood in need of, and prohibited all commerce with her enemies. Nay, more than this, when the people of *Utica*, having revolted from the *Carthaginians*, would have put that city into the hands of the *Romans*, the latter rejected the overture; as they also did an offer made them of the Island of *Sardinia* by the mercenaries there, who, following the example of those in *Africa*, had turned their arms against the masters in whose pay they were, and had forcibly seized upon that Island.

This behaviour towards a rival power (says a learned writer) might have served as a notable example of *Roman* faith to all posterity, had not the issue proved that it proceeded wholly from the hope of greater profit thereby, than could reasonably be expected from an open violation of the

Sir W. R.

Y. R. 515.
Bef. Chr.

237.

214 Conf.

Polyb. B.
1. c. 38.

Sinnius
Capito a-
pud Pomp.
Fest. in vo-
ce Sardi-
Venales.

the treaty of peace. The whole estate of *Carthage* depended, at that time, upon the virtue of *Amilcar*, and had he been overthrown by the rebels in one main battle, that mighty city must either have fallen into the hands of merciless villains, or have humbled herself under the protection of the *Romans*, with whom she had lately contended for superiority. She was once, during the war, reduced by the rebels to so great extremity as not to be far from such a miserable choice. Wherefore it was not unwisely done of the *Romans*, to make such demonstration of kindness, and honourable dealing, as might invite a rich, but sinking ship, to run herself aground upon their shore. But when all was well ended in *Africa*, and the *Carthaginians* began to prepare for the recovery of *Sardinia*, then did ambition put off her goodly vizour. Though the *Romans* had formerly refused this Island, when offered them by the mercenaries, (who were afterwards driven thence by the natives) they now resolved to take possession of it by force of arms. One of the Consuls passed thither with an army, and denounced war against *Carthage*, under the shameless pretence, *That the preparations made* (by that enfeebled and impoverished city) *to reduce Sardinia, were indeed designed against Rome.* The *Carthaginians* were in no condition at this time to enter upon a new war with so potent an enemy: yielding therefore to necessity, they relinquished all pretensions to the Island for ever; and not only so, but submitted to the exactions of the Consul, who further demanded of them,

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as the price of a peace, the sum of * 1200 ta-
lents: Detestable injustice and extortion, which,
as *Polybius* assures us, were the chief cause of
that bloody war, in which *Hannibal* afterwards,
with hereditary hatred and an implacable spirit of
revenge, pushed the *Romans* to the very brink of
destruction.

Y. R. 515.
Bef. Chr.

237.

214 Conf.

* 232500l.
Arbuth-
not.

C H A P. XII.

*Wars of the Romans with the Boian Gauls,
Ligurians, Sardinians and Corsicans.*

DURING the three years and some months
that the war of *Carthage* with her merce-
naries had lasted, the *Roman* Consuls had no af-
fairs abroad, and seem to have chiefly employ-
ed their thoughts to establish good order in *Italy*,
and to secure the frontiers against the *Gauls* and
Ligurians, by planting colonies in their neigh-
bourhood. The Republic however would gladly
have engaged in some quarrel, if she could have
found a plausible pretence for it. *Eutropius* tells
us that after the conclusion of the war in *Sicily*,
she sent Ambassadors to *Ptolemy Evergetes*, King
of *Egypt*, to offer him her assistance against *An-
tiocbus* of *Syria*, surnamed *the God*: but the *Æ-
gyptian* having got rid of his enemy before the
Ambassadors arrived, his answer was only a com-
pliment of thanks. And we have seen, that
after the conclusion of the *African* war, in which
Carthage was triumphant, the *Romans* would have
renewed hostilities against that hated rival, on
account

Eutrop. l.
3. c. 1.

Y. R. 515.
Bef. Chr.
237.
214 Conf.

account of *Sardinia*, if they had not been prevented in this project, by an unwilling cession of that Island to them.

See B. 3.
ch. 25. §.
1, 2. Polyb.
L. 2. c. 21.

But about the same time these ambitious and restless spirits found sufficient opportunity to keep their hardy legions in exercise. In the Consulate of *Tib. Sempronius*, and *P. Valerius*, those *Italic Gauls* who were called *Boii*, and who, after infinite losses and calamities sustained in their struggles with the *Romans*, had continued quiet 45 years, resolved at length, upon some very trivial pretences, to break the peace, which had been so long maintained with the republic. The old men, all those who had felt the hardships and sufferings of the former wars, being extinct, the young men, their successors, who had experienced nothing of those miseries, and feared nothing from fortune, began, according to the nature of man, to grow turbulent and desirous of some change in their condition; and this was the true source of their rash enterprize.

Liv. Epit.
20.

The *Ligurians* also (whom *Rome* had not yet begun to subdue,) being in motion, and seeming to threaten her with war, the Consuls for the year were obliged to divide their forces.

Orof. B.
4. c. 12.
Val. Max.
B. 5. c. 6.

Valerius led a consular army against the *Gauls*, and was vanquished in his first battle with them, in which he lost 3500 men. Upon the news of this defeat, the *Romans* immediately dispatched

* *Liguria* comprehended at this time the whole extent of country between the *Arno*, the *Apennines*, the country of the *Ananes*, the *Po*, the maritime *Alps*, and the *Ligurian sea* (now the sea of *Genoa*.)

M. Genz-

M. Genucius Cippus, one of the Prætors, from the city, with a reinforcement for the Consul. *Valerius* looking on this precaution as a personal affront, and believing that he was still strong enough to cope with the enemy, notwithstanding the blow he had received, hastened to attack them again, before *Cippus* could arrive. His soldiers were no less zealous than himself to recover their honour; and being animated by this motive behaved themselves so gallantly that they slew 14,000 of the *Gauls* and took 2000 prisoners. However, this victory did not obtain the consul a triumph, because he had been rash in the attempt, and had not paid sufficient deference to the sentiments of the senate and people.

In the mean time *Sempronius*, the other Consul, gained a battle, (though not a decisive one) against the *Ligurians*.

These wars were continued by the next year's Consuls *L. Cornelius Lentulus*, and *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*. *Fulvius* acquired no honour by the campaign. It was with great difficulty that he preserved his camp from being forced by the *Gauls*, whose country on this side of the *Po* he had entered; he was obliged to keep within his intrenchments, and to act entirely on the defensive.

Cornelius had better success against the *Ligurians* near *Hetruria*. He obtained a victory, for which he was rewarded with a triumph.

During these wars, preparations were made at

Y. R. 515.
Bef. Chr.
237.
214 Conf.

Y. R. 516.

Zon. B. 3.

Eutrop. B.
3. c. 1.

Y. R. 516.
 Ref. Chr.
 236.
 215 Conf.

at Rome to celebrate the 'secular games: Hiero King of Syracuse came to see the show, and brought

Ken. Antiq. Part
 2. B. 5. c. 7.
 Lib. II.
 cap. 4.
 Miscel.
 cap. 58.

' *Ludi Sæculares*, the most remarkable games that we meet with in the Roman story. The common opinion makes them to have had a very odd original, of which we have a tedious relation in *Valerius Maximus*, of the Antients, and *Angelus Politianus* of the Moderns. Monsieur *Dacier*, in his excellent remarks on the secular poem of *Horace*, passes by this old conceit as trivial and fabulous, and assures us, that we need go no farther for the rise of the custom, than to the *Sybilline* oracles, for which the Romans had so great an esteem and veneration.

In these sacred writings, there was one famous prophecy to this effect; that if the Romans, at the beginning of every age, should hold solemn games in the *Campus Martius* to the honour of *Pluto*, *Proserpine*, *Juno*, *Apollo*, *Diana*, *Ceres*, and the *Parcæ*, or three fatal sisters, their city should ever flourish, and all nations be subjected to their dominion. They were very ready to obey the oracle, and, in all the ceremonies used on that occasion, conformed themselves to its directions. The whole manner of the solemnity was as follows: In the first place, the heralds received orders to make an invitation of the whole world to come to a feast which they had never seen already, and should never see again. Some few days before the beginning of the games, the *Quindecimviri*, taking their seats in the capitol, and in the *Palatine* temple, distributed among the people purifying compositions, as flambeaux, brimstone and sulphur. From hence the people passed on to *Diana's* temple on the *Aventine* mountain, carrying wheat, barley, and beans, as an offering; and after this they spent whole nights in devotion to the destinies. At length, when the time of the games was actually come, which continued three days and three nights, the people assembled in the *Campus Martius*, and sacrificed to *Jupiter*, *Juno*, *Apollo*, *Latona*, *Diana*, the *Parcæ*, *Ceres*, *Pluto*, and *Proserpine*. On the first night of the feast, the Emperor accompanied by the *Quindecimviri*, commanded three altars to be raised on the bank of *Tiber*, which

Chap. XII. *The Roman History.*

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brought with him 200,000 *Modii* (measures containing a peck and a half) of wheat, that the vast concourse

Y. R. 516.
Bef. Chr.
236.
215 Conf.

which they sprinkled with the blood of three lambs, and then proceeded to burn the offerings and the victims. After this they marked out a space which served for a *Theatre*, being illuminated by an innumerable multitude of flambeaux and fires: here they sung some certain hymns composed on this occasion, and celebrated all kinds of sports. On the day after, when they had been at the capitol to offer the victims, they returned to the *Campus Martius*, and held sports to the honour of *Apollo* and *Diana*. These lasted till the next day, when the noble matrons, at the hour appointed by the oracle, went to the capitol to sing hymns to *Jupiter*. On the third day, which concluded the feast, twenty-seven young boys, and as many girls, sung in the temple of *Palatine Apollo*, hymns and verses in *Greek* and *Latin*, to recommend the city to the protection of those deities whom they designed particularly to honour by their sacrifices.

The famous secular poem of *Horace* was composed for this last day, in the secular game held by *Augustus*. *Dacier* has given his judgment on this poem, as the masterpiece of *Horace*; and believes that all antiquity cannot furnish us with any thing more happily compleat.

There has been much controversy, whether these games were celebrated every hundred or every hundred and ten years. For the former opinion, *Censorinus* * alledges the testimony of *Valerius Antius*, *Varro* and *Livy*; and this was certainly the space of time which the *Romans* called *seculum*, or an age. For the latter he produceth the authority of the registers, or commentaries of the *Quindecimviri*, and the edicts of *Augustus*, besides the plain evidence of *Horace* in his secular poem; 21.

* De Die
Natali,
cap. 17.

Certus undecies decies per annos, &c.

This last space is expressly enjoined by the *Sybilline* oracle itself; the verses of which, relating to this purpose, are transcribed by *Zosimus* in the second book of his history.

'ΑΛΛ'

Y. R. 517.
Bef. Chr.

235.
216 Conf.

concourse of people might not cause a scarcity of provisions.

The year of the *secular games* was not a year of tranquillity. The new Consuls, *P. Cornelius*

Ἄλλ' ὅτε δὲ μήκισθ' ἴκη χρόν' ἀνθρώποισι
Ζωῆς, εἰς ἐτίων ἑκατὸν δέκα κύκλον ὀδύων, &c.

Yet according to the antient accounts we have of their celebration in the several ages, neither of these periods are much regarded.

The first were held *A. U. C.* 245, or 298.

The second *A.* 330, or 408.

The third *A.* 518.

The fourth either *A.* 605, or 608, or 628.

The fifth by *Augustus*, *A.* 736.

The sixth by *Claudius*, *A.* 800.

The seventh by *Domitian*, 841.

The eighth by *Severus*, *A.* 957.

The ninth by *Philip*, 1000.

The tenth by *Honorius*, *A.* 1157.

The disorder, without question, was owing to the ambition of the Emperors, who were extremely desirous to have the honour of celebrating these games in their reign; and therefore upon the slightest pretence, many times made them return before their ordinary course. Thus *Claudius* pretended that *Augustus* had held the games before their due time, that he might have the least excuse to keep them within sixty-four years afterwards. On which account, *Suetonius* tells us, that the people scoffed at his cryers, when they went about proclaiming games that nobody had ever seen, nor would see again; whereas there were not only many persons alive who remembered the games of *Augustus*, but several players, who had acted in those games, were now again brought on the stage by *Claudius*. *Sueton. Claud.* 21.

What part of the year the secular games were celebrated in, is uncertain; probably in the times of the commonwealth on the days of the nativity of the city, *i. e.* the 9, 10, 11, *Kal. Maii*, but under the Emperors, on the day when they came to their power.

Lentulus,

Lentulus, and *C. Licinius Varus*, were obliged to take the field to oppose the *Gauls*. The confidence of their leaders being raised by the multitudes of men they had assembled, and by the expectation of a strong reinforcement of their countrymen from the other side the *Alps*, they demanded the restitution of *Ariminum*, formerly taken from them by the *Romans*. *Lentulus* and *Varus*, to gain time (not having their troops compleat) referred the matter to the determination of the senate, and in the interim agreed upon a truce with the enemy, whose commanders were very ready to consent to a cessation of arms till they should be joined by the forces they expected from *Transalpine Gaul*. When these forces arrived, their number proved so great as to give umbrage to those whom they came to assist. The *Cisalpine Gauls*, more afraid of the new comers than of the *Romans*, turned their arms against them and put them to flight, but first slew their own two Generals (or Kings) *Ates* and *Galatus*, for having of their own head, and without consulting the nation, invited such dangerous allies to cross the *Alps*. The enemy being thus defeated by themselves, two consular armies were no longer necessary to repress them. *Lentulus* with his legions alone, not only reduced the *Boii* to yield a part of their country as the condition of a peace; but took a great number of forts from the *Ligurians*, partly by force and partly by composition.

In the mean time, *Varus* made preparations for going to the Island of *Corfica*, which, by the

Y. R. 517.
Bef. Chr.

235.
216. Conf.

Polyb. B.
2. c. 21.

Zon. B. 8.

Y.R. 517.
Bef. Chr.

235.
216 Conf.

Zon. B. 8.

Dio. apud
Valef. p.
593. Val.
Max. B. 6.
c. 3. §. 3.

secret intrigues of the *Cartbaginians*, had been induced to throw off the *Roman* yoke. The Consul, not finding a fleet ready to transport his whole army, sent away before him a small number of ships with a detachment under the command of that *Claudius Glycias*, who had formerly been named to the Dictatorship in derision. *Claudius* had served, since that time, with good reputation, in several posts of a lower order, but had never commanded in chief. Seeing himself now at the head of a part of the Consular army, his ambition was raised, and fancying it would be much for his honour to gain this Island to the republic without bloodshed; he, without the consent of Consul or Senate, made a shameful peace with the *Corficans*. The Consul, at his arrival, annulled the treaty, renewed the war, and subdued the Island by force of arms. As for *Claudius*, by a decree of the senate, he was delivered up to the resentment of the *Corficans*, for having drawn them (as it was alledged) into a bloody war by a fallacious peace: In which sentence the republic, beside the punishing a breach of duty and order, had the further view of preventing the reproach that might have been cast upon the Consul, for having made war on a people who depended on the faith of a treaty. However, the *Corficans* disdained this reparation, and sent *Claudius* back to *Rome*. There he was put to death in prison, and then his body, being first carried to the top of the steps called *Scale Gemonie*, on which the bodies of the greatest malefactors used to be exposed, was thence dragged

ged away with an iron crook and thrown into the *Tiber*.

Y. R. 517.
Bef. Chr.

235.
216 Conf.

This execution of *Claudius* did not satisfy the *Corficans*, who had been amused by a treaty of peace, only to give their enemies the better opportunity to subdue them by a war. The near neighbourhood of *Sardinia* made it easy for them to communicate their discontent to the people of that Island; and it is said, that *Carthage* under-hand excited the *Sardinians* to revolt from the *Romans*; and that *Rome*, for this reason, made preparations for a new war with the *African Republic*. Alarmed at this news the *Carthaginians* sent ambassador after ambassador to negotiate an accommodation; but all in vain. At length they dispatched to *Rome*, for the same end, ten of the principal members of their state, among whom was one *Hanno*, a young man of great spirit and vivacity. When these new deputies had for a while employed the lowest submissions and the humblest entreaties to procure a reconciliation, and all to no effect, *Hanno*, weary of so much cringing, and full of indignation at the rough and haughty answers of the Senate, cried out, with an air of confidence and dignity, "Well then, if you are resolved to break the treaty, reinstate us in the condition we were in before it was concluded. Restore to us SICILY and SARDINIA. With these we bought of you, not a *Short Truce*, but a *Peace* that was to be perpetual." The Senators, ashamed, dismissed the Deputies with a milder answer.

Zon: B. 8.
Eutrop: B.
3. c. 2.

Orosius, B.
4. ch. 12.

Dio. in
Excerpt. xi.
p. 922.

Y. R. 518.
Bef. Chr.
234.
217 Conf.

After this the Consuls for the new year, *C. Atilius Balbus*, and *T. Manlius Torquatus*, drew lots for their provinces; the former continued in *Italy*, while the latter easily recovered *Sardinia*, and settled peace there, but without reducing it to a *Roman province*.

Eutrop. B.
3. c. 3.
Vell. Pat.
B. 2. c. 38.
Oros. B. 4.
c. 12.
Livy, B. 1.
c. 19.
Y. R. 519.
Bef. Chr.
233.
218 Conf.

And now the temple of *Janus* was shut up for the first time since the reign of *Numa Pompilius*. For near 450 years the *Romans* had been almost continually in arms: And so steady was their ambition, and so unwearied their constancy in pursuing its dictates, that in the succeeding parts of this history we shall see them, in spite of numberless misfortunes, still forming new enterprizes upon the neighbouring nations, and never ceasing to push their conquests till they have attained to universal empire.

Zon. B. 8.
Liv. Epit.
20.
Tab. Triumph.

The present tranquillity lasted but a few months. In the following *Consulship* of *L. Posthumius Albinus*, and *Sp. Carvilius*, three armies were raised to act against the *Sardinians*, *Corficans* and *Ligurians*, who had (probably) engaged themselves, by secret treaties, mutually to assist one another. *Posthumius* succeeded against the *Ligurians*; but the *Prætor Cornelius*, who commanded in *Sardinia*, was, with many of his soldiers, carried off by distemper. *Carvilius* (from *Corfica*) transported his *Legions* thither, gained a victory over the *Sardinians*, and then returned to *Rome* in triumph.

In this *Consulship*, the *Censors*, observing the number of the *Citizens* to be considerably lessened, and imputing it to mens marrying only with a
view

view to interest, deserting their own wives for fear of having many children to maintain, and carrying on unlawful intrigues with other women, they obliged all the citizens to swear, that they would not marry with any other view, than that of increasing the subjects of the republic. This oath raised many scruples; and caused many ruptures between husbands and wives. Among the rest, one *Carvilius Ruga*, a considerable man, thought himself bound by his oath to divorce his wife whom he passionately loved, because she was barren; and accordingly he put her away, contrary to his inclination, and married another; the first instance of divorce at *Rome* in 519 years, notwithstanding that the laws had always allowed it. And it was on this occasion that marriage-contracts were first introduced, to secure women's portions in case of divorces, which we shall see hereafter grow scandalously frequent, as a corruption of manners prevailed in the republic.

The fresh revolts of the *Sardinians* and *Ligurians* obliged the new Consuls, *M. Pomponius Matbo* and *Q. Fabius Maximus*, (the same *Fabius* who afterwards acquired so much glory in the wars of *Hannibal*) to divide the *Roman* forces. It now falling to *Fabius's* lot to make war with the *Ligurians*, he drove them out of the flat country, and forced them to take shelter under the *Alps*. In the mean time, his colleague *Pomponius* sailed for *Sardinia*, and gained some victories there, for which a triumph was granted him at his return home.

N 3

It

Y. R. 519.
Bef. Chr.
233.
218 Conf.

Gell. B. 4.
c. 3. and
B. 17. c.
21. in fine.
Sulp. de
dotibus.
D. Hal. p.
93.

Y. R. 520.
Bef. Chr.
232.
219 Conf.

Plut. life of
Fab.

Tab. Tri-
umph.

Y. R. 520.
Bef. Chr.
232.
219 Conf.

A. Gel. B.
xvi. c. 10.

Pompon. de
orig. Juris.

Y. R. 521.
Bef. Chr.
231.
220 Conf.

Cic. in
Bruto, c.
14.
Polyb. B. 2.
c. 21.

Plin. Jun.
B. 5. Epist.
1.
Cicero de
Orat. B. 1.
c. 28.

It is conjectured, that about this time the *Æbutian Law* (so called from the two *Æbutii*, Tribunes of the people, who proposed it and got it passed) was promulged. It retrenched many frivolous customs, ordained by *the twelve tables* to be observed in processes relating to civil affairs, and it also directed that three able and judicious men should be chosen out of each *tribe*, to form a new *tribunal*, which subordinate to the Prætors, might assist them, and remedy the inconveniencies often occasioned by their absence from *Rome*. These new judges were called, for brevity's sake, *Centumvirs* ^b, though they were 105 in number; and when they were afterwards augmented to 180, they still kept the same name.

The establishment of this new *tribunal* made no change as to the direction of state affairs, which continued wholly in the Senate and *Comitia*. *Flaminius*, one of the *Tribunes*, made a motion to the Commons, at this time, to distribute a fruitful country lately taken from the *Gauls*, among the poor citizens of *Rome*. All motions of this kind had ever been opposed by the Senators, out of private interest; and now they had indeed a better reason to unite their strength, in order to hinder *Flaminius's* motion

^b They were divided into four courts or chambers. The causes, which fell under their cognizance, were such as related to prescriptions, guardianships, degrees of consanguinity, or affinity, damages occasioned by inundations, contests about building or repairing middle walls, the windows a man might open upon his neighbour, with an infinite number of other matters, that often raised disputes between the inhabitants of the same city.

from

from passing into a law. They foresaw that the *Gauls*, on both sides the *Po*, would impatiently bear the distribution proposed of those lands. Neither the threats of the present Consuls, *M. Æmilius Lepidus*, and *M. Publicius Malleolus*, nor the entreaties of the Senate, nor yet the tears of his own father, whom the *Patricians* had gained over to them, could prevail with *Flaminius* to desist. On the day appointed for proposing the law to the *Comitia*, he mounted the *Rostra* and spoke to the people in favour of it; but in the midst of his harangue, his father appearing on a sudden, ascended the *Rostra*, took him by the arm, and commanded him to follow him home; and then *Flaminius* immediately obeyed without reply; and, what is most extraordinary, not the least noise nor murmur was heard in the assembly. Nevertheless, the affair was now only postponed; it was afterwards carried into execution; and what the Senators had apprehended came to pass; a dangerous war from the angry *Gauls*.

In the following year the new Consuls, *M. Pomponius Matheo*, and *C. Papirius Maso*, entirely finished the conquest of the two islands of *Sardinia* and *Corfica*, which were then reduced to the state of a *Roman Province*, upon the same foot as *Sicily*. It is probable, that after this regulation *Pomponius* continued in the new province to govern it in quality of *Pro-Consul*, or *Prætor*, when the year of his Consulate, which was not far from a conclusion, should expire; but *Papirius* returned to *Rome*. At his arrival he found the grand elections over; a Dictator had been

Y. R. 521.
Bef. Chr.
231.
220 Conf.

Val. Max.
B. 5. c. 4.
§. 5.
Cic. de Inv.
Rhet. B. 2.
c. 17.

Polyb. B. 2.
c. 21.

Y. R. 522.
Bef. Chr.
230.
221 Conf.

Zon. B. 8.

Fast. Cap.

Y. R. 522.
Bef. Chr.
230.
221 Conf.

Val. Max.
B. 3. c. 6.
Pliny, B.
15. c. 29.

Festus in
voce Myr-
tea.

reated to hold the Comitia, so that during the few remaining days of his magistracy, he had nothing to do, and he also quickly perceived, upon trial, that he had no more credit than business. The senate, dissatisfied with him for some reason unknown, refused him a triumph. This provoked him to take a method entirely new, to do himself honour. At the head of his army he marched to the temple of *Jupiter Latialis* on the hill of *Alba*, with all the pomp with which triumphant victors were wont to march to the Capitol; he made no alteration in the ceremony, except that instead of a crown of laurel, he wore a crown of myrtle, on account of his having defeated the *Corficans* in a place where was a grove of myrtles. This example of *Papyrius*, was afterwards followed by many Generals to whom the senate refused the honour of a *Triumph*.

C P A P. XIII.

The first Illyrian War.

Y. R. 523.
Bef. Chr.
229.
222d Conf.

Polyb. B. 2.
c. 2.
Appian in
Illyr.

THE next year *M. Æmilius Barbula*, and *M. Junius Pera*, being Consuls, the republic engaged in a new war out of *Italy*. *Illyricum*, or rather that part of the country so called, which lies upon the *Adriatic*, and confines upon *Macedon* and *Epirus*, was at this time governed by a woman, named *Teuta*, the widow of King *Agron*, and guardian to her son, *Pineus*, under age. The success of her late husband's arms, who had vanquished the *Ætolians*, made her vain and presumptuous;



presumptuous; and being governed by evil councils, she, instead of prudently managing the affairs of her ward in peace, commissioned her subjects to practise piracy on the sea coast, and seize all the places they could; which was, in a manner, declaring herself a common enemy to all nations. Her pirates had taken many ships belonging to the *Roman* merchants, and she was now besieging the island of *Issa* in the *Adriatic*; the inhabitants of which, had put themselves under the protection of the republic. Upon the complaints of those merchants, and to protect the people of *Issa*, the senate dispatched two ambassadors, *Caius* and *Lucius Coruncanius*, to the *Illyrian* Queen, to require of her that she would restrain her subjects from infesting the seas with their piracies. To this demand the Queen answered, that she would take care, that no injury should be done to the *Romans* by the *Illyrian* NATION, but that she thought it was never the custom of Princes to hinder *private subjects* from making what advantages they could from the sea. *But the Romans*, (replied the younger of the ambassadors) *have an excellent custom, which is, to punish private injuries by a public revenge, and to relieve the oppressed. Teuta, by the help of the Gods, we shall find means to make you speedily reform your royal institutions.* The proud Queen, angry to excess at these words, secretly contrived to have the ambassadors murdered in their return homeward. Upon the news of this cruel breach of the law of nations, the senate, having first done honour to the *manes* of the ambassadors,

Y. R. 523.
Bef. Chr.
229.
222 Conf.

Zon. B. 8.
Dio. in Ex-
cerpt. xii.

Polyb. B.
2. c. 8.

Pliny, B.
34. c. 6,

Dio. in Ex-
cerpt. xii.
Zon. B. 8.

by erecting, as was usual in such cases, statues, three feet high, to their memory, equipped a fleet with all expedition to begin the war. *Teuta*, alarmed with these preparations, dispatched an embassy to *Rome*, to disown her having had any share in the murder: Yet, when the *Romans* demanded that the murderers should be delivered up, she peremptorily refused it.

Y. R. 524.
Bef. Chr.
228.
223d Conf.

Polyb. B.
2. c. 11.

* Now Cur-
zola.

The Consuls therefore for the new year, *P. Posthumius Albinus*, and *Cn. Fulvius Centumalus*, both embarked for *Illyricum*. *Fulvius* had the command of the fleet, consisting of 200 gallies, and *Posthumius* of the land-forces, which were 20,000 foot, and a small body of horse. The Queen, in the beginning of the spring, had augmented her fleet, and sent it to plunder the coasts of *Greece*. One part sailed to *Corcyra**; (a small island lying near *Pharos* in the *Adriatic*) the rest anchored before *Epidamnium*. These, who had thought to surprize the town, having failed of their hope, rejoined the squadron that lay before *Corcyra*: the people of which place had called in the *Ætolians* and *Acheans* to their assistance. Nevertheless, the *Illyrians*, being assisted by the *Acarnanians*, had the victory in a brisk action by sea: so that *Corcyra*, being no longer in a condition to defend itself, capitulated; and received an *Illyrian* garrison, commanded by *Demetrius* of *Pharos*: after which, the conquerors sailed to *Epidamnium*, and renewed the siege of that Place.

Fulvius sailed directly for *Corcyra*; and tho' he learnt by the way that the city had surrendered, he

he pursued his course, having a secret intelligence with *Demetrius*; who, knowing that some ill offices had been done him with *Teuta*, and fearing her resentment, had promised the Consul to deliver up the Place to him; and this he did with the consent of the *Corcyraeans*, who thought it the only means of getting a protection from the insults of the *Illyrians*.

By the advice and assistance of the same *Demetrius*, the *Romans* (after *Posthumius* had landed his forces) made themselves masters of *Apollonia* (a great city, and one of the keys of *Illyricum* on the side of *Macedon*) and of many other places; of which, to reward his services, they appointed him governor. *Teuta* was quickly constrained by *Posthumius's* army to retire for safety to the inner Part of *Illyricum*; while *Fulvius*, with his naval forces, cleared the sea of her pirates.

Upon the election of *Sp. Carvilius*, and *Q. Fabius Verrucosus*, to the Consulate, *Fulvius* was recalled from *Illyricum* with the greater part of the fleet, and of the land-forces; and *Posthumius* received orders to stay there with the remainder, in quality of Pro-consul. *Teuta*, who perhaps had built some hopes on a change of the *Roman* magistrates, finding that *Posthumius* not only wintered in *Illyricum*, but was raising fresh troops to pursue the war, sent, early in the spring, from *Rhizon*, (whither she had retired) an embassy to *Rome* to divert the storm. The Senate granted her a peace on these conditions. That she should pay an annual tribute to the *Romans*. Surrender to them all *Illyricum*,
a few

Y. R. 524.
Bef. Chr.
228.
223d Conf.

Y. R. 525.
Bef. Chr.
227.
224 Conf.

Polyb. B. 2.
ch. 12.
in *Illyr.*

Y. R. 525.
Bef. Chr.
227.
224 Conf.

a few places excepted. (*Appian* mentions *Corcyra*, *Pbaros*, *Iffa*, *Epidamnum* (or *Dyrrbachium*) and the country of the *Atintanes* as yielded to the Romans.) And (which principally concerned the *Greeks*) that not more than two of her ships, and these unarmed, should be permitted to sail beyond *Lissos*, a sea-port on the confines of *Illyricum* and *Macedon*. Thus ended the first *Illyrian* war, which had not lasted quite two years. As for *Teuta*, whether out of shame, or compelled to it by a secret article of the treaty, she abdicated the Regency, and *Demetrius* took her place.

Posthumius, after this, sent ambassadors to the *Ætolians* and *Achæans*, to lay before them the reasons for which the *Romans* had undertaken the war, what had been the events of it, and upon what terms a peace had been concluded. The ambassadors, having performed their commission, returned to *Corcyra*, much pleased with the courteous reception they had met with from those states. In reality, the treaty was of great benefit to the *Greeks*, and delivered them from vexations and perpetual fears : for all *Greece* had been plagued and infested with the *Illyrian* pyracies.

Polybius remarks, that this was the first time that any *Roman* troops crost the sea into *Illyricum*; and the first time that there was any intercourse by ambassadors between the *Greeks* and the *Romans*. The latter, about the same time, sent ambassadors to *Corinth* and to *Athens*. They were honourably received. The *Corinthians*, by a public act, decreed that the *Romans* should be admitted to the celebration of the *Isthmian* games.

And

Polyb. B.
2. c. 12.
Zon. B. 8.

And *Zonaras* tells us, that the *Athenians* declared the *Romans Citizens of Athens*, and decreed them the privilege of being admitted to the mysteries of *Eleusis*; that is, of the festival of *Ceres* celebrated at *Eleusis*, a city of *Attica*.

C H A P. XIV.

The Romans vanquish the Gauls on both sides the Po.

BEFORE the *Illyrian* war was well ended, the *Italic Gauls* on both sides the *Po* began to be in motion. Nevertheless it does not appear, that *P. Valerius Flaccus*, and *M. Attilius Regulus*, the Consuls for the new year, took the field against them, or performed any military exploit ^a.

Y. R. 526.
Bef. Chr.
226.
225 Conf.

The *Romans* had the extremest dread of those enemies, who had formerly reduced their state to the very brink of total destruction. There was a prophecy, at this time current at *Rome*, That the *Gauls and Greeks should one day be in possession of it*. This prophecy is said to have been found

^a Some authors say, that the first establishment of two *Provincial Prætors*, one for the government of *Sicily*, and one for that of *Sardinia and Corsica*, was in this Consulate, and not at the time before mentioned. Be that as it will, it was in this year that, at the motion of two Tribunes, *Villius*, and *Titius*, a law passed, empowering the *Roman Prætors* to appoint, as well in the provinces belonging to the republic, as at *Rome*, guardians to those women and children who had none. This law was called *Villia-Titia Catrou*.

Pomp. de
Orig. Juris.
Justinian.
Instit. B. 1.
Ulpian.
c. 11. de
tutelis.

Y. R. 527.
Bef. Chr.225.
226 Conf.Zon. B. 8.
Oros. B. 4.
c. 13.Polyb. B.
2. c. 24.

in the *Sybilline* books. The completion of it seemed now to approach, when the states of the republic were bounded on one side by the *Greeks*, and on the other by the *Gauls*. The succeeding Consuls therefore, *M. Valerius Messala*, and *L. Apustius Fullo*, consulted with the *Pontifices*, how to quiet the apprehensions of the people; and immediately an edict was published by the *Decemvirs*, who had the care of the *Sybilline* books, commanding that two *Greeks*, a man and a woman, and two *Gauls*, a man and a woman, should be buried alive in the Ox-Market; and by this they persuaded the people, that the prophecy was fulfilled, and that the *Gauls* and *Greeks* had taken possession of *Rome*.

The difficulties raised by superstition being thus surmounted, the *Romans* applied themselves to create divisions among the *Gauls*, and to levy a prodigious force; which (according to *Polybius*^b) amounted to near 700,000 foot, and near 70,000

| | | Foot. | Horse. |
|---|---|--------|--------|
| b The numbers found upon the muster, as recorded by <i>Polybius</i> , are as follow. With the Consuls marched four legions of <i>Romans</i> , each legion consisting of 5,200 foot, and 300 horse. | } | 20,800 | 1,200 |
| | | | |
| They had also with them, of the allies, | | 30,000 | 2,000 |
| Of the <i>Sabines</i> and <i>Hetrurians</i> were sent, under the command of a <i>Prætor</i> , to the frontiers of <i>Hetruria</i> , | } | 50,000 | 4,000 |
| Of the <i>Umbrians</i> and <i>Sarcinates</i> (from the <i>Appennines</i>) 20,000, and as many of the <i>Veneti</i> and <i>Cenomani</i> were appointed to invade the <i>Boii</i> , in order to oblige them to keep a part of their forces at home, for their own defence, | | 40,000 | |

At

70,000 horse, so great was the terror which the threatened invasion from these Barbarians spread over

Polyb. B.
2. c. 23.

| | Foot. | Horse. |
|--|---------|--------|
| At <i>Rome</i> were kept ready to march, (on any exigence) of the citizens, — } | 20,000 | 1,500 |
| These were strengthened by a body of the allies, amounting to — — } | 30,000 | 2,000 |
| On the muster rolls sent to the senate, from the allies were, | | |
| Of the <i>Latins</i> , — — — — | 80,000 | 5,000 |
| Of the <i>Samnites</i> , — — — — | 70,000 | 7,000 |
| Of the <i>Iapyges</i> , and <i>Messapyges</i> , — — | 50,000 | 16,000 |
| Of the people of <i>Lucania</i> , — — | 30,000 | 3,000 |
| Of the <i>Marfi</i> , <i>Marrucini</i> , <i>Ferentini</i> , and <i>Vestini</i> , — — — — } | 20,000 | 4,000 |
| The <i>Romans</i> had also in <i>Sicily</i> and <i>Tarentum</i> two legions, consisting each of 4200 foot and 200 horse, — — } | 8,400 | 400 |
| Beside all these, of the common people, in <i>Rome</i> and in <i>Campania</i> , were mustered, as fit to bear arms, — — } | 250,000 | 23,000 |
| | 699,200 | 69,100 |

Polybius, on occasion of this muster, expresses his admiration of the hardy enterprize of *Hannibal*, to attack an empire of such prodigious strength with an army of scarcely 20,000 men.

But Sir *Walter Raleigh* observes, that this muster seems to have been like to that which *Lodowic Sforza* made, when *Lewis* the XIIth invaded *Milan*; at which time, the better to encourage himself and his subjects, he took a roll of all persons able to bear arms within the Dutchy, though indeed he was never able to bring a tenth part of them into the field. Certain it is, (adds our historian) that the battles of *Trebia*, *Thrasymene*, and *Cannæ*, did not consume any such proportion as was answerable to this large account. Yet were the *Romans* fain to arm their slaves, even for want of other soldiers, after their overthrow at *Cannæ*. Wherefore the

over all *Italy*. The *Gauls* nevertheless, with only fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse, began the hostilities, entered *Hetruria*, pillaging and laying waste the country, without opposition.

Y. R. 528.

Bef. Chr.

224.

227 Conf.

The republic had promoted *L. Æmilius Papus*, and *C. Attilius Regulus*, to the Consulship. The latter went into *Sardinia*, to quiet some commotion there; while *Æmilius* took upon him the conduct of the war with the *Insubrian* and *Boian Gauls*, joined by a numerous army, from the other side of the *Alps*, of the *Gæsatae*, so called (says

B. 2. c.

22.

the^r marvel is not great, that the *Carthaginians* and others were little terrified with the report of such a multitude: For, all heads are not fit for helmets; though the *Roman* citizens were, in general, as good fighting men as elsewhere might be found.

Another reason may be also assigned why *Hannibal* should not be much frightened at these muster rolls, even supposing the far greater part of the men, there registered, to be fit to bear arms. *Polybius* tells us, that the people of *Italy*, terrified at the approach of the *Gauls*, did not consider themselves now as being to fight only as allies of *Rome*, and for the preservation of her empire, but for their own proper safety, their families, their fortunes, all that was dear to them; and that it was for this reason they so readily executed the orders that were sent to them from the senate. The contest with the *Gauls* was looked upon as the common cause of all *Italy*.

But when *Hannibal* passed the *Alps*, the case was widely different; for we may well conclude from the neutrality and cold behaviour generally observed by the allies of *Rome*, on that occasion, that they looked upon this war as regarding her only, and in which they themselves had little concern.

According to the *Jesuits*, the *Gæsatae* were not a particular people of *Transalpine Gaul*, but probably *German* dispersed

Chap. XIV. *The Roman History.*

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(says *Polybius*) because they served for pay, the word having that signification. They were commanded by two kings, *Concolitanus*, and *Aneroestus*.

Y. R. 528.
Bef. Chr.
224.
227 Conf.

Æmilius being uncertain what rout the *Gætæ* would take after they had passed the *Ap's*, had led his troops to *Ariminum*, to hinder the enemy from entering upon the *Roman* lands by the coasts of the *Adriatic* sea. At the same time a Prætor, with a body of 50,000 foot, and 4000 horse, had been ordered into *Hetruria*, to defend the frontiers of that country. But in his march he missed of the enemy; who were advanced to the neighbourhood of *Clusum* (within three days march of *Rome*) when they heard that a *Roman* army was behind them, and would soon be at their heels. They immediately turned back to meet the Prætor and give him battle. It being about the close of day, when the two armies came in sight of each other, they both encamped. But in the night, the leaders of the *Gauls*, having meditated a stratagem, marched away with their infantry towards *Fæsula*^a, leaving only their cavalry to appear in the field, when day should return. In the morning, the Prætor seeing nothing but horse to oppose him, sallied out of his entrenchments and attacked them. The *Gallic* cavalry, according to their instructions, instantly

B. 2. c.
26.

c. 25.

perfed through all the *Gallic* nation, whose profession was arms, and who hired themselves to whoever would employ them in war. They had their name from a weapon they bore, called *Gesum*.

^a A city of *Hetruria*, at the foot of the *Apennines*.

Y. R. 5 28.
 Bef. Chr.
 224.
 227 Conf.

gave ground, and took the road to *Fesula*. Their flight drew the *Romans* after them, never suspecting that they should find the enemy's infantry in their way. The latter on a sudden appeared and fell vigorously upon the Prætor's troops already fatigued with the pursuit. 6000 of his men were killed upon the spot; the rest in disorder fled to a neighbouring hill, where they entrenched themselves. The first thought of the *Gallie* Generals was to force the enemy immediately in this post; but considering afterwards that their own troops were wearied with the former night's march, they thought it best to give them some repose, and defer the attack till the next day.

Polyb. B.
 2. c. 26.
 to c. 31.

In this distress of the Prætor's army, the Consul *Æmilius* came seasonably to their relief. Being informed of the approach of the *Gætæ* towards *Rome*, he had instantly quitted his camp at *Ariminum*, and had marched with expedition to the defence of his country. He was now encamped within a small distance from the enemy; and the Prætor's troops seeing the fires in his camp, and conjecturing the truth, took courage. The *Gauls*, perceiving the same fires, were greatly alarmed at the Consul's unexpected arrival; and being unwilling to hazard by a battle the loss of the rich booty they had got, they, by the advice of their King *Aneroestus*, decamped in the night, purposing to march home through *Insabria*; and when they had secured their booty, to return to the war. In their march they kept along the shore of the *Hetrurian* sea. *Æmilius*, though

though his army was now strengthened by the remains of the Prætor's troops, did not think it adviseable to hazard a pitched battle; but chose rather to follow the enemy close, and watch his opportunity to harass them in their retreat, and, if possible, to recover some part of the spoils they were carrying off. It luckily happened, that his colleague *Attilius*, having put a speedy end to the troubles in *Sardinia*, had, in his return home, landed with his army at *Pisa*, and was now marching along the coast of the *Hetrurian* sea towards *Rome*: he was overjoyed when, near *Telamon*, a little port of *Hetruria*, he learned, by his scouts, the situation of things. And, in order to intercept the *Gauls*, he immediately drew up his infantry, making as wide a front as he could; and then commanded them to advance slowly to meet the enemy. He himself hastened with his cavalry to the top of a hill, by the foot of which the enemy must necessarily pass. His ambition was to have the chief glory of the success; and he persuaded himself, that by being the first to begin the battle, he should obtain that advantage.

The *Gauls* imagined at first that this body of *Roman* horse was only a detachment from *Æmilius's* army, and therefore ordered their cavalry to advance and drive them from their post. As for *Æmilius*, as soon as he perceived fighting at a distance, he concluded it was his colleague *Attilius*, attacking the enemy in front, for he had been informed of his landing at *Pisa*. He immediately detached all his horse to fetch a com-

Y. R. 528.

Bef. Chr.

224.

227 Conf.

pass and join those of *Attilius*. Upon the arrival of so powerful a reinforcement the *Romans* renewed the attack with more briskness than ever. *Attilius* fighting with the utmost intrepidity was killed in the engagement. A *Gaul* cut off his head, and sticking it on the top of a lance carried it through all the files of the *Gallic* troops. However the death of this brave man proved no advantage to them. One of his lieutenants took his place, and the action was continued as before. The *Romans* in the end had the victory, and kept possession of their post.

During the conflict between the cavalry, on both sides, the *Gallic* Generals had time to form their infantry. Having two consular armies to deal with, one in their front, the other in their rear, they divided their battalions pretty equally, one half of them turning their backs to the other half; and to avoid being attacked in flank, they placed all their waggons and other carriages on the wings. Their plunder they had carried to a neighbouring hill, where they left it under a good guard.

The *Gesatae* who made the first line of the troops that faced *Æmilius*, confiding in their gigantic stature and strength, and observing that the plain where they were drawn up was full of bushes and briars, to avoid being incommoded in the battle by the thorns catching in their clothes stripped themselves naked, keeping only their arms. But this vain confidence proved their destruction. For having only small bucklers, which were not sufficient to ward their huge

bodies

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bodies from the darts that were unexpectedly showered upon them by the *Romans* at a distance, they presently fell into discouragement and perplexity. Some transported with rage and despair threw themselves madly upon the enemy, where they found certain death; others, pale, discomfited and trembling, drew back in disorder, breaking the ranks that were behind them. And thus were quelled at the very first attack the pride and ferocity of the *Gesatae*.

Y. R. 528.
Bef. Chr.
224.
227 Conf.

And now the *Roman* dartmen retiring within the intervals of the army, the cohorts advanced to encounter the *Insubrians*, *Boians*, and *Tauriscans*, who fought with great resolution; for though they were hard pressed, and covered with wounds, they sustained the shock and kept their post, and may be truly said to have been inferior to the *Romans* only in their arms. Their shields were not so large as those of the *Romans*, and their swords were made only for cutting. Nevertheless they maintained the fight till the *Roman* cavalry, who had been victorious on the eminence, driving at once full speed upon them, put an end to the struggle. The defeat was general; 40,000 of the *Gauls* remained dead upon the field of battle, and 10,000 were made prisoners, together with *Concolitanus*, one of their kings. The rest escaped by flight, but *Aneroestus* their other king, the bravest soldier, and most experienced commander of all the *Gauls*, cut his throat afterwards in rage and despair. *Emilius* after this victory marched his army into the country of the *Boian Gauls*, enriched

Diod. Sic.
B. 25. in
Eclog.

Y. R. 529.
Bef. Chr.

223.
228 Conf.

Polyb. B.
2. c. 31.

Fast, Cap.

Y. R. 530.
Bef. Chr.
222.
229 Conf.

Polyb. B. 2.
c. 32.

his soldiers with booty, and then returned to *Rome*, where he had a magnificent triumph.

The fear of the *Gallie* war was over, but the desire of revenge remained; and the next year's Consuls therefore, *T. Manlius Torquatus*, and *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, had *Gaul* assigned them for their provinces. But these great men did not succeed, to the expectation of the *Romans*, nor pass the *Po*, as it was hoped they would. Their marches were retarded by violent rains, and a plague infected their army, which latter calamity not suffering them to return to *Rome* at the usual time, the famous *Cæcilius Metellus* was created *Dictator*, to hold the *Comitia* in their absence, for the new elections.

C. Flaminius Nepos, and *P. Furius Philo*, being chosen Consuls, put the design of their Predecessors in execution, and notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of the *Gauls*, passed the *Po*, and entered *Insubria*; but having suffered much both in their passage, and afterwards, and finding they could perform nothing of moment, they made a truce with this people, and retired into the territory of their friends the *Cænomani*. There they continued a while augmenting their army with auxiliaries; and then renewed their incursions on the *Insubrian* plains at the foot of the *Alps*. Hereupon the princes of this nation, perceiving the fixed determination of the *Romans* to subdue them, resolved to put all to the hazard of a battle; and having collected all their strength, which amounted to 50,000 men, marched against the enemy, and encamped within sight of them.

It

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It happened a litle before this that the *Romans* were much frightened by various prodigies in the heavens, in the waters, and upon the earth. In *Hetruria* extraordinary lights appeared in the air. At *Ariminum* three moons were seen at the same time. A river of *Picenum* rolled waters as red as blood. The *Italians* felt the violent earthquake that overturned the *Colossus* of *Rhodes*. At *Rome* a vulture lighted in the middle of the *Forum*, and staid there a considerable time. The *Augurs* being consulted upon these prodigies, declared that there must have been some defect in the ceremonial at the election of the *Consuls*: upon which, a courier was immediately dispatched from the senate, with letters commanding them to return to *Rome*. But when these letters arrived, the *Consuls* being on the banks of the river *Addua*, were in sight of the powerful army of the *Insubrians*; and *Flaminius* either guessing at the substance of the letters, or having been informed of it by his friends, prevailed with his colleague not to open the packet till after the battle.

The *Romans*, being sensible that the enemy exceeded them in numbers, had intended to use the aid of those *Gauls* with whom they had reinforced their army. But now, remembring the faithlessness of these people, who were to be employed against troops of the same nation, they could not resolve to trust them in the present important conjuncture. At the same time it was by no means proper to express a diffidence of them, in such a manner as should give them occasion of

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.

222.

229 Conf.

Zon. B. 8.
Plut. life of
Marcel.
and Oros.
B. 4. c.
13.

Polyb. B. 2.
c. 32. 33.

Y. R. 530.
Bef. Chr.

222.

229 Conf.

quarrel. *Flaminius*, to free himself from this perplexity, made his *Gauls* pass to the other side of the river on a bridge of boats; and then, by causing the boats to be hawled to his own side, put it out of the power of those suspected troops to do him any harm during the action. By this means also his own army was left without any hopes but in victory; for the river which they had at their backs was unfordable. Thus far the conduct of *Flaminius* appears commendable: but he was guilty of a great oversight in drawing up his army too near the brink of the river; for he left so little space between that and his rear, that had the *Romans* been ever so little pressed during the engagement, they had no whither to retire but into the water. However this defect of the Consul's management was supplied by the bravery and skill of his soldiers, instructed by their Tribunes. These officers had observed in former conflicts, that the *Gauls* were not formidable but in the ardour of their first attack, and that their swords were of such a fashion and temper as, after two or three good cuts, to stand bent in their hands, and so become useless to them if they had not time to streighten them on the ground with their foot. The Tribunes therefore furnished the first line of the *Roman* troops with the arms of the triarii, or third line; that is to say, with long javelins, like our halberts, and ordered the soldiers, first to make use of these, and then to draw their swords. These precautions had the desired success. The swords of the *Gauls* by the first strokes

on

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on the *Roman* javelins became blunted, bent, and useleſs; and then the *Romans* cloſing in with them, ſtabbed them in the face and breaſt with their pointed ſwords, making a terrible ſlaughter. Nine thouſand of the enemy were killed, and ſeventeen thouſand taken priſoners.

Y. R. 531.
Bef. Chr.
221.
230 Conf.

Orof. B. 4.
c. 13.

After the action the Conſuls opened the packet. *Furius* was for immediately obeying the order; *Flaminius* inſiſted on purſuing the war: *The victory*, he ſaid, *was a ſufficient proof that there had been no defect in the auguries, and that the letters of revocation were wholly from the envy of the ſenate; that he would finiſh his enterprize, and would teach the people not to be deceived by* THE OBSERVATION OF BIRDS, *or any thing elſe.* Purſuant to this reſolution he attacked and took ſeveral caſtles, and one conſiderable town, with the ſpoils of which he enriched his ſoldiers, to prepare them for his defence in that quarrel which he knew would ariſe between him and the Senate. His colleague would not accompany him in theſe expeditions, but continued encamped, waiting to join him when he ſhould return from his in-cuſſion.

Zon. B. 8.

When the two colleagues came back to *Rome* with their armies, the people as well as the Senate at firſt ſhewed their reſentment, by a very cold reception; but the troops of *Flaminius*, whom he had enriched, found means to prevail with the former to grant both the *Conſuls* the honours of the triumph. The Senate, however, obliged theſe magiſtrates afterwards to depoſe themſelves; ſuch a reſpect, ſays *Plutarch*, had the

Life of
Marcellus,

the *Romans* for religion, making all their affairs depend on the sole will of the Gods, and never suffering, even in their greatest prosperities, the least contempt or neglect of the antient oracles, or of the usages of their country; being fully persuaded, that what most contributed to the welfare of their state was not the success of their arms, but their steady submission to the Gods.

Y. R. 531.

Bef. Chr.

221.

230 Conf.

Polyb. B. 2.

c. 34.

The *Comitia* being held by an interrex, *M. Claudius Marcellus* (of a *Plebeian* branch of the *Glandian* family) who became afterwards so famous, was raised to the *Consulate*, with *Cn. Cornelius Scipio*. They were scarce entered upon their office when a deputation came to *Rome* from the *Insubrians*, to implore a peace; but the Senate at the instigation of the new *Consuls*, who represented those *Gauls* as an untractable people, on whom there could be no dependance, dismissed their deputies with a refusal. Upon this they resolved to bring into *Italy* a fresh inundation of *Gesates*, who were always ready to fight for hire. Thirty thousand of these mercenaries crossed the *Alps* under the command of their king, *Viridomarus*.

Early in the spring the *Consuls* passed the *Po*, and laid siege to *Acerræ*, a place near that river, and in the neighbourhood of *Cremona*. The *Gauls* were now ninety thousand strong, yet they thought it more adviseable to oblige the *Romans* to raise the siege of that frontier town, by making a useful diversion, than to hazard a battle. *Viridomarus* therefore with ten thousand men passed the *Po*, entered the *Roman* territories, and advanced

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vanced towards *Claſtidium* in *Liguria*. Upon the news of this motion of the *Gauls*, *Marcellus*, followed by only two-thirds of the *Roman* cavalry, and about fix hundred of the light-armed infantry, left his camp and came up with the enemy near the place before named. He drew up his little army all in one line, giving it as much extent as he could. The *Gauls* ſeeing the infantry of the *Romans* ſo inconfiderable, and always deſpiſing their cavalry, had no doubt of the victory. But when the two armies were juſt ready to join battle, *Viridomarus* advancing before his troops, deſied the *Roman* general to ſingle combat. *Marcellus* joyfully accepted the challenge (for ſingle combat was his talent) ruſhed upon his enemy, killed him and ſtripped him of his armour; and then the *Gæſatæ* were ſo diſheartened that the victor, with his handful of *Romans*, put them intirely to flight.

During the abſence of *Marcellus*, his colleague had taken *Acerra*, and laid ſiege to *Milan* (or *Mediolanum*) the chief city of *Inſubria*, but was himſelf beſieged by the *Gauls*, while he lay before the town. The return of the victorious *Conſul* changed the ſcene; the *Gæſatæ* quite diſcouraged broke up their camp, fled, and re- paſſed the *Alps*; and *Milan* immediately ſurrendered at diſcretion. *Como* was reduced to the ſame neceſſity; and, in ſhort, the whole nation of the *Inſubrians* ſubmitted to receive law from the republic. *Inſubria* and *Liguria* were now made one province, and called *Ciſalpine Gaul*:
and

Y. R. 531.
Bef. Chr.

221.

230 Conf.

Plut. life
of Marcellus.

Polyb. B.
2. c. 34.

Eutrop. B.
3. c. 6.

Zon. B. 9.

Vide Pigh.
ad Ann.
531.

and thus did all *Italy* become subject to *Rome*,
from the *Alps* to the *Ionian* sea.

Plut. life
of Marcell.

The Senate decreed *Marcellus* a triumph, and
it was said in the decree to be, *for having conquered*
the Insubrians and Germans, which makes it pro-
bable that the *Gasate* were originally *German*.

Fast. Cap.

The *Consul*, in his triumphal procession, carried
on his shoulders a trophy of the spoils of *Viridoma-
rus*; and this was the third and last triumph

See vol. 1.
B. 1. c. 2.
§. xii. & B.
2. c. 33.
§. 1.

in which any *opima spolia* were seen at *Rome*. As
for *Cornelius Marcellus's* colleague, he was conti-
nued in the new province as *Pro-Consul*, to re-
gulate the affairs of it; and the same *Comitia*
which allotted him that post, chose *M. Minucius*
Rufus, and *P. Cornelius Scipio Asina*, to be the
Consuls for the new year. The conquest of *Istria*,
on the borders of the *Adriatic*, was the only mili-
tary exploit during their magistracy.

Y. R. 532.
Bef. Chr.
220.
231 Conf.

Eutrop.

B. 3. c. 7.

C H A P. XV.

The second Illyrian war.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 16.

ABOUT this time *Demetrius of Pbaros*,
whom the *Roman* republic had placed in
the government of *Illyricum*, and guardianship
of the young king *Pinaeus*, seeing the *Romans*
engaged in a troublesome war with the *Gauls*,
and that *Carthage* wanted only a fair opportu-
nity to break with them, had despised their or-
ders, forced the *Atintanes* to renounce their alli-
ance with the republic, and sent fifty ships of
war

App. Illyr.
Dio. in E-
clog. 9. ap.
Vales.

war beyond *Lyffos* to pillage the Islands, called *Cyclades*, in the *Archipelago*.

The new *Consuls*, *L. Veturius Philo*, and *C. Lutatius*, would have sailed for *Illyricum*, if they had not been forced to depose themselves upon some defect found in the ceremony of their election. They were succeeded by *M. Æmilius Lepidus*, and *M. Valerius Ævinus*; but the season was now too far advanced to begin the expedition, so that it was postponed to the next *Consulship*. [By a *Census* taken this year, the number of *Roman citizens* fit to bear arms appeared to be two hundred seventy thousand, two hundred and thirteen. The *Census*, as usual, was followed by a *Lustrum*, the forty-third from its institution.]

BOTH the *Consuls* of the new year, *M. Livius Salinator*, and *L. Æmilius Paulus*, embarked for *Illyricum*. *Demetrius* had assisted *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, (while a minor under the tuition of his uncle, *Antigonus Doson*) in his wars with the *Lacedæmonians*, and had thereby secured himself a retreat with that prince, in case of a disaster. He had also fortified *Dimalum*, a city of importance in *Illyricum*; and having assembled the choicest of his troops in the Island of *Pbaros*, his own country, held his court there. Early in the spring *Æmilius* sat down before *Dimalum*, and by surprising efforts took it in seven days; upon which all the old allies of *Rome*, who had been compelled to submit to the tyrant, returned joyfully to their former engagements. The next attempt was upon *Pbaros*, the last refuge of the traitor. As the enterprize was difficult, *Æmilius* thought it

Y. R. 533.
Bef. Chr.
219.
232d Conf.

Vid. Pigh.
ad Ann.
533.
Liv. Epit.
20.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 16. c. 18,
19.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.

233d Conf.

it necessary to join artifice to valour. The *Roman* fleet had two *Consular* armies on board it; one of them was ordered to land in the Island, in the night, and hide itself in forests, and behind rocks. This done, a detachment of the fleet appeared off *Pharos*, in open day, as it were with design to land some forces there. *Demetrius* drew his army out of the town, to the sea-shore, to hinder the descent; which when the *Legionaries*, that were already landed, perceived, they left their ambush, and marching silently seized an eminence between the city and the port. It was of the last consequence to *Demetrius* to drive the *Romans* from this post, and therefore having encouraged his men he led them strait to the attack.

This gave the *Consuls* on board the fleet an opportunity to make their descent, and then the *Illyrians* finding themselves invested on all sides presently took to flight. As for the regent he made his escape to *Macedon* in a bark kept ready for that purpose.

B. 3. c. 19.

The defeat of the *Illyrian* army was followed by the taking of *Pharos*, which the *Romans* first plundered and then levelled with the ground. Thus *Rome* became a second time mistress of *Illyricum*. However, she did not reduce it to the state of a *Roman* province, having some compassion for the young king, who had been embarked in these affairs merely by the fault of his guardians.

App. in
Illyr.

Auth. of
the lives of
illust. men.
c. 50.

The *Consuls* returned to *Rome* and obtained a triumph for their victories. Their conduct, nevertheless, had not been, in all respects, pleasing

ing to the people, as appeared after the expiration of their magistracy¹. *Livius* and *Æmilius* were then accused before the *Tribes* of having applied a great part of the spoils taken from the enemy to their own use, and of having distributed the rest of the booty partially among the soldiers. *Æmilius* upon his trial was acquitted, but *Livius* was condemned by all the *Tribes*, except the *Mecian*, an affront which he resented to excess, as we shall see hereafter when he comes to be *Censor*.

In this Consulship the Senate observing, that the great concourse of strangers from *Egypt* and the *Levant* had introduced into the city the worship of *Isis* and *Osiris*, to whom several sanctuaries were already built, ordered these to be all demolished, agreeably to one of the twelve Tables, forbidding the worship of strange Gods. No workman, however, would venture the guilt of sacrilege by doing it, such credit had their worship gained among the people. The Consul *Æmilius* therefore, full of zeal for the religion and laws of his country, laid aside his *Consular* robe, took a hatchet and beat down those oratories to the ground.

But the most important transaction of this year was the planting colonies at *Placentia* and *Cre-*

¹ It was at this time *Archagathus* of *Peloponnesus* introduced surgery into *Rome*. At first he met with great applause, and a shop was built for him at the public charge, in a part of the city where four streets met: But as his constant practice in the cure of wounds was to make large incisions, which are painful remedies, his art soon fell into disrepute.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.
Front.
Strat. B. 4.
c. 1. §. 45.
Liv. B. 29.
c. 37.

Val. Max.
B. 1. c. 3.
§. 3.

Plin. B. 29.
c. 1.

Y. R. 534.

Bef. Chr.

218.

233d Conf.

Liv. Epit.

B. 20. Liv.

B. 21.

C. 25.

mona in the *Gallic* territories; this being the chief motive which inclined the *Boians* and *Insubrians* to favour *Hannibal* in his attempt upon *Italy*, that memorable and surprising event which is next to engage the reader's attention.

C H A P. XVI.

The second *Punic* war, or the war of *Hannibal*.

Its causes and commencement.

Y. of R.

534-

TWENTY-TWO years were now past, since *Carthage*, bending to the superior fortune of *Rome*, had with shame and reluctance submitted to the hard conditions of that treaty, which put an end to the FIRST PUNIC WAR. To relinquish the fair Island of *Sicily* to an impetuous rival was a sore and grievous article; and perhaps the payment of those large sums, that were further exacted for the peace, was a yet more sensible mortification to a republic of avaritious merchants: But necessity compelled; nor could even the courage and abilities of the incomparable *Amilcar* furnish any remedy, in the then distressful situation of affairs. For after the defeat of *Hanno* at the *Ægates*, which made the *Romans* masters of the sea, neither the army of *Amilcar* at *Eryx*, nor the garrisons of *Lilybaeum* and *Drepanum* could receive any supply of provisions or military stores. *Sicily* therefore was unavoidably lost: The army might be preserved; but

See p. 124.

but the only visible way to preserve it was by a peace with the enemy. *Amilcar's* immediate object in the treaty was this preservation of the troops. Yet even this neither he nor they would consent to purchase at the expence of their honour as soldiers. They chose rather to perish than to give up their arms. As for the annual sums which the Consul *Lutatius* demanded from *Carthage*, *Amilcar*, on the part of his republic, readily yielded to that imposition. Nor did he much hesitate in complying with the further demands of money, which the ten commissioners from *Rome* insisted upon, before they would ratify the peace. What rendered him so tractable on this head, was doubtless (beside the danger of his army) the resolution he had secretly formed, that no more of the stipulated tribute should be paid, than was required to be paid at the time of the ratification. For as we learn from *Polybius*, he was determined to renew the war against *Rome* as soon as it should be possible to do it. Whatever fears some of the citizens of *Carthage* might have of the war's being transferred from *Sicily* to their own gates, if a peace were not concluded, it is evident that *Amilcar*, with that army of hardy veterans he then commanded, feared no enemy but famine; and could he have found means to transport those troops safely into *Africa* without a peace, he would have entered into no treaty with the *Romans*.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

B. 3: c. 9.

The indignation of *Amilcar*, when he was thus constrained to leave *Eryx* and abandon *Sicily*, is

Polyb. L.
3 c. 9.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.

218.

233d Conf.

assigned by *Polybius* for the FIRST CAUSE of that memorable war which we are going to enter upon: For though this implacable enemy of the *Romans* did not live to attempt that vengeance, which to his last breath he was ever meditating, we shall presently see, that his spirit of revenge was not extinguished by his death.

The dreadful and destructive conflict at home, to which on his return thither from *Sicily* he was obliged to give all his attention during more than three years, unavoidably suspended the execution of his purpose against *Rome*. And when that domestic disturbance was happily quelled, the treasury and strength of *Carthage* were too much exhausted to furnish what was necessary to support her in so arduous an enterprize. The *Romans* sensible of her weakness took advantage of it (as we have seen) to extort from her not only the cession of *Sardinia*, but the sum of 1200 talents; a fine shamelessly demanded for the reparation of an injury they had not received. And this odious extortion is held to be the SECOND and the PRINCIPAL CAUSE of that war which followed it at almost 20 years distance. For so barefaced an injustice, so insulting a procedure, as it furnished *Carthage* with a just ground to attack the *Romans* whenever she should be in a condition to do it, so it also brought all the *Carthaginians* in general to concur with their brave captain in his resentment and designs; it being now sufficiently manifest that they must either resolve to become obedient subjects of *Rome*, or take

See p. 166.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 10.

take some effectual measures to render themselves the more potent republic.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

With this view *Amilcar*, soon after the re-establishment of tranquillity at home by the suppression of the mercenaries and rebels, had a new army committed to him, to be employed in extending the *Carthaginian* empire in *Spain*; a country that both abounded with riches and was able to supply the republic with a sufficient number of brave troops, to make head against those multitudes of soldiers with which *Italy* furnished the *Romans*.

How deeply *Amilcar's* hatred to *Rome* had rooted itself in his heart, and that revenge was his chief aim in this expedition, we have a singular and incontestable proof, in what he did just before his departure from *Africa*. His son *Hannibal*, at that time about nine years old, was with him, when he performed a sacrifice to *Jupiter* for the success of his intended voyage. The rites being all ended, and *Amilcar* having ordered the rest of the assistants to withdraw, he called his son to him, and tenderly caressing the boy, asked him, whether he were willing to accompany him into *Spain*? The boy not only most readily declared his consent, but with all the blandishments and eager vivacity peculiar to children, begged of his father, that he would permit him to go. *Amilcar* then taking him by the hand led him to the altar, made him lay his hand upon it, touch the sacrifice, and swear, *that he would never be in friendship with the Romans.*

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 11.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.

218.

233d Conf.

Polyb. B. 2.
c. 1.

Portugal.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 10.

See p. 182.

Polyb. B. 2.
c. 13.

THE CARTHAGINIAN passed the Streights of *Hercules*, and landed with his army on the western coast of *Spain*. Nine years he conducted the war in this country with uninterrupted success, reducing ^b many nations to the obedience of his republic: but at length, in a battle which he fought with the *Vettones*, a people of *Lusitania*, (defending himself a long time with admirable resolution) he was encompassed and slain; carrying with him to the grave the same great honour and reputation, which by many signal victories he had acquired, together with the name of a *second Mars*.

This happened about the time when the *Romans* made their first expedition against the *Illyrians*.

Upon the death of *Amilcar* the command of the army was given to his son-in-law *Asdrubal*,

^b According to *Zonaras*, in the Consulate of *Q. Fabius* and *M. Pomponius*, [in the 520 of *Rome*, when *Amilcar* had been about five years in *Spain*] the *Romans* believing that the wars they had to sustain against the *Ligurians* and *Sardinians*, were owing to the secret practices of the *Carthaginians*, sent to these some ambassadors, who demanded of them in harsh terms, certain sums of money due by treaty, and that they should forbear touching at any of the Islands in the *Roman* jurisdiction: and to gain the readier compliance to these demands, the ambassadors presented a caduceus and a javelin, the one a symbol of peace, the other of war, bidding the Senate take their choice. The *Carthaginians* nothing terrified at this menace, answered, that they would chuse neither, but would readily accept whichever they should think fit to leave them.

If this story [which does not seem probable] be true, the boldness of the *Carthaginians* proceeded doubtless from the great success of *Amilcar* in *Spain*.

at that time admiral of the gallies. He was no bad soldier, and a very able statesman; by his wisdom and gentle manners attracting the good-will of many princes of that country, and gaining more subjects to *Carthage* by his wonderful address in negotiation, than his predecessor had done by the sword. He also built new *Carthage*, (the present *Carthagera*) a town commodiously situated to be a magazine of arms, and to receive succours from *Africa*.

ROME began now to be alarmed. Her jealousy of *Carthage* had been asleep during *Amilcar's* remote conquests in *Spain*: But the formidable growth of her rival's power under the management of *Asdrubal* awakened it. She did not dare, however, to exact any thing of the *Carthaginians* very grievous, or to commence hostilities against them, being at this time in extreme dread of the *Gauls*, who threatened her with an invasion. Ambassadors were therefore sent to *Asdrubal*, to draw him by fair words into a treaty, wherein he should covenant, *that the Carthaginians would confine their arms within the Iberus*. No mention was made of any other part of *Spain* in this treaty.

As the *Spanish* affairs had no relation to the peace between the two states, this demand was unreasonable; and the *Romans* seem to have sought by it a *pretext of quarrel*, when by freeing themselves from the *Gauls*, they should be in a condition to begin a new war with *Carthage*.

^c According to *Appian* the treaty was made at *Carthage*, but the sequel proves this to be false.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

Livy, B. 21.
c. 2.

See p. 185.
Polyb. B.
2. c. 13.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

For should *Asdrubal* refuse to engage, or engaging not perform, they would in either case be furnished with such a pretext, though perhaps in neither would the pretext be just ^d.

Asdrubal was full of the same spirit as *Amilcar*; and had the same designs ever at heart. However he made no difficulty to comply with the motion of the ambassadors, having much to do, before he could pass that boundary which the *Romans* were for fixing to his conquests.

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By this treaty, *Rome* acquired some reputation in *Spain*. For when it was conceived by the *Spaniards*, that the *African* republic, which sought to be mistress over them, stood herself in fear of a more potent state, they began to turn their eyes hither for protection; and the *Saguntines*, whose city was on the south-side of the *Iberus*, entered into a confederacy with the *Romans*, and were gladly received.

Polyb. B. 2.
c. 36.

WHEN *Asdrubal* had governed in *Spain* for the space of eight years, he was treacherously murdered ^e by a certain *Gaul* whom he had provoked by some injury. The *Carthaginians*, upon receipt of this news, suspended the nomination of a new commander, till they could learn the inclinations of the army; and they no sooner understood that the soldiers had unanimously made choice of ^f *Hannibal* for their leader, than they called

and B. 3.
c. 13.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 3.

^d This will be explained when we come to the proper place for it.

^e *Livy* and *Appian* say, that *Asdrubal* was killed in revenge by a slave, whose master he had put to death.

^f It is surprising that the judicious Mr. *Rollin* (in his Hist.

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called an assembly, and with one voice ratified the election.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Cnr.

218.

233d Conf.

Hist. Anc. 380.) should follow *Livy*, in relating an idle story full of absurdity, and which he afterwards (following again the same author) manifestly contradicts.

The *Latin* Historian reports, "that *Asdrubal* [about "three years before his death] wrote to *Carthage* to have "*Hannibal*, who was then *hardly at the age of puberty*, sent "to him, that the young man might be trained up to war, "so as one day to imitate his father's prowess. He adds, "that *Hanno* and others opposed this motion in the Senate, imputing to *Asdrubal* dishonest intentions with regard to the lad; but that it was carried by a majority. "That *Hannibal* arriving in *Spain*, drew all eyes upon "him; and that the old soldiers observed in his person "and manner, a wonderful resemblance to his father, &c. "That he served three years under *Asdrubal*, and was then "declared general of the army." Now is there the least probability, either that *Hannibal* should arrive at such a masterly knowledge in the art of war in three years service; or that the *Carthaginians* should trust the conduct of their army and their empire in *Spain* to a young man of so short experience? That *Livy* was very careless in delivering this tradition, appears sufficiently from the age he gives to *Hannibal*, at the time of his being sent into *Spain*, at *Asdrubal's* request, HUNC VIX DUM PUBEREM, *when he was scarce fourteen*. By the historian's own account *Hannibal* was *nine* when *Amilcar* went into *Spain*; *Amilcar* lived there *nine* years; and *Asdrubal* had commanded near *five* years, before he sent for the young man.

Mr. Rollin, aware, I suppose, of this inconsistency, drops the *vix dum puberem*, and makes *Hannibal* to be *twenty-two* at the time of his going from *Carthage* to *Asdrubal*; and by this indeed he avoids the anachronism: but then he seems not to have been aware that the whole story is overthrown by what *Hannibal* says in the Senate of *Carthage* at the end of the *second Punic war*, *That he had never before been at home since he was nine years old*. See *Livy*, B. 30. and Mr. Rollin, Vol. I. p. 486.

P 4

Hannibal,

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.

218.

233d Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.

c. 13.

Hannibal, soon after his confirmation in the command of the troops, undertook the reduction of the *Olcades*. The success was answerable to his desires. Having amassed much treasure by the sale of the booty taken in several towns, he marched to New *Carthage*, which he made his winter quarters; where liberally paying the soldiers who had served under him, and promising them farther gratifications, he both gained their affections, and inspired them with extraordinary hopes.

c. 14.

Early the next spring he led his army against the *Vaccæi*, and made a fortunate expedition: but in his return home, being attacked by the *Carpetani*, whom great numbers of the fugitive *Olcades* and *Vaccæi* (driven out of their own countries) had joined, he was reduced to very great streights. Could the enemy have compelled him to a pitched battle, he had inevitably been undone; but he, with great skill, making a slow retreat, till he had got the river *Tagus* between him and them, so judiciously disposed his horse and elephants, as entirely to defeat their endeavours to cross the river after him, which they attempted to their prodigious loss, by several fords at one and the same time. After which, passing the river himself, and pursuing his advantage, he, with terrible slaughter, routed this army of 100,000 *Barbarians*.

The *Vaccæi* being thus vanquished, there remained no nation on that side the *Iberus*, who durst think of opposing the *Carthaginians*, except the *Saguntines*. *Hannibal* had hitherto carefully

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fully forbore all hostility against this people, being ever mindful of his father's advice, which was, to avoid giving occasion to the *Romans* to declare war against *Carthage*, until such time as by the enlargement of her dominion and strength she was in a condition to cope with them. This time was now at hand; and the great success of the *Carthaginian* arms in *Spain*, under the conduct of *Amilcar*, *Asdrubal*, and *Hannibal*, is therefore assigned by *Polybius* for the THIRD CAUSE of the SECOND PUNIC WAR.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

While *Hannibal* was meditating the first blow he intended to give, and was clearing the way for the attack, by the several enterprizes above-mentioned, the *Saguntines* dispatched frequent messengers to the *Romans*, partly out of apprehension of their own impending danger, and partly out of friendship to their allies, that they might be perfectly informed of the progress of the *Carthaginians*. Little attention was given, at *Rome*, to these advices, for a long time; but at last it was judged proper to send some ambassadors into *Spain*, to examine into the truth of the facts.

B. 3. c. 10.

c. 15.

Hannibal having carried his conquests as far as he had proposed that year, returned to take up his winter-quarters in *New Carthage*, which was then become the seat of the *Carthaginian* government in *Spain*. There he found the *Roman* ambassadors; and, giving them audience, was by them admonished, upon no account to attempt any thing against the *Saguntines*, a people received into the protection of *Rome*; and also

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

to be mindful of the treaty with Asdrubal, and to forbear passing the river Iberus.

HANNIBAL, young, full of martial fire, fortunate in his enterprizes, and mortally hating the Romans, answered with a careless and haughty air, (personating a friend to the Saguntines) *That a sedition having formerly happened among the citizens of Saguntum, the Romans, to whose arbitration they referred the dispute, had unjustly condemned to death some of the magistrates; and that he would not suffer this injustice to go unpunished; for it had ever been the custom of the Carthaginians to undertake the cause of those who were wrongfully persecuted.*

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 16.

The ambassadors departing with this answer, failed to Carthage (pursuant to their instructions, in case of such a reception from Hannibal) there to expostulate upon the matter with the Senate; though they well saw, that a war was unavoidable. Little indeed did they imagine that Italy would be the theatre of it; but concluded that Saguntum and its territory would be the scene of action.

c. 15,

Hannibal at the same time sent to Carthage for instructions how to proceed, with regard to the Saguntines, who, as he said, encouraged by their confederacy with Rome, committed many outrages against those who were in alliance with Carthage. According to Livy, these allies of Carthage were the Turdetani, between whom and the Saguntines Hannibal had contrived to raise a quarrel, that he might have a pretence, in quality of friend to the former, to attack the latter.

Liv. B. 27.
c. 6.

What

What answer the *Roman* ambassadors received from the *Carthaginian* Senate is not recorded; but we may well gather from the sequel, that it was by no means satisfactory. The Senate of *Rome*, nevertheless, being in the same prepossession as their ambassadors, concerning the seat of the war, that it would be in a remote country; and considering also that the war when once begun would probably be carried to a great length, resolved, before they entered upon it, to give a period first to their affairs in *Illyricum*, and punish the perfidy of *Demetrius*; believing that they should be able to effect this, and yet have sufficient opportunity to defeat the designs of *Hannibal*.

But these proved vain deliberations; for *Hannibal* was too much in earnest. He marched with his army towards *Saguntum*, at the same time that the *Roman* Consuls embarked for *Illyricum*; and before the Consuls had finished their expedition *Saguntum* was taken.

The *Carthaginian* used the more diligence in attacking this strong and wealthy city, for many weighty considerations. The reduction of *Saguntum* would probably deprive the *Romans* of all hope of making war in *Spain*: The nations, he had already conquered, terrified by this new success of his arms, would be held in better obedience; and those who were yet unconquered would stand in greater awe of his power. And, what was still of greater importance, he should be able to pursue his enterprizes with more security when he had no enemy at his

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 16.

c. 17.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

his back. He farther considered, that this town, should he take it, would yield him large supplies of treasure for carrying on the war; that his army would be more at his devotion when he had enriched them with booty; and that he should be enabled to secure to himself friends at *Carthage*, by sending thither a part of the spoil.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 6.

From all these motives he was indefatigable in pressing the siege; which nevertheless lasted many months. The *Roman* Senate no sooner received advice of his having begun it, but they sent ambassadors into *Spain* with instructions to give him warning to desist, and, in case of his refusal, to sail to *Carthage* and there demand of the Senate, the delivering up of their general to the *Romans* by way of compensation for the breach of the league between the two states.

c. 9.

HANNIBAL hearing of the arrival of these ambassadors on the coast of *Spain*, dispatched some messengers to meet them at the sea-side, and to signify to them, *that neither would it be safe for them to come to his quarters; nor had he leisure to give them audience.* And, as he knew very well to what place they would direct their course, after receiving such a message, he without delay sent proper emissaries to *Carthage* to prepare the chiefs of the *Barbicine* faction for the occasion.

c. 10.

Livy reports that *Hanno*, the avowed enemy of *Amilcar's* family, and the head of the opposite faction, was the only man, in the *Carthaginian* Senate, who was for complying with the demands of *Rome*; and that he spoke to this effect:

“How

“ How often have I conjured you by those
 “ Gods who are the witnesses and arbiters of
 “ leagues and treaties, not to suffer any of *A-*
 “ *milcar*’s race to command your armies ! How
 “ often have I told you, that neither the manes
 “ nor the progeny of that man would ever be
 “ at rest, and that no friendship, no peace
 “ with the *Romans* could be preserved inviolate,
 “ so long as there remained one alive of the
 “ *Barchine* name and family ! *Hannibal* is an
 “ aspiring youth, proudly ambitious of being
 “ a monarch ; and who thinks nothing so con-
 “ ducive to his purpose, as to draw upon us war
 “ after war, that so he may live in arms, and
 “ be always surrounded with legions : And you,
 “ by making him the general of your armies,
 “ have furnished fuel to his fire ; you have fed
 “ the flame which now scorches you. Your
 “ forces at this time besiege *Saguntum*, contrary
 “ to the faith of treaties. What can you ex-
 “ pect, but that *Carthage* be soon invested by the
 “ *Roman* legions, under the conduct of those
 “ very Gods, who in the former war took venge-
 “ ance on us for the like ⁸ perfidiousness ? Are

Y. R. 534.
 Bef. Chr.
 218.
 233d Conf.

⁸ *Hanno* refers here (as he afterwards explains himself)
 to some attempts of the *Carthaginians* upon *Tarentum*, [at
 the time, I suppose, when *Pyrrhus*’s troops held that city.]
 In the *Epit. of Livy*, B. 14. it is said, that the *Carthagi-*
nians came with a fleet to the succour of Tarentum, whereby
they broke their league with the Romans. And this doubt-
 less is the foundation whereon *Zonaras* builds his report,
 that the motive assigned by the *Romans* for their beginning the
 first Punic war, was the assistance which the *Carthaginians*
 had given the *Tarentines* against *Rome*. See p. 29. of this
 Vol.

you

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.

218.
233d Conf.

“ you yet to learn what kind of enemies they are
“ whom you provoke? Are you still strangers
“ to yourselves? Are you ignorant of the for-
“ tunes of the two republics?

“ Your worthy general would not vouchsafe
“ the ambassadors of your allies a hearing; he
“ has violated the law of nations. The amba-
“ ssadors of our friends, worse treated than the
“ messengers from an enemy were ever known
“ to be, have now recourse to you. They de-
“ mand satisfaction for the unjust violation of a
“ treaty. They would have you clear the body
“ of the nation from the shame of so odious
“ a breach of faith, by giving up into their hands
“ the author of the crime. The more mode-
“ rate they are at present, the more exasperated,
“ I fear, and the more implacable will they be
“ hereafter. Remember the *Ægates*, and the
“ affair of *Eryx*, with all the calamities you suf-
“ fered for four and twenty years together.
“ And yet we had not then this boy at the head
“ of our armies, but his father, *Amilcar* himself,
“ a second *Mars*, as some are pleased to style
“ him. But we could not then forbear making
“ attempts upon *Tarentum* in violation of trea-
“ ties, as we do now upon *Saguntum*. The Gods
“ declared themselves against us in that war,
“ and, in spite of all our pretences of right,
“ made appear by giving victory to our ene-
“ mies, which of the two nations had unjustly
“ broken the league.

See p. 124.

“ ’Tis against *Carthage* that *Hannibal* now
“ plants his mantelets and erects his towers;
“ it

" it is her wall that he now shakes with his battering rams. The ruins of *Saguntum* (I wish I may prove a false prophet!) will fall upon our heads; and the war begun with the *Saguntines* must be maintained against the *Romans*.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

" But, say you, shall we then deliver up *Hannibal* into the hands of his enemies? I know that my opinion will have little weight with you, because of the old animosities between his father and me: Yet I must declare, that, as I rejoiced when *Amilcar* fell, because, had he lived, he would have engaged us before now in a war with the *Romans*, so I hate and detest this youth as a fury and the firebrand to kindle a *Roman* war. Yes, I think it fit, that *Hannibal* be delivered up to expiate the breach of the league; and, if nobody had demanded him, I should vote to have him transported to the remotest corner of the earth, whence his name might never reach our ears to disturb the repose of our state.

" My conclusion therefore is, that deputies be forthwith sent to *Rome* to pacify the Senate; others into *Spain*, with orders to the army to raise the siege of *Saguntum*, and deliver up their general to the *Romans*; and a third deputation to the *Saguntines* to make reparation for the injuries they have sustained^h."

The

^h The reader, I am persuaded, will not easily believe, that a speech of this tenor was really delivered either by

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.

218.
233d Conf.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 21.

The Senate, though they heard this orator with respectful attention, as a man of authority and reputation among them, paid no regard to his remonstrance, invective, or advice on the present occasion. Nay, the Senators in general exclaimed, that he had spoken more like an enemy than a subject of *Carthage*. As for the *Roman* ambassadors, they were dismissed with this answer, *That the war was begun by the Saguntines and not by Hannibal. And that the Romans would act injuriously to Carthage, if to her antient alliance with them, they preferred the later friendship of the Saguntines.*

Polyb. B.
3. c. 17.

Hannibal was all this time pressing the siege of *Saguntum* with uninterrupted diligence. He animated his soldiers in person, working in the trenches among them, and mingling with them in all hazards. The defence was brave even to obstinacy; and it is said to have lasted eight months. When the besieged could no longer hold out, many of the citizens, rather than listen to the hard terms of peace which *Hannibal* exacted, (as the giving up their arms, leaving their city to be demolished, and moving off with nothing more of all their substance than two suits of apparel) threw themselves into a great fire, where they had first cast all their most valuable effects. While this was doing, it happened that

Liv. B. 21.
c. 14.

Hanno or any other *Carthaginian* Senator. The greater part of the matter of it doubtless belongs to *Livy* no less than the form. However, thus much we may conclude from the party spirit of *Hanno*, that he disapproved the proceedings of *Hannibal*, and was against a rupture with *Rome*:

a tower,

a tower, which had been much battered and shaken, fell down on a sudden. A body of *Carthaginians* immediately entered at the breach; and *Hannibal*, upon notice of this accident, seizing the opportunity, made a general assault and carried the place without difficulty. He gave orders, that all who were found in arms should be put to the sword; an unnecessary order, for they themselves were firmly determined to die fighting: many of the inhabitants shut themselves up with their wives and children, and burnt the houses over their heads. But notwithstanding all this destruction of men and effects, the place yielded to the conquered great store of wealth and many slaves. The money he appropriated for carrying on the war against *Rome*; the slaves he divided among the soldiers; and all the rich household stuff he sent to *Carthage*.

Y. R. 534.
Bef. Chr.
218.
233d Conf.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 17.

The *Roman* ambassadors who had been dispatched to the *Carthaginian* Senate brought the answer, they had there received, to *Rome*, about the same time that the news arrived of the destruction of *Saguntum*.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 16.

Livy tells us, that the compassion of the *Romans* for this unfortunate city, their shame for having failed to succour such a faithful ally, their indignation against the *Carthaginians*, and their apprehension of the main event of things, (as if the enemy were already at the gates of *Rome*;) all these various passions were so strong in their minds, that at first they only mourned

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Cons.

Liv. B. 21.

c. 17.

and trembled, instead of consulting for the common safety.

But it being now no longer a question whether they should enter into a war, they quickly began to make the necessary preparations for action. The Consuls *P. Cornelius Scipio*, and *Tib. Sempronius Longus* drew lots for their provinces. *Sicily* and *Africa* fell to *Sempronius*, and *Spain* to *Cornelius*. *Sempronius* with two *Roman* legions, consisting each of 4000 foot and 300 horse, and with 16,000 foot and 1800 horse of the allies on board a fleet of 160 gallies, was to go first into *Sicily* and thence into *Africa*, in case the other Consul should prove strong enough to hinder the *Carthaginians* from coming into *Italy*. *Cornelius* for this purpose had two *Roman* legions, with 14,000 foot and 1600 horse of the allies committed to his conduct; and with a fleet of 60 quinqueremes, he was to sail to *Spain*, and endeavour to prevent *Hannibal's* leaving that country. The Consul had no stronger a navy appointed him, because it was supposed that the enemy would not come by sea, nor chuse to fight in that kind of service. And his army was also the less numerous, because the Prætor *Manlius* had two *Roman* legions with 10,000 foot and 1000 horse of the allies to guard the province of *Gaul*. The whole number of the forces raised by the republic on this occasion was 24,000 *Roman* foot and 1800 horse, 40,000 foot and 4400 horse of the allies; and their ships of war amounted to 220.

These

These extraordinary preparations sufficiently shew the terror the *Romans* were in at the approaching war. And indeed it will not appear to be ill grounded, if we consider, that the *Carthaginians* ever since *Amilcar's* going into *Spain* had been fighting and conquering, and that the *Spaniards*, by whom their army was strengthened, were men steady even to obstinacy. Besides, the *Roman* republic had now no general equal to *Hannibal*, a man of immense views; ever judicious in his enterprizes; a wonderful genius for seizing the critical moment to execute his designs; the greatest master in the art of appearing not to act, when he was most busy; inexhaustible of expedients; as skilful in recovering himself out of danger, as in drawing an enemy into it. He had been bred up to arms from his infancy, and though now only in the flower of his age, had the experience of several years command of an army. For *Asdrubal* being himself no great warrior, had committed to him the conduct of all dangerous and difficult enterprizes. So that no general then living had had more exercise than he; nor were any troops better disciplined than his. *Hannibal's* design of carrying the war from the remote parts of *Spain* into the very center of *Italy*, is said by an ingenious writer, to be the boldest project that ever captain durst conceive, and what was justified only by the event. But this does not seem to have been the opinion of *Polybius*, who tells us, that *Hannibal* had taken all prudent measures for facilitating his march, and for securing the assistance of

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

Abb. Vert.
B. 8.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 4.

Abb. Vert.
Polyb. B.
3. c. 34.
vid. inf. p.
129, 130.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

the *Gauls* about the *Alps* and about the *Po*, which it was the easier to do, because he and they had one common interest with respect to the *Romans*, the hated enemies of both.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 20.
Livy. B.
21. c. 18.

Though the *Romans* made the Preparations above mentioned for war, as a thing certain and unavoidable, yet that nothing might be wanting to the exact observance of forms, they dispatched a¹ third embassy to *Carthage*, to demand once more,

¹ *Polybius* mentions only two embassies from *Rome* to the *Carthaginians*, on the affair of *Saguntum*, one before the siege, another after the town was taken. *Livy* also mentions only two; but, according to him, the first was during the siege, when (he tells us) *Hannibal* refused the ambassadors an audience; the second, after the reduction of the place. That we may not reject *Polybius's* authority, who relates an audience which *Hannibal* before the siege of *Saguntum*, gave at *Carthagera* to some ambassadors from *Rome*; nor yet accuse *Livy* or his vouchers of inventing the story of *Hannibal's* refusing audience, and of all that followed thereupon at *Carthage*, we have supposed (what seems most probable) that there were three embassies from *Rome* in relation to *Saguntum*, the first before the siege, the second while it was carrying on, the third after the place was taken.

To the first ambassadors *Hannibal* gave audience and a haughty answer, of which they made complaint to the *Carthaginian* Senate. Those who came next were refused audience by him, and they also carried their complaints to *Carthage*. The last embassy was sent only to *Carthage*.

Father *Catrou*, not liking, I suppose, that the *Romans* should appear in so disadvantageous a light as they do, upon this occasion, is angry with *Livy*, for making them send even twice to *Carthage* before they declare war; though if any thing may be depended upon in the *Roman* story, this fact has a title to credit.

It

more, what they did not expect would be yielded, *That Hannibal and his council should be delivered up to them*; and the ambassadors were also now instructed to *declare war* in case of refusal.

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Bef. Chr.
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When they were come to *Carthage*, and admitted to audience, the Senate heard the haughty demand they brought with a coldness, approaching to contempt. Nevertheless, one of the Senators best qualified, was directed to speak in maintenance of the *Carthaginian* cause. This orator, *without taking the least notice of the treaty made with Asdrubal*, (as if no such treaty had been made, or, if made, was nothing to the purpose, because made without authority) dwelt wholly on that which was concluded at the end of the *Sicilian* war; in which, as he alledged, there was no mention of *Spain*. He allowed indeed, that it was there covenanted, that neither of the contracting parties should make war on the allies of the other, but added,

Polyb. I.
3. c. 21.

It may indeed seem hard to be accounted for, that the *Romans*, contrary to their former methods of proceeding, should so shamefully neglect to succour their allies, the *Saguntines*, and, when the case required the most vigorous measures, should lose so much time in vain and fruitless embassies to a people they had formerly vanquished and rendered tributary. *Chevalier Folard* conjectures, that the *Romans* were really intimidated by *Hannibal's* superior genius and skill in war, being conscious of their having no general of equal ability with the *Carthaginian*. And may we not also reasonably suppose, that at the time, when *Hannibal* began to threaten *Saguntum*, the *Roman* republic was not in a condition to send by sea into *Spain* an army of sufficient strength to make head against the numerous and victorious troops of *Carthage*?

Q 3

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that the *Saguntines* were entirely out of the question, they not being at that time in alliance with *Rome*; and he caused the articles of the treaty to be read.

The *Romans* refused absolutely to enter into a verbal discussion of this point. They said, there might have been room for such a discussion, had *Saguntum* been then in the same state as formerly, but that this city having been sacked contrary to the faith of treaties, the *Carthaginians* must either clear themselves of perfidy, by delivering up the authors of the injustice, or confess themselves guilty by refusing the satisfaction required. And finding that the Senate would give no answer to the question, *whether Saguntum was besieged by private or public authority*, but would confine the debate to *the justice or injustice of the action*, the eldest of the ambassadors, gathering up the skirt of his gown, and making a hollow in it, *Here*, said he, *we bring you Peace and War, take which you will*. At which they all cried out with one voice, *Give us which you please*. *I give you War then*, said the ambassador, letting his robe loose again. *We accept it*, they all answered, *and with the same spirit that we accept it, we will maintain it*.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 18.
& Polyb.
B. 3. c. 33.

Liv. B. 21.
§ 19.

A mutual denunciation of war being thus made, the ambassadors did not return directly homeward, but, pursuant to their instructions, passed into *Spain*, to solicit the states and princes of that country, who were on the north side of the *Iberus*, to enter into an alliance with *Rome*, or at least not to contract any friendship with the

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Carthaginians. They were courteously entertained by the *Bargusians*. But when they came to the *Volsicians*, they received from this people an answer, which being reported all over the country, was a means to turn away all the other nations from siding with the *Romans*. *With what assurance*, said they, *can you ask of us to prefer your friendship to that of the Carthaginians, after we have seen the Saguntines, who did so, more cruelly betrayed by you, their allies, than destroyed by their open enemies. Go seek for confederates among those who never heard of the ruin of Saguntum. The miserable fate of this city will be a warning to all the nations of Spain, never to repose confidence in Roman faith or amity.* The same kind of reception they met with from all the *Spanish* states to which they afterwards addressed themselves. So that finding their negotiations in this country fruitless, they passed into *Gaul*, endeavouring to persuade the several nations there, not to suffer the *Carthaginians* to march through their territories into *Italy*. The first public assembly of *Gauls*, to whom they made this proposal, burst into so loud a laughter, mixt with a murmur of indignation, that the magistrates and seniors could hardly still the noise of the younger sort, so impudent and foolish did it seem, to request of them, *That they would suffer their own lands to be ravaged and spoiled, to preserve those of other men who were utter strangers to them.* But silence at length being made, the ambassadors were answered, *That neither had the Romans deserved so well, nor the Carthaginians so ill at*

Y. R. 535.
B. f. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

Livy, B. 21.
C. 20.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
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their hands, that they should take arms, either in behalf of Rome, or against Carthage. That, on the contrary, they had heard, that some of their countrymen had been driven out of their possessions in Italy by the Romans, constrained to pay tribute, and made to undergo other indignities. The like answers to the like demands were made in the other public councils of *Gaul*. Nor did the ambassadors meet with any thing like friendship or even peaceable disposition towards them, till they came to *Marseilles*, which was in alliance with *Rome*; and where, upon careful enquiry made by their allies, they learnt that *Hannibal* had been beforehand with them, and by the force of gold, of which the *Gauls* were ever most greedy, had gained them over to side with him. And with this unpleasing news they returned to *Rome*.

Polyb. B.
3. C. 33.

Liv. B. 21.
6, 21.

Hannibal was all this time extremely busy in settling the affairs of *Spain*, and in taking all the proper measures his foresight could suggest, for the happy execution of his great designs. After the reduction of *Saguntum*, he had retired into winter quarters at *New Carthage*. And the better to dispose his *Spanish* soldiers to his service, he had given them permission to retire to their respective homes till the beginning of the spring, when, he told them, he expected their appearance again. In the mean while, as one of his chief cares was to provide for the safety of *Africa*, he transported thither, of *Spaniards*, (raised among the *Therfites*, *Mastii*, and *Olcades*,) 13,850 foot, and 1200 horse, together with 800 slingers of

of the *Baleares*. And while he thus furnished *Africa* with *Spanish* troops, he took order for the security * of *Spain*, by sending for a supply of near 15,000 *Africans*, to be commanded by his brother *Asdrubal*, whom he intended to leave governor in his absence. He furnished him also with 50 quinqueres, 4 quadrires, and 5 trires, that he might be in a condition to oppose any descents that should be attempted there by the *Romans*.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

Livy and *Polybius* commend the prudence of the *Carthaginian* in this exchange of troops; because both the *Africans* and *Spaniards* would probably prove the better soldiers for being thus at a distance from their respective countries, and they would be a kind of pledges or hostages for the mutual fidelity of the two nations.

Besides these precautions, *Hannibal* (as has been already hinted) had dispatched ambassadors to the *Gauls* on both sides the *Alps*, to sound their dispositions, and to engage them to take part with him in his enterprize. For this end he was extremely liberal, not only of his promises, but of his gold, believing it would be a main step towards a happy issue of his undertaking, if, by avoiding war in his way to *Italy*, he could lead his

Polyb. B.
3. c. 34.

* *Livy* reports, that *Hannibal* selected 4000 young men out of the chief cities in *Spain*, and of the best families, and caused them to be brought to [New] *Carthage*, there to remain as hostages for the fidelity of the *Spaniards*. These were probably the same youths which are afterwards said to be left by him in *Saguntum*, as we shall see in its proper place.

army

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

237.

334. Conf.

army entire against the *Romans*. The answers he received were favourable to his wishes; *That the Gauls most willingly agreed to his proposal, and expected him with impatience.* They also sent him word, that though the passage of those mountains was difficult, it was not insuperable. Animated with new hope by these reports, he began early in the spring to march his troops out of their winter quarters; and having now the concurrence of the Senate and people of *Carthage* to his purpose, he began openly to discourse of his intended war against *Rome*, exhorting the soldiers (whom he assembled for this purpose) cheerfully to engage in the expedition; and telling them, in order to raise their indignation against the *Romans*, that they had impudently demanded a surrendry of both him and all his chief officers into their hands. He also expatiated on the fertility of the country which he purposed to invade, the good will of the *Gauls*, and the confederacies he had made with their princes: And when the army had loudly declared their readiness to go whithersoever he was disposed to conduct them, and he had, with thanks, applauded their fidelity, and prefixed the day for their march, he dismissed the assembly.

The *Spaniards*, whom *Hannibal* had permitted to visit their families during the winter, being returned to their service, and the day ¹ appointed for

¹ According to *Livy*, *Hannibal*, before he began his expedition against the *Romans*; went from *New Carthage* to *Gades*, there to discharge some vows he had made to *Hercules*,

for the general rendezvous being come, the whole army took the field. It consisted of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse, and with this mighty force the *Carthaginian* immediately began his march from *New Carthage* towards the river *Iberus*.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234. Conf.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 35.

BUT now, before the reader accompanies *Hannibal* into *Italy*, he may perhaps be willing to make a pause, and enquire into the justice of the cause that leads him thither.

“ *If the destruction of Saguntum* (says *Polybius*)
“ be considered as the CAUSE of the SECOND
“ PUNIC WAR, we must necessarily determine,
“ that the *Carthaginians* engaged in it very un-
“ justly: Whether regard be had to the treaty
“ of *Lulatus*, whereby each party became bound
“ to offer no violence to the allies of the other:
“ Or regard be had to the treaty of *Asdrubal*, in
“ which it was stipulated that the *Carthaginians*
“ should not carry their arms beyond the *Iberus*.

B. 3. c. 30.

See p. 126.

See p. 209.

“ But if, for the CAUSE of the war made by
“ *Hannibal*, we assign the seizure of *Sardinia* by
“ the *Romans*, and the money which they extorted
“ from *Carthage* at that time, we shall be oblig-
“ ed to confess, that the *Carthaginians* acted
“ not unjustly in entering upon this war. For
“ they did no more than lay hold of a favour-
“ able opportunity to revenge themselves on
“ those, who had taken advantage of their di-
“ stresses, to injure and oppress them.”

rules, and to bind himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was going to enter upon. *Polybius* says nothing of the matter.

Here

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Conf.

B. 3. c. 6.

Here then *the question of right* is decided by our author. For he had before declared, and enlarged upon it, that *the siege of Saguntum* and the *passing the Iberus* were only the *beginnings* of the war and not the *causes*; and that *the affair of Sardinia*, and the *money extorted* at that time were the *principal cause* of it. And he now declares, that this *principal cause* is sufficient to justify the *Carthaginians*.

Our author nevertheless, in another part of his history, observes, that though *Hannibal* had a just motive to begin the war, and though he did begin it from that just motive, yet because he did not publickly assign that motive for beginning it, but made use of a false pretext, his enterprize seemed contrary to justice. After relating the haughty and evasive *answer of Hannibal* to the first ambassadors that were sent to him from *Rome*, he adds,

See p. 214.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 15.

“ Thus *Hannibal*, transported by a violent hatred, acted in every thing without consulting his reason, and, instead of declaring the true motives of his proceeding, had recourse to false pretexts, after the manner of those, who, prepossessed by their passion, do what they have determined, without regard to equity or honour: Otherwise, had it not been better to have demanded of the *Romans* the restitution of *Sardinia*, and the money, which, during the weakness and distress of the *Carthaginian* republic, they had extorted from her, and, in case of refusal, to declare war against them? But as he concealed the true cause,

“ and

“ and made use of the *false pretext of injuries done to the Saguntines, he seemed to enter into that war without reason, and contrary to justice.*”

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

The reader observes, that *Polybius* here takes it for granted, that *Hannibal*, in attacking *Saguntum*, made war upon the *Romans*. Now *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians* denied that the treaty with *Lutatius* could be broke by the siege of *Saguntum*. They alledged, that, as the *Saguntines* were not allies of *Rome* at the time of making that treaty, they could not be comprehended in it. *Polybius* indeed thinks, that *future* allies as well as *present* ought to be understood to be comprehended in that treaty; and so said the *Romans*. But what then? It was surely a point that might well bear a debate. Yet the *Roman* ambassadors (as we have seen) would enter into no discussion of this matter with the *Carthaginians*, but, upon their refusal to give up *Hannibal* as having unjustly violated that treaty by the siege of *Saguntum*, declared war.

And this makes it difficult to conceive why *Polybius*, on the present occasion, mentions the treaty with *Asdrubal*; that treaty, according to him, relating only to the *Carthaginians* passing the *Iberus*, which river *Hannibal* did not attempt to pass till after the declaration of war by the *Romans*. *Polybius* never speaks of the *Saguntines* as concerned in that treaty, but says expressly, that, when it was concluded, *no mention was made in it of any other part of Spain*, i. e. of any part on the south of that river; consequently no mention of the * *Saguntines*.

Polyb. B.
2. c. 13.
* B. 3. 19.
Liv. B. 21.
c. 18.

Livy

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Conf.

Sir W. R.

Livy indeed tells us, that the *Saguntines* were included in the treaty with *Asdrubal*, and makes the *Carthaginians* confess it; which, if true, we must suppose that a new article in favour of the *Saguntines* was inserted into that treaty, after *Rome* had entered into an alliance with them.

Livy adds, that the *Carthaginians*, in their conference with the *Roman* ambassadors, would have evaded the obligation of the treaty with *Asdrubal*, by saying ^m, that it was concluded by him without authority from *Carthage*, and that, in paying no regard to it, they did but follow the example of the *Romans*, who had refused to abide by the first treaty of *Lutatius* in *Sicily*, for the like reason. Doubtless, if the *Carthaginians* employed this subterfuge, it was weak and trifling, because, (as the same author, from *Polybius*, observes) in the treaty of *Lutatius* this clause was added, *That it should be firm and inviolable, if ratified by the people of Rome*; but in *Asdrubal's* treaty there was no proviso of like import.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 29.

^m *Livy*, in making the *Carthaginians* use this plea at the time of the conference in question, seems to found himself on *Polybius*; and perhaps *Polybius* ought to be so understood: But as the *Greek* historian tells us, that the *Carthaginian* orator past over the treaty of *Asdrubal* in silence, as if no such treaty had ever been made, or, if made, was nothing to the purpose; I imagine, that the plea abovementioned was not employed at the time of the conference; but that afterwards, when they used to speak of the justice of their cause, they urged among other things the nullity of *Asdrubal's* treaty: For, as *Polybius* relates, the *Roman* Ambassadors did not, at their audience in the *Carthaginian* senate, object that treaty, nor set forth their rights, or pretensions of right, till after the war was begun. B. 3. c. 29.

Chap. XVI. *Second Punic War.*

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Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Cons.

But it is possible that *Asdrubal* might make an absolute treaty, and yet have no authority for so doing. At least, it was a common practice with the *Roman* generals, to make such treaties; and it was as common with the *Roman* Senate to break them, as having been concluded without sufficient authority.

To return to the main question, the justice of the war made by *Hannibal*:

It is plain that if the treaty of *Sicily* could not be construed to extend to future allies as well as present; and if *Asdrubal's* treaty was made without sufficient authority from *Carthage*, (both which the *Carthaginians* pleaded) there can be no pretence to charge *Hannibal* with beginning a war against *Rome*, by his attacking *Saguntum*.

But let us suppose, with the *Romans*, that the *Saguntines* were unquestionably within the treaty of *Sicily*; and also, that *Asdrubal*, in his treaty, acted with ample authority. What will follow? Not, that the second *Punic* war is to be imputed to the injustice of *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians*, or that they were the first violators of the treaty of peace between the two nations. No: The *Romans* had scandalously violated that treaty by their seizure of *Sardinia*, and extortion of the 1200 talents; and all conventions between *Rome* and *Carthage* following that first violence and breach of the peace, were no better than *Roman* injuries, as implying this menace, on the part of the *Romans*, *Do whatsoever we require; otherwise we will make war, without regard to our oath, which we have already broken.*

Sir W. R.

And

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Conf.

And as their engaging *Asdrubal* to covenant, that he would not pass the *Iberus*, was a new breach of the *peace of Sicily*, and a new insult upon *Carthage*; because *Rome* had as yet no foot in *Spain*, on the one side of that river, whereas *Carthage*, on the other side, held almost all the country: So the alliance, which the *Romans* made with the *Saguntines*, was in reality a breach of their treaty with *Asdrubal*. For the *Romans* could have no sort of colour for requiring that *Asdrubal* should not pass the *Iberus*, but an implicit covenant that this river should be a boundary, over which they themselves would not pass in any discovery or conquest by them intended to be made upon *Spain*; and that the *Carthaginians* should be free to push their conquests as far northward as to this limit. And so *Livy* says expressly, that by *Asdrubal's* treaty, *the river Iberus was to be the boundary between the two empires*. Only he adds (inconsistently with *Polybius's* account) that the *Saguntines* were included in that treaty.

B. 21. c. 2.

It would seem then that the *Carthaginians* were not obliged, by any treaties with *Rome*, or by any consideration of justice, to abstain from the war which *Hannibal* began. And as to that open declaration of his true motives, the want of which made his enterprize seem dishonourable, he could not have made that declaration without throwing a bar in the way to the execution of his main design, *the marching into Italy*. For by demanding the restitution of *Sardinia*, and of the 1200 talents, he would have discovered the

the extent of his meditated revenge, and would thereby have put the enemy on such preparations for war, as might have disappointed all his views of doing justice to his country. It was to avoid this inconvenience, that he would seem at first to have no design but against the *Saguntines*; and we find his policy had its effect: For the *Romans* (as has been observed) had not the least apprehension of his intending so soon to invade *Italy*, but imagined that the seat of the war, they should have with him, would be in *Spain*.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 16.

C H A P. XVII.

The march of Hannibal, from the Iberus in Spain, to the Po in Italy: and how the Roman arms were employed in the mean time.

First Year of the War.

HANNIBAL, having passed the *Iberus*, subdued in a short time all those parts of *Spain*, which he had not before entered, and which lie between that river and the *Pyrenees*. His successes however cost him many hard conflicts in which he lost abundance of men. Of this newly conquered country he appointed one *Hanno* to be governor, instructing him to have a particular watch over the *Bargusians*, of whom he had the greatest jealousy on account of the friendship they had contracted with the *Romans*. And for the support of his government, he left under his command 10,000 foot and 1000 horse; and he

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 35. & seq.
Liv. B. 21.
c. 23. & seq.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

committed likewise to his keeping all the heavy baggage of the main army, who left it behind them, that they might march light and disencumbered.

Being arrived at the borders of *Spain*, 3000 of his *Spanish* soldiers, (not so much for fear of the war, as of the fatigue of so long a march, and of passing over the *Alps*) returned home without asking leave; which that others might not also do or attempt, he courteously dismissed above 7000 more, who seemed willing to be gone; a condescension that made the journey seem less tedious to those that did follow him, as not being enforced by compulsion. His army consisted now of but 50,000 foot and 9000 horse; but they were good men, and had been long trained, and in continual action during the wars in *Spain*, under the ablest captains that *Carthage* could ever boast. With these he passed the *Pyrenees* and entered into *Gaul*. He found the *Gauls*, that bordered upon *Spain*, ready in arms to forbid his entrance into their country. However by gentle words and rich presents to the leaders, he gained them over to favour his expedition, which he assured them was not designed against them; and he continued his march without any dangerous molestation, till he arrived upon the banks of the *Rhone*.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 42.

Here he bought up from the *Gauls*, (who, on the west side of the river, favoured his passage for money and to get rid of him) all the boats large and small he could meet with, whereof the inhabitants, practising commerce, had a

great number; and he also amassed prodigious quantities of timber for making floats, of which the soldiers, labouring in that employment with great diligence, in two days time made abundant provision. Nevertheless the *Carthaginian* found that it would be impossible to compass his passage without some stratagem, because of the opposition of the *Gauls* on the east side the river, who, in great multitudes, had determined to defend their bank. Wherefore, after three days deliberation, he in the night detached an officer named *Hanno* with a considerable part of the army, to go a good way up the river, then cross it, and endeavour to get behind the enemy. *Hanno* passed the stream about 25 miles from the *Carthaginian* camp, made silent marches towards the camp of the *Gauls*, and, in the morning after the fifth night, by smoke in several places, (the appointed signal) gave notice of his approach to *Hannibal*, who thereupon immediately began to attempt his passage. He put into the larger boats a part of his cavalry, ready for action. The horses of the rest, which could not be embarked, swam in tow after the small boats, one man, on each side of a boat, holding three or four horses by the bridles. The horsemen and the infantry went in small vessels and on floats; and that their passage might be the easier, the largest vessels were so disposed, a little higher up the stream, as to break the force of the current. When the *Gauls* perceived the *Carthaginians* advancing on the river, they by dreadful howlings, (according to their custom,)

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 43.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

signified, that they waited the attack with resolution. But when they heard a great noise behind them, saw their tents on fire, and themselves assailed in rear, as well as front, they made but a short resistance. Vanquished and broken, they fled every man to his own village.

See p. 222.
Polyb. B. 3.
c. 40.

It has been already observed, that the *Romans*, without waiting the return of their ambassadors from *Carthage*, had ordered the Consul *P. Cornelius Scipio* into *Spain*, and *Tib. Sempronius* into *Sicily*, from whence he was to go into *Africa*.

c. 41. & 42.

* *Genoa*.

Cornelius, though, before he set out, the news arrived that *Hannibal* had passed the *Iberus*, was still in hopes he should be able to hinder him from marching out of *Spain*. For this end having embarked his forces at *Pisa*, on board the fleet of sixty galleys, which had been assigned him, he steered along the coast of *Liguria* *, and in five days arrived at *Marseilles*. Learning here that *Hannibal* had already passed the *Pyrenees*, he proceeded no further in his voyage than to the nearest mouth of the *Rhone*, where he landed his men, with intention to wait for the enemy on the banks of that river, and there put a stop to their further progress. The difficulties of the way from the *Pyrenees*, and the divers nations, through which *Hannibal* was to make his passage, induced the Consul to conclude, that he was yet a great way off. The *Carthaginian* however was at this time actually employed in passing the *Rhone*, at the distance of about four days march † from the sea. The Consul heard a report of this; but it seemed so incredible, that

† A little above *Avignon*.

that he could not believe it. Nevertheless, thinking it adviseable to endeavour after such intelligence as he might rely on, while the army lay to refresh themselves after the fatigue of their voyage, he commanded out 300 chosen horse to make *discovery*, giving them, for guides, some *Gauls* in the service of *Marseilles*.

This detachment met with a party of 500 *Numidian* horse, not far from the *Carthaginian* camp. For *Hannibal*, the next morning after his passage, and while his men were wafting over the elephants, having received intelligence of the Consul's arrival at the mouth of the *Rhone*, had sent this party out to bring him an account of the strength and situation of the enemy. The conflict between the *Romans* and *Numidians* was very bloody, an hundred and sixty of the former were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of the latter. The *Romans* had the honour of the day, forcing the *Numidians* to quit the field, and pursuing them so near their entrenchments as to be eye-witnesses of what they were sent to learn. After which they returned with all diligence to carry the news to the Consul.

Hannibal, while these things passed, was giving audience, in the presence of his whole army, to *Magilus* a *Gallic* Prince, who was come to him from the countries about the *Po*. *Magilus* (with whom the *Carthaginian* had before had a private conference) assured him by an interpreter, that the *Gauls* impatiently expected his arrival, and were ready to join him; and that he himself would be the guide to conduct the army through

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 29.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 45.

c. 44.

Y. R. 535.
 Bef. Chr.
 217.
 234 Conf.

places, where they would find every thing necessary, and by a road, which would bring them speedily and safely into *Italy*. When the Prince was withdrawn, *Hannibal* in a speech to his troops reminded them of all their exploits to that time, and of the success they had met with in every occasion of danger, by following his counsels. He exhorted them to continue their confidence in him, and to fear nothing for the future; since having passed the *Rhone*, and secured such good allies as they found the *Gauls* to be, the greatest obstacles to their enterprize were now surmounted. The soldiers applauded all he said, expressing great willingness, and even ardour, to follow him whithersoever he should lead the way. He commended their good dispositions, made vows to the Gods for the preservation of all his troops, admonished them to refresh themselves well, and prepare to march next day, and then dismissed the assembly.

Polyb. B. 3.
 c. 45.

Just at this time the *Numidians*, who had survived the skirmish, returned with an account of their adventure. *Hannibal*, as he had before resolved, broke up his camp, the next morning as soon as it was day, and posting his horse as a body of reserve, a little down the river, ordered his infantry to march. He himself staid behind, waiting the arrival of the elephants that were not yet all waisted over the stream.

c. 46.

The method of doing it was this. From the bank of the river they threw a large float of timber, which, being strongly held by great ropes twisted about some trees, they covered over with earth,

earth, that the elephants might be deceived by this appearance, and take it for firm ground. At the end of this first float was fastened a second, but so, as it might be easily loosened from it. The female elephants were brought upon the first float, the males followed them; and when they were all got upon the second float, this was loosened from the first, and by the help of small boats towed to the opposite shore. It does not appear how many of these animals were transported at a time. But when the first were landed, the float was sent back to fetch others, and so on till the whole number was brought over. Some of them being unruly fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore; not a single elephant was drowned, though some of their conductors were.

And now *Hannibal*, making his horse and elephants the rear-guard to his infantry, marched along the banks of the river *northward**, (though that was not the shortest way to the *Alps*,) being resolved to avoid an engagement with *Scipio*, that he might lead his troops as entire as possible into *Italy*.

Scipio, upon the information brought him by his *discoverers*, having immediately ordered all the baggage on board his ships, was coming by long marches with his whole army to attack the *Carthaginians*; but he did not arrive at the place where *Hannibal* had passed the *Rhone*, till three days after he was gone from thence. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he made haste back to his fleet, embarked his army, dispatched his

Y.R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

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* Polybins
(c. 47) says
Eastward,
but this a-
grees not
with the
context.
Liv. B. 21.
c. 31.
Polyb. B.
3. c. 49.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

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brother *Cneius* with the greatest part of it into *Spain*, to carry the war into that country, and set sail himself for *Italy*, in hopes, by the way of *Hetruria*, to reach the foot of the *Alps* before *Hannibal* could arrive there.

The *Carthaginian* after four days march arrived in a country which, from its situation, was called *the Island*, being washed on two sides by the *Rbone*, and another^m river which runs into

^m It has been much disputed whether this *other river* was the *Arar*, [now called the *Saone*,] or the *Isara*, [the *Iser*.]

“ The text of *Polybius*, says *Mons. Rollin*, as it has been
“ transmitted to us, and that of *Livy*, place this island at
“ the conflux of the *Rbone* and the *Saone*, that is, in the
“ place where the city of *Lyons* now stands. But this is
“ a manifest error. It was, in the Greek, *Σαῶνας*, instead
“ of which *ὁ Ἀραρός* has been substituted. *J. Granovius*
“ says, that he had seen in a manuscript of *Livy*, *Bisarat*,
“ which shews, that we are to read *Isara*, “ *Rhodanusque*
“ *amnes*, instead of *Arar*, *Rhodanusque*; and that the island
“ in question is formed by the conflux of the *Isara* and the
“ *Rbone*.”

Chevalier Folard, who knows perfectly well the road from the place where *Hannibal* passed the *Rbone* (which is agreed to be between *Orange* and *Avignon*) to *Lyons*; and who also knows perfectly well what an army like *Hannibal's* is capable of doing, maintains, that it was absolutely impossible for it to march to *Lyons* in four days, it being 35 leagues; and, though he does not omit the reasons brought by *Mr. Rollin*, he lays the main stress of his argument (in behalf of the *Iser*) on the length and badness of the way to the *Saone*, there being three rivers to pass, and almost the whole way being through defiles.

I know not whether some aid to this cause might not be drawn from the time employed in *Scipio's* march, who was so eager to come up with the *Carthaginians*, and give them battle.

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into that. Its form is triangular, and resembles the *Delta of Egypt*, with this difference, that the country

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Bef. Chr.

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234 Cons.

battle. It is said that he did not arrive at the place where *Hannibal* had passed the *Rhone*, till three days after he was gone from thence. Now it is reasonable to suppose that he began his march the very same morning that *Hannibal* began his; the skirmish between the parties having happened the morning before, and there being time enough for *Scipio* to receive intelligence by his scouts where the enemy was: and though, to get to that place, he had not half the way to make, that *Hannibal* had, to reach *Lyons*, it cost him, with all his expedition, three days march.

On the decision of this question, another is made very much to depend, *Over what part of the Alps the Carthaginian army passed into Italy? Whether over the Alpes Penninæ, that stand a good way to the north of Turin, or over the Alpes Cottinæ, that stand a little to the west of that city?* *Livy* is for the latter, and wonders that this fact should ever be questioned, since it is agreed that the part of *Italy* which *Hannibal* first entered, was the territory of the *Taurini*, [the people of *Turin*] into which country the other passage would not have brought him; nor does he believe that passage was then open. He tells us also that the army crossed the *Durance*, in its way to the mountains, which agrees very well with the opinion of it's going over the *Alpes Cottinæ*, as may be seen by the maps. But the rest of *Livy's* account does not well accord with these particulars, nor indeed with common sense.

Chevalier Folard, who is well acquainted with the *Alps*, and all the roads thither, is sure, that *Hannibal* went the shortest road, from the country of prince *Bernicus* to *Turin*; not only because it was the shortest, but because it was the safest and the best. He won't allow, that *Hannibal* went so far northward, along the banks of the *Rhone*, as even to the conflux of that river and the *Isere*. He says, there was no occasion to do it, on account of any danger, either from *Scipio* or any allies of *Rome*. According to the chevalier, *Hannibal*, leaving *Grenoble* on his left, passed the *Drac* [which

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country here spoken of, is bounded on it's third side by high mountains, whereas the *Delta*, which the

[which runs into the *Ifere*] over against *Vizille*. Thence he successively marched to *Bourg d'Oisons*, *Le Mont de Lens*, *Le Lautaret*, *Briançon*, *Le Mont Genevre*, *Sezanne*, *Le Mont Se-frieres*, *Suze*, *Col de la Fenestre*, and *Pignerol*; at a small distance from which last he encamped in the plains.

THE fathers *Catrou* and *Rouillé* differ from the chevalier on both these questions. According to them, *Hannibal* crossed the *Rhone*, at its conflux with the *Saone*, and then turning eastward marched along the *Rhone*, on its north-side; then crossed it again, marching on its south-side to the *Durance*, (which they suppose to be *Livy's Durance*) and thence to the foot of the *Alpes Penninæ*, which they passed, by the *Great St. Bernard*.

As to the objection of the 35 leagues march, in four days, they think it is sufficient to say, that *Hannibal* was in haste to get out of *Scipio's* way.

† Cluve-
rius.

And as to Σκωρας [*Scoras*] (the supposed † antient name of the *Ifere*) "It can only impose, say they, on those who don't know that the *Saone* was antiently called *Scona*, and by corruption *Saucona*. *Ammianus Marcellinus* calls it so, and it had the name of *Matifcona*, because *Macon* is situated upon its banks. So that here is correction for correction. Is it not more natural and more probable that *Scoras* should be changed into *Sconas*, than that *Scoras* should be changed into *Ifaras*?"

* B. 3. c.
47.

But the main strength of their argument is from *Polybius*, who tells us *, that *Hannibal* continued his march along the *Rhone* EASTWARD. "Now, say the reverend Fathers, it is evident by a cast of an eye on the map, that if the *Carthaginian* army marched up the *Rhone* from west to east, it must first have marched along it as far as to *Lyons*." The necessity of this consequence I don't see. However, much doubtless might be built on this passage of *Polybius*, if we did not meet with it at a time when it is impossible it should be true; but it is just when *Hannibal* is setting

the Nile washes on two sides, is bounded on the third by the sea.

Here he found two brothers disputing for the kingdom, and the nation engaged in a civil war. The two armies were just ready to give battle when *Hannibal* arrived. At the request of

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Polyb. B. 3.

c. 49.

Livy, B. 21.

c. 31.

setting out to go NORTHWARD along the river, and even 35 leagues northward, if he went to the conflux of the Rhone and the Saone. Casaubon seems to have been shocked at this inconsistency; for in his translation he has neglected the words *παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν* (along the river.)

As to the PASSAGE OF THE ALPS, "There are six reasons, say the Jesuits, which incline us to believe that *Hannibal* crossed the Alps by the Great St. Bernard, [one of the *Alpes Penninae*.]"

I shall mention only three of them.

"1. *Livy* and *Polybius* say, that this general, to encourage his troops, shewed them from the top of the mountain the rich plains of *Italy* that lay near the *Po*. Now supposing he had marched by the *Alpes Cottiae*, as *Livy* pretends, he could not possibly from thence discover those plains; other mountains would have intercepted his view."

"2. *Polybius* reckons 1400 stadia, or about 175 miles from the place where *Hannibal* passed the *Rhone* to the foot of those Alps which he ascended to go into *Italy*. And if we say with *Livy*, that he passed any of the *Alpes Cottiae*, it is impossible to make out that distance."

"3. *Polybius* tells us, that *Hannibal* passed the Alps near the place where the *Rhone* rises. Consequently he passed over the *Alpes Penninae*."

These reasons seem decisive, as to the passage of the Alps, (whatever becomes of Scoras, and the 35 leagues march) Polybius's authority being unquestionable, since, as he tells us, he made a journey on purpose to visit the places where Hannibal had passed, that he might be the better able to give an account of them.

the

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Bef. Chr.

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the elder brother (named *Brancus*) he assisted him, and forced the younger to retire. *Hannibal* had foreseen, that it would be very advantageous to him to have the friendship of a prince of this country; and he immediately reaped many benefits from it. The *Gaul* furnished his troops, not only with provisions and arms, but with clothes; for they were in a tattered condition, most of them barefoot, and very ill provided for a march over the snows and ice of the mountains. But the most essential service he did was by putting his troops in the rear of *Hannibal's* army, (which could not without great dread enter the territories of the *Gauls* called *Allobroges*) and escorting it to the place where it was to ascend the *Alps*.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 50.

Hannibal, thus attended, marched 100 miles in ten days without molestation. So long as he was in the flat country the petty princes of the *Allobroges* made no opposition to his progress, either fearing the *Carthaginian* cavalry, or being held in respect by the *Gauls* that were in the rear of the army. But when these had retired to go home, and the *Carthaginians* began to ascend the mountains, they perceived that the mountaineers had possessed themselves of the highest cliffs that commanded the streight through which the army was to pass, with a resolution to oppose its passage. Here *Hannibal* therefore was obliged to make a halt and encamp. Had the mountaineers, says *Polybius*, concealed their designs till the *Carthaginian* army was advanced a good way into the narrow passes, it had been inevitably

tably destroyed. *Hannibal* having learnt by the means of some of those *Gauls*, who served him for guides, that the enemy quitted their posts every night, retiring to a town not far off, he took his opportunity with a detachment of his best men (leaving the greatest part of his forces with the baggage) to advance by night and seize those posts, before the return of the *Barbarians*; who in the morning were extremely surprized to find themselves thus dispossessed. However, as they perceived the cavalry and beasts of burden moving forward in the streights at a great distance, they ran thither and fell with fury upon the rear-guard of the army. The *Carthaginians* suffered a great loss of men, horses, and beasts of burden upon this occasion; which destruction was owing more to the difficulty of the passage, than the swords of the enemy. For the horses, when wounded by the mountaineers, or frightened by their howlings, rushed upon the beasts of burden, oversetting them and every thing else that stood in their way, and hurrying all down the precipices that bordered the road.

Hannibal being sensible, that the loss of his baggage would alone be sufficient to destroy his army, hastened with his detachment to the succour of the troops that were thus embarrassed. Falling on the enemy from the higher ground he slew most of them, and put the rest to flight, yet not without sustaining considerable loss of men himself. What remained of his horses and beasts of burden now passed the streight, but with much difficulty, because of the ruggedness of the way.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

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Polyb. B. 3.
c. 51.

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Bef. Chr.

217.

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way. After which, taking with him those of his men who were the least fatigued with the combat, he attacked the town, from whence the enemy had sallied upon him, and he easily made himself master of it, the inhabitants having been almost all drawn out of it by the hopes of plunder. This conquest proved of great advantage to him. For he recovered a good number of men, horses, and beasts of carriage which had fallen into the enemies hands. He also found a sufficient quantity of corn and cattle to sustain his army for two or three days. And he gained this farther benefit, that the mountaineers of these parts were now so struck with dread, that they thought no more of interrupting his march.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 52.

Here he encamped and staid a whole day to refresh his troops. He then pursued his march, which for some days was unmolested. On the fourth, the people inhabiting the places near the road, having contrived a stratagem to attack him by surprize, came to meet him with olive branches and garlands, the usual signals of peace among these nations. *Hannibal*, mistrusting them, was very inquisitive concerning the intention of their coming. They told him, that having been informed of what had happened to their neighbours, and being themselves unwilling either to do or to suffer any injury, they were come to assure him of their peaceable dispositions; of which if he doubted they would give him hostages, for his security.

Hannibal was for a while in suspense what resolution to take: But considering that if he accepted

cepted their offer with condescension, they might possibly become more easy and tractable, and that, if he rejected it, he should have them immediately for open enemies, he at length pretended a great willingness to be upon terms of friendship with them.

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Bef. Chr.

217.

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Upon which they brought him hostages, furnished him with cattle, and seemed to place entire confidence in the *Carthaginians*. *Hannibal* seeing this, and either having, or seeming to have a better opinion of them, told them, they should be his guides to conduct him through the remaining part of his way over the mountains. Thus for two days they marched at the head of the army. But when it was got into a hollow way, overlooked by steep and craggy rocks, these faithless friends, in concert with others of their countrymen who had lain concealed, fell suddenly upon the troops in front, flank and rear. The greatest number attacked the rear. The army would have been utterly destroyed, says *Polybius*, if *Hannibal*, who all along retained some diffidence of these Barbarians, had not taken his precautions to guard against them, by placing his baggage and his cavalry in the van, and his heavy armed infantry in the rear-guard. These sustained the shock of the enemy. Nevertheless he lost a great number of men, horses, and beasts of burden. For the *Gauls* having possessed themselves of the cliffs, and advancing thereon as the *Carthaginians* advanced in the hollow way, rolled down upon them huge stones, which occasioned an exceeding terror among them.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 53.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

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them. *Hannibal* was obliged, with one half of his army, to remain all night in the open air, upon a rock, to defend the horses and beasts of carriage, as they filed along through the streight below; for which movement that night was hardly sufficient, the train was of such a length.

The next day, the enemy being retired, *Hannibal* rejoined his horse and baggage, and continued his march. The *Gauls* after this made no more attempts upon him, except in small parties, that, sallying out by surprize from their lurking places in the hollows of the rocks, sometimes upon his van, sometimes upon his rear, seldom failed to carry off a part of his baggage, which was their chief purpose. The elephants were of great use to the *Carthaginians* on these occasions, for where-ever they chanced to appear, they struck such a terror into the mountaineers as made them instantly take to their heels.

Hannibal at length, after nine days march from the first ascent, gained the summit of the mountain. Here he staid two days, that those of his men, who with infinite toil had climbed to this height, might take breath; and that his sick and wounded, who were still behind and moving slowly on, might have time to crawl up. And *Polybius* adds, that while the troops continued here, they had the agreeable surprize of seeing many of the horses and beasts of burden which had fallen in the way, or had by fear been driven out of it, and were thought lost, arrive safely at the camp, having followed the track of the army.

It

It was now about the end of autumn, and abundance of snow was newly fallen on the top of the mountain. *Hannibal* perceiving his soldiers to be extremely discouraged by the sufferings they had already undergone, and by the apprehension of those that were to come, called them together, that he might try to revive their hope. Having led them to a convenient spot for taking an extensive view of the plains below; "There! *said he*, cast your eyes over those large and fruitful countries. The *Gauls* who inhabit them are our friends. They are waiting for us, ready, and impatient to join us. You have scaled, not only the rampart of *Italy*, but the walls of *Rome* itself. What remains is all smoothness and descent. One battle gained, or two at most, and the capital of *Italy* will be ours."

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
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Polyb. B.
3. c. 54.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 35.

The next day he broke up his camp and began to descend. But now, though he had no enemies to encounter except a few lurking robbers, he is said to have lost almost as many men and horses in going down the mountain as in coming up. The way was so steep and slippery in most places, that the soldiers could neither keep on their feet, nor recover themselves when they slipped; and the ground being covered with snow, it was difficult to hit the right path, and if they missed it, they fell down frightful precipices, or were swallowed up in depths of snow. Nevertheless being inured to such dangers, they supported this with fortitude. But at length they came to a place much worse than any they

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Conf.Polyb. B.
3. c. 55.

had before met with, and which quite took away their courage. The path, for about a furlong and a half, naturally very steep and craggy, was rendered much more so by the late falling away of a great quantity of earth: so that neither elephants nor horses could pass. Here therefore they stopt short. *Hannibal* wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and having viewed it, plainly saw there was no advancing farther that way. His first thought was to try another, by fetching a compass. But he quickly desisted from this attempt, it being found impracticable. For though the snow that had last fallen, being soft and of no great depth, yielded good footing enough for the soldiers and horses that marched foremost; yet when this had been so trampled upon, by them, that the feet of those who followed came to the hard snow and ice under it, the latter could by no means advance, or even keep upon their feet. And when they endeavoured to sustain themselves on their hands and knees, they often slid down and were lost in pits and precipices. And as for the horses and beasts of burden, when they struck their feet into the ice to preserve themselves from falling, they could not draw them out again, but remained there as if they had been themselves frozen. It was necessary therefore to seek some other expedient.

Hannibal having caused all the snow to be removed that lay upon the ground near the entrance of the first way, he there pitched his camp; and then gave orders to cut out a wind-
ing

ing path in the ^a rock itself; and this work was carried on with so great diligence and vigour, that at the end of one day the beasts of burden and the horses were able to descend without much difficulty. He immediately sent them forward, and, removing his camp to a place that was free from snow, put them to pasture. It now remained to enlarge the way, that the elephants might pass. This task was assigned to the Numidians, and it took up so much time, that Hannibal did not arrive with his whole army in the plains below, on the confines of *Insubria*, till four days after he began to descend. He had been 15 days in passing the *Alps*, and, these included,

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Bef. Chr.

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^a Mr. Rollin seems very loth to part with *Livy's* VINEGAR, which was poured upon the rock to soften it, after this had been first made red hot under flaming piles of huge trees: "Many, says Mr. Rollin, reject this fact as fabulous. *Pliny* observes, that vinegar has the force to break stones and rocks. *Saxa rumpit infusum, quæ non ruperit ignis antecedens.* Lib. 23. For which reason he calls vinegar *Succus rerum domitor*. Lib. 33. c. 2. *Dio*, speaking of the siege of *Eleuthera*, says, that the walls of it were made to fall by the force of vinegar. L. 36. p. 8.

"It is likely, [apparentment] adds Mr. Rollin, what makes people question the truth of *Livy's* account, is the difficulty that *Hannibal* would have to procure in those mountains a sufficient quantity of vinegar for the operation." Doubtless the unbelievers do imagine this to be an insuperable objection to the story. But this is not all. For a better authority than *Livy* assures us, that *Hannibal* had no wood to make a fire with; That there was not a tree in the place where he then was, or near it. *Polybius*, B. 3. c. 55. Τὼν γὰρ Ἀλπίων τὰ μὲν ἀγρὰ, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβόλας ἀνηχοῖσιν, τελείως ἄδενδρα καὶ ψιλά παντ' ἐστὶ.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Car.

217.

234 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 56.

five months and a half in his march : (of about 1000 miles) from *New Carthage*.

Of the thirty-eight thousand foot with which the *Carthaginian* general had crossed the *Rhone*, he had now but 12,000 *Africans*, and 8000 *Spaniards*; and his eight thousand horse were reduced to about 6000. This enumeration is according to *Hannibal's* own register, which he afterwards caused to be engraved on a column near the promontory of *Lacinium* in *Calabria*.

c. 60.

* The people of *Taurini*.

His first care, after entering *Italy* and pitching his camp in the plain at the foot of the mountain, was to refresh his men, who stood in great need of it. Famine and fatigue had so disfigured them, that they looked like Savages. But as soon as he saw that both men and horses had recovered their strength, and were fit for action; he marched against the *Taurini**, who were at that time in war with the *Insubrians*, and who had rejected his repeated solicitations to enter into an alliance with him. He sat down before their chief city and took it in three days, putting all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck such a terror into the *Gauls* of this neighbourhood, that they came of their own accord and surrendered themselves at discretion. The remoter *Gauls* of the plains about the *Po* would have also been glad to join him, as they had long intended to do. But as the *Roman* legions had passed beyond those plains, and had escaped the ambushes there laid for them, these *Gauls* thought it better now to keep quiet; nay some of their nation were constrained to take arms for the

the *Romans*. *Hannibal* therefore judging that he had no time to lose, resolved to march into their country, and endeavour by some exploit to raise the courage of a people who were so well disposed to favour him.

He was full of this design when he received intelligence that *Scipio* had passed the *Po* with his army, and that he was not far off. The two Generals are said to have conceived a high opinion of each other. *Hannibal's* name had been long renowned, even before the taking of *Saguntum*; and, that *Scipio* must be a captain of eminent worth, the *Carthaginian* had well concluded, from the *Romans* having chosen him, preferably to all others, to be his opponent. But this mutual impression was now become much stronger, by the *bold enterprize* of the one to march over the *Alps*, with the *happy execution* of it: and the expeditious courage of the other in coming from the banks of the *Rhone*, to meet him, at the foot of those mountains.

But nothing had ever so astonished the people of *Rome*, as the news of the *Carthaginians* being so near. They had scarce ordered one of their Consuls into *Africa* to attack *Carthage*, and another into *Spain* to stop *Hannibal*, when they hear, that this same *Hannibal* is in *Italy* at the head of an army besieging towns. Such terror seized them, that they immediately dispatched an express to the Consul *Sempronius*, then at *Lilybæum*, to postpone every other affair, and come with all expedition to the defence of his country.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 61.

Livy, B. 21.
c. 39.

Y. R. 335.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234. Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.

c. 41. and

Liv. B. 21.

c. 49. &
seq.

Sempronius, to whom a considerable army, and a fleet of 160 gallies had been committed, and who had made mighty preparations at *Lilybæum* for a descent upon *Africa*, was so elated with ambitious hope, that he thought of nothing less than laying siege to *Carthage* itself, when he had first cleared the coasts of *Italy* and *Sicily* of the *Carthaginian* fleets: Before he went into *Sicily*, the *Roman* prætor of that province had gained some considerable advantages by sea over the *Carthaginians*, and had disappointed a design formed by them to possess themselves of *Lilybæum* by surprize. When the Consul arrived at *Messina*, he was there met by king *Hiero*, who, continuing his friendship to the *Romans*, not only clothed the legions and furnished them with corn at his own expence, but with his fleet accompanied theirs to *Lilybæum*. From this place *Sempronius* made a successful attempt upon the Island of *Malta*; a conquest which served to cover *Sicily* on that side. After which, being returned to *Lilybæum*, and having learnt there, that a *Carthaginian* fleet was ravaging the coasts of *Calabria*, he made preparations to drive the enemy from thence; but while he was getting ready for this expedition, he received the order above-mentioned to return into *Italy* to the assistance of his colleague. Hereupon he gave one part of his fleet to his lieutenant *Pomponius*, to guard the coast of *Italy*, another to *Æmilius* prætor of *Sicily*, and with the rest, having embarked his army, set sail for *Ariminum* in the *Adriatic*.

CHAP.

C H A P. XVIII.

The Battle of the TICIN.

WHILE the forces of *Sempronius* from Sicily were in their voyage, *Hannibal* and the Consul *Publius Scipio* were advancing to meet each other. *Scipio* (as was before * observed) had, from the mouth of the *Rhone*, sent almost all his own consular army, under the conduct of his brother *Cneius*, into *Spain*. The forces which he now commanded were chiefly the remains of an army † which had been assigned to the Prætor *Manlius*, to guard the province of *Gaul*, and which had since been defeated by the *Boii*.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.
* See p. 243,
244.

† See p.
222.

For these *Gauls* had no sooner heard of *Hannibal's* passing the *Iberus*, in his way to *Italy*, but, regardless of the hostages they had given at the conclusion of the last war with *Rome*, they rose in arms against her, and drew the *Insubrians* into the revolt. What made the *Boii* so forward in this matter, was their extreme dissatisfaction with the republic, for planting two colonies in their neighbourhood at *Placentia* and *Cremona*, an affair which, though long intended, was not quite finished when the *Carthaginian* began his march from *Spain*. The *Boii* fell first upon those lands which had been destined for the new colonies, pursuing the *Romans* who fled before them, to *Mutina* *, another *Roman* colony. In this place, which they besieged, were three *Romans* of great distinction, (one of them having been Consul, and the other

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 40.

* Modena.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.217.
234 Conf.Liv. B. 21.
c. 26.Polyb. B. 3.
c. 56.Liv. B. 21.
c. 39, & 40.

two, Prætors) who had been commissioned to make the partition of the lands. The *Gauls*, contrary to their faith given, seized upon the persons of these commissioners at a conference for an accommodation, hoping by this treachery to recover their hostages. The news of it roused the Prætor *Manlius*. He hastened to the relief of *Mutina*: But the *Gauls* having got notice of his approach, fell upon him by surprize, in his passage through a forest, and cut off a great part of his army, he himself narrowly escaping with the remainder to *Tanetum*, a small town on the banks of the *Po*. To this place the enemy pursued him, and there held him invested, till the Prætor *Attilius*, with a legion, that had been raised for *Spain*, and 5000 men of the allies, was sent from *Rome* to his assistance. Upon the approach of these troops the *Gauls* raised the sieges of both *Mutina* and *Tanetum*, and retiring thence dispersed themselves about the country,

The forces of *Manlius* and *Attilius*, which had been thus employed, composed the army, which *Scipio*, (who had landed at *Pisa*, and gone thence to *Placentia*) led against *Hannibal*. Having passed the *Po*, he turned to the left, and advanced to the *Ticin*^a, over which he caused a bridge to be laid. But before he marched further, he thought it proper to assemble his soldiers, and endeavour to animate their courage for the approaching occasion. He spoke to them in words to this effect.

^a A small River on the north side of the *Po*, and running into it.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

“ Were *you*, Soldiers, the same army, which
“ I had with me in *Gaul*, I might well forbear
“ saying any thing to you at this time. For,
“ what occasion could there be to use exhorta-
“ tion to a CAVALRY, that had so signally van-
“ quished the squadrons of the enemy upon
“ the *Rhone*; or to LEGIONS, by whom that
“ same enemy, flying before them to avoid a
“ battle, did in effect confess themselves con-
“ quered? But, as those troops, having been
“ enrolled for *Spain*, are there with my brother
“ *Cneius*, making war under my auspices (as was
“ the will of the Senate and people of *Rome*). I,
“ that you might have a Consul for your captain
“ against *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians*, have
“ freely offered myself for this war. *You* then
“ have a *new general*, and I a *new army*. In
“ this circumstance a few words from *me* to *you*
“ will be neither improper nor unseasonable.

“ And that you may not be unapprized of
“ what sort of enemies you are going to en-
“ counter, or of what is to be feared from them,
“ they are the very same, whom in a former
“ war, you vanquished both by land and sea;
“ the same from whom you took *Sicily* and *Sar-*
“ *dinia*, and who have been for these twenty
“ years your tributaries. You will not, I pre-
“ sume, march against *these* men with only that
“ courage, with which you are wont to face
“ other enemies, but with a certain anger and
“ indignation, such as you would feel, if you
“ saw your slaves on a sudden rise up in arms
“ against you. Conquered and enslaved, it is
“ not

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

“ not boldness but necessity that urges them to
“ battle: unless you can believe that those, who
“ avoided fighting when their army was entire,
“ have acquired better hope by the loss of two
“ thirds of their horse and foot, in the passage
“ of the *Alps*.

“ But you have heard perhaps, that, though
“ they be few in number, they are men of stout
“ hearts and robust bodies, heroes of such
“ strength and vigour, as nothing is able to re-
“ sist.—Meer effigies! nay shadows of men!
“ wretches emaciated with hunger, and be-
“ numbed with cold! bruised and battered to
“ pieces among the rocks and craggy cliffs!
“ their weapons broke, and their horses weak
“ and foundered! Such are the cavalry, and
“ such the infantry with which you are going
“ to contend; not enemies, but the fragments
“ of enemies. There is nothing which I more
“ apprehend, than that it will be thought, *Han-*
“ *nibal* was vanquished by the *Alps*, before we
“ had any conflict with him. But perhaps it
“ was fitting that so it should be; and that with
“ a people and a leader, who had violated
“ leagues and covenants, the Gods themselves,
“ without man's help, should begin the war, and
“ bring it near to a conclusion; and that we,
“ who, next to the Gods, have been injured
“ and offended, should happily finish what they
“ begun.

“ I need not be in any fear, that you should
“ suspect me of saying these things merely to en-
“ courage you, while inwardly I have different

“ sentiments. What hindered me from going
 “ into *Spain*? *That* was my province, where I
 “ should have had the less dreaded *Asdrubal*,
 “ not *Hannibal*, to deal with. But hearing, as
 “ I past along the coast of *Gaul*, of this ene-
 “ my’s march, I landed my troops, sent the
 “ Horse forward, and pitched my camp upon
 “ the *Rhone*. A part of my cavalry encountered
 “ and defeated that of the enemy; my infantry
 “ not being able to overtake theirs which fled
 “ before us, I returned to my fleet, and with all
 “ the expedition I could use in so long a voyage
 “ by sea and land, am come to meet them at
 “ the foot of the *Alps*. Was it then my incli-
 “ nation to avoid a contest with this tremen-
 “ dous *Hannibal*? And have I lit upon him only
 “ by accident and unawares? Or am I come on
 “ purpose to challenge him to the combat? I
 “ would gladly try, whether the earth, within
 “ these twenty years, has brought forth a new
 “ kind of *Carthaginians*; or whether they be the
 “ same sort of men who fought at the *Ægates*;
 “ and whom, at *Eryx*, you suffered to redeem
 “ themselves at 18 * *denarii* per head: Whether
 “ this *Hannibal*, for labours and journies, be,
 “ as he would be thought, the rival of *Hercules*;
 “ or whether he be what his father left him, a
 “ tributary, a vassal, a slave of the *Roman* people.
 “ Did not the consciousness of his wicked deed,
 “ at *Saguntum*, torment him and make him de-
 “ sperate, he would have some regard, if not to
 “ his conquered country, yet surely to his own
 “ family, to his father’s memory, to the treaty
 “ written

Y. R. 535.
 Bef. Chr.
 217.
 234 Conf.

* 11s. 7d. $\frac{1}{2}$
 Arbuth.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.217.
234 Conf.

" written with *Amilcar's* own hand. We might
 " have starved them in *Eryx*; we might have
 " passed into *Africa* with our victorious fleet,
 " and in a few days have destroyed *Carthage*.
 " At their humble supplication we pardoned
 " them; we released them when they were close-
 " ly shut up without a possibility of escaping;
 " we made peace with them when they were
 " conquered. When they were distressed by the
 " *African* war, we considered them, we treated
 " them as a people under our protection. And
 " what is the return they make us for all these
 " favours? Under the conduct of a hair-brained
 " young man, they come hither to overturn our
 " state and lay waste our country.—I could wish
 " indeed, that it were not so; and that the war
 " we are now engaged in, concerned only our
 " glory and not our preservation. But the con-
 " test at present is not for the possession of *Si-*
 " *cily* or *Sardinia*, but of *Italy* itself. Nor is
 " there, behind us, another army which, if we
 " should not prove the conquerors, may make
 " head against our victorious enemies. There
 " are no more *Alps* for them to pass, which
 " might give us leisure to raise new forces. No,
 " Soldiers, here you must make your stand, as
 " if you were just now before the walls of *Rome*.
 " Let every one reflect, that he is now to de-
 " fend, not his own person alone, but his wife,
 " his children, his helpless infants. Yet let not
 " private considerations alone possess our minds;
 " let us remember that the eyes of the Senate
 " and people of *Rome* are upon us, and that as
 " our

I. by 211
A. d. 211

“ our force and courage shall now prove, such
“ will be the fortune of that City, and of the
“ *Roman* empire.”

V. R. 335.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

This discourse, supported by the authority of the speaker, the certainty of some things he had said, and the probability of others, had the wished for effect on the minds of the hearers.

On the other side, *Hannibal* made use of a new kind of rhetoric to inspire his soldiers with resolution. He had taken prisoners, some young men of the mountaineers who opposed his march over the *Alps*; and, to prepare them for his purpose, had caused them to be treated in the severest manner, loaded with irons, tormented with hunger, and macerated with stripes. In this miserable condition he had them brought into the presence of his whole army; where, shewing them such weapons as the *Gallic* Princes were accustomed to use in single combat, and placing also before their eyes horses and handsome suits of apparel, he demanded, Who of them would be willing, with those weapons, to fight in duel one against another, to the death of one of the duellists, on the condition, that the victor should have his liberty, and the prizes they beheld? There was not a single wretch of these prisoners, who did not instantly and eagerly call out for the arms; for, at worst, they were sure of this advantage, to be by death delivered from all their miseries. *Hannibal* hereupon directed that they should draw lots for entering the lists. At the hearing of this order, all the young men lifted up their hands to heaven, each conjuring the

Polyb. B.
3. c. 62.
Livy, B. 21.
c. 42 & seq.

V. R. 835.

Bef. Chr.

277.

294. Conf.

the Gods that he might be of the number of the combatants; and all those, whose fortune it proved to be so, exceedingly rejoiced and exulted, while the rest were as much dejected.

When these duels were over, those of the prisoners who had been only spectators seemed to envy the conquered, no less than they did the conquerors.

The spectacle had made the like impression on the greater part of the *Carthaginians*, who comparing the fortune of the dead with that of the living, who had not fought, compassionated these, and thought the others happy.

Hannibal, having thus brought his soldiers to the temper and disposition he desired, advanced into the midst of them, and then spoke in the following manner.

“ If in the estimation of your own fortune,
 “ you will but bear the same mind which you
 “ just now did, in contemplating the fortune of
 “ others, the victory, Soldiers, is ours. What
 “ you have seen, was not a meer shew for amuse-
 “ ment, but a representation of your own real
 “ condition. I know not whether you or your
 “ prisoners be encompassed by fortune with the
 “ stricter bonds and necessities. Two seas in-
 “ close you on the right and left;—not a ship to
 “ fly to, for escaping. Before you is the *Po*, a ri-
 “ ver broader and more rapid than the *Rhone*;
 “ behind you are the *Alps*, over which, even
 “ when your numbers were undiminished, you
 “ were hardly able to force a passage. Here,
 “ then, Soldiers, you must either conquer or die,
 “ the

“ the very first hour you meet the enemy. But
 “ the same fortune which has thus laid you un-
 “ der the necessity of fighting, has set before
 “ your eyes those rewards of victory, than which
 “ no men are ever wont to wish for greater from
 “ the immortal Gods. Should we by our va-
 “ lour recover only *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, which
 “ were ravished from our fathers, those would
 “ be no inconsiderable prizes. Yet, what are
 “ those? The wealth of *Rome*, whatever riches
 “ she has heaped together from the spoils of na-
 “ tions, all these, with the masters of them, will
 “ be yours. You have been long enough em-
 “ ployed in driving the cattle upon the vast
 “ mountains of *Lusitania* and *Celtiberia*; you
 “ have hitherto met with no reward worthy of
 “ the labours and dangers you have undergone.
 “ The time is now come to reap the full re-
 “ compence of your toilsome marches over so
 “ many mountains and rivers, and through so
 “ many nations, all of them in arms. This is
 “ the place, which fortune has appointed to be
 “ the limit of your labours; it is here that you
 “ will finish your glorious warfare, and receive
 “ an ample recompence of your completed ser-
 “ vice. For I would not have you imagine that
 “ victory will be as difficult as the name of a
 “ ROMAN WAR is great and sounding. It has
 “ often happened that a despised enemy has
 “ given a bloody battle, and the most renowned
 “ kings and nations have by a small force been
 “ overthrown. And if you but take away that
 “ glitter of the *Roman* name, what is there,
 “ wherein

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Conf.

“ wherein they may stand in competition with
 “ *you*? For, (to say nothing of your service in
 “ war for twenty years together with so much
 “ valour and success) from the very pillars of
 “ *Hercules*, from the ocean, from the utmost
 “ bounds of the earth, through so many warlike
 “ nations of *Spain* and *Gaul*, are you not come
 “ hither victorious? And with whom are you
 “ now to fight? with raw soldiers, an undisc-
 “ ciplined army, beaten, vanquished, besieged
 “ by the *Gauls* the very last summer, an army
 “ unknown to their leader, and unacquainted
 “ with him.

“ Or shall *I*, who, I might almost say, was
 “ *born*, but certainly *brought*^b up in the tent of
 “ my father, that most excellent general, shall
 “ *I*, the conqueror of *Spain* and *Gaul*, and not
 “ only of the *Alpine* nations, but, which is greater
 “ yet, of the *Alps* themselves, shall I compare
 “ myself with this half-year-captain? A captain
 “ before whom should one place the two armies,
 “ without their ensigns, I am persuaded he would
 “ not know to which of them he is *Consul*? I
 “ esteem it no small advantage, Soldiers, that
 “ there is not *one* among you, who has not often
 “ been an eye-witness of my exploits in war; not
 “ *one*, of whose valour, I myself have not been a
 “ spectator, so as to be able to name the times
 “ and places of his noble achievements; that
 “ with soldiers, whom I have a thousand times
 “ praised and rewarded, and whose pupil I was,

^b Here we have another proof from *Livy* himself of his own
 inadvertency in delivering the idle story mentioned, p. 211.

before

" before I became their general, I shall march
" against an army of men strangers to one ano-
" ther.

" On what side soever I turn my eyes, I be-
" hold all full of courage and strength; a ve-
" teran infantry, a most gallant cavalry^c; you,
" my allies, most faithful and valiant; you,
" *Carthaginians*, whom not only your country's
" cause, but the justest anger impels to battle.
" The hope, the courage of assailants is always
" greater, than of those who act upon the de-
" fensive. With hostile banners displayed you
" are come down upon *Italy*; you bring the
" war. Grief, injuries, indignities fire your
" mind, and spur you forward to revenge.—
" First they demand *me*, that I, your General,
" should be delivered up to them; next, *all you*,
" who had fought at the siege of *Saguntum*; and
" we were to be put to death by the extrem-
" est tortures. Proud and cruel nation! Every
" thing must be yours, and at your disposal?
" You are to prescribe to us, with whom we
" shall make war, with whom we shall make
" peace? You are to set us bounds, to shut us
" up within hills and rivers; but *you*, you are
" not to observe the limits which yourselves have
" fixed^d? *Pass not the IBERUS*. What next?

" *Touch*

^c *Livy's* Expression is, *Generosissimarum gentium equites
frænatos & infrænatos*, horsemen that ride with bridles, and
those that ride without bridles, by the latter meaning the *Nu-
midians*, who had no bridles nor saddles to their horses, and
who in action resembled the modern *Hussars*.

^d By the words which *Livy* here puts into the mouth
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Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217

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“ *Touch not the SAGUNTINES; SAGUNTUM* * is
“ *upon the IBERUS; move not a step towards that*
“ *city.* It is a small matter then, that you have
“ deprived us of our ancient possessions, *Sicily*
“ and *Sardinia*; you would have *Spain* too?
“ Well, we shall yield *Spain*; and then—you
“ will pass into *Africa.* Will pass did I say?—
“ This very year they ordered one of their Con-
“ suls into *Africa*, the other into *Spain.* No, Sol-
“ diers, there is nothing left for us but what we
“ can vindicate with our swords. Come on then.
“ Be men. The *Romans* may with more safety
“ be cowards; they have their own country be-
“ hind them, have places of refuge to fly to, and
“ are secure from danger in the roads thither:
“ But for *you* there is no middle fortune be-
“ tween death and victory. Let this be but well
“ fixed in your minds, and once again I say,
“ *you are CONQUERORS.*”

Liv. B. 21.
c. 45.

Livy reports, that *Hannibal*, further to animate his men, assured them, that they should have every one of them lands in property, either in *Africa*, *Spain*, or *Italy*, or else an equivalent in money, if they preferred money. And these assurances he ratified in form. Taking a flint in

of *Hannibal*, it is plain, that the *Saguntines* were not included at first in the treaty with *Asdrubal*; that this treaty only restrained the *Carthaginians* from passing the *Iberus*, as *Polybius* declares; and that the alliance of the *Romans* with the *Saguntines* was posterior to it, and a real infraction of it. See pag. 235, 236.

* *Hannibal*, the more to incense his hearers against the *Romans*, makes these assert an impudent falsehood, that *Saguntum* is upon the *Iberus*.

one hand, and holding a lamb with the other, he said, *Great JUPITER, and all ye Gods, if I do not perform my promise, slay me as I do this lamb!* at which words he broke with the flint the skull of the lamb; a solemnity which much augmented the confidence of his troops.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234. Conf.

The next day the two armies advanced towards each other along the *Ticin*, on that side of it which is next the *Alps*, the *Romans* having the river on their left, the *Carthaginians* the same river on their right. The day following each army receiving intelligence by its foragers that the enemy was near, encamped in the place where it then was. The third, *Scipio* with his cavalry and light armed foot marching forward to discover the strength and situation of the *Carthaginians*; and *Hannibal*, with his cavalry only, coming on with the like intention, they soon perceived each other's approach by the dust they raised in the plain, and thereupon immediately prepared for battle. The *Roman* General sent before him his *Gallic* horse, assisted by his dartmen to begin the fight, he himself with the rest of his cavalry in one line following slowly in good order. The *Gauls* behaved themselves courageously, but the foot, that should have aided them, shrunk at the first onset, or rather fled cowardly through the intervals of the squadrons without casting a dart, fearing to be trodden down by the enemy's horse. Nevertheless the *Gauls* maintained the fight, as presuming they should be well sustained by the *Roman* horse behind them. Nor did the Consul neglect his

Polyb. B.
3. c. 65.

Y. R. 553.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Conf.

part, but hazarded his person so far, that he received a dangerous wound, and had been left upon the place, if his son^f, a meer youth (afterwards the great *Africanus*) had not, by a surprising effort of courage, brought him off. Whilst the *Romans* were busied in assisting their Consul, an unexpected storm came driving at their backs, and obliged them to look to their own preservation. For *Hannibal* had ordered his *Numidians*, who were in the wings, to wheel and give upon the *Romans* in flank and rear, while he with his *Spanish* and other horse sustained their charge in front. The *Numidians* performed their instructions, and having first cut in pieces the scattered foot that had run away at the beginning of the action, fell instantly upon the backs of the *Roman* cavalry, who by this impression were intirely broken and forced to betake themselves to their speed, leaving to their enemies the honour of the day.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 66.

Scipio the night following decamped secretly, and marched with expedition over the plains to the *Po*, which he now repassed, retiring to the^g neighbourhood of *Placentia*. For he thought

^f So *Livy* is inclined to believe, with the greater number of authors; but adds, that *Celius* the historian gives the honour of the Consul's rescue to a *Ligurian* slave.

^g *Livy* says, that *Scipio* retired to *Placentia*; which if true, *Placentia* must have had a different situation from what it has now, and must have been, not on the east but the * west side of the *Trebia*. For we find, that *Scipio*, after this first retreat, passed the *Trebia* to get further from *Hannibal*. *Polybius's* words import no more than that the *Romans* retired to the neighbourhood of *Placentia*, περί πόλιν Πλακενσίαν.

*See Polyb.
B. 3. c. 74.

it not safe, wounded as he was, to stay in a flat open country, with an enemy so near, that was much superior to him in horse. *Hannibal*, who had expected to have an engagement with the enemies infantry, no sooner learned that the *Romans* were retired, but he followed them as far as to their bridge^h upon the *Ticin*. Here he

sur-

^h *Livy*, who, in this part of his history, plainly borrows from *Polybius*, seems to have misunderstood him with regard to the *Bridge*, at which *Hannibal* is said to have arrived in his pursuit of the *Romans*. The Latin Historian makes it to be their bridge over the *Po*, as if they had no river to pass in their way to the *Po*; which, if true, we must say, that the battle was fought on the east side of the *Ticin*, the side towards *Placentia*: For *Polybius* expressly affirms that *Scipio* at the head of the battle had the *Ticin* to his left, and *Hannibal* the same river to his right. Yet, that the battle was fought on the west side of the *Ticin*, we have *Livy's* own authority. He makes *Scipio's* march, in order to meet *Hannibal*, to have been from *Placentia* to that river, over which he passed by a bridge, before he gave battle to the *Carthaginian*. *Ponte perfecto traductus Romanus exercitus in agrum Insubrium*, B. 21. c. 45. And in this he does not disagree with *Polybius*. Now, if the battle was fought on the west bank of the *Ticin*, and *Scipio* had this river to his left, it is evident that the *Carthaginians* were between him and the *Po*, and that he could not steal a march to the *Po* (in the way to *Placentia*) without first repassing the *Ticin*; which *Hannibal* must also have crossed in the pursuit of his enemy to the *Po*. But not one word is any where said of *Hannibal's* passing, or attempting to pass, the *Ticin*.

B. 21. c. 39.

The bridge therefore to which *Hannibal* came, in pursuit of the *Romans*, must have been their bridge over the *Ticin*; at the entrance of which, according to *Livy*, *Scipio* had raised a fort and placed a guard. And it was this guard which *Hannibal* surpris'd.

The reason which *Polybius* assigns for *Hannibal's* turning

back,

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

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surprized and made prisoners 600 men who had been left behind to destroy the bridge so soon as the army should be passed. The work was however effected; the boats which had composed the bridge being loosed from one another were floating down the stream; which *Hannibal* perceiving, and hearing also that the *Romans* were far advanced in their march, he immediately turned back, went down the *Ticin*, and then up along the banks of the *Po*, to find a convenient place where he might lay a bridge of boats over this river. After two days march, a proper place being found, and the bridge formed, he ordered *Asdrubal* to lead over the army, while he himself was employed in giving audience to ambassadors come to him from the *Gauls* of the neighbouring countries, who, after his success

back, when he came to the broken bridge, is the distance of the enemy: He heard that the *Romans* were got a great way off (too far to be overtaken.) This furnishes another proof, that the river in question was the *Ticin* and not the *Po*. For as he had determined to pass the *Po* with all expedition, how could he find a more convenient time to lay his bridge, than when he had no enemies to oppose him? But the distance of the enemy was a good reason why he should not lay a bridge over the *Ticin*; since this would be only loss of time and labour, and could not in the least further his intention of passing the *Po*, or coming up with the *Romans*. And what necessity could he be under of spending two days (as *Livy* says he did) in search of a convenient place to lay a bridge over the *Po*, if he was already at that very place where the *Romans* had laid their bridge over that river. Chevalier *Folard's* translator of *Polybius*, understands him as *Livy* does. Yet the chevalier, in his comment, regardless of his text, speaks of the bridge in question, as the bridge over the *Ticin*, tom. 4. p. 129.

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at the *Ticin*, retaining their first design, now offered to join their forces to his, and to furnish him with whatever he wanted.

Y. R. 535
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

When the army was all passed, the *Carthaginian* took his march down the river, and at the end of the second day came within view of the *Romans*. The third, he drew up his forces in *battalia*, in the face of the enemy: But finding his challenge not accepted, he retired and pitched his camp about six miles from them.

At this time certain *Gauls*, to the number of 2000 foot and 200 horse, who served in the Consul's camp, observing the fortunate state of *Hannibal's* affairs, plotted together to desert to him. After supper they retired to their tents, and there kept quiet till towards day-break; but then, having suddenly armed themselves, they fell upon the sleeping *Romans*, who lay nearest to them, slew a great number and wounded many others; after which they fled out of the camp, carrying with them to *Hannibal* the heads of those they had slain. The *Carthaginian* received these traitors kindly, exhorted them to continue their zeal, and promised them rewards proportionable to their services; but distrusting perhaps their fidelity, he did not enrol them among his troops, but dismissed them to their respective towns and villages, that they might publish among their countrymen the success of his arms, and exhort them to enter into alliance with him. There was in truth little need, for that end, of the exhortations of these emissaries, whose recent treachery alone sufficed to put

Polyb. B.
3. c. 67.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chi.

217.

234 Conf.

the rest of the *Boii* under a necessity of siding with the *Carthaginian*. A party of them at this very juncture, brought to *Hannibal's* camp the three *Roman* commissioners, whom, contrary to faith given, they had seized at a conference (as was before mentioned), and they put them into his hands. *Hannibal*, after many kind words and promises to these *Gauls*, made a treaty with them, and then restored to them the three captives, whom he advised them to keep under strict guard, and to make use of (as they had at first proposed) to recover their hostages from the *Romans*.

Scipio, alarmed at the bloody treason of his *Gallic* deserters, and not doubting but the *Gauls* in general would quickly declare themselves in favour of *Hannibal*, thought it adviseable to retire into a country where the friendship of the inhabitants was more to be depended upon. He decamped therefore about three hours after midnight, to pass the *Trebia*¹, and take post upon the eminencies near that river, where he believed the enemy would not have the boldness to attack him.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 68.

Hannibal, upon notice of this motion of the *Romans*, detached his *Numidian* cavalry after them, he himself soon following with the rest of the army. The *Numidians*, finding the *Roman* camp deserted, stopt to set fire to it, a delay very fortunate to the *Romans*, who, had they been overtaken in the plain, and before they had got their baggage over the river, would have been

¹ A small river running northward into the *Po* near *Placentia*.
extremely

extremely embarrassed. But when the *Numidians* came up, the main body of the Consul's army, together with the baggage, had already passed the stream. There remained on the other side some of his rear guard only, of which the enemy slew a part and took the rest prisoners.

V. R. 335.
Def. Chr.
277.
234 Cons.

The Consul having fortified himself in his new camp, resolved to wait there the arrival of his colleague *Sempronius* with the troops from *Sicily*, and, in the mean time, to attend carefully to the cure of his wound, that he might be in a condition to act, when, after the junction of the two armies, a favourable opportunity should present. *Hannibal* advanced, and pitched his camp about five miles from that of the Consul, the *Trebia* running between them. Great numbers of *Gauls* from the circumjacent country flocked to the *Cartaginian*, and supplied him abundantly with arms and provisions.

C H A P. XIX.

The Battle of the TREBIA.

Hannibal passes over the Apennines into Hetruria.

WHEN the news came to *Rome* of the action upon the *Ticin*, though the public expectation was much disappointed by the ill success, yet they endeavoured to account for it by reasons that would leave no discouragement upon their minds. Some imputed the misfortune to rashness in the Consul, stimulated by too

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 68.

V. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234. Conf.

too eager a desire of fighting: others to perfidy in the *Gauls* of his army, whom they supposed to have designedly suffered themselves to be vanquished; a conjecture founded on the subsequent treachery of some of their countrymen: and as the *Roman* infantry remained unbroken, no danger to the republic was yet apprehended, from a defeat which the horse alone had sustained. The arrival of *Sempronius*, from *Sicily*, at *Ariminum*, with his legions, confirmed this confidence. It was imagined that when these had joined the forces of *Scipio*, the very appearance of so powerful an army would alone be sufficient to put the *Carthaginians* to flight.

Sempronius marched with all diligence from *Ariminum* to join his colleague. Having pitched his camp near him, and refreshed his legions, which had been fatigued by their voyage^k and march from *Lilybaeum*, to *Ariminum*, which took up forty days, he gave orders to get all things ready for battle. While these preparations were going forward, he made frequent visits to *Scipio*, enquiring of him all the circumstances of the late action upon the *Ticin*, and consulting with him upon future measures.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 69.

In the mean time *Hannibal* found means to get possession of *Clastidium*, a small town on the confines of *Liguria*, where the *Romans* had formed a magazine of arms and provisions. To give

^k *Livy* sends the troops of *Sempronius*, all the way from *Lilybaeum* to *Ariminum*, by sea. *Polybius* represents them traversing the city of *Rome*, and marching from thence to *Ariminum*.

an impression of his clemency, and engage more of his enemies to have recourse to it, he treated the garrison with all gentleness. And as the governor had betrayed the place to him, he most richly rewarded him, in hopes thereby to allure other officers intrusted by the *Romans* to the like treachery.

Soon after this, having notice that certain *Gauls* who inhabited between the *Trebia* and the *Po*, and who had made alliance with him, continued nevertheless (that they might have a refuge in all events) to hold a secret correspondence with the enemy, he detached 2000 foot and 1000 horse to pillage and lay waste their lands. His orders were punctually executed, and the booty proved considerable; the plundered *Gauls* flocking to the *Roman* entrenchments to ask succour.

Sempronius, who had impatiently waited an occasion of fighting, seized this pretext. He sent out the greater part of his cavalry with a thousand light armed foot, who expeditiously passing the *Trebia*, attacked the pillagers that were carrying off the booty, put them to flight, and obliged them to retire within their intrenchments. But a vigorous sally being made from thence, the pursuers were repulsed, and obliged in their turn to fly to their camp. Hereupon *Sempronius* put all his cavalry and all his light armed troops in motion, so that the enemy were once more forced to retire. *Hannibal*, who was not prepared for a general action, and who thought it not the part of a prudent commander, to hazard one lightly, and without a premeditated design, con-

V. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234. Conf.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

257.
254. Conf.

contented himself with stopping the flight of his men, and making them face about. He forbade them by his officers, and by his trumpets, either to charge or pursue the enemy; who after they had continued some time upon the place, retreated to their camp.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 70.

The loss of men had not been very considerable on either side; but as the *Romans* had lost fewer than the *Carthaginians*, *Sempronius*, much elated with this trivial advantage, could think of nothing now but a decisive action. Nevertheless, he continued to observe the decency of advising with his colleague. *Scipio's* opinion was, that in prudence they ought to avoid fighting, till the troops, having been trained and exercised during the winter, might more reasonably be depended upon than at present: He added, that the *Gauls* were naturally too fickle and inconstant to keep long in friendship with the *Carthaginian*, and would infallibly turn against him, if they found him out of a condition to enterprize any thing of importance; and he therefore intreated *Sempronius* to lay aside, for some time, all thoughts of a general battle; an occasion, in which (he modestly added) he himself, when his wound was healed, might perhaps be of some use. *Sempronius* could not but be sensible, that this advice was judicious; but his passion to distinguish himself overpowering his reason, and begetting a confidence of success, he, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of his colleague, bent his whole mind to bring on a general action, as soon as possible; that so

neither

neither *Scipio's* cure, nor the election of new consuls (the time for which drew near) might prevent his acquiring the sole glory of finishing the war. And thus, says *Polybius*, as he considered not what was seasonable for the publick, but for himself, it was impossible but he must take wrong measures.

Y.R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Cons.

Hannibal formed the same judgment as *Scipio* upon the situation of things, and was therefore no less desirous than *Sempronius* of coming to a decisive battle without delay. He was well aware of his present advantages in the favourable disposition of the *Gauls* to him, the inexperience of the *Roman* troops, and the inability of *Scipio* to be in the action: But his strongest motive was the necessity an invader is under of being almost incessantly active, and of performing repeated exploits, if he would preserve to himself the esteem, and keep alive the hopes of his confederates.

The *Carthaginian* had viewed and fully examined the ground between the two armies. It was an open plain, through which ran a winding rivulet. The banks of this small stream being pretty high, and also thick set with bushes and brambles, *Hannibal* perceived that it was easy not only for foot, but even for horsemen to be there concealed. Having imparted to his chief officers the design he had formed, and finding it universally approved, he after supper sent for his brother *Mago*, a young man of great spirit and a good soldier, and directed him to choose out a hundred horse and a hundred foot

Polyb. B.
3. c. 71.

of

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Conf.

of the bravest men in the army, and to bring them before night to his tent. This done, and the general having exhorted the two hundred to behave themselves gallantly in the post he should assign them, he bid each man go and choose out of the corps to which he belonged, nine others, such as he knew to be the stoutest soldiers in it, and then to repair to him at a certain place in the camp. The whole number came, a thousand horse, and a thousand foot. He furnished them with guides, and under the conduct of his brother, to whom he signified the time when they should fall upon the enemy, sent them to the place he had chosen for the ambush.

The next morning, at day break, he assembled his *Numidian* cavalry, a hardy people inured to fatigue; and when he had promised ample rewards to every one that should distinguish himself in the discharge of his duty, he ordered them instantly to pass the *Trebia*, brave the enemy in their camp, skirmish with them if they sallied out, and, in skirmishing, retire and repass the river.

Hannibal's view in making this movement so early in the morning, was to provoke the *Romans* to an engagement while they were yet fasting, thoughtless of fighting, and unprepared for it.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 72.

Sempronius no sooner saw the *Numidians* approach, but he sent out his cavalry to attack them. The cavalry were followed by 6000 dart-men; and the general himself not long after came out of his entrenchment with all the rest of

of his army. His numerous forces, and the light advantage he had gained the day before, made him vain enough to think, that there needed little more than his appearance in the field to secure the victory.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

It was yet winter, it snowed, the weather was extremely cold, and the soldiers had begun their march before they had eaten any thing to sustain them. And therefore, though they moved forward briskly at first, and with an eager desire of fighting, yet when they came to ford the river, which, being swelled by the rain of the night before, was breast-high, they began to shrink; and when they had waded through it (the day being then pretty far advanced) they found themselves extremely pinched and weakened both with cold and hunger: Whereas on the other hand the *Cartbaginians* had, by *Hannibal's* order, taken a good repast in their tents, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their arms before the fire.

When *Hannibal* perceived that the *Romans* had passed the *Trebia*, which was the favourable moment he had waited for, he instantly sent out, to the succour of his *Numidians*, the slingers of the *Baleares*, and his other light-armed infantry, to the number of 8000; after which he led forth his main army. His foot consisted of 20,000 men, *Gauls*, *Spaniards*, and *Africans*. His cavalry, including the *Gauls* his allies, amounted to above 10,000. He drew up the whole horse and foot, in one line, about a mile from his camp, posting the horse on the wings. His elephants

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.

234 Conf.

elephants he placed before the points of his body of infantry.

In the mean time, *Sempronius* by a signal called off his cavalry that were fatiguing themselves to little purpose against the *Numidians*. For it was the custom of these to attack briskly; then on a sudden break their ranks, turn their backs and fly; and presently after return to the charge in as good order, and with as much boldness as at first: A manner of fighting, which being entirely new to the *Roman* cavalry, perplexed and disconcerted them.

The Consul's infantry consisted of ¹ 16,000 *Roman* legionaries, and 20,000 foot of the allies. He formed his battle after the usual manner of the *Romans*, the infantry in three lines, and the horse, amounting to 4000, upon the wings. In this order he advanced slowly towards the enemy. The light-armed troops on both sides began the action, much to the advantage of the *Carthaginians*: for the dartmen of the *Romans*, having suffered cold and hunger ever since the morning, and having spent the most of their darts against the *Numidians*, were by no means a match for those of *Hannibal*, who had but just left their camp well armed, fresh and vigorous.

When these skirmishing troops had retired through the intervals of the respective armies to which they belonged, a general charge ensued. The *Roman* cavalry being soon routed and driven

¹ *Livy* says 18,000. He adds, that the Consul's army was strengthened by a body of the *Cenomani*, the only nation of the *Gauls* that continued faithful to the *Romans*.

from

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 73.

Chap. XIX. *Second Punic War.*

285

from their ground by the superior numbers of the *Carthaginians*, left the wings of their infantry exposed to be attacked in flank. The *Nu- midians* who had been employed to provoke the battle, and the light-armed troops who had begun it, were ready on the part of *Hannibal* for this service, having, after their retreat, posted themselves to the right and left behind the *Carthaginian* cavalry; falling furiously therefore on the two wings of the *Roman* infantry in flank, they put them into great disorder, and disabled them from defending themselves against the elephants, that attacked them in front. These wings, utterly broken and put to flight, were chased into the river:

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

At the same time the 2000 men, who had lain in ambush in the brook before-mentioned, came out, and fell upon the rear of the *Roman* legions in the center, which caused a terrible confusion there. The foremost ranks of this center were the only troops of the Consul's army that could keep their ground. They fought a long time with undaunted bravery against the heavy armed forces of the enemy, and at length, urged by necessity, broke their way through them with great slaughter. But seeing that their wings were defeated, and not thinking themselves able either to succour them, or to return to their camp, by reason of the enemies numerous horse and the river that were in the way, they formed themselves into a close compact body, to the number of 10,000, and took the direct road to *Placentia*. Hither they retreated without the least danger,

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 74.

Y. R. 535.
Ref. Chr.

217.

234. Conf.

or opposition; and they were followed by all those of the rout, horse and foot, that could escape out of the field, without passing the river. Of the remainder of the *Roman* army, some had the good fortune to get safely over the stream to their camp; but the greater part perished on the banks of it, either trodden down by the elephants or slain by the horse. The *Carthaginians* pursued the enemy no farther than to the river, which the rigour of the season restrained them from passing. They returned to their intrenchments. Their victory was complete, and their loss inconsiderable. A few only of the *Africans* and *Spaniards* remained upon the field; the *Gauls* suffered most. Yet after this victory the *Carthaginians*, through the inclemency of the weather, lost a great number both of men and horses; and of the elephants all died but one^m.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 56.

As for the Consul *Scipio*, and those that were with him, they stole away from their camp, the very night after the battle, crossed the *Trebia* upon boats or upon rafts, and got safe to *Placentia*; the enemy either not perceiving their flight, or not being able to pursue them, for cold and weariness.

^m *Livy*, B. 21. c. 58, speaks of seven elephants, that, after this time, perished of cold, in a fruitless attempt which *Hannibal* made to pass the *Apennines*, being forced back from the top of those hills by a hurricane. The same author relates a battle that presently followed *Hannibal's* return into the plains, and was terminated by the night's coming on, when there had been no great slaughter on either side. *Polybius* says nothing of all this, and there is nothing of probability in the story, but a good deal of poetry.

Sempronius,

Sempronius, to conceal the shame of his defeat, sent messengers to *Rome*, whose tidings imported only, that there had been a battle, and that the severity of the weather had snatched the victory out of his hands. This report passed currently at first, but the true situation of affairs was quickly known; that the *Roman* forces had been utterly vanquished; that the rout had fled to the neighbouring colonies for refuge; that *Scipio* after his flight to *Placentia*, not to ruin that place by keeping too great a number of soldiers there, had crossed the *Po* with his part of the army, and retired to *Cremona*; that the troops had no provisions but what were brought by sea and up the *Po*; and lastly, that all the nations of the *Gauls* had declared for *Hannibal*.

The people of *Rome* were yet in their first fright and consternation at all this bad news, when *Sempronius* himself, after escaping many dangers from the enemies cavalry that were dispersed, in parties, over the country, arrived in the city. His business was to hold the *Comitia* by centuries, for electing new *Consuls*.

Notwithstanding the late disasters and the present distress, party favour had a greater share in the elections, than a due regard to the exigencies of the state. For (with *Cn. Servilius*) was raised to the *Consulate* *C. Flaminius*, a rash hot-headed man, who, when in the same station six years before, had signalized himself by his disobedience to the senate, and his contempt of religion. His merit with the people, and what now procured him the fasces, was his having been the only

V. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 75.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 56.

See p. 196.
and 197.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

Livy, B.
21. c. 63.

man of the *Conscript Fathers*, that assisted in promoting a law, which enacted, that no Senator, nor father of a Senator, should have a ship at sea, carrying above eight ton or thereabouts. A vessel of that burthen was thought sufficient for transporting to *Rome* the produce of any man's lands; and it was intended by this law to confine commerce to the *Plebeians*.

Sempronius's year not being yet expired, he immediately after the elections returned to his winter quarters at *Placentia*.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 75.

The Senate provided for the next campaign. They made new levies amongst the allies, ordered troops into *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, put garrisons into *Tarentum*, and other places where they were most wanted, and sent provisions to *Ariminum* and into *Hetruria*; through which country the army was to march against *Hannibal*. They also dispatched ambassadors to ask assistance of King *Hiero*, who furnished them with 500 *Cretan* archers, and 1000 other light armed soldiers. And lest the *Carthaginians* should from *Africa* attempt to land troops in *Italy*, they equipt sixty *quinqueremes* to guard the coast. In a word, they omitted nothing that was necessary for carrying on the war with the utmost vigour, it being the peculiar character of the *Romans*, says *Polybius*, that they are then most to be feared when they are most afraid.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 76.

On the side of *Spain* all was safe; for in that country during the late unfortunate campaign in *Italy*, the arms of the republic, under the conduct of *Cn. Scipio*, had prospered beyond expectation.

tation. He had entirely defeated *Hanno* *, the *Carthaginian* General, and reduced almost all the nations between the *Iberus* and the *Pyrenees*, to the obedience of *Rome*.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.
217.
234 Conf.

As for *Hannibal*, he did not remain unactive after his victory at the *Trebia*. Wounded and repulsed in an attack upon one town belonging to the *Romans*, he assaulted and took another called *Vieltumvia*, in *Insurbria*, and gave it up to be plundered by the soldiers.

* See p.
237.
Liv. B. 21.
c. 57.

The *Carthaginian*, during his winter quarters among the *Gauls*, with whose levity he was well acquainted, and who, he feared, might repent of their newly contracted alliance with him, is said to have put in practise some of his *Punic* arts, to preserve himself from their snares. He not only wore false hair, but at different times the habits of different ages, frequently changing his dress in order to disguise himself. And because the *Gauls* were extremely dissatisfied that their country continued to be the seat of the war, and were impatiently desirous (from a hatred, as they pretended, to the *Romans*, but in truth, from an eagerness to enrich themselves with plunder) of being led into the territories of the allies of *Rome*, he resolved to pass as soon as possible over the *Apennines* into *Hetruria*. Just before he entered upon this expedition, he assembled all his captives that were of the *Roman* allies, and when he had assured them that he was come into *Italy*, not as their enemy, but their friend, to restore them to liberty and to the possession of the towns which the *Romans* had

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 78.

c. 77.

Y. R. 535.

Bef. Chr.

217.

234. Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.

c. 78.

Liv. B. 22.

c. 2.

Polyb. B. 3.

c.

taken from them; and when he had exhorted them to join with him in the common cause, and to engage their countrymen to do the same, he dismissed them all without ransom.

After this, having made enquiry about the several roads into *Hetruria*, he learnt that there was one much shorter than any of the rest, but very difficult to pass, as it led through marshy grounds; the other roads more easy, but known to the enemy, and in their possession. *Hannibal* for these reasons, or perhaps because he had naturally a turn for those dangerous enterprizes, which are apt to raise mens admiration of a general, and strike his enemies with terror, chose the difficult road, which was now rendered more so by the overflowing of the *Arnus*. Having passed the *Apennines*, he entered the marshes. His *Africans* and *Spaniards*, who were inured to this sort of fatigue, and who marched first, went into the water without hesitation, and kept their order. The *Gauls* had more difficulty (the way being made much worse by the multitudes of men and beasts of burthen that had gone before them) and many of them were killed with the fatigue: for to add to the distress, they were obliged to march thus in mire and water four days together, with but very little sleep, such as they could get lying upon their baggage, or upon the beasts which had carried it, and had perished in the mud. *Hannibal* himself was not without his share of the inconveniencies of this march, for though he rode upon an elephant (the only one remaining) his continual

continual watchings, and the unwholesome damps, brought such a defluxion upon his eyes that he lost one of them. When he was come out of the marshes, he halted for some days that he might refresh his army, and enquire into the situation of the country, the strength and designs of the enemy, and the character and disposition of their General.

Y. R. 535.
Bef. Chr.

217.
234 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 80.

C H A P. XX.

SECOND YEAR of the War.

The BATTLE of the Lake THRASYMENUS.

Fabius Maximus Cunctator is sent against Hannibal, who deceives him by a very singular stratagem.

Transactions in Spain.

FLAMINIUS, as was before observed, had obtained the consulship by the favour of the people, contrary to the inclinations of the Senate. Being apprehensive that the augurs, influenced by his enemies, would, to render his election invalid, pretend some defect in the auspices, he took a bold unprecedented step, left *Rome*, without performing the usual ceremonies of religion, went strait to *Ariminum* (where he had ordered the army to rendezvous) and was there invested in the consulate. The Senate, highly offended at this proceeding, sent two of

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.

216.
235 Conf.

Liv. B. 21.
c. 63.

Y. R. 536.

Bef. Chr.

216.

235 Conf.

their body to recal him to *Rome*, that he might perform those ceremonies which he had despised. But the Consul paid no regard to their orders. At the head of four legions (two of which he received from *Sempronius*, and the other two from the Prætor *Atilius*) he crossed the *Apennines*, and encamped his army under the walls of *Arretium* in *Ettruria*; and there he still was when *Hannibal* came out of the marshes.

Polyb. B.

3. c. 80. 82.

The *Cartaginian* having learnt that *Flaminius's* chief talent was haranguing the people, in whose assemblies he was a leading man, but that he wanted the skill for conducting a war, was of a hasty disposition, easy to be inflamed, and confident of his own abilities, did not doubt but he should be able, by provoking his high spirit, to lead him whithersoever he pleased. With this view, having put his army in march, he laid waste, before the Consul's eyes, the fertile fields of *Ettruria*, and in seeming contempt of him, passed by his camp at *Arretium*, and advanced nearer to *Rome*, as if he intended to carry on his devastations to the walls of the capital.

Liv. B. 22.

c. 4.

Flaminius beheld the lands of *Cortona* (one of the most considerable cities of *Ettruria*) in a flame behind him. Enraged at being thus insulted by *Hannibal*, he immediately called a council of war, but would not listen to his officers who advised him to continue in his camp till he was joined by his colleague, and in the mean time content himself with sending out strong parties to hinder the enemy from ravaging the country. He rushed out from the council in great wrath,

and

and gave orders for marching. And when word was brought him, that one of the standards stuck so fast in the ground that they could not pull it out, he asked the messenger whether he had not likewise brought letters from the Senate forbidding him to fight. He added, *since fear has not left the soldiers strength enough in their hands to pull up the standard, bid them dig it up.* He then began his march with a full resolution to fight *Hannibal* as soon as he could overtake him. And though his officers were greatly dissatisfied, yet the common soldiers applauded the confidence of their General, who to such an extravagant height had raised the hopes of the vulgar, that an immense number of them followed the camp in expectation of booty, and went loaded with chains for the multitude of enemies that were to be taken prisoners.

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
235 Conf.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 3.

Hannibal was pursuing his march in the way towards *Rome*, having the lake *Thrasymenus* (now *Lago di Perugia*) close on his right, and the town of *Cortona* at some distance on his left, when he learnt that the Consul was following him. Upon this advice, he turned his thoughts to seek out a convenient spot of ground where he might draw the enemy into an ambuscade. Nor was it long before he found a place fit for his purpose. He came to a valley, which, extending lengthways from the lake to a hill very steep and difficult of access, was lined on the two sides by ridges of little hills. Upon the steep hill *Hannibal* posted himself with his *Africans* and *Spaniards* in open view. Behind the ridge of hills,

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 82.

Y. R. 535.
 Bef. Chr.
 216.
 235. Conf.

on the right of the valley, he placed in a long line the *Balears* and other light-armed infantry; and behind that on the left, his cavalry and the *Gauls*, who formed a line, the extremity of which reached to a narrow pass, whereby he had entered the valley. These dispositions being made in the beginning of the night, he continued the remaining part of it in quiet and silence in his camp.

It was late before the Consul arrived at the lake; he therefore encamped that night by the side of it. But next morning by break of day, without examining the ground, he marched into the valley through the pass before mentioned. As soon as *Hannibal* was apprised that the *Roman* army were entered, and that their vanguard was not far from him, he gave orders for a general onset. So thick a fog from the lake at this time covered the valley, that the *Romans* found themselves attacked in front, flank and rear, almost before they saw the enemy. Many of them were slain in the order of their march, not having had time to form themselves for battle: and so closely was the greater part hemmed in, that they could neither fight nor fly^a. Fifteen thousand were slaughtered in the valley, among whom was the Consul *Flaminius*. Great numbers being

^a *Livy* and *Plutarch* tell us that this battle was fought with so much eagerness and fury on both sides, that the combatants were not sensible of an earthquake, which happened during the engagement, and which ruined many cities in *Italy*, overturned mountains, and changed the course of rivers. *Livy*, B. 22. c. 5. *Plut.* life of *Fabius*.

pushed

pushed into the lake, perished there. A body of six thousand men forced their way through the enemy. Could those brave legionaries have seen (says *Polybius*) what passed, they might, by facing about, and falling upon the backs of the *Carthaginians*, have given a turn to the fortune of the day. But they expecting to encounter new enemies, continued advancing on till they arrived at the summit of a hill: From which, when the fog was dispersed, seeing the total defeat of the rest of the army, they retreated to a neighbouring village. The *Carthaginian* General detached *Mabarbal* after them with a large body of horse and foot, to whom they surrendered next day upon a promise of their lives, and, if we may credit *Livy*, their liberties: Whence he takes occasion to reproach *Hannibal* with breach of faith, because when the next day he had assembled all his prisoners to the number of 15,000, and had separated the *Romans* from the other *Italians*, he delivered the former to his soldiers, to be kept in chains, and released only the latter. *Polybius* tells us, that *Hannibal* declared he did not think himself bound by the promise which *Mabarbal* had made, as being without authority from him; but then according to the same historian, that promise was only of their lives, which, if true, *Hannibal* cannot on this occasion be charged with breach of faith, whether he was in reality bound by *Mabarbal's* promise or not. The loss on the side of the *Carthaginians* amounted only to 1500 men, most of them *Gauls*.

X. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
246.
235 Conf.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 6.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 83.

The

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.236.
235 Conf.

The first report of the defeat of the *Roman* army spread an unspeakable consternation in *Rome*. The people flocked in crowds to the forum, calling upon their magistrates to give them an account of the battle. It being impossible for these to conceal or disguise the truth for any long time, the Prætor *Pomponius*, towards sun-set, mounted the *rostra*. All he said was, *We are vanquished in a great battle*. And the people, little accustomed to misfortunes in war, much less to hear their magistrates plainly and publicly own that they were conquered, could not bear this so heavy a calamity with patience and moderation. In this universal dejection the Senators alone preserved their steadiness. The Prætors assembled them, and kept them sitting several days together from sun-rising to sun-set. Before they came to any fixed resolution in what manner to oppose the conqueror, they were alarmed with the news of a second defeat. The Consul *Servilius* having heard at *Ariminum* that *Flaminius* was following *Hannibal* with an intention to give him battle, had detached *C. Centenius* with 4000 horse to strengthen the *Roman* army. But this reinforcement had come too late. And *Hannibal*, after the action, hearing of *Centenius's* approach, had sent *Mabarbal*, with the light armed foot, and part of the cavalry, to encounter him. Near 2000 *Romans* were killed in the engagement; the rest fled to a rising ground, but being invested by the enemy, were next day obliged to surrender.

It

It was thought by the Senate that the present exigency required a magistrate with dictatorial authority. Yet because there was no precedent of the *people's* naming a Dictator, and because their only Consul *Servilius*, to whom that nomination legally belonged, was absent, and all communication between him and *Rome* cut off by the enemy, it was agreed that the Comitia should create a magistrate, whose authority should be superior to the Consular, but somewhat inferior to the Dictatorial; and that he should be stiled Pro-Dictator. *Fabius Maximus* was the person pitched upon; and the only privilege he seems to have wanted of those belonging to a Dictator was that of naming his General of the horse. To this office the people appointed *M. Minucius Rufus*, a young man much in their favour. *Fabius* was a Senator distinguished for the coolness of his temper, and the great caution with which he proceeded in all his actions. He was as wary and circumspect in his conduct, as *Sempronius* and *Flaminius* had been rash and impetuous. The Pro-Dictator began the exercise of his office by acts of religion. The Sybilline books were consulted to know the causes of the present calamities; and the guardians of those oracles declared, that the misfortunes of the republic were owing to the undue performance of a vow to *Mars*; that it ought to be repeated, and four new vows made to several Deities, besides a dedication to Jupiter of all the pigs, lambs, kids and calves which should be produced in one spring. This last required the authority of the people; the other

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
236.
235 Conf.

Y. R. 536.

Bef. Chr.

216.

235 Cons.

Liv. B. 22.

c. 8.

other were made by the proper magistrates. This done, *Fabius* and *Minucius* immediately applied themselves to repair the fortifications of the city. They also posted guards in proper places, caused the bridges over the rivers to be broke down, and sent orders to the people all over the country through which it was thought *Hannibal* would pass, to burn their houses, destroy the fruits of the ground, and retire into places of strength and safety.

Before the Pro-Dictator took the field, he advised with the Senate concerning the troops that should serve under him. They allotted him the army of *Servilius*, and decreed that he should make what new levies he pleased, either at *Rome* or amongst the allies. *Fabius* raised but two new legions, which having commanded to repair to *Tibur* upon the *Anio*, he set out for *Ocriculum*, a city of *Umbria*, there to meet the troops from *Ariminum* under the Consul *Servilius*. These forces he himself led to *Tibur*, where he was joined by the new recruits. And having been informed that a *Carthaginian* fleet had taken, near the coast of *Hebruria*, some *Roman* ships of burthen which were carrying provisions to the army in *Spain*, he sent the Consul *Servilius* to equip with all diligence what vessels were at *Rome* and *Ostia*, and with them to take upon him the guard of the coast of *Italy*. After these regulations *Fabius* began his march towards *Hannibal*, in which he proceeded with great caution, carefully searching all the places through which the army was to pass.

The *Carthaginian*, immediately after the defeat of *Centenius*, had led his army through *Umbria* and *Picenum* to the territory of *Adria*, a considerable town on the *Adriatic*, destroying the country wherever he passed, and putting to the sword all the *Romans* he found in his way, that were able to bear arms; such was his hatred to the *Roman* name. Here he halted for some time, because the country abounded with good provisions and store of old wines, which served to recruit the strength of his exhausted troops, who had contracted distempers from bad food, and the fatigues they had undergone. He armed his *Africans* after the *Roman* manner, out of the spoils he had taken from the enemy. And being now near the sea, for the first time since his coming into *Italy*, he laid hold of the opportunity, and sent to *Carthage* an account of his success. Then having ravaged the territories of *Asculum* and *Adria*, he proceeded to the countries of the *Prætutiani*, the *Marfi*, the *Marucini*, the *Peligni* and *Frentani*. Last of all he entered *Apulia*, and was laying waste this country, when *Fabius* arrived and pitched his camp upon the hills near *Æce*, within six miles of him. *Hannibal* instantly led his army to the *Roman* entrenchments, and offered battle to the enemy, But the *Pro-Dictator* remaining quiet in his camp, the *Carthaginian*, after waiting some time, drew off his men, openly reproaching the *Romans*, (says *Livy*) that at length their martial spirit was

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
335 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 86.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 12.

* A town on the borders of *Apulia*.

broke,

Y R. 536.
Bef. Chl.

216.
235 Conf.

Polyh. B. 3.
c. 90.

broke, that the war was at an end, and that they plainly owned themselves vanquished. Nevertheless, he was inwardly grieved to find he had to do with a General very different from *Sempronius* and *Flaminius*, and was much more afraid of *Fabius's* prudence than his strength. He had not yet tried his constancy. To provoke him to battle he made frequent incursions into the countries of the *Roman* allies, and destroyed them with fire and sword; employing likewise all his arts by sudden marches and counter-marches to ensnare him. All was to no purpose; he could neither surprisè *Fabius*, nor make him leave his hills, where he kept himself continually on his guard against so active an enemy. He did not suffer his soldiers to stir out of their camp, except in large bodies; he followed the *Carthaginians*, but at a considerable distance, because he would on no account hazard a pitched battle; yet he had frequent skirmishes with the enemy, and intercepted such parties of them as ventured too far from their camp. And indeed this was the surest method to ruin *Hannibal*. The *Romans* were in no danger of wanting men or provisions in their own country; whereas the *Carthaginian* could only subsist by pillage, and when his men dropped off, had but small opportunities of recruiting. While the Pro-Dictator was thus baffling his enemy, he had the continual murmurs of his General of the horse, and of his soldiers to contend with. *Minucius* being a favourite of the people, and ambitious of the chief command, openly accused *Fabius* of real cowardice concealed

concealed under the appearance of prudence. But neither the invectives of this seditious man, nor the fresh devastations of *Hannibal*, who passed over the *Apennines* into *Samnium*, could make him alter his wise measures.

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
235 Conf.

The *Carthaginian* having ravaged *Samnium*, and taken the town of *Telefia*, resolved to penetrate into *Campania*, one of the finest countries in the world, and at the same time the most inaccessible. Except on one side where it is bounded by the sea, it is encompassed by a chain of high mountains through which there are but three passes, and those very narrow and difficult. It was a bold step in *Hannibal* to undertake this expedition in sight of a *Roman* army commanded by an expert General; but he had his reasons for it. He would thereby either force the enemy to a battle, or shew plainly to the neighbouring nations that he was master of all the open country; by which means he hoped to draw over some of the towns to his party, not one of which had hitherto fallen off from the republic. Add to this, that the cities of *Campania* were the richest of any in *Italy*, and their trade the most considerable. *Hannibal* entered *Campania* by a pass at the foot of mount* *Callicula*°, near the *Vulturnus*, and encamped on the

* Polyb.
calls it
Eribanus.

° *Livy* tells us (B. 22. c. 13.) that *Hannibal* designed to enter *Campania* by a pass near *Casinum*, a town of *Latium*, beyond the *Liris*, because by guarding that pass he was told he might prevent the *Romans* from assisting their allies. But the *Carthaginian* not pronouncing the word *Casinum* well, his guides thought he had said *Casilinum*, and accordingly led

Y. R. 536.
 Bef. Chr.
 216.
 235 Conf.

Plut. life
 of Fabius.

the banks of that river. *Fabius* was indeed surprized at the boldness of the *Carthaginian*, but *Minucius* and the rest of the army, transported with rage at the being thus insulted, impatiently demanded to be led to battle, insomuch that the Pro-Dictator was forced to pretend the same eagerness to fight, and march with much greater expedition than usual. But when he came near the enemy, he returned to his former conduct, encamped upon mount *Massicus*, and from thence quietly beheld the *Carthaginian* army gathering the fruits and rich harvests of the *Falernian* fields. This so provoked his soldiers, that they called him in derision *the Pædagogus* of Hannibal. And *Minucius* joining in the insolent raillery, said, their General had chosen for them a fine theatre, from whence they might conveniently behold the ravages of *Italy*. He then asked the friends of *Fabius*, whether the Pro-Dictator did not think the earth an unsafe place for him, and was therefore going to pitch his camp in heaven, and cover himself with the clouds. When these things were told *Fabius*, he only replied, that he should indeed be more cowardly than they made him, if he changed his resolution through fear of idle raileries or reproaches. He added, *it is no inglorious thing, to fear for the safety of our country. That man is not fit to rule others who will be influenced by foolish calumnies, or subject himself*

him to that town, which was situated on the *Vulturnus*, at the foot of mount *Callicula*. *Hannibal* was so enraged at the mistake, that he immediately ordered the chief of his guides to be crucified, for a terror to the rest.

and his government to the caprice of those whom he ought to command. *Fabius* continued the same conduct the whole summer, though he was not ignorant that his caution was blamed at *Rome* as well as in the army.

Y. R. 536.
B. ef. Chr.
216.
235 Conf.
Liv. B. 22.
c. 15.

Hannibal despaired of bringing the *Romans* to a battle, and therefore having got an immense booty, he began now to look out for a place in which to secure it, and where he might likewise take up his winter quarters; for though *Campania* abounded with fruits and wine, yet yielded not corn sufficient to subsist a numerous army for any considerable time. For these reasons *Hannibal* began to draw towards the pass by which he had entered this country. *Fabius* perceiving his design, detached 4000 men to seize the streight, which being commanded by mount *Callicula*, he encamped the rest of his army towards the top of that hill. From thence he sent a garrison into *Casilinum*, a town on the *Vulturnus*, on the other side the pass, and ordered *L. Hostilius Mancinus*, with 400 horse, to observe the enemy. This young officer rashly engaging with a party of *Numidians*, was himself slain together with the greatest part of the detachment. The same day *Minucius* joined *Fabius*. He had been sent to guard a pass at *Terracina*, a city of *Latium*, to hinder *Hannibal* from penetrating that way into the territory of *Rome*.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 92.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 15.

The

Hannibal, according to *Livy*, advanced towards *Fabius*, and sent his light horse to try once more to provoke him to battle. But though the Pro-Dictator had greatly the ad-

Y. R. 536.

Bef. Chr.

216.

235 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.

c. 93.

The *Carthaginian*, not being able to dislodge *Fabius*, contrived the following stratagem to be executed in the night. Being encamped at the foot of mount *Callicula*, he ordered *Asdrubal* to pick out 2000 of the strongest oxen, to cause faggots of dry wood to be tied to their horns, and then to keep the cattle, with the herdsmen, ready without the camp. After supper, when all things were quiet, the oxen were brought to the foot of an eminence not far from the pass, that was guarded by the 4000 *Romans*. Upon a signal given, the wood on the horns of those beasts was set on fire, and the herdsmen, who had been instructed to drive them if possible to the top of the eminence, immediately set out, being followed by the light armed infantry. These had orders to assist the herdsmen as long as the cattle kept together, but upon their dispersing, to seize the top of the hill, making as great a noise as they could, and be in readiness to defend themselves in case they were attacked by the enemy. In the mean time *Hannibal* led his army to the very entrance of the pass. The *Africans* marched first, next followed the cavalry, then the booty, and last of all the *Spaniards* and *Gauls*. The *Roman* detachment seeing the fires approach the top of the eminence, thought *Hannibal* was endeavouring to escape that way; they therefore left the pass in all haste, and marched up in order to oppose

vantage of the ground, he would not hazard a general action, but contented himself with skirmishing with the enemies cavalry, of whom he killed eight hundred, with the loss of only two hundred of his own men.

him.

him. But as they came nearer the cattle, which now were running up and down, firing the bushes wherever they went, they knew not what to think of these lights, their imaginations suggesting to them a thousand fears. In this perplexity they began to skirmish with the *Carthaginians* on the top of the hill, but the cattle running in among the combatants separated them; after which both parties continued quiet waiting for day-light. *Fabius* was surprised at what he saw, but suspecting it to be some stratagem of the enemy, would not stir from his camp, lest he should be entrapped, or, contrary to his intention, be forced to hazard a general action. *Hannibal* finding the pass open, marched safely through it with his army and baggage: but that his light armed foot might not be overpowered by the *Romans* on the eminence, he, as soon as it was day, sent his *Spaniards* to their assistance, who brought off the detachment, with the slaughter of a thousand of the enemy. The *Carthaginian* continued his march to the neighbourhood of *Alifæ*, a city on the confines of *Samnium* and *Campania*.

Fabius, though rallied by his soldiers by being thus over-reached, kept steady to his first resolution; he marched directly after *Hannibal*, but encamped on the eminencies near him. The latter having again pillaged *Samnium* and the country of the *Peligni*, returned to *Apulia*, where he took *Geronium*, the houses of which he turned into granaries, and pitched his camp under the walls. From thence he sent out two thirds of his army to forage; part of the remainder he

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
235 Conf.

Liv. B. 22,
c. 18.

Y. R. 536.

Bef. Chr.

216.

235. Conf.

kept to guard the camp, and the rest he disposed in different stations to protect his foragers. As these were in great number, and the country was very fertile, vast quantities of provisions were brought in daily. The Pro-Dictator, continuing to follow him, at length encamped in the territory of *Larinum*, in the country of the *Frentani*. From thence he was recalled to *Rome* to perform a solemn sacrifice which required his presence. Both the Senate and people were at this time much discontented with him. For beside that his caution had not succeeded to their wishes, *Hannibal*, by sparing the lands of *Fabius* in the general devastation, had rendered him suspected at *Rome* of holding a secret correspondence with the enemy. And as he had, without consulting the Senate, agreed upon an exchange of prisoners with *Hannibal*, and to purchase the redemption of 247 captives which the *Carthaginian* had more than he, the Senate refused him the money. *Fabius*, determined to keep his word and release his countrymen, directed his son to sell his lands, and paid the sum stipulated. And though most of the prisoners afterwards offered to reimburse him their respective ransoms, he would not consent to it.

Plut. life of
Fabius.Polyb. B.
3. c. 94.

Fabius, upon his leaving the army, had advised, entreated, and by his authority commanded his General of the horse not to fight during his absence. But *Minucius*, even while the Dictator was making his exhortation, had his thoughts wholly intent upon a battle, which he was determined to hazard the very first opportunity.

After

After *Fabius's* departure he indeed stayed some time on the hills in hopes that *Hannibal* would give him an opportunity of coming to an engagement with him there. But in this being disappointed, he marched down into the plain, and drew nearer the enemy. The *Carthaginian*, upon his approach leaving one third of his army to be employed in foraging, advanced with the rest from *Geronium* to meet him. Between the two camps there was a rising ground, that would be very commodious to which ever party should possess it. A detachment of 2000 *Carthaginian* light armed troops seized it by night. *Minucius* the next day drove them from it, and there entrenched his forces. As *Hannibal's* principal affair at this time was to provide abundantly not only for his men but for his horses, that they might be in good condition for action the next summer; and as the *Romans* did not for several days stir from their camp, the *Carthaginian* detached great numbers of his soldiers to forage. *Minucius* laid hold of this advantage, and marched his legions to the very entrenchments of the enemy, at the same time sending out his horse and the light armed men, in parties, to attack their foragers, who being dispersed over the fields, and loaded with booty, could make no resistance. Nor had *Hannibal* sufficient strength within his camp to venture out against those that assailed it. He was reduced to keep upon the defensive, till *Asdrubal*, informed of the danger by those who had escaped the *Roman* horse, came from *Geronium*, with 4000 men to the assistance of his General.

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
236 Conf.

Upon the arrival of this succour he sallied out, and *Minucius* retired. The *Carthaginian* fearing lest the *Romans* should attack his camp at *Geronium*, and make themselves masters of the plunder and provisions he had laid up in it, returned thither, and after this time became more cautious in sending out parties to forage.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 25.

When *Minucius's* success was known at *Rome*, his friends took advantage of it to extol his bravery and abilities above those of *Fabius*. *M. Metilius*, a tribune of the commons, assembled the people, and made a speech to them full of injurious reflections upon *Fabius's* conduct, and concluded with a motion to give the General of the horse an equal authority with the Pro-Dictator. The latter thought it to no purpose to defend himself in the assemblies of the people, since he had not a favourable hearing even in the Senate. There he endeavoured to convince the *Fathers* that their losses had been owing to the rashness of their Generals; and he did not scruple to say, that if the Dictatorial power continued in him, he would call *Minucius* to an account for disobeying his orders; that he hoped soon to make it evident to all the world, that fortune was of small moment to an able General, and that reason and good conduct sufficed; adding, that for his part he thought it a greater glory for a General to preserve his army (if he did it without ignominy) than to destroy many thousands of enemies. Having assisted at the sacrifice to which he had been called, and presided at the election of a new Consul, (*M. Atilius Regulus*,

gulus, who was substituted in the room of *Flaminius*) he left the city the night before the *comitia* were to determine in his affair, that he might not be present at the affront which was going to be put upon him. Next day, when the people were assembled, though they were prejudiced against *Fabius* and zealous for *Minucius*, yet scarce any one had courage enough to harangue them in favour of *Metilius's* proposal. *C. Terentius Varro* was the only man that seconded the Tribune. *Varro* was the son of a butcher, had been a shop-keeper, then a pleader, undertaking poor mens causes right or wrong. By this practice, and by railing at the nobility, he had ingratiated himself with the multitude, and by their favour obtained successively the offices of *Quæstor*, *Ædile* and *Prætor*, and was now aiming at the Consulship. The motion in short was carried, *Minucius* was put upon an equal foot with *Fabius*, and the Senate confirmed the decree of the people.

Fabius being arrived at the camp, it was agreed between him and his late Master of the horse, now his colleague, to divide the army equally between them. The former kept on the hills, and *Minucius* posted himself at the distance of 1500 paces below him. Between the entrenchments of *Minucius* and those of the *Carthaginian* at *Geronium* was an eminence from whence either camp might be annoyed. This post *Hannibal* resolved to seize, not doubting but *Minucius* would attempt to dispossess him; and he hoped to draw him into a snare. With this view he had over night chosen out 5000 foot and 500 horse, divided them

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
236.
235 Conf.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 103.

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
235 Conf.

Plut. life of
Fabius.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 105.

Plut. life of
Fabius.

them into bodies of 200 and 300 men each, and hid them in several cavities at the foot of the hill. And lest his ambush should happen to be discovered, he, to fix the attention of the *Romans* another way, sent a detachment to take possession of the eminence as soon as it was light. When *Minucius* perceived the *Carthaginians* upon the top of the hill, to dislodge them, he sent first his light armed foot, then his cavalry, and last of all (seeing that *Hannibal* sustained his own men by successive detachments) he followed in person with the legions. When the battle became general, the ambush, upon a signal given, rose on all sides. *Minucius's* army was quickly routed, and would have been entirely destroyed, but that *Fabius* had too much zeal for his country to let himself be swayed by private resentment. *We must make haste*, said he to those that were about him, *to rescue Minucius, who is a valiant man, and a lover of his country. And if he has been too forward to engage the enemy, we will tell him of it at another time.* Instantly he gave orders to march to the relief of his colleague and his routed troops, who at his approach began to rally, and retire to him for protection. *Hannibal*, seeing a fresh army advancing against him in good order, was obliged to give over the pursuit and found a retreat. He is reported to have said to some of his friends while he was retiring, *Have not I often told you, that that cloud which hovered upon the mountains would one day break upon us in a storm?* The *Carthaginian*, after the battle, having possession of the

Chap. XX. *Second Punic War.*

the eminence, fortified it, and placed a guard on it to secure his camp on that side.

Minucius and *Fabius* returned each to his entrenchments. The latter did not drop a word which favoured of contempt for his colleague, and *Minucius*, now convinced of his error, did justice both to *Fabius* and himself. Having assembled his troops, he ingenuously owned to them that he had learnt by experience, he was not fit to command, adding, that both he and they for the future ought to obey the orders of *Fabius*. Then marching them to the Pro-Dictator's camp, he presented himself before him, made his acknowledgments, and resigned the dignity last conferred on him by the people. *Fabius* received him with great kindness, the soldiers embraced one another, and there was an universal joy. The Pro-Dictatorship being almost expired, *Fabius* sent for the Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* to take upon them the command of the army.

Servilius, with a fleet of 120 ships, had made an expedition into *Africa*, where as he was ravaging the coast, he fell into an ambuscade, and was forced to retire to his fleet with the loss of a thousand of his men. Weighing anchor in all haste he sailed to *Lilybæum* in *Sicily*, and from thence, after delivering up the fleet to the Prætor *Otacilius*, was returned to *Italy*.

The Consuls following the advice and example of *Fabius*, no action of moment happened between the two armies, though *Hannibal* still continued

311

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
235 Conf.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 30.

Livy, B. 22.
c. 31.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 106.

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
236 Conf.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 20.
vid. infr.
chap. 31.

tinued at *Geronium*, and the *Romans* held their camp so near him as to watch all his motions.

THE SAME YEAR, while the war was thus carried on in *Italy*, *Cn. Scipio* had great success, both by sea and land, against the *Carthaginians* in *Spain*¹.
Ambassadors

¹ The *Romans* at first divided this country into *Hither Spain* and *Further Spain*. *Augustus Caesar* afterwards divided *Further Spain* into two provinces, *Bætica* and *Lusitania*, and gave the name of *Tarraconia* to *Hither Spain*.

* Guadalquivir.

Strabo, l. 3.
p. 171.

Strab. l. 3.
p. 139-142.

* Seville.

Bætica, so called from the river * *Bætis*, which runs through the middle of it, was the most southern province, and comprehended the present kingdom of *Granada*, *Andalusia*, part of *New Castile*, and *Estremadura*. *Cadiz*, called by the antients, *Gades* and *Gadira*, is a town situated in a small island of the same name, on the western coast of *Andalusia*, about nine leagues from *Gibraltar*. It is said that *Hercules* having extended his conquests to the ocean, and imagining he was come to the extremity of the world, raised two pillars near *Gades*, as monuments of his victories. Geographers are not agreed about the place where these pillars were erected. *Bætica* was the most fruitful, the wealthiest and the most populous part of *Spain*. It contained two hundred cities, the chief of which stood on the *Bætis*, *Castulo* towards the source of that river, *Corduba* (the native place of *Lucan* and the two *Seneca's*) lower down, and * *Hispalis* nearest the sea. It's chief inhabitants were the *Turdetani*.

Lusitania was bounded on the west by the ocean, on the north by the river *Durius*, and on the south by the river *Anas*. Between these two rivers runs the *Tagus*. *Lusitania* included what is now called *Portugal*, together with part of *Old* and *New Castile*.

Tarraconia comprehended the rest of *Spain*, that is to say, the Kingdoms of *Murcia* and *Valencia*, *Catalonia*, *Aragon*, *Navarre*, *Biscay*, the *Asturias*, *Gallicia*, the kingdom of *Leop*, and the greatest part of the two *Castiles*. *Terraco* †, a city on the sea coast, not far from the *Iberus*, gave name to the province. Pretty near this town lay *Barcino*, which from it's name

† Tarragon

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313

Ambassadors came to him from all the nations between the *Iberus* and the *Pyrenees*, and a hundred and twenty cities surrendered to him. To add to this good fortune, his allies, the *Celtiberians*, defeated *Asdrubal* in two battles, killed 15,000 of his men, and took 4000 prisoners. This was the state of the *Roman* affairs in *Spain*, when *P. Scipio*, the brother of *Cneius*, arrived there with the character of Pro-Consul. The view of the Senate in carrying on the war with vigour in this country, was to divide the forces of *Carthage*, who would be more jealous of her conquests in *Spain* than of those in *Italy*, and by sending powerful succours to *Asdrubal*, would be less in a condition to supply his brother *Hannibal*. *P. Scipio* brought with him thirty ships of war, 8000 *Roman* soldiers, and a great quantity of arms and provisions.

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
235 Cons.

Asdrubal being employed in the *Celtiberian* war, the two brothers with joint forces passed the *Iberus*, and advanced to *Saguntum* without seeing an enemy. This city *Hannibal* had rebuilt, placed a garrison in it, and assigned it for the residence of all the young noblemen, whom he had obliged their parents to put into his hands as pledges of their fidelity. There was then at *Saguntum* a *Spaniard* named *Abelox*, of a good family, and considerable interest in his country, and hitherto

Liv. B. 22.
c. 22.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 98.

name is thought to have been built by *Amilcar Barca* the father of the great *Hannibal*. The chief nations of *Tarraconia* were the *Celtiberi* beyond the river *Iberus*, the *Cantabri*, where *Biscay* now lyes, the *Carpetani*, whose capital was *Toledo*, and the *Overtani*, &c. Rollin. Hist. Anc. Tom. 1. p. 247.

Y. R. 536.
 Bef. Chr.
 216.
 235 Conf.

looked upon as firmly attached to the *Carthaginians*. This man seeing their affairs declining in *Spain*, while the *Romans* were daily gaining ground, began to think of going over to the prevailing party. But considering at the same time that a deserter, how well born soever, makes but an indifferent figure, unless he can gain himself credit, by some important services to his new friends, formed a scheme to put the young hostages into the hands of the *Romans*. At this time *Bostar* commanded the *Carthaginians* in those parts, having been sent by *Asdrubal* to hinder the *Scipio's* from passing the *Iberus*; but not daring to wait for them, he had retired to *Saguntum*, and encamped under its walls. *Bostar* was a good natured easy man, and placed great confidence in *Abelox*, which the latter abusing, insinuated to him that the *Romans* having now passed the *Iberus*, it would be no longer possible for the *Carthaginians* to keep *Spain* in obedience by fear; that *Saguntum* being threatened with a siege, he had an opportunity of attaching all the *Spaniards* to the interest of his republic, by restoring the hostages to their parents, who would think themselves under a perpetual obligation to him for so early providing for the safety of their children, and that if the *Romans* should by force or artifice get them into their hands, they would certainly act the part which he advised him to act, and by that means bring over many nations to their party. *Abelox* added, that if he was sent to conduct the hostages to their respective countries, he did not doubt but he should be able to represent the

the obligation in such a light to the *Spaniards*, as that they should continue firm to the interest of a Republic, who had given so eminent an example of her regard for her allies. The easy *Carthaginian*, deceived by an appearance of friendship, gave his consent to the proposal. *Abelox* hereupon stole away in the night to the *Roman* camp, acquainted the Pro-Consul with what he had done; and it was agreed between them that a detachment of *Romans* should lye in ambush the night following, and intercept the youths with their leader. The project was executed with success; and *Scipio*, by sending back the hostages to their relations, gained to himself a considerable interest in the country.

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
235 Conf.

To return to *Italy*: The Senate at *Rome* was attentive to every thing that concerned the interest of the Republic. To maintain her dignity, and preserve to her the respect of foreign nations, they sent to *Pineus* the *Illyrian* king for the annual tribute he had engaged to pay, and to *Philip* of *Macedon* to demand the treacherous *Demetrius*, who had sheltered himself in his dominions, and was exciting him to take advantage of the misfortunes of *Rome*, and make a descent upon *Italy*; at the same time she refused to accept a present of forty vases of gold from the city of *Naples*, that the world might see her finances were not exhausted.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 33.

Polyb. B. 5.
c. 101.
Liv. B. 22.
c. 32.

C H A P. XXI.

THIRD YEAR of the WAR.

BATTLE of CANNÆ.

Y. R. 536.

Bef. Chr.

216.

235 Conf.

Liv. B.

22. C. 34.

THE time for a new election of Consuls drawing on, and the present Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* not thinking it safe to leave the army, one of them, at the desire of the Senate, nominated a Dictator to hold the *comitia*. *L. Veturius Philo* was the person pitched upon, but as he seems to have been attached to the interests of the people, it was probably for this reason that the Senators made the Augurs find some defect with regard to religion, in his nomination. After fourteen days exercise of his office he was forced to abdicate; and an interregnum ensued. *P. Cornelius Asina*, one of the *interreges*, convened the *centuries*; and then amongst the candidates for the consulship appeared *C. Terentius Varro*, who had scarce any thing to recommend him but his hatred of the nobility, and the zeal he had lately shewn for advancing *Minucius* the General of the horse to an equal authority with the Pro-Dictator *Fabius*. The *Patricians*, as the most effectual way to disappoint the hopes of *Varro*, set up against him competitors of such known merit, both out of their own body, and from among the *Plebeians*, as must naturally prepossess the people in their favour. But *Varro* happened to have among the tribunes of the commons a re-

lation

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lation named *Q. Bebius Herennius*. This man, in a speech to the people, inveighed bitterly against the nobility. He asserted that it was the *Patricians* who had brought *Hannibal* into *Italy*; that an end might have been put to the war had not they fraudulently protracted it; and that the *Carthaginian* would never be conquered till a true *Plebeian*, not such a one as was only *Plebeian* by extraction, and being dignified and ranked among the nobility, had imbibed the patrician spirit, but a new man, not infected with their maxims, was at the head of the *Roman* armies. The people full of these impressions declared *Terentius Varro* Consul, and would name no other that day, that *Varro* might preside in the *comitia* for choosing his colleague. The nobility, vexed at their disappointment, prevailed with great difficulty upon *L. Æmilius Paullus*, an enemy to the *Plebeians* (on account of the affront they had put upon him after his victories in *Illyricum*) to offer himself as a candidate; and the other competitors yielding to him, he was chosen Consul in the next assembly. The other offices were bestowed with great judgment. *Servilius* and *Atilius* were directed to remain in quality of Pro-Consuls, at the head of the same armies they at present commanded. *P. Scipio* was continued Pro-Consul in *Spain*, *M. Cl. Marcellus* was appointed Prætor, in *Sicily*, and *L. Posthumius Albinus* in *Cis-Alpine Gaul*. All these, except *Terentius Varro*, had borne the same offices before; so careful were the *Romans* to have men of experience to conduct their affairs at so critical a time.

Y. R. 536.
Bef. Chr.
216.
235 Conf.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.
215.
236 Conf.

See pag.
203.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.
236. Conf.

B. 3. c.
107.

The Senate also in the present exigence augmented the army to eight legions (each consisting of 5000 foot and 300 horse) without reckoning the allies.

The usual practice (says *Polybius*) is to raise yearly but four legions, each of 4000 foot and 200 horse; and it is only in the most important conjunctures that these numbers are increased to 5000 and 300. The *infantry* furnished by the allies is only equal to that of the legions, but the *cavalry* twice the number of the *Roman* horse. Generally speaking each Consul has two legions and one half of the auxiliary forces, and commands his army separately, against a different enemy. It rarely happens that the four legions, with proportionable number of auxiliaries, are employed in the same expedition. But in *this* the *Romans* employed not only four but eight legions, so great was their apprehension of the impending danger.

* We read *thrice* in *Polybius*, doubtless through a mistake of the copyist. *Livy* says *twice*, and this must be the truth, otherwise the cavalry of the *Roman* army at the battle of *Cannæ* (which is going to be related) would have amounted to 9600, and *Polybius* himself says they were little more than 6000. Here again there must be some mistake, it should be *little more than 7000*: for reckoning 300 horse to each of the eight legions, and supposing the allies to have furnished double the Number that the *Romans* did, the whole amount will be 7200. and so *Livy*, who frequently copies *Polybius*, seems to have understood him in this place. Some historians, says he, write, that when the battle of *Cannæ* was fought the *Romans* were 87,200 strong (i. e. 80,000 foot and 7200 horse.) B. 22. c. 36.

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Though the Republic would not receive any presents from her dependents in *Italy*, she readily accepted at this time a very rich one from King *Hiero*, a statue of Victory of massy gold, and of great weight, 75,000 bushels of wheat, 50,000 bushels of barley, and a 1000 dartmen and slingers to oppose the *Baleares* and *Numidians*. The King's present was accompanied with an exhortation to the Senate to employ a fleet and some land forces to make a descent upon *Africa*. The *Conscript Fathers* returned him a grateful answer, and in pursuit of his advice ordered a reinforcement of twenty-five quinqueremes to *T. Otacilius* the Pro-Prætor in *Sicily*, (for *Marcellus* was not yet arrived there) giving him permission to carry the war into *Africa* if he thought proper. Before the Consuls took the field, the soldiers (which had never been done before) were *required* to take an oath to this effect, that they would assemble at the command of the Consuls, and not depart afterwards without leave; and whereas they had been accustomed *voluntarily* to swear that they would not forsake their ensigns through fear, nor go out of their ranks unless to take up a weapon, or to smite an enemy, or to save the life of a citizen, this oath also was now enjoined them by authority.

While these preparations were making at *Rome*, the army under the Pro-Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* continued to observe the motions of *Hannibal*. As those Generals had received orders from the Senate not to venture a battle, but only to train and discipline their men, and harass the

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.
236 Conf.

Livy, B.
22. c. 37.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 106.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.

236 Conf.

enemy by frequent skirmishes, all the spring passed, as the winter had done, without any considerable action on either side.

But the time of harvest being come, *Hannibal* decamped from *Geronium*, and to drive the enemy to the necessity of fighting, seized upon the castle of *Cannæ*, where the *Romans* had lodged the ammunition and provisions they had brought from *Canusium*. The town of *Cannæ* had been destroyed the last year; the castle was left standing, and *Hannibal*, by possessing himself of it, threw the *Roman* army into great perplexity: for beside being master of those provisions, he was now in a post which by its situation commanded all the adjacent country. The Pro-Consuls dispatched messenger after messenger to ask instructions from the Senate, concerning the measures they should take. In their letters they represented that the country all around was ruined, that it was impossible to advance near the enemy without being obliged to fight; and that all the allies, attentive to the uncertain state of things, were in suspense waiting the event. The Senate judged it expedient to come to a decisive action with the enemy, but wrote to *Servilius* and *Atilius* to defer it, till the Consuls (whom they now sent from *Rome*) were arrived in the camp. Great dependance had the *Fathers* on the virtue and abilities of *Æmilius*; and indeed his known prudence, and the eminent services he had done his country some years before in the *Illyrian* war, justified the confidence they reposed in him. At his departure from *Rome*, when they had represented

sented to him the great importance of the present occasion, they urged him to exert himself, as a true citizen mindful of the majesty of the *Roman* name. Nor was *Æmilius* wanting either of a just sense of his country's danger, or of the warmest zeal for its preservation: So that when he was arrived at the camp, and had assembled the soldiers to impart to them the pleasure of the Senate, he made use of all the arguments he could think of to restore their courage, much abated by so many preceding disasters. He told them that several good reasons might be assigned for the defeat of the *former* armies; but that no excuse could be found if *this* should fail of victory. That the soldiers of those armies were new raised men without discipline or experience, and entirely unacquainted with the sort of enemy they had to deal with: That those who fought at the *Trebia* were not recovered from the fatigue of their voyage from *Sicily* when they were led to battle: That at the lake *Thrasymenus* the *Romans*, so far from seeing the enemy before the battle, did not even see them during the conflict: That in none of the preceding engagements had there been two Consuls with two consular armies; but that now all circumstances were changed: "By frequent skirmishes with the enemy you have learned their manner of fighting. You have not only both the Consuls of the present year to conduct you, but both the Consuls of the last year, who have consented to continue with us and share the fortune of the day. With equal numbers you have seldom failed

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.
215.
236 Cons.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.

236 Conf.

" of beating the enemy in small engagements :
" It would be strange therefore, nay I think it
" impossible, that now when you are double
" their number you should be vanquished by
" them in a general action. But what need of
" further exhortation ? The fate of *Rome*, the
" preservation of whatever is dear to you, de-
" pends at this time upon your courage and re-
" solution."

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 100.

The next day the Consuls put their army in march towards the place where the *Carthaginians* were posted, and the day following pitched their camp within six miles of them. As it was a smooth plain, and the *Carthaginian* cavalry were far superior to the *Roman*, *Æmilius* judged it not proper to come to a battle in that situation. He was for drawing the enemy, if possible, to some ground where horse would have little opportunity to act. But the next day, it being

* *Livy* differs from *Polybius* with regard to the particulars that happened before the battle of *Cannæ*. The *Latin* historian tells us that *Hannibal* had not yet removed from *Geranium* when the Consuls began their march from *Rome*; that he had then scarce ten days provisions in his camp, that the *Spaniards* were ready to desert him, and that he himself had thoughts of running away into *Gaul* with his cavalry, and leaving his infantry to shift for themselves. He adds several other circumstances as little worth relating as these. And indeed, the accounts that he, *Appian*, and the later writers, give of these affairs, are intermixt with so many things evidently fabulous, and often inconsistent with one another, that in the text *Polybius* has been chiefly followed, who wrote the nearest to the times he speaks of, was himself a soldier, and whose history is the most consistent and the most judicious.

Varro's

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Bef. Chr.
215.
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Varro's turn to command, he, in spite of all that his colleague could say to dissuade him from it, decamped and drew nearer the enemy.

Hannibal with his cavalry and light armed foot advanced to meet him, fell furiously upon the *Romans* in their march, and put them into great disorder. *Varro*, when he had sustained this first shock, by means of some of the heavy armed foot, commanded his horse and dartmen to charge, and he had the prudence to mingle with these some of his legionaries; this gave him the advantage in the combat, to which the night at length put an end.

The day following, *Emilius*, who was against fighting, and yet could not safely retreat, encamped two thirds of his army along the *Aufidus*, which lay to their left. The other third he led over the river, and made them intrench themselves at the distance of about 1300 paces eastward from his greater camp, and at somewhat more than that distance from the camp of the enemy, which lay to the south. By this disposition he could protect his own foragers and distress those of the *Carthaginian*.

Hannibal foreseeing that these movements of the *Romans* would infallibly bring on a general action, thought it adviseable, before he came to that hazard, to animate his soldiers for the occasion; lest their late repulse should have left some impression of fear upon their minds. Having

¹ The *Aufidus* runs through the *Apennines* into the *Adriatic*, and is the only river in *Italy* which takes that course.

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Bef. Chr.215.
236 Conf.

called them together, he bid them cast their eyes over the country all around, and then tell him, "Whether, being superior as they were to the enemy in horse, they could possibly, had the Gods consulted their wishes, have desired any thing more to their advantage than to come to a decisive battle on such a spot." They all agreed that they could not have chosen better. He added, "Thank the Gods then who have brought your enemies hither, that you may triumph over them; and remember also your obligation to me for having reduced the *Romans* to the necessity of fighting: for, advantageous as the ground is to us, here fight they must, there is no avoiding it." He concluded with reminding them of their former exploits, and with assuring them that one victory more would give a period to all their labours, and put them in possession of all their hopes, the wealth of *Rome*, and the dominion of *Italy*.

The *Carthaginian* after this entrenched his forces on the west side of the *Ausidus*, where lay the greater camp of the *Romans*, and the next day but one drew out his army and presented battle. *Emilius* not liking the ground, and being persuaded that want of provisions would very soon oblige *Hannibal* to quit his post, declined the challenge, but took great care to have his two camps well fortified and guarded. *Hannibal*, after waiting a while in the field, returned to his intrenchments, and detached some of his *Numidians* to pass the *Ausidus*, and fall upon certain parties that from the *Roman* lesser camp were coming

coming to the river for water. The *Numidians* having easily put these to flight, advanced so far as to brave the *Romans* in their very camp; an insult so offensive to the soldiers in general as well as to *Varro*, that had it not been *Æmilius's* turn to command, those of the greater camp would have instantly crossed the river to join their fellows, and offer battle to the enemy. "Their impatience to fight, says *Polybius*, was extreme; for when men have once resolved upon a difficult and dangerous enterprize, no time seems so tedious as the space between the determination and the execution."

The same author tells us, that when the news came to *Rome* of the armies being near each other, and of their daily skirmishing and picqueering, the people, remembring their former defeats, were universally in the utmost anxiety and fear, well foreseeing the fatal consequences of a new overthrow; that they talked of nothing but oracles, extraordinary appearances, prodigies seen both in temples and in private houses; and that their whole time was spent in vows and supplications: He adds, "for in all public calamities and dangers the *Romans* are extremely careful to pacify the anger of the Gods; nor of the many religious ceremonies prescribed for such occasions, is there one, of which, how frivolous and impertinent soever it may appear, they think the practice unbecoming."

At sun-rise in the morning after the insult by the *Numidians*, *Varro*, having the command, led his troops of the greater camp over the *Aufidius*, and

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

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The battle
of Cannæ.
Polyb. B. 3.
c. 113.

Y. R. 537.

Bef. Chr.

215.

239 Conf.

* See B. 3.

c. 10. §. 6.

and joining them to those of the lesser, drew them up in the plain after the accustomed manner *, excepting that, in all the three lines, the battalions stood closer, and those in the first line were deeper than usual. The *Roman* knights, commanded by *Æmilius*, formed the right wing close to the river; the cavalry of the allies, under *Terentius Varro*, made the left. The Pro-Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius* led the main body consisting of 70,000 foot; for *Varro* had left 10,000 men in the greater camp, with orders to attack that of *Hannibal* when the armies should be engaged.

The *Carthaginian* no sooner perceived the *Romans* in motion, but he sent over the *Aufidus* his slingers and the other light armed foot. The rest of the army followed, passing the river at two different places. He drew up his forces in one front. To face the *Roman* knights he posted his *Spanish* and *Galic* cavalry in his left wing;

Plutarch reports that *Varro's* confidence and his numerous army alarmed the *Carthaginians*; that *Hannibal* with a small company went out to take a view of the *Romans*, and that one of his followers, called *Gisco*, saying to him, that the number of the enemy was very astonishing; *Hannibal* with a serious countenance answered, *There is something yet more astonishing which you take no notice of, That in all that multitude there is not one man whose name is Gisco.* This jest made all the company laugh, who telling it to every one they met in their return, the laughter was continued till they reached the camp. The army seeing *Hannibal* and his Attendants come back laughing, imagined that without doubt this mirth proceeded from the good posture of their affairs, and their contempt of the enemy, which did not a little raise the spirits of the soldiers.

next

next these were placed one half of his *African* infantry, then the *Spanish* and *Gallic* foot, then the other half of his *Africans*; and the *Numidian* horse made his right wing.

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Bef. Chr.
215.
236 Conf.

The *Africans* were armed after the *Roman* manner, out of the spoils taken from the enemy in former battles. The *Gauls*, naked from the waist upward, and the *Spaniards*, clothed in linen jackets trimmed with purple, were armed each after the manner of their country. They had shields alike; but the *Gauls* used long broad swords fit only for cutting strokes, and at a certain distance; the *Spaniards* short and well pointed blades proper both for striking and thrusting. The cohorts of these two nations being ranged alternately, this medley of troops of such different appearances, is said to have been terrible to behold. Strong of body, and furious in charging were the *Gauls*, but accustomed to spend their violence at the first brunt; the *Spaniards* less eager and more wary, were neither ashamed to give ground when over-matched, nor afraid to return and renew the fight whenever it was practicable. As the impetuosity of the one, and the patience of the other, served mutually to reduce each of them to a good and firm temper, so the place which they held in this battle added confidence to them both; For they saw themselves well and strongly flanked by the *Africans*, whose name was grown terrible in *Spain* by their conquests, and in *Gaul* by this their present war. *Asdrubal* commanded the cavalry of the left wing, *Hanno* * the right; and *Hannibal* with his brother

* Livy says
Maharbal.

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Bef. Chr.215.
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brother *Mago* took the conduct of the main body : This amounted to about 40,000 foot ; the horse were 10,000. The armies were neither of them incommoded by the rising sun, the *Romans* facing to the south, their enemies to the north.

The action began with the skirmishing of the velites or light armed troops, with little advantage to either side. During this skirmish the *Roman* knights came to an engagement with the *Spanish* and *Gallic* cavalry. Being shut in by the river on one side, and by their own infantry on the other, they could practise none of the evolutions and returns commonly used in fight by the horse in those days. There was no way but to bear forward in a right line ; and both parties rushing violently on, the men came at length to grapple with one another, and many of them, their horses running from under them, fell to the ground, whence starting up again they fought on foot. In conclusion, the *Roman* cavalry were overborne and forced to recoil. This the Con-

Sir W. R.

sul *Æmilius* could by no means remedy, for *Asdrubal* with his boisterous *Gauls* and *Spaniards* was not to be resisted by the *Roman* knights, unequal both in number and horsemanship. The greater part of them, after they had defended themselves with the utmost bravery, were slain upon the spot, and most of the remainder, in their flight along the river ; for *Asdrubal* gave no quarter.

Before this rout was quite finished, the heavy armed infantry on both sides joined battle. *Hannibal*, in advancing against the enemy, had caused

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ed his *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, who held the middle of his line (and probably ^w made nine tenths of it) to march, some faster some slower, so as by degrees to form the figure of a *crescent*, the *convex* side towards the *Romans*, and the extreme points touching the *Africans* to the right and left. The middle or most prominent part of the curve being the thickest ^x (as its figure of a *crescent* implies) and the best strengthened against all impression, sustained the shock of the enemy for some time, with great bravery and steadiness; till the *Roman* center, reinforced by some battalions from the wings, compelled, by its very weight, the curve to yield: but by the artful management of *Hannibal*, this curve so yielded and bent inward as at length to form a new curve, the *concave* side towards the enemy. The *Roman* legions following their supposed victory, and pressing still forward against the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, who continued retiring before them, came insensibly between the two bodies of *African* infantry, which had not yet moved from their

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^w The reason for this opinion will be given hereafter.

^x *Polybius* (B. 3. c. 115.) tells us that the *Gauls* were *thinly* ranged, and therefore easily broken. But if this be meant of the *whole crescent*, how will it accord with the stout fight which he himself says the *Gauls* maintained, or with the necessity which the *Roman* center, already deep, was under of being strengthened by draughts from the wings, in order to break that *crescent*. I imagine therefore, that *Polybius* speaks here of the *sides* only of the *crescent*, the parts towards the horns, and not of the middle part, which though thick and strong, was already broken by the superior weight of the *Roman* center.

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posts, and the depth ¹ of whose files was, perhaps, at first concealed by the sides of the concave into which the *Romans* entered, and was but gradually discovered in proportion as the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* recoiled. The two bodies of *Africans*, as the conjuncture itself dictated, facing one to the right, the other to the left, attacked the *Romans* in flank, so that these could fight no longer in *the order* ² of a *phalanx* (which form they had taken during the conflict) but were obliged to divide themselves into platoons

¹ Neither *Livy* nor *Polybius* say any thing of the proportion which the number of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* bore to that of the *Africans*; nor whether the *African* battalions were longer in rank or in file. Nor do they give us any light concerning those wonderful movements, by which *Hannibal* could, without confusion, form his center from a strait line into a crescent, the convex to the enemy; and afterwards, without confusion, invert its figure.

² Chevalier *Folard* (tom. 4. p. 377.) from this expression of *Polybius*, triumphantly concludes that the *Romans* were originally drawn up by *Varro* in a *phalange coupée*, that is, says the Chevalier, in columns with small intervals between them. The inference is not well deduced. For, supposing the *Romans* to have been ranged at first in three lines as usual, yet *Polybius* might well speak of them as in the order of a phalanx at this time. It was the constant practice for all the three lines to form themselves into one phalanx, whenever it happened that neither the first alone, nor the first and second united, could make any impression on the enemy. And that this was the present case with the center of the *Roman* army is plain from the necessity the Generals were under of bringing some battalions from the wings to strengthen it. If the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* of the center, united in one phalanx, had not failed in the attempt to break *Hannibal's* crescent, what occasion could there be of adding strength to them from the wings?

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or small bodies, to make head against those unexpected enemies.

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The Consul *Æmilius*, after the defeat of his cavalry, seeing that all depended upon the foot, had by this time put himself among the legionaries, animating them both by words and example. *Hannibal* acted the like part among the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, the conduct of whom he had taken upon himself from the beginning.

Hitherto there had nothing of moment happened between the *Numidian* horse and the cavalry of the *Roman* allies, commanded by *Varro*; for the former would neither give nor sustain any charge: yet by making frequent offers, they kept their enemies so employed as to hinder them from assisting the legions. But now the last and fatal blow, which completed the destruction of the *Roman* army, was given by the same hand that gave the first. For *Asdrubal*, having cut in

* According to *Livy*, when the two armies were just ready to join battle, 500 of these *Numidians* came galloping away from their fellows, with their shields cast behind their backs (as was the manner of those that yielded) and throwing down their arms, surrendered themselves. *Varro* had not leisure to examine them, but thinking them really disarmed, ordered them behind the lines. In the heat of the battle, these pretended deserters, having short swords under their jackets, flew upon the hindmost of the *Romans*, while all eyes and thoughts were bent another way, so that they did great mischief, and caused yet a greater terror. *Polybius* mentions nothing of this, which he would hardly have omitted had there been any foundation for it. Nor does he say any thing of a certain wind called *Vulturinus*, which, according to the *Latin* historian, proved very pernicious to the *Romans*, by blowing dust in their eyes.

pieces

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pieces almost all the horse of the *Roman* right wing, hastened to the assistance of the *Numidians*. The cavalry of the *Roman* left wing, perceiving his approach, did not wait to be attacked. They immediately fled. Hereupon *Asdrubal* ordering the light *Numidians*, as fittest for that service, to pursue them, turned with his *Spanish* and *Gallic* horse upon the rear of the *Roman* main body, which by this means was entirely surrounded. Then was the slaughter dreadful, and then fell the Consul ^b *Æmilius* quite covered with wounds,

^b *Livy* tells us that *Æmilius* had been wounded in the action between the cavalry, yet being assisted by those of the *Roman* knights who had escaped from *Asdrubal*, he made head against *Hannibal*, and restored the fight in several places. At length, unable through weakness to manage his horse, he was obliged to dismount; his attendants did the like, and it being told *Hannibal* that the Consul had ordered his cavalry to quit their horses, he is reported to have said jestingly, *I had rather he had delivered them to me bound*. *Livy* adds, what is hard to be conceived, that some of the *Roman* knights, when they saw the battle irrecoverably lost, remounted their horses and escaped. One of them, *Cn. Lentulus*, a legionary tribune, galloping along, found the Consul covered with blood, and sitting upon a stone. *Lentulus* entreated him to rise and save himself, offering him his horse; but *Æmilius* refused it, exhorting the tribune to shift for himself, and not to lose time, adding, that it was not his purpose to be brought again into judgment by the people; be an accuser of his colleague, or be himself charged with that day's loss. He further desired *Lentulus* to give the Senate notice to fortify *Rome*, and to tell *Fabius* that he had been mindful of his counsel to the last. The Consul had no sooner uttered these words, but first a multitude of his own men in the rout, and then the enemy in the pursuit came upon him: the latter, not knowing who he was, dispatched him with their darts. *Lentulus* escaped by the swiftness of his horse.

nobly

nobly discharging in this conclusion of his life, as in all the former parts of it, the duties of a good citizen. The *Romans*, encompassed on all sides, faced every way, and held out for some time: But the outermost ranks of their orb being still mowed down, they were gradually forced into a narrow compass, and becoming at length a mere throng, unable to wield their arms, were all put to the sword^c.

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During

^c THE ACCOUNTS transmitted to us by *Polybius* and *Livy* of the battle of *Cannæ*, are not sufficiently full and clear to convey to those who read them at this distance of time, distinct and satisfactory ideas of what passed in that memorable day; but have left much room for conjecture.

In the plans that are commonly given by the moderns of this battle, the *infantry* of the two armies are equal in front. *Hannibal's* center which he formed into a crescent, the *convex* side towards the enemy, makes but *one third* of his line of foot. How then came it to pass, that this crescent, when it yielded and retreated, so as gradually to invert its figure, and present a *concave* to the enemy, drew after it, and within it, *more* of the *Roman* infantry than had stood opposite to it, when the armies first faced each other? This may be answered from *Polybius*, who tells us, that during the conflict between the centers of the two armies, the *Romans*, by draughts from their wings, thickened or deepened their center, which therefore broke, by its very weight, the *Carthaginian* center or crescent, consisting of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*. He adds, that the *Romans* pressing unwarily after those *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, came at length between the *two bodies* of *African* infantry; which by a conversion, one to the right, and the other to the left, instantly pressed the *Romans* on their flanks; and that *Asdrubal* soon after came thundering upon their backs with his victorious cavalry.

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During this slaughter of the *Roman* foot, the *Numidians* were pursuing *Terentius* and the horse of

All this is conceivable and credible: and we here see how not only the cohorts that were originally in the *Roman* center, but those which were drawn from the wings to deepen it, became totally encompassed by the enemy; by the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* in front, by the *Africans* in flank, and by *Asdrubal* in the rear.

But the great difficulty still remains: For it is generally agreed (and indeed *Polybius's* words seem to import) that the ~~whole~~, or almost the ~~whole~~ of the *Roman* infantry, in one deep phalanx, pressed after the retiring *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, and so became at length wedged between the two bodies of *Africans*. Now, how could this happen, if the *space between those two bodies* was but *one third* of *Hannibal's* line of foot? For is it credible, that the *Roman* Generals could be so infatuated as, in the heat of the battle, to contract the front of their army to one third of its first extent, draw ALL the battalions of the wings to the center, and leave no troops to oppose the two wings (two thirds) of *Hannibal's* line, that were standing before them in battle array? And if those Generals, to deepen their center, only *thinned* their wings (as *Chevalier Folard* supposes) what advantage could *Hannibal* hope from drawing the *Roman* center within his two wings? Since these wings, while employed in attacking the flanks of that center, would themselves be exposed to be attacked both in flank and rear by the remainder of the *Roman* wings; which, if we suppose them diminished by *one half*, were still equal in number of men to the *Carthaginian* wings.

It would seem therefore that the plans which represent *Hannibal's* crescent, as making but *one third* of his line, must be extremely faulty.

Chevalier Folard, though he speaks as if he were a perfect master of the subject, is as unsatisfactory in his account of the battle as any writer before him. His plan of it (tom. 4. p. 391.) represents *Hannibal's* curve, as but *one third* of his line.

of the left wing. Of all the *Roman* cavalry seventy only escaped with the Consul to *Venusia*,
and

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line of foot: but being aware of the *small number* of *Africans* in the *Carthaginian* army, much too small to make the other *two thirds* of the line (as they do in the *Jesuits* plan) he represents the curve as consisting of only a *part* of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*; the remainder of which troops stand extended to the right and left from the horns of the crescent, and between it and the *Africans*, who make only the extremities of the line, or the outer parts of the wings.

The employment which the Chevalier finds for these wings, is not to give upon the flanks of the *Romans* that were advanced within the hollow of the inverted curve, but to wheel, extend themselves, and attack both in flank and rear the *Roman* wings, which he supposes to be still subsisting, though much weakened by the imprudence of their leaders.

This account of the action has not the least foundation in *Polybius*, who does not say, that the *Romans* of the center; by rashly pursuing the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of *Hannibal's* crescent, came between other *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of his wings (as they must do according to the Chevalier's plan) but between the two bodies of *Africans*. The *Africans* are the only troops the historian speaks of as coming upon the flanks of the *Romans*. Nor does he say any thing of the *Africans* wheeling and extending themselves to attack the *Roman* wings in flank and rear, but that turning or inclining (*κλιναντες*) one part of them to the shield, the other to the spear, i. e. one facing or turning to the right, the other to the left, they pressed upon the flanks of those *Romans* that were pursuing the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* of *Hannibal's* crescent or center.

The *Roman* wings, says the Chevalier, still subsisted, though much weakened by the draughts made from them. I know not how much the Chevalier would allow them to be weakened. But if we suppose them to be diminished by one half, they were still equal, (as I said before) in number of men to the *Carthaginian* wings; and it is hardly
Z 2
credible

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and about three hundred more into other neighbouring towns, two thousand were taken prisoners, the rest were slain.

The

credible that the *Roman* wings having at this time no enemies to contend with but the *Carthaginian* wings, should stand still while these were wheeling and extending themselves to come upon their flank and rear; or that the *Carthaginians* should find their account in such an attempt.

I shall observe, by the way, that *Polybius* never speaks of any part of the *Roman* army being attacked in rear by the *Carthaginian* foot. This was left for *Asdrubal* and his horse, who could hardly have performed this part without riding over the *Africans*, had these inclosed the *Romans* behind.

What seems to have driven the Chevalier into all these deviations from his author, is his fundamental error of forming *Hannibal's* crescent out of but *one third* of his line.

Sir Walter Raleigh has gone into the other extreme. To account for the *whole Roman army's* being inclosed by the enemy, he supposes that *Hannibal's* crescent was of such extent, as to make his *whole front*; that the *Romans* saw nothing before them but that crescent; that the *Africans* (deep in file) were hid behind its two corners, and not discovered by the *Romans* till they were attacked by them.

"For it is agreed, says he, that the *Romans* were encompassed *unawares*, and that they behaved themselves as men who thought upon no other work than what was found them by the *Gauls*. Neither is it credible, that they would have been so mad, as to run headlong with the whole bulk of their army into the throat of slaughter, had they seen those weapons bent against them at the first, which when they did see, they had little hope to escape. Much might be imputed to their heat of fight, and rashness of inferior captains: but since the Consul *Paulus*, a man so expert in war, being vanquished in horse, had put himself among the legions, it cannot be supposed that he and they did wilfully thus engage themselves."

That

The whole of the infantry that had been in the battle, was cut off except about 3000 who

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Livy, B. 22.
c. 49.

That *Hannibal's* crescent of *Gauls* and *Spaniards* made the whole of his front, cannot be reconciled with *Polybius* or *Livy*, who expressly relate, that the *Carthaginian* drew up all his infantry in one line, of which the *Africans* made the two points or wings; and *Polybius* more than once in describing the action, calls this crescent τὰ μέσα the middle or center of *Hannibal's* battalia, and the *Africans* are spoke of, not as hid, but as appearing to the enemy armed after the *Roman* manner.

But it is not credible, says Sir *Walter*, that the *Romans* would have been so mad as to run with the whole bulk of their army between the *Africans*, had they seen them at first.

I will not pretend to remove this difficulty. All I can aim at, is, in some measure to lessen it.

Hannibal's infantry is said to have consisted of about 40,000 men, extended at first in one strait line. Of this line the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* (who afterwards formed themselves into a crescent) made the middle or center, and the *Africans* the wings. Now if that middle part, instead of being but one third, was at least nine tenths of the line, as there is good reason to believe, it will much lessen our wonder, that the *Romans*, when they had forced that middle part to give ground, should imagine themselves secure of the victory, and unwarily engage themselves between the *Africans*, who made so narrow a front, as only a tenth of the *Carthaginian* line, that is to say, at each extremity a twentieth.

That the *Africans* made but a very narrow front, in respect of the rest of the line, may, I think, be fairly collected from the small number to which we are obliged to reduce them, and from the manner in which it is reasonable to believe they were drawn up.

It cannot be supposed that the *Africans* amounted to above 8000 men. *Hannibal* brought into *Italy* but 20,000 foot, of which number 12,000 only were *Africans**, and the other 8000 *Spaniards*. At the battle of the *Trebia*, his heavy armed infantry, *Spaniards*, *Africans*, and *Gauls*, were

* See p.
256.

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^d who fled, most of them to *Canusium*. Among the dead were, beside the Consul *Æmilius*, the two

but 20,000 in all. He lost some of his *Africans* in this battle, some at the lake *Thrasymenus*; and doubtless the *Africans* suffered with the rest of the troops in their march through the fens of *Hetruria*, and in their other fatigues. *Hannibal* had now been three years in *Italy*, and had received no recruits from *Africa*; and from all these considerations we may well conclude, that his *Africans* were diminished by one third at least, before the battle of *Canne*.

Now supposing the *Africans* to be but 8000 of *Hannibal's* 40,000 foot, and supposing his battalia to be every where of equal depth, it is plain that the *Africans* could make no more than one fifth part of the *Carthaginian* front, or one tenth of it at each extremity of the line. But if we consider, that *Hannibal's* intention, from the beginning of the day, was to draw the bulk of the *Roman* army between his *Africans*, it is reasonable to believe that he so disposed those *Africans* as to hide their strength as much as possible; and that he gave them no more extent in front, than was necessary to be their depth when they should face, one part of them to the right, and the other to the left, to attack the flanks of the *Romans* pressing after the retiring *Gauls* and *Spaniards*; and if so, it is probable that the front, which the *Africans* made, was not so much as a tenth part of the line, or, at each extremity a twentieth. And this being granted, it will not be so astonishing that the bulk of the *Roman* army should run precipitately between them. That the whole did, strictly speaking, engage themselves between the *Africans*, I do not conceive necessary to be supposed, in order to account for the event of the battle. For it seems from *Polybius's* relation, that none of those who did so engage themselves, escaped destruction. Yet we find, according to the same author, that 3000 of the *Roman* foot escaped from the battle, and according to *Livy*, a much greater number. These might be of the troops that were in the points of the *Roman* battalia, and who probably took

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two Pro-Consuls *Servilius* and *Atilius*, *M. Minucius* late Master of the horse to *Fabius*, two military Quæstors, twenty-nine legionary Tribunes, with eighty persons who had either been Senators, or had born such offices as entitled them to be chosen into the Senate. Those of the infantry who were taken prisoners had not been in the fight. *Varro*, by the advice of *Æmilius*, had left 10,000 foot in his greater camp, with orders to

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Polyb. B. 3.
c. 117.

took to their heels as soon as they saw *Asdrubal* with his horse coming upon the rear of the legions.

d *Dionysius* of *Halicarnassus* agrees nearly with *Polybius* as to the number of men the Romans lost in this battle. Of 6000 horse (says he, *Antiquit. B. 2. p. 37.*) there remained only 370, and of 80,000 foot there escaped somewhat more than 3000. But *Livy* differs from *them*, and is not very consistent with himself. According to the first account he gives, the sum total of those that were slain and taken prisoners amounts to about 59,400, and of those that escaped to about 5670. In which reckonings (supposing, as he seems to do, that the whole Roman army at *Cannæ* consisted of 87,200 men) there are above 18,000 omitted. He afterwards tells us (*B. 22. c. 45, 49.*) that there were got together of the fugitives 10,000 at *Canusium*, and 4070 at *Venusia*. In this case the number of the prisoners and the slain would be 73,130. But (*c. 56.*) he makes *Varro* write to the Senate from *Canusium* (after he had brought to that place those that had fled to *Venusia*) that the whole remains of the Roman army were only 10,000 men. And yet in the same book (*c. 60.*) *M. Torquatus* tells the Senate, that if the captives who petitioned to be ransomed, and who (as one of themselves had said a little before) amounted to 8000 men, were added to the forces at *Canusium*, the republic would have there an army of 20,000 men. According to *Appian*, the whole Roman army at *Cannæ* consisted of 70,000 foot and 6000 horse, of which 50,000 were slain, a great number taken prisoners, and about 10,000 escaped to *Canusium*.

In Hannibal. c. 323.

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 Bef. Cur.
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attack the camp of *Hannibal* during the battle. The Consul's view in this was, to oblige the *Carthaginian* either to abandon his baggage, or to leave a greater part of his forces to guard it than he could well spare from the general action. The design so far succeeded, that *Hannibal* was just upon the point of losing his camp, when (after his victory in the field) he came to the assistance of the few troops he had left to defend it. Upon his approach, the assailants fled to their own entrenchments; where being invested, they surrendered themselves prisoners, after they had lost 2000 of their number *.

Hannibal's

* *Livy* relates that 7000 *Romans* fled out of the battle to the lesser camp, 10,000 to the greater, and that 2000 took refuge in the village of *Cannæ*. These last were immediately surrounded by *Carthalo*, and taken prisoners. The soldiers in the greater camp, who were without leaders, and but half-armed, sent a messenger to those in the lesser, desiring they would come over to them in the night, that they might march together and take refuge in *Canusum*, a city not far distant. But the troops in the little camp could not be prevailed upon to hearken to this proposal, fearing to be intercepted by the enemy in their passage. Nevertheless 600 of them, encouraged by *Sempronius Tuditanus*, a legionary tribune who commanded them, drew themselves up in the form of a wedge, and casting their shields upon their right arms, to defend themselves from the darts of the *Numidians*, to which they were exposed upon that side, made their way through the enemy to the great camp, from whence, in conjunction with another large body, they escaped to *Canusum*. Next day *Hannibal* having invested the little camp, the *Romans* surrendered upon terms. They had leave to depart each with one garment, upon paying a certain ransom. In the mean time about 4000 foot and

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Hannibal's loss of men on this important day amounted to no more than 4000 Gauls and Spaniards, 1500 Africans, and 200 horse^f.

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The consequence of this victory (says *Polybius*) was such as both parties had expected^g.

Polyb. B.
3. c. 118.

Hannibal

200 horse escaped from the great camp in straggling parties to *Canusium*. The rest yielded upon the conditions granted to those of the little camp.

^f According to the *Latin* historian the loss of the *Carthaginians* amounted to 8000 men.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 52.

^g *Livy* thinks it might reasonably have been expected that *Hannibal* should have taken *Rome* immediately after the battle of *Cannæ*. When the *Carthaginian* officers (says that author) flocked round their General, congratulating him on his victory, and advising him to spend the rest of that day, and the following night, in refreshing himself and his wearied Troops, *Maharbal*, on the contrary, pressed him not to lose a moment's time. *That you may know* (said he) *the importance of this victory, follow me, I will instantly march away with the cavalry, and be at Rome before they have notice of my coming. In five days we shall sup in the capitol.* *Hannibal* commended his zeal, but told him that what he had proposed was of too great moment to be suddenly resolved upon, and that he would take time to consider of it. *Nay then* (said *Maharbal*) *I find that no one man is endued by the Gods with all talents. Hannibal knows how to conquer, but he knows not how to make advantage of his victories.* It is generally believed (adds *Livy*) that this day's delay was the preservation of the city and empire of *Rome*.

B. 22. c.
51.

Several of the antients have joined with *Livy* in blaming *Hannibal* for not laying siege to *Rome* without delay, but whether justly or not may very well be a question. If the advantages he had gained were, as *Polybius* says, chiefly owing to the superiority of his cavalry, those could be of little use in a siege, and the *Roman* infantry not inferior to his, would be invincible behind walls. *Rome* was provided with every thing necessary to sustain a siege. After the

Y. R. 537. Hannibal became master of almost all Great
 Bef. Chr. Greece.

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the battle of *Thrasymen*, its fortifications had been repaired, (*Liv.* B. 22. c. 8.) and *Polybius* takes notice of the care of the Senate upon the present occasion to put the city in a posture of defence, (B. 3. c. 118.) *Rome* abounded with soldiers well trained to war. *Livy* speaks of four new legions and 1000 horse raised in the city by *Junius Pera*, who was made Dictator immediately after the battle of *Cannæ*. (*Liv.* B. 22. c. 57.) And exclusive of these the same Dictator led out an army of 25,000 men (*id.* B. 23. c. 14.) which he would not have done, had not he thought he had left troops enough in the town to defend it. *Marcellus* had also sent from *Ostia* 1500 men to strengthen the garrison of *Rome* (*Liv.* B. 22. c. 57.)

Now what forces had *Hannibal* to bring against so powerful a city? His army after the battle of *Cannæ* consisted of scarce 45,000 men, 9800 of which were cavalry. He was moreover intirely unprovided of implements for carrying on a siege. And had he marched directly to *Rome*, it is not probable any of the nations of *Italy* would have gone over to him. At most they would have waited the issue of the siege, in which, if he had not succeeded, they would have been the less disposed to venture themselves under his protection. Nor perhaps would it have been prudent in him, when not one city in *Italy* had declared for him, to neglect the other towns (that were beginning to waver in their fidelity to the *Romans*) to go and besiege the capital; especially since his hopes of success in this undertaking must have depended more on the terror of his name, than the force of his arms. And that both these would have been insufficient seems plain from the little effect they had upon *Nola* and *Naples*, which cities were twice in vain attempted by *Hannibal* soon after his victory at *Cannæ*, (*Liv.* B. 23. c. 1, 14, 16.) *Nuceria* also and *Casilinum*, two considerable towns, gave him a great deal of trouble before he could reduce them. The latter held out more than a whole winter, though defended by only 960 men. (*Liv.* B. 23. c. 15, 17, 18, 19.)

Add to this, that had *Hannibal* laid siege to *Rome*, it is not likely that the *Latin* nations, and those other of the allies who

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Greece^b. Nay, the *Carthaginians* were not without hope, by some sudden stroke, to possess themselves of *Rome*. The *Romans*, on the other hand, despaired of being able to retain the dominion of *Italy*, and, every moment expecting to hear of *Hannibal's* approach, were in the utmost anxiety for themselves and for their country. The Senators nevertheless preserved their fortitude and dignity; they all zealously applied themselves to put the city in a posture of defence, and did every thing that could be done for the common safety. And though the *Ro-*

who always continued steady to her interest, would have quietly looked on till the city had been taken. And that these allies were not yet exhausted of soldiers, is plain from the great levies made among them in the course of this war. In the Dictatorship of *Junius Pera*, just after the defeat at *Cannæ*, the *Roman* armies in *Italy* (reckoning the remains of *Cannæ* at 10,000) amounted to above 84,000 men, as appears from *Livy*, B. 22. c. 57. and B. 23. c. 14. The year after, the Republic had twelve legions on foot, and the year after that eighteen legions (*Liv.* B. 24. c. 11.) The third year after the battle they had twenty-one legions, and the fourth, viz. in the Consulship of *Q. Fulvius Flaccus* and *Appius Claudius Pulcher*, twenty-three Legions. (*Liv.* B. 25. c. 3.)

Upon the whole, *Livy's* censure of *Hannibal's* conduct seems not well founded, and the rather as we do not find that *Polybius* has any where blamed him upon this article.

^b The nations that revolted to the *Carthaginians* after the battle of *Cannæ* are thus reckoned up by *Livy* (B. 22. c. 61.) The *Atellani*, *Calatini* and *Hirpini*, part of *Apulia*, the *Samnites* except the *Pentri*, all the *Bruttians*, the *Lucanians*, the *Surrentini*, and almost all *Great Greece*, the *Tarentines*, *Metapontines*, *Crotonienses*, *Locri*, and all the *Cisalpine Gauls*.

mans

mans were now undoubtedly vanquished, and yielded, for the present, in military glory, to their enemies, yet by their courage, steadiness, and unwearied labours, the wisdom of their counsels, and the constitution of their government, they not only recovered the empire of *Italy*, but totally subdued the *Carthaginians*, and in a few years after became lords of the world.

C H A P. XXII.

The extreme terror, with which the Romans were struck, by their defeat at Cannæ. Their reception of Terentius Varro at Rome. They refuse to redeem the prisoners. Hannibal gets possession of Capua, and winters there. He sends to Carthage an account of his victories. The Romans create a Dictator for the sole affair of filling the many vacant places in their Senate.

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Liv. B. 22.
c. 53.

AMONG those *Romans*, who had fled from the late battle to *Canusium*, were four le-
gionary Tribunes. Of these the soldiers chose two, to be their chief commanders, *Appius Claudius Pulcher* and *P. Cornelius Scipio*, the son of the Pro-Consul in *Spain*. Whilst *Scipio* (who was now about nineteen years of age) was deliberating with his colleague, and some others, what measures to take, notice was brought them, that certain young men of the best families of *Rome*, at the head of whom was *L. Cecilius Metellus*, giving all up for lost, had resolved to embark at the first port, and fly from *Italy*.

So

So base a thought stirred up *Scipio's* indignation. Turning therefore to the company, he said, *Let those who value the preservation of Rome follow me.* Y. R. 537.
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They all went immediately to the house where the young Patricians were assembled. *Scipio*, as he entered their chamber, *I swear*, said he, drawing his sword, *that I will never abandon the Republic, nor consent that any of her citizens forsake her; I call the great Jupiter to witness this my oath:* And then addressing himself to *Metellus*, he added, *Do you, Metellus, and all that are here present, take the same oath, or not a man of you shall escape this sword.* His look, his action, his menaces so terrified them all, that they readily came into the engagements he required.

The consternation and despondency of the people at *Rome* almost equalled those of *Metellus* and his companions. For it was there currently reported that both the Consuls were killed, and their armies so entirely destroyed, that not an officer, nor hardly a single soldier remained alive; and that *Hannibal* was master of *Apulia*, *Samnium*, and all *Italy*. The *Conscript Fathers*, the pilots of the state, did not, however, leave the helm because the storm blew high. For want of Consuls the two *Prætors* assembled them. As *Fabius's* cunctation, that lingering war, he had counselled and practised against *Hannibal*, was discovered, by the present calamity, to have been the dictate of wisdom, he now was principally listened to. He advised, that some horsemen well mounted should be sent out upon the *Appian* and *Latine* roads, to learn,
if

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if possible, of such as they met, the true state of affairs, what was become of the Consuls; to what place the remains of the army, if there were any, had retreated; where *Hannibal* was encamped; what he was doing, and what he designed to do: That the women should be forbid to appear in public, disturbing the city with their lamentations: That when any courier arrived, he should be brought privately and without noise to the Prætors; and that no person should be suffered to go out of the city.

Not long after, a messenger arrived from *Terentius*; his letters imported that the *Roman* army had been defeated; that his colleague *Æmilius* was slain; that he himself was retired to *Canusium*, where he was assembling the remains of the troops; that about 10,000 men of different corps, and for the most part without officers, had joined him; and that *Hannibal* was still at *Cannæ*¹.

At the same time a bark arrived from *Sicily* with advice from the Pro-Prætor *Otacilius*, that one *Carthaginian* squadron was ravaging the coast

¹ *Livy* says that *Hannibal*, after this famous battle, acted more like a man that had finished his conquests than one that had a war to carry on, and that he was sitting at *Cannæ* bargaining about his plunder and the captives, in a manner very unbecoming a great General (*Liv. B. 22. c. 56, 58.*) If this be not a calumny, at least the *Carthaginian* did not continue long thus employed; for the same author begins his 23d book by telling us, that *Hannibal*, after the battle of *Cannæ*, having taken and plundered the *Roman* camps, marched immediately (*confestim*) from *Apulia* into *Samnum*.

of *Syracuse*, while another appeared off the *Ægates* ready to make a descent at *Lilybæum*; and that it was necessary to send a fleet thither with all speed. The *Conscript Fathers*, not dejected at these additional cares, prepared for the defence both of *Italy* and *Sicily*. *Marcellus*, appointed Prætor for the last named province, and now at *Ostia* aboard the fleet, was ordered to resign the conduct of it to *P. Furius Philus*, the Prætor *Peregrinus*, and to go and take upon him the command of the army at *Canusium*. As for *Terrentius Varro*, the Senate recalled him to *Rome*; and nothing has been more wondered at, than the respect with which he was received at his arrival. Multitudes of people of all ranks went out to meet him, and the Senate returned him thanks for that he had not despaired of the commonwealth. How different this conduct, says *Livy*, from that of the *Carthaginians*, who were wont to put their unsuccessful Generals to the most cruel deaths *!

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.
215.
236 Conf.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 61.

As.

* The Reception *Varro* met with at *Rome*, and his being afterwards intrusted with the command of an army, seem to have been the effects of just policy in the *Romans*. This General had done nothing irregular, nothing contrary to orders. The Senate and people had sent him to fight *Hannibal*, not to follow him at a distance like *Fabius*. *Æmilius*, it is true, was against fighting at that time; and he was an able General. But what then? *Varro* was not obliged to follow his advice. In a dispute they had had a little before about marching, *Æmilius* had no officer of his opinion, except the late Consul *Servilius*, as we are informed by *Livy*. And there is reason to think that it was not only

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Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.215.
236 Conf.

As the present situation of things required an absolute magistrate to govern the state, *M. Junius Pera* was, by the authority of the Senate, named Dictator, and *Sempronius Gracchus* to be his General of the horse. *Junius* made it his whole business to put the army in a condition to resist the enemy. Four legions and a thousand horse were raised among the citizens of *Rome*. The two *Latiums*, the *Municipia*, and the colonies furnished their contingents as usual; and to all these were added 8000 slaves, whom the Republic bought of their masters, and who were called *Volones*, from the word *volo* (I will) which every one returned in answer, when he was asked, whether he would serve in the troops. To recruit the treasury, which was greatly exhausted,

the general inclination of the soldiers, but agreeable to the judgment of most of the officers, that *Varro* should fight, when he did. No objection is made to the order of his battle. If a fatal error was committed during the action, through the rashness of the infantry imagining themselves victorious, this was no more imputable to *Varro* than to *Æmilius*. In short, as *Varro* does not appear to be chargeable with any thing worse, than the having such a dependence on the number and valour of his troops, as to venture a battle contrary to the advice of his colleague, it ought not perhaps to be so surprising that the Senate and people received him in the manner they did. They could not have treated him with rigour without discouraging their Generals, which might have been of dangerous consequence at this juncture. Nor is it much to be wondered at that they employed him again. He was very humble after his defeat at *Cannæ*, and behaved himself to the general satisfaction of both Senate and people. However, they never put him at the head of a great army; he seldom had the command of above one legion.

and to put the public revenues under a good regulation, three men of eminent prudence and integrity were chosen for that trust. And then, the Senators giving the example, and being followed by the knights, the whole people in general of the *Roman* tribes brought all their gold to the public treasury; the Senators only reserving their rings, and the *bulleæ* about their children's necks. The silver coin was now, for the first time, alloyed with copper.

While they were thus employed at *Rome*, *Hannibal*, to get a supply of money, and with the further view of abating the obstinate resolution of the *Romans* in battle, by the hopes of being ransomed, in case they should be defeated and taken, gave leave to his *Roman* prisoners, to redeem themselves¹. These chose out ten of their body, to send to *Rome*, to negotiate their redemption; and *Hannibal* exacted no other security for their return than an oath. They were accompanied by a noble *Carthaginian*, named *Carthalo*, who, in case he found the *Romans* inclined to peace, was empowered to declare upon what terms *Hannibal* would grant it. Upon the first report of *Carthalo's* arrival, the Dictator sent a lictor to order him out of the *Roman* territory. The ten deputies were admitted to an audience of the Senate. *M. Junius*, the chief of them, pleaded with great earnestness in behalf of the captives. He justified them from the charge of

¹ The ransom of each horseman he fixed at 500 *denarii* (16l. 2s. 11d.); that of each soldier at 300 (9l. 3s. 9d.); and that of each slave at 100 (3l. 4s. 7d.) *

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.
236 Conf.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 21.

Florus, B.
2. c. 6.

Liv. B. 22.
c. 56. 58.

c. 59.

* Liv. B.
22. c. 58.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.215.
236 Conf.

cowardice in having yielded themselves prisoners to the enemy. He alledged that they had been left in the camp to defend it, that they had done nothing cowardly or unworthy the *Roman* name, but by the adverse fortune of the day, the troops in the field being all cut off, they had been under a necessity of surrendering to the conqueror. He cited precedents of the regard had to prisoners in former times, and urged the advantage it would be to the Republic, to have in her army 8000 *Romans*, redeemed at a less^m price than the purchase of so many slaves would amount to. His discourse was seconded by the multitude, whose concern for their relations in captivity had brought them together; and they

^m This (says Sir *W. Raleigh*) is but a tale devised to countenance the *Roman* proceedings, as if they had been severe, when as indeed they were suitable to the present fortune, poor and somewhat beggarly. Hereof it is no little proof, that *Hannibal* valued those *Roman* slaves whom he had taken in the camp among their masters, at no more, than every one the third part of a common soldier's ransom: and likely it is, that he offered them at the price, whereat he thought them current. But if we should suppose, that by trading with *Hannibal*, a better bargain for slaves might have been made, than was by the state at home, in dealing with private men; yet must we withal consider, that these private men did only lend these slaves for a while unto the commonwealth, and were afterwards contented to forbear the price of them, until the war should be ended. [*Liv.* B. 24. c. 18.] If *Hannibal* would have given such long day of payment, it is likely that the *Romans* would have been his chapmen: but seeing he dealt only for ready money, they chose rather to say we will not give, than we cannot. *Hist. of the World*, part 1. B. 5. ch. 3. §. 9.

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implored the clemency of the *Fathers* in a suppliant manner.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

The Senate debated the matter for some time, being much divided in opinion; but at length they concluded absolutely against the redemption of the captives: For having penetrated into *Hannibal's* views, they would convince their soldiers, that they must either conquer or be at the mercy of their enemies.

215.
236 Conf.

Hannibal, after his victory at *Cannæ*, marched without delay from *Apulia* into *Samnum*. *Compsa*, a city of *Hirpini*, almost at the head of the *Aufidus*, surrendered to him, and was the first which fell off from the *Romans*. Having here placed a garrison, together with all his plunder and baggage, he divided his army. One part of it he gave to his brother *Mago* to reduce the towns and fortresses of this country and of all *Bruttium*; and with the other he himself marched towards *Naples*, to get possession, if practicable, of that maritime city, which would open to him an easy communication with *Africa*. But though he drew a part of the garrison into an ambuscade, and cut them off, yet the strength of the place deterred him from laying siege to it.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 1.

From thence he turned towards *Capua*. This city, which had been formerly governed by *Roman* laws, and a *Roman* prefect, was now a *Municipium*, and chose her own magistrates; and the *Capuans* had the uncommon privilege of intermarrying with the *Romans*. After the battle of the lake *Tbrasymenus*, one *Pacuvius Calavius*, a man of the greatest interest among the people,

c. 2. & seq.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.215.
236 Conf.

ple, and then governor of the town, had laid a design to assassinate the Senate, who were odious both to himself and the people, and deliver up the place to *Hannibal*: But afterwards he thought that to assume a kind of sovereignty himself there, would be a better scheme, than that of introducing a stranger to usurp it. The only difficulty he had was to engage the Senators, who were universally for adhering to the *Romans*, to favour the project of his ambition. To this end, he told them that the people had sworn to cut their throats, and to surrender up *Capua* to the *Carthaginians*; but that if they would leave themselves to his conduct, he would preserve them. The Senators trusted him, upon his oath; and suffered him to shut them up in the temple, where they were then assembled, and to set a guard at the door. He then called the people together, and acquainted them, that the Senate were now entirely in his power, and that he would abandon those detestable slaves of *Rome* to their resentment, to be treated according to their demerits; but he insisted that (in order to preserve the old form of government, which ought not to be destroyed) as soon as any one of them had received sentence, and before he was executed, the people should name some man of probity, to succeed him; by which stratagem, *Pacuvius* saved the lives of all the Senators; for the multitude could not agree upon this man of probity. Some disqualification or other was still objected to whoever was named; so that in the end, the people finding that they could

could not rid themselves of their present Senate without choosing a worse, desired that all the prisoners might be released; and from this time the Senate courted the people by all manner of kindness and adulation, and (if we may credit *Livy*) *Pacuvius*, acquired an absolute ascendant over both.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.
215.
236. Conf.

After the defeat of the *Romans* at *Cannæ*, the *Capuans* were again disposed to side with the *Carthaginians*. Two reasons restrained them; the intermarriages before-mentioned, and the consideration that the flower of their nobility were in the service of the *Romans*, in *Sicily*, and were therefore as so many hostages for their fidelity. And the relations of these young men prevailed to have a deputation sent to the Consul *Terentius*, then at *Venusia*, to offer him succours. These deputies found the Consul so dejected and desponding, that, weighing the circumstances of things, they thought the time now come to shake off the *Roman* yoke, and recover their antient liberty. But to do this with the more decency, they first sent ambassadors to *Rome*, with such proposals as they knew would not be received. They demanded, that for the future *Rome* and *Capua* should be upon a perfect equality, and that every year one of the Consuls should be chosen out of the *Capuans*.

The *Conscript Fathers* having haughtily rejected the demand, it was carried by a majority of voices both of the Senate and people of *Capua*, to send deputies to treat with *Hannibal*. They demanded entire liberty and independence, and

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Bef. Chr.

215.
236 Conf.

that three hundred *Roman* knights should be put into their hands, to be exchanged against the same number of *Capuan* youths in the service of *Rome*. *Hannibal* readily granted all that was asked; and then the people contrived to have all the *Romans* in the city shut up in the public baths, and there suffocated. One *Decius Magius*, a man of a *Roman* spirit, and a friend to the *Romans*, loudly declared against these proceedings of his countrymen, warning them not to receive a *Carthaginian* garrison, and putting them in mind of *Pyrrhus's* tyranny over the people of *Tarentum*; but this discourse was despised. When *Hannibal* was to make his entry, all the town crowded to meet him, except this *Magius*, and some few of the nobility, among whom was *Perolla*, the son of *Pacuvius*, who though not governor of *Capua* at this time, had been the soul of all the late proceedings. *Perolla* was afterwards obliged by his father to go and pay his homage to *Hannibal*; nevertheless having deeply imbibed the sentiments of *Magius*, he formed a resolution to stab the *Carthaginian* General, at a magnificent entertainment which *Pacuvius* and some other of the principal citizens were to give him: But the young man, having communicated the design to his father, was by his tears and entreaties dissuaded from it. The next day the Senate assembled, and *Hannibal* complaining to them of the disaffection of *Magius*, this brave man was delivered up to him, loaded with irons, and put on board a ship bound for *Carthage*. A tempest drove the vessel into the port of *Cyrene*, a

Liv. B. 23.
c. 10.

city belonging to the kings of *Egypt*; there the prisoner finding means to get to a statue of *Ptolemy Philopater*, and laying hold of it, the *Carthaginians* durst not drag him from that sanctuary. The *Cyrenians* conveyed him to *Alexandria*, where he chose to continue under the protection of *Ptolemy*.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.
215.
236 Conf.

About this time *Hannibal* dispatched his brother *Mago* to *Carthage* with an account of his success. *Mago* reported to the Senate, " That their General had defeated six Consular armies, slain above 200,000 *Romans*, and taken more than 50,000 prisoners; that *Bruttium* and *Apulia*, with a part of *Samnium*, and a part of *Lucania*, had revolted to the *Carthaginians*; that *Capua*, the chief city, not of *Campania* only, but (in the present low estate of *Rome*) even of *Italy*, had surrendered to *Hannibal*:" and he concluded with saying, That for so many and so great victories it was meet to return solemn thanks to the immortal Gods." To verify his report, he spread abroad in the Senate-house, some say *one*, others *three* bushels of gold rings taken from the *Roman* Knights and Senators. Having thus prepossest the Senate in favour of his brother, he proceeded to solicit for him supplies of men, corn, and money, that he might be enabled to carry on so successful a war. The request was universally applauded; and *Himilco*, a Senator of the *Barchine* faction, turning towards *Hanno*, as it were to insult him, " Well, *Hanno*, are you still dissatisfied that we entered into a war against *Rome*?"

Liv. B. 23.
C. 12.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.

236 Conf.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 13.

“ Are you still of opinion that we ought to
 “ deliver up *Hannibal*? Come, declare against
 “ our giving thanks to the Gods for our suc-
 “ cess; speak, *Hanno*, let us hear the language
 “ of a *Roman* in a *Carthaginian* Senate.” *Hanno*
 “ rose up; To day, Fathers, if I had not been
 “ compelled to speak, I should have held my
 “ peace, that, in this concert of *your common*
 “ gladness, no discordant word might drop, from
 “ me. But to be silent when thus interrogated
 “ by a Senator, would argue either pride or dis-
 “ affection to the state, a disregard of other mens
 “ liberty or of my own. To *Himilco*, therefore,
 “ I answer, that I do still condemn the war, and
 “ that I never shall cease to blame our invinci-
 “ ble General, till I see it ended by a peace up-
 “ on some tolerable conditions. The exploits
 “ which *Mago* has boasted of, have caused much
 “ joy to *Himilco* and his friends. To me too they
 “ may prove matter of joy, if a proper use be
 “ made of them for bringing about an honour-
 “ able peace. But what is the ground of all
 “ this exultation? To what does it amount? *I*
 “ have slain, says *Hannibal*, whole armies of ene-
 “ mies: Send me soldiers. What else could he have
 “ asked had he been vanquished? *I have taken*
 “ two camps, full, doubtless, of wealth and pro-
 “ visions: Supply me with corn and money. What
 “ other demand could he have made, had he lost
 “ his own camp, with every thing that was in
 “ it? And, that I alone may not wonder at all
 “ this, I would have *Himilco* (for as I have an-
 “ swered him, I have now surely a right to
 “ inter-

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.
215.
236 Conf.

“interrogate); I say, I would have *Himilco* or
“*Mago* answer me some questions. The Roman
“empire, it seems, was overturned at the bat-
“tle of *Cannæ*, and all *Italy* is revolting: Is
“any one, I pray, of the *Latine nations* come over
“to us? Has any one man of the *five and thirty*
“*tribes* deserted to *Hannibal*?” When *Mago*
had to both these answered in the negative:
“There remain then (replied *Hanno*) a huge
“number of enemies still to be subdued. And
“this multitude, what heart, what hope have
“they?” *Mago* answered, *That he knew not.*
“And yet (returned *Hanno*) there is nothing
“easier to be known. Have the *Romans* sent
“any ambassadors to *Hannibal* to treat of peace?
“Has intelligence been brought you, that any
“mention of peace was made at *Rome*?” *No,*
“said *Mago*. “Why then (replied the other)
“the progress made in this war, is exactly the
“same, as when *Hannibal* first entered *Italy*. The
“vicissitude of our fortune in the first *Roman*
“*War* many of us here present can well remem-
“ber. Our affairs were never in a more pro-
“sperous course both by land and sea, than just
“before our defeat at the *Ægates*. Should the
“like turn of fortune (the Gods avert the
“omen!) happen to us again, can we hope to
“obtain, when vanquished, that peace, which
“when we are victorious we disdain to think
“of? Were it now in debate to *offer* or to *accept*
“a peace, I know what I should say: If you
“ask my opinion concerning the supplies which
“*Mago* demands for the army, my answer is,
“That

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

235.
236 Conf.

*193,750l.

Liv. B. 23.
C. 14.

“ That if they be truly conquerors, they little
“ need them; and if they deceive us with vain
“ hope, they less deserve them.” *Hanno*’s speech
made no impression on the Senate. It was car-
ried by a great majority to send to *Hannibal* from
Africa, 4000 *Numidians*, 40 elephants, and 1000
talents of silver *. And one of the magistrates
was immediately commissioned to go with *Mago*
into *Spain*, and there hire 20,000 foot and 4000
horse for recruiting the armies in that country
and in *Italy*. These preparations however went
on slowly, as is usual in times of prosperity.
On the other side, neither the character, nor
the present circumstances of the *Romans* would
permit *them* to be dilatory in their proceedings.
The Senate neglected nothing, deferred nothing,
that was necessary for supporting the war. The
Consul *Varro* shewed himself extremely diligent
in whatever belonged to his office; and the
Dictator *Junius Pera*, after performing the usual
ceremonies of religion, marched out of *Rome*
at the head of 25,000 men. This army was
composed of two legions, which had been raised
in the beginning of the year for the defence
of the city, of some cohorts from *Picenum* and
the *Gallie* territory ^m, of the 8000 *Volones* before-
mentioned, and of 6000 prisoners for crimes
and debt, whom *Junius* had released, upon the
condition of their enlisting themselves in the

^m This was a tract of land between the *Rubicon* and the
Esis, formerly taken from the *Galli Senones*, and divided
amongst some *Roman citizens* by virtue of a law lately
enacted.

troops,

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troops, and whom he had armed out of the spoils *Flaminius* had formerly brought from *Gaul*.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.
236 Conf.

As for *Hannibal*, having settled his affairs at *Capua*, he made a second attempt upon *Naples*, with as little success as in the first. From thence he marched to *Nola*, in hopes that the populace, who were inclined to his party, would deliver up the town to him. But their Senate, alarmed at the danger, had sent for assistance from *Marcellus*, who commanded the *Roman* army at *Canusium*, and who came in all haste to the defence of the place. *Hannibal*, disappointed here, once more attempted *Naples*. As this city had lately received a *Roman* garrison, under the command of *M. Junius Silanus*, the *Carthaginian* soon despaired of being able to reduce it by force; and he turned his arms against *Nuceria*, a town not far from the other. The inhabitants, for want of provisions, were obliged to capitulate: Yet he could not prevail upon any of them to serve in his army. After he had plundered and burnt *Nuceria*, he again sat down before *Nola*. *Marcellus* sallied out upon him at three several gates, and killed 2300 of his men, with the loss only of 500 of his own. The *Carthaginian* being thus repulsed, laid siege to *Aceræ*, a small town on the banks of the *Clanis*, near *Nola*, and took it. Here he learnt that the Dictator was approaching to *Casilinum* with his army. Whereupon being afraid lest the neighbourhood of the enemy might occasion some sinister accident at *Capua*, he drew near to this city, and at the same time sent a part of his forces

Liv. B. 23.
C. 15.

C. 17.

ces

Y. R. 537.
Ref. Chr.215.
236 Conf.

ces to attack *Casilinum*. These not succeeding, he himself marched thither with his army, and besieged the town in form. It was not garrisoned by *Campanians*. A body of *Prænestini*, to the number of 500 men, happening to pass that way, had found the inhabitants wavering in their fidelity to *Rome*, and had therefore cut their throats in the night, and possessed themselves of the walls. The *Prænestini* were afterwards reinforced by about 400 *Perusini* from *Hetruria*, and some *Romans* and *Latines*. All these being men of bravery and resolution, made a vigorous resistance. Winter approaching, *Hannibal* discontinued the siege, intending to renew it in the spring. He left a small body of troops before the town, and retired to *Capua* with the rest of his army.

Livy, B. 23.
c. 18.

Livy and some other historians tell us, that both *Hannibal* and his soldiers were extremely softened by the effeminate life they gave themselves up to, this winter, at *Capua*, and are very particular in their descriptions of the luxury of the *Cartbaginians*, making *Capua* prove as fatal a place to them as *Cannæ* had been to the *Romans*. It does not however appear by their after behaviour, that they had lost much of their martial ardour. The principal cause of the decline of *Hannibal's* affairs in *Italy* after the battle of *Cannæ*, seems to have been his not receiving supplies from his own country. He had not men enough to oppose so many armies as the *Romans* sent against him, and at the same time to garrison the towns and protect the countries,

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tries, that had submitted to him. And that his residence at *Capua* had abated nothing of his wonted activity, seems plain from *Livy* himself, who informs us, that as soon as the rigour of the season began to soften he renewed the siege of *Casilinum*, and this in sight of an army, which without reckoning the allies, amounted to 25,000 men. This army was now under the conduct of *Sempronius*, General of the horse, the Dictator having been recalled to *Rome* on account of some religious affair. *Sempronius* continued quiet in his camp; for he had received orders not to fight. *Marcellus* (according to *Livy*) would have gone to the assistance of the besieged, if he had not been hindered by the swelling of the *Vulturnus*, and by the people of *Nola*, who feared that the *Capuans* would attack them if the *Roman* garrison should withdraw. In the mean time *Casilinum* was reduced to great extremities for want of provisions, insomuch that many of the soldiers threw themselves from the walls, or exposed themselves without defence to the darts of the enemy. *Sempronius* attempted to relieve them, first by throwing barrels of meal into the *Vulturnus*, that ran through the town, and afterwards by scattering in the stream great quantities of nuts, which the besieged stopped with hurdles. These convoys of provisions being discovered and cut off, the garrison were reduced to live upon rats, and what other vermin they could find; nay, they pulled off the leather that covered their shields, boiled it soft in water, and eat it. And when *Hannibal*, to hinder them from gathering

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.
236 Conf.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 19.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.
236 Conf.

gathering any weeds or roots that grew close under the wall, had ploughed up the ground, they threw turnip seed out upon the mold; which when the *Carthaginian* heard of, he cried out, *What! am I then to sit here till their turnips are come to maturity?* And from this time he became more willing to grant them terms. They were at length allowed to march out of the town, provided each freeman among them paid seven ounces of gold. The condition was accepted; they remained prisoners till the money was paid, and the *Carthaginian* put a garrison of 700 men into the place.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 20.

and 30.

The inhabitants of *Petilia*, in *Bruttium*, gave likewise a signal proof of their attachment to the Republic, and shewed how agreeable her government was to her subjects. They resolutely stood a siege, though refused assistance from *Rome* on account of the distress she was in; and *Himilco*, one of *Hannibal's* Lieutenants, found almost as much difficulty in subduing them, as the General had met with, in reducing the garrison of *Casili-num*.

c. 21.

About the same time couriers arrived from *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, with complaints from the Prætors of those two provinces, of the want both of provisions and pay for their armies and fleets. The answer was, that they must shift for themselves as well as they could; for that *Rome* was not in a condition to help them. King *Hiero* supplied the Prætor of *Sicily* with what money he wanted, and six months provisions; and the cities of *Sardinia* in alliance with the Republic raised

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raised contributions among themselves for the Prætor of that island.

And now the Senate began to think of filling up the many vacant places in their assembly. When this matter was in debate, *Sp. Carvilius* proposed that the present opportunity might be taken to oblige the *Latines*, those antient and faithful allies of *Rome*, by admitting two out of each nation of them to sit among the Fathers: but the motion was rejected with indignation; and *Fabius* reproved *Carvilius* for his imprudence in exposing the Senate to a shameful innovation, or to the danger of affronting the *Latines*, at so critical a conjuncture. He added, that it was of the utmost consequence to observe a strict silence upon this head, that so the allies might never know such a proposal had been made. The matter was kept secret; no mischief followed.

As there were no Censors in being, to fill up the vacancies in question, and the Dictator was now with the army, the Consul *Terentius*, by order of the Senate, nominated *M. Fabius Buteo*, the oldest of the former Censors, to be a second Dictator, whose office should be confined to this affair. And never did Dictator discharge his trust with more modesty and prudence. The first upon his list were all those who since the last Censors had obtained *curule magistracies*, but had not yet been ranked among the Fathers; then all those, without exception, who had been Tribunes of the people, *Plebeian Ædiles* or *Quæstors*; and lastly, such of the citizens as could shew the spoils of enemies by them vanquished,

or

Y.R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.
236 Conf.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 22.

c. 23.

Y. R. 537.
Bef. Chr.

215.

236 Conf.

or had been rewarded by their Generals with a Civic Crown. By this impartial election the Romans had the happiness to see 177 new Senators created without jealousy or contention. *Fabius* was highly applauded for his conduct, and when he had finished his list, he immediately abdicated the Dictatorship, though he had been named to it for six months.

C H A P. XXIII.

The FOURTH YEAR of the War.

A Roman army destroyed by the Gauls. King Philip of Macedon enters into league with Hannibal against Rome. Favourable accounts from Sardinia and from the Scipios in Spain. After the death of King Hiero, Syracuse takes part with the Carthaginians.

Y. R. 538.
Bef. Chr.

214.

237 Conf.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 30.

THE next affair, at Rome, was to appoint the great officers of the state for the new year. *T. Sempronius Gracchus* (General of the horse to the Dictator *Junius*) and *L. Posthumus Albinus* now at the head of an army in *Cisalpine Gaul*, were elected Consuls. Then the several Prætors were named, and *Marcellus* had the power and title given him of Pro-Consul; because, of all the Roman Generals in Italy, he was the only one who had gained any advantage over the enemy since the battle of *Cannæ*. The elections being over, *Junius* returned to his camp in *Apulia*, but *Sempronius* continued in the city,

to

to consult with the Senate about the operations of the approaching campaign. While they were deliberating on these things, news came to *Rome* that *Posthumius Albinus* (one of the Consuls elect) with all his army, was destroyed by the *Gauls*ⁿ. The fortitude of the *Romans* enabled them to surmount this last calamity of so unfortunate a year. *Sempronius* assembled the Senate, and endeavoured to raise their dejected spirits. "The defeat of *Cannæ* ought to have hardened us against every adversity that can happen in war. Shall we be discouraged by moderate losses, after having supported the greatest calamities? The war with the *Gauls* may be deferred. Let us have no more armies in *Gaul*, but turn all our forces against *Hannibal*. When he is once driven out of *Italy*, the rebellious nations will soon be reduced again." This advice was followed, and all the *Roman* forces were ordered to the provinces near *Hannibal*.

In the new disposition of employments, *Terentius Varro*, notwithstanding his former ill success, was intrusted with the command of an army in *Apulia*, and had the character of Pro-Consul. His

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Livy, B. 23,

c. 30.

c. 24.

c. 25.

Val. Max.
B. 4. c. 5.
f. 2.

ⁿ According to *Livy*, (B. 23. c. 24.) the *Gauls* made use of a very extraordinary stratagem upon this occasion. *Posthumius* being to pass through a wood, they, against his coming, had, on each side the road, sawed all the trees so far that a little force would serve to cast them down. When therefore the whole army had entered this dangerous passage, the *Gauls* that lay about the wood, began to throw down the trees, which falling one against another, those that were nearest the road came upon the heads of the *Romans*, so that scarce ten men of them escaped being crushed.

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Frontin.
Stratag.
l. 4. c. 5.
f. 6.

Livy, B.
23. c. 31.

behaviour since his misfortune had softened every body to him. He had let his hair and beard grow, and had never taken a meal lying on a bed, as was the manner of the *Romans*. Nay, it is said, he modestly declined the Dictatorship, to which the people, still well affected to him, would have raised him.

It now remained to choose a new Consul in the room of *Posthumius Albinus*; and *Marcellus* being sent upon a commission to the army, it was suspected, and complained of in the Senate, that he was kept out of the way on purpose that he might not be present at the *comitia*. *Sempronius* therefore deferred convening the centuries till the return of *Marcellus*, and then he was unanimously chosen Consul. But as it had happened to thunder during the assembly, the augurs laid hold of this accident to declare the election disagreeable to the will of the Gods. Their true reason for opposing it was his being a *Plebeian*, for *Sempronius* also being of that order, should *Marcellus's* election be confirmed, *Rome* would have two *Plebeian* Consuls. Hereupon *Marcellus* abdicated, and *Fabius Cunctator* was chosen (the third time) in his stead.

Livy, B. 23.
c. 32.

And now the *Romans* began to be in motion. *Fabius* put himself at the head of those troops which the late Dictator had commanded. *Sempronius* was General of the *Volones*, and of 25,000 auxiliaries. The troops that had escaped from *Canne*, and which after that battle had served under *Marcellus*, and all the weak soldiers in the army lately under the conduct of *Junius Pera*,

Pera, had been sent into *Sicily*, there to serve as long as the war should last in *Italy*. In the room of these, *Marcellus* led to his camp near *Suessula* (a city nine miles from *Nola*) two legions that had been raised for the defence of *Rome*. The Prætor *Lævinus* was ordered to cover *Apulia* with two legions, which arrived from *Sicily*, and to defend the coast from *Brundisium* to *Tarentum*, with a fleet of twenty-five ships. A like number of vessels was sent under *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, the other Prætor, to guard the coast near the capital. The legion under *Varro* being commanded into *Sicily*, he was ordered to make new levies in the country of *Picenum*, and to continue there to protect that and the neighbouring territories.

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While the Prætor *Lævinus* lay encamped at *Luceria* in *Apulia*, a company of *Macedonians* were to his great surprize brought before him.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 33.

At the head of them was an *Athenian* named *Xenophanes*. These strangers had landed not far from the *Lacinian* promontory, and were making their way to *Hannibal's* camp near *Capua*, when *Lævinus's* scouts intercepted them. Being examined by the Prætor, the *Athenian* answered that he was commissioned by King *Philip* of *Macedon* to treat of an alliance with the *Roman Republic*. *Lævinus* overjoyed at this, shewed great respect to the ambassador, and furnished him with guides to conduct him to *Rome*. It is not known by what artifice he got to *Hannibal's* camp: But the league which, in his master's name, he made with the *Carthaginian*, is pre-

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served to this day °. Having finished his commission he returned to his ship, and *Mago, Bo-*
star,

° The form of the league as it is in *Polybius*, B. 7. c. 2. runs thus.

The treaty confirmed by oath, which *Hannibal* the General, *Mago*, *Myrcan*, *Barmocar*, and all the Senators of *Carthage* that are with him [*Hannibal*] and all the *Carthaginians* that serve under him, have concluded with *Xenophanes* the *Athenian*, the son of *Cleomachus*, whom King *Philip*, the son of *Demetrius*, hath sent to us, in his own name, and in name of the *Macedonians*, and of his allies.

In the presence of *Jupiter*, and *Juno*, and *Apollo*; in the presence of the tutelary Divinity of the *Carthaginians*, and of *Hercules*, and of *Iolaus*; in the presence of *Mars*, of *Triton* and *Neptune*; in the presence of the Gods who accompany our expedition, and of the sun, the moon, and the earth; in the presence of the rivers, the fields, and the waters; in the presence of all the Gods who rule over *Carthage*; in the presence of all the Gods who rule over *Macedon* and the rest of *Greece*; in the presence of all the Gods who preside over war, and at the making this treaty; *Hannibal* the General hath said, and all the Senators of *Carthage* that are with him, and all the *Carthaginians* that are in his army.

If it seem good unto you and to us, this shall be a treaty of amity and good will between you and us, as friends, allies, and brethren, upon condition that King *Philip*, and the *Macedonians*, and all the other *Greeks* that are his allies, shall preserve and defend the *Carthaginian* Lords, and *Hannibal* the General, and those that are with him, and the Governors of provinces dependent upon the *Carthaginians*, and those that use the same laws with them; and the inhabitants of *Utica*, and of all the cities and countries subject to the *Carthaginians*, and all the soldiers and allies, and all the cities and nations in confederacy with us in *Italy*, *Gaul*, and *Liguria*, and all those in this country who are in friendship and alliance with us. In like manner the *Carthaginian* armies, and the inhabitants of

Utica,

Star, and *Gisco*, three ambassadors from *Hannibal*, embarked with him. They were scarce

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Utica, and all the cities and nations subject to *Carthage*, and the soldiers and allies, and all the nations and cities with which we have amity and alliance in *Italy*, in *Gaul*, in *Liguria*, and with which we may contract amity and alliance in this country, shall preserve and defend King *Philip*, and the *Macedonians*, and all their allies amongst the *Greeks*. We will not secretly devise evil against one another. We will not lay snares for one another. We [the *Macedonians*] with all affection and good will, without guile or fraud [declare that we] will be enemies to the enemies of the *Carthaginians*, except to those Kings, cities and ports with which we are in friendship and alliance. In like manner, we [the *Carthaginians*] will be enemies to the enemies of King *Philip*, except to those Kings, cities and nations with whom we are in alliance and friendship. You [the *Macedonians*] shall engage in the war we have with the *Romans* till it please the Gods to give success to our arms and yours. You shall assist us with what is necessary, according as shall be agreed upon between us. But if the Gods shall not grant to you and us a happy issue of the war against the *Romans* and their allies, and if we be reduced to make peace with the *Romans*, we shall treat in such a manner as that you shall be included in the treaty; and on condition that they shall not be allowed to declare war against you; that the *Romans* shall not be masters of the *Corcyraei*, nor of the *Apollinates*, nor of the *Dyrrachini*, nor of *Pharus*, nor of *Dymallar*, nor of the *Parthini*, nor of *Antintania*. They shall likewise restore to *Demetrius Pharius* all his friends and relations who are in the *Roman* dominions. If the *Romans* shall declare war against you or against us, we will assist each other as the occasion shall require. We will act in the same manner in case any other shall declare war against us, except the Kings, cities, and nations with whom we are in alliance and friendship. If either of us shall judge proper to add any thing to this treaty, or retrench any thing from it, it shall not be done without the consent of both of us.

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out at sea when the vessel was descried by *P. Valerius Flaccus*, whom *Lævinus* had appointed to command the fleet. She was soon obliged to strike to some ships sent after her. *Xenophanes* endeavoured to escape a second time, by the same story of his embassy from *Philip* to the Senate; adding only, that not having been able to reach the capital, because the enemy infested the roads, he had negotiated his business with the Prætor *Lævinus*. He would have imposed upon *Flaccus*, but for the habit and language of the three *Carthaginians*. The *Roman* having discovered the truth, detached five galleys under the command of *Valerius Antias*, to transport the *Athenian* and his companions to *Rome*.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 35.

c. 36.

To return to *Hannibal*. *Campania* was now the chief seat of the war; and the *Campanians* themselves, to assist him, raised an army of 14,000 men. These having, in vain, solicited *Cumæ*, a city in the neighbourhood, to join with them; endeavoured, with no better success, to surprise the *Cumans* by treachery. After which *Hannibal*, at the request of the *Campanians*, laid siege to the place. *Fabius* was then encamped at *Cales*, but durst not cross the *Vulturnus*, to go to the assistance of the besieged, because of unlucky omens and prodigies. *Sempronius* had a little before entered the place, and he defended it. He is said to have slain in a sally 1300 of the *Carthaginians*. *Hannibal* the next day presented battle, in hopes the Consul, flushed with his success, would venture to fight: But the *Romans* keeping close within the walls, he at length

length drew off his men, and returned to his camp, which was on mount *Tifata*.

Y. R. 538.
Bef. Chr.

Whilst *Sempronius Gracchus* was thus defending *Cumæ*, the Roman armies prospered in two other places. Another *Sempronius*, surnamed *Longus*, gained a victory over *Hanno* in *Lucania*, and drove him from thence into *Bruttium*. And *Lævinus* retook three cities of the *Hirpini*, which had revolted to *Hannibal*.

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Polyb. B.
23. c. 37.

About the same time the intercepted ambassador from King *Philip*, and his letters, were brought to *Rome*. And the Senate finding that the treaty was actually concluded, came immediately to the wise and noble resolution of keeping the *Macedonian* out of *Italy*, by carrying the war into his country.

c. 38.

And now *Fabius*, having made expiation for the prodigies, at length passed the *Vulturnus*, and both the Consuls carried on the war in concert together. *Fabius* recovered some towns that had declared for *Hannibal*, and had received *Carthaginian* garrisons. At *Nola*, the people still disaffected to *Rome*, were secretly plotting to destroy their Senators, and betray the city to *Hannibal*. To prevent this, *Fabius* sent *Marcellus* with his army into *Nola*, and he himself removed to the Pro-Consul's camp near *Suessula*. There he continued quiet while *Marcellus* made frequent incursions into the lands of the *Hirpini* and the *Samnites* about *Caudium*. Deputies from these two nations came to *Hannibal* to inform him of the devastation of their country, and to desire relief. They even added reproaches

c. 39.

c. 40.

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Bef. Chr.

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c. 42.

to their complaints. " We believed (said they)
" that so long as you were safe and our friend,
" we might have banished all fear, not only of
" the *Romans*, but (were it lawful so to speak)
" even of the angry Gods themselves. Yet
" certain it is, that whilst you are not only safe
" and victorious, but so near us too, that you
" can see the burning of our houses, and almost
" hear the cries of our wives and children, we
" have been miserably harassed this summer by
" *Marcellus*, as if he, and not you, had been
" conqueror at *Cannæ*. The *Romans* give out
" that you are like a bee that can sting but
" once ^p." *Hannibal* returned a civil answer to
the

^p The *Roman* historians frequently reproach *Hannibal* with inaction after the winter he spent in *Capua*, and *Livy* upon this occasion has put very severe reflections upon him into the mouths of the *Samnite* deputies. The truth of the matter seems to be this: The *Romans* had now learnt by their defeats that they were not a match for *Hannibal* in the open field. It was a long time before they would yield this point; but the battle of *Cannæ* seems to have convinced them. At first they sent one Consul to oppose him with the usual army of two legions (consisting of about 4000 men each) with a proportionable number of auxiliaries. The misfortune at the *Ticin*, and what immediately followed it, obliged them to send the other Consul with his army to join his colleague. These being defeated at the *Trebia*, the Republic increased her armies the next year. *Flaminius* had alone the command of four legions, and his colleague of two. The former being vanquished at the lake *Thrasymen*, and *Fabius's* dilatory arts not having any sensible good effect, the *Romans* seemed resolved to exert their whole strength, and ruin *Hannibal* at a blow. They doubled their legions, increased the number of men in each, and sent

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the deputies, and encouraged them to hope for a happy issue of the war. "Of the victories I have gained said he, the last has always been the greatest. That of the lake *Thrasymenus* was more considerable than that of the *Trebia*, and

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Liv. B. 23.
C. 43.

sent both their Consuls at the head of an army of near 90,000 men to fight a decisive battle. The victory over these at *Cannæ* was so complete, that the Romans saw plainly they could not hope to conquer the *Carthaginian* in a general battle, and that they must change their manner of carrying on the war. Accordingly they divided their troops into many armies, never risked their whole strength in one action, but contented themselves with wasting *Hannibal's* forces in small engagements, harassing his allies, and protecting their own. This very year they besieged him, as it were, with armies. *Fabius* commanded one at *Liternum*, *Sempronius* had another at *Cumæ*, and *Marcellus* a third at *Suessula*, all in *Campania* where *Hannibal* was. *Lævinus* defended *Apulia*, and *Terentius Varro*, *Picenum*. Each of these Generals had at least two legions under him, except *T. Varro* who had but one. Beside these, *Livy* mentions a *Sempronius Longus*, who had an army in *Lucania* sufficient to defeat a considerable part of the *Carthaginian* army under *Hanno*, of which 2000 were slain in the action. All these forces joined together would have made a greater army than the Romans had at *Cannæ*, but the Republic had now altered her measures. Nay so steady was she in pursuing this new method of carrying on the war, that though *Hannibal* was many years hemmed in among the *Bruttians*, in a corner of *Italy*, without supplies from his own country, and in great want of men and money, she never ventured to unite her forces, in order to compel him to a general battle. Now considering the small number of his troops, his want of money, the many armies he had to deal with, the towns he had to garrison, and the several allies he had to protect, it is more to be wondered at that he kept footing so long in *Italy*, than that he made no progress in conquest.

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Liv. B. 23.
c. 44.

“ the victory of *Cannæ* surpassed them both. I
“ shall soon gain a fourth victory superior to
“ all the past.” With this answer, and rich pre-
sents, he dismissed the deputies.

Hannibal, being soon after joined by *Hanno*
with some troops from *Bruttium*, invested *Nola*,
which was defended by *Marcellus*, who (if we
may credit the *Latine* historian (boldly marched
his troops out of the town, and came to a pitch-
ed battle with the *Carthaginian* before the walls :
victory declared for the *Romans*, and *Hannibal*
lost 5000 men ^a.

About

^a *Livy*, *Plutarch*, and others, relate several victories gain-
ed by *Marcellus* over *Hannibal*. But *Corn. Nepos* (in *Vit.*
Hannib.) tells us, that the latter was always victorious in
Italy, and that after the battle of *Cannæ* no one ever ven-
tured to pitch a camp in the plain against him. *Quamdiu in*
Italia fuit, nemo ei in Acie resistit, nemo adversus eum, post
Cannensem pugnam, in Campo Castra posuit. *Polybius's*
history of the *Roman* affairs after the battle of *Cannæ*, is
not entire; but we have several considerable fragments of it
remaining, none of which mention any victory over *Hannibal*
in *Italy*. From a passage in B. 9. c. 3. it is plain, that *Han-*
nibal was never defeated by any *Roman* General before the
siege of *Capua*, and consequently not by *Marcellus* this year.
“ Who” (says the historian) “ can help admiring the *Ro-*
“ *mans*? That they who durst not draw out an army in bat-
“ tle against *Hannibal*, but used to lead their legions, and
“ that with difficulty, along the hills, should venture to lay
“ siege to a strong city, while they themselves were ha-
“ rassed by an enemy whom they dared not to think of
“ encountering in the field. But the *Carthaginians*, who
“ had been conquerors in every battle, suffered no less
“ than the vanquished, &c.” And in B. 15. c. 16. he ex-
pressly asserts, that *Hannibal* was never vanquished before
the battle of *Zama*. And in chap. 11. he represents *Han-*
nibal,

About this time, 1272 of his *Spanish* and *Nu-
midian* horse went over to the enemy. These de-
ferrers continued faithful to *Rome*, and did her
important services, for which they were recom-
pensed with lands in their own countries at the end
of the war. The *Carthaginian* General raised the
siege of *Nola*, sent *Hanno* again into *Bruttium*
with the forces he had brought from thence,
marched himself into *Apulia*, and pitched his
camp near *Arpi*, where he purposed to winter.
As soon as he was gone, *Fabius* made two incur-
sions, with the greatest part of his army, into
the flat country of *Campania*, gathered in all
the corn, and carried it to his camp at *Suessu-
la*, which he put in a condition to serve him for
winter quarters. He then ordered *Marcellus* to
keep no more soldiers at *Nola* than were neces-
sary to defend the town, and to send the rest
to *Rome*, that they might neither be a burden
to the allies nor an expence to the Republic.
The Consul *Sempronius* marched his legions from
Cumæ to *Luceria* in *Apulia*; from thence he dis-
patched the Prætor *Lævinus* with the army under
his command to *Brundisium*, to guard the coast
of *Salentum*, and provide what was necessary for
the *Macedonian* war.

While affairs in *Italy* were in the situation that
has been described, good news came to *Rome*
from *Sardinia* and *Spain*. The Prætor, *Manlius*
Torquatus, had defeated the rebel *Sardinians*,

nibal, just before that battle, reminding his soldiers, that
they had been victorious in every battle they had fought in
Italy.

though

Y. R. 538⁸
Bef. Chr.

214.
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Liv. B. 23.
c. 46.

c. 48.

c. 34, 40,
41.

Y. R. 538.
Bef. Chr.214.
237 Conf.

though assisted by an army sent from *Carthage* under the command of *Asdrubal* the Bald. Twelve thousand of the enemy were killed upon the spot, *Asdrubal* himself, with *Hanno* and *Mago* his chief officers, taken prisoners, and the island entirely reduced.

Liv. B. 23.
c. 48.

The *Scipios* had been equally fortunate in their wars in *Spain*. However, they wrote to the Senate, that the troops wanted their pay, clothes to cover them, and provisions to subsist them. As to the first indeed, they added, that if the public treasury was exhausted, they would find means to get money from the *Spaniards*; but that the other necessaries must be sent from *Rome*, otherwise they could neither keep the province in obedience, nor support the army. The Senators were all sensible of the reasonableness of the request; but how to comply with it was the difficulty. They considered the numerous forces they already had to maintain both at land and sea, and what a large new fleet must presently be equipped, if a war with *Macedon* should be commenced: That as to *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, which, before the war, brought in considerable subsidies to the treasury, they were now scarce able to maintain the forces necessary for the defence of these provinces; and that to tax the citizens at home for the supply demanded, would quite oppress and ruin them. The result of all was, that *Fulvius the Prator* should assemble the people, and lay before them the necessities of the state and earnestly press all those who were grown rich by farming the public revenues, to lend the public,

for

for a while, a part of what they had gained by it, and furnish the army in Spain with necessaries, under a promise of being reimbursed the first of any of the public creditors, when the treasury should be in a condition to discharge debts. The Prætor accordingly represented the matter to the people, and also appointed a day when he would bargain for clothes and corn, to be sent to the troops in Spain, and for other necessaries to equip the fleet.

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When the day came, three companies of nineteen persons each, presented themselves as undertakers; but they insisted on two demands, *That while thus employed, they should be exempted from serving in the war: And That, if what they shipped were taken by the enemy, or cast away by storm, the public should bear the loss;* both which conditions being agreed to, they undertook this affair, so that now the Roman armies were subsisted by the purses of private subjects; nor was any thing wanting to carry on the war in Spain more than if the treasury had been full.

The Scipios, thus supplied, immediately took the field, and (according to Livy) performed strange things, as shall hereafter be related.

The accounts from Sicily were not so satisfactory as those from Spain and Sardinia. King Hiero was dead, and had left his dominions, by will, to his grandson Hieronymus (whose father Gelo had rebelled against the old King the year before his death, and had come to an untimely end) under the tuition of fifteen guardians; whom he had entreated, a little before his decease, to keep up a good understanding with the

Livy, B. 24.
c. 4.
B. 23, 30.

the

Y. R. 538.
Bef. Chr.

214.
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Polyb. de
Virt. & Vit.
Exc. lib. 7.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 5, 6.

the *Romans*, as he himself had done for fifty years past. *Hieronymus*, being suffered by his guardians to take the reins of government into his own hands at fifteen Years of age, ran into many excesses of vice and cruelty. He affected an extravagant pomp, was difficult of access, gave audience with an air of contempt, and often added insulting jests to refusals. Three lords of distinction engrossed his favour, *Andranodorus* and *Zoippus* (his two uncles in law) and *Tbrafo* surnamed *Charcarus*. This last was a friend to the *Romans*; the other two favoured *Carthage*. *Tbrafo* being put to death, upon a false accusation of treason, the uncles easily persuaded their nephew to enter into a negotiation with *Hannibal*. *Claudius Pulcher*, the Roman Prætor in *Sicily*, sent a deputation to the King, to renew the alliance formerly made by his grandfather with the *Romans*. *Hieronymus* insulted the deputies, asking them, *What fortune they had at the battle of Cannæ? because, said he, Hannibal's ambassadors have given most incredible accounts of it; and I would fain know the truth, that I may take my measures accordingly.* The *Romans* only answered, that when he had learnt to give audience to ambassadors in a serious manner, they would come to him again; and then having rather admonished, than requested him, not rashly to violate the antient league, they departed and returned to the Prætor. *Hieronymus*, without delay, sent ambassadors to *Carthage*, to ratify a treaty he had already made with *Hannibal*; the substance of which was, that he and the *Carthaginians*

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ginians should divide *Sicily* between them, when they had jointly conquered the whole island. But being afterwards persuaded to think that he had himself a title of inheritance to all *Sicily*, by being descended from *Nereis*, the daughter of *Pyrrhus* (who had been declared King of it) he sent a new embassy, with instructions to lay before the Senate of *Carthage* his pretended rights, and to conclude only a treaty of mutual assistance with them. The *Carthaginians* were glad at any rate to draw off *Syracuse* from the *Roman* interest, and readily yielded to the proposals.

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Bef. Chr.
214.
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Not long after, this foolish King being at *Leontini*, a town situate on the frontiers of his dominions, was there assassinated in the presence of his guards, by some conspirators among his own subjects; an event which promised no great benefit to the *Romans*: for though the *Syracusians*, fond of liberty, seemed much inclined to change the monarchy into a commonwealth, they seemed no less inclined to side with the *Carthaginian Republic*.

Livy, B. 24.
c. 7.

CHAP.

C H A P. XXIV.

FIFTH YEAR of the War.

The wise and public spirited conduct of the Romans in several instances. They gain some advantages over Hannibal in Italy, and over King Philip in Greece.

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Bef. Chr.
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IN *Italy*, the campaign of this year being ended, *Fabius* took the road to *Rome*, to hold the *comitia* by centuries for the new elections. The prudent Consul did not enter the city, but appeared at the assembly in the *Campus Martius*, on the day appointed, in his military habit, and attended by his *Lictors* with their axes as well as fasces. It fell by lot to the tribe of the *Anio*, to vote first, and of this tribe to a century which consisted of the younger men; and the majority of this prerogative century named to the Consulship, *T. Otacilius* (a relation of the president) and *M. Æmilius Regillus*, men, neither of them, of such abilities as the present exigency

After the thirty-five tribes were compleated, the Centuries, which formed the *comitia centuriata*, were divided among the tribes, and became parts of them; and then in these assemblies it was decided by lot which of the tribes should vote first, and the tribe upon which the lot fell was called the *prerogative tribe*. Then lots were again cast among the centuries of this *prerogative tribe*, to determine which of those should vote before the rest; and the Century upon which the lot fell was called the *prerogative century*, *Resin. p. 466.*

required.

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required. *Fabius* therefore thought fit to interrupt the election, and harangue the assembly. He first excused the irregularity of his proceeding, by the present dangers which threatened the state. He then represented to them the importance of chusing Consuls qualified to enter the lists with *Hannibal*; that *Otacilius* had given no cause to think him equal to that enterprize, not having performed any one thing for which the command of the fleet had, this year, been intrusted to him; and that *Æmilius*, as high-priest of *Quirinus*, could not be absent from *Rome*. Romans (he added) *do you name such Consuls as you would wish to be conducted by, if you were this moment to give Hannibal battle. I pronounce, That the prerogative century give their suffrages again. Heralds, proclaim my orders.* *Otacilius* at first made some opposition to this; but the Lictors with their axes surrounded him, and soon forced him to silence. Then the prerogative century returned to the voting place, and gave their suffrages for the president himself, *Q. Fabius Verucosus* * (surnamed *Cunctator*, or the *Lingerer*) and *Claudius Marcellus* †, who was absent; and the other Centuries unanimously followed the example of this. *Rome* had never seen two greater men together at the head of her affairs. And though *Fabius*, by an irregular proceeding had procured his own continuance in the Consular dignity, against law and custom, yet no one accused him of ambition or tyranny, or of being actuated by any motive but a zeal for his country. The *Romans* were convinced of the

Y. R. 538.
Bef. Chr.

214.
237 Conf.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 8.

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.

213.
238 Conf.

c. 9.

* 4th time.

† 3d time.

Y. R. 539.
 Bef. Chr.
 213.
 238 Conf.

Livy, B. 34.
 c. 1.

necessity of continuing the commanders of their armies more than one year in office; and they now therefore made little alteration in the disposition of military employments.

As a law had been made the last year (at the motion of *Oppius*, a tribune of the people) to restrain the luxury of women, forbidding them to wear above half an ounce of gold in toys, and to ride in a chariot within a mile of *Rome*, except to a public sacrifice; so now the Censors, *M. Atilius Regulus*, and *P. Furius Philus*, made a strict enquiry into offences committed by the men, to the detriment of the public. *Cæcilius Metellus* and the other young nobles who with him would in despair have left *Italy* after the battle of *Cannæ*, those of the ten deputies from the prisoners taken at that battle, who had not returned to *Hannibal* according to their oath, and about 2000 young men of military age who had neglected, without just cause, to enrol themselves for the service, were all degraded. The Senate also decreed that all who were stigmatized by the Censors, should be sent into *Sicily*, and there be obliged to serve on foot, amongst the run-aways from the battle of *Cannæ*, till the war should be at an end. The *Romans* never exerted their virtue and disinterested zeal for their country in a greater degree than in this second *Punic* war; private men voluntarily advanced money for the public works; the masters who had sold their slaves to the Republic, would not accept of payment till the war was ended; scarce a centurion or trooper demanded his pay, and if any

* Liv. B.
 24. c. 18.

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one had so little generosity as to receive it from the Quæstor, he became the jest of his legion. Nay the money of the widow and the orphan was freely brought into the treasury, so great was the confidence in the public faith.

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.

213.
238 Conf.

Such being the dispositions of the people, the new levies were soon compleated. Six legions were added to the twelve already on foot. The *Sicilian* expedition seemed to require the most dispatch: and *Otacilius* was therefore ordered to embark with all diligence for that island, with one legion. And in order to man and equip the fleet, the Consuls, by authority from the Senate, laid a tax upon the rich. Each head of a family, who by the Censors register was found worth from 50,000 to a 100,000 asses, was obliged to maintain a rower or a sailor, at his own expence, for six months; and the more wealthy three, five, seven, in proportion to their riches. The Senators were obliged each to maintain eight sailors for a whole year.

Liv. B. 24.
C. 11.

What remained now, was to march the land forces, and begin the campaign in *Italy*. *Hannibal*, who had spent the winter in *Apulia*, returned to his camp on the *Tifata*, at the request of the *Capuans*, who thought their city threatened. He had ordered *Hanno*, with an army of 17,000 foot, and 1200 *Numidian* horse, to come from the country of the *Bruttians* and seize *Beneventum*; but *Sempronius*, with his army of *Volones*, prevented him, and possessed himself of that defenceless city. From thence he marched to give *Hanno* battle; and to engage his *Vo-*

c. 12.

c. 14.

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.

213.
238 Conf.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 15, 16.

Volones to exert themselves, he promised every man his liberty, who should bring off the head of an enemy. The Senate had given him power to enfranchise whom he pleased. But this promise had like to have ruined his affairs. For though his troops fought bravely at first, they lost much time in cutting off the heads of the enemies they had slain, and the ardour of those who had performed the condition of obtaining their freedom, was immediately abated : so that he was forced to publish a new declaration through all the ranks of his army, *That none should obtain their liberty, unless the Carthaginians were routed.* Hereupon the *Volones* renewed the fight with impetuosity, and gained so compleat a victory, that scarce 2000 of the enemy escaped *. We are told however that 4000 of those legionary slaves did not behave themselves in the battle so well as the rest, and were afraid to pursue the enemy to their camp ; and that apprehending punishment for their cowardice, they retired after the action to a hill. *Sempronius* had compassion for their weakness, and sent a Tribune to invite them back : And then, to perform his promise, he pronounced all, without exception, free. Nevertheless, that some distinction might be made between the brave and the cowards, he forbade the latter to eat sitting or lying down, all the time of their service, unless they were sick.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 17.

In the mean while, *Hannibal* endeavoured to surprise *Puteoli*. Failing in this attempt, he went

* The reader has been already cautioned concerning *Livy's* tales of *Roman victories* in this war.

and

and pillaged the country about *Naples*. From thence he moved towards *Nola*, whither the populace (who were still in his interest, in opposition to their Senate) had invited him. *Marcellus* being joined by the army from *Suessula* (now under *Q. Pomponius*) attacked and killed 2000 of his men, with the loss only of 400; and would have entirely ruined him, had *Claudius Nero*, whom the Consul had ordered with some squadrons out of *Nola* to make a tour, and fall upon the *Carthaginians* in the rear during the action, come up in time. *Marcellus* offered *Hannibal* battle again the next day; but the latter declined it, decamped the night following, and marched towards *Tarentum*.

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.
213.
238 Conf.

He had entertained strong hopes that this city would open her gates to him, upon his first appearance before it. Some *Tarentine* prisoners, whom he had formerly released without ransom, had engaged a great number of the young men of that place in his interest, and these invited him thither. But *M. Livius*, who commanded in the place, took such effectual measures to prevent the designs of the factious, that *Hannibal* was again disappointed. He quitted the enterprise, and marched towards *Salapia* in *Apulia*, where he resolved to spend the winter. Thither he ordered corn to be brought from *Lucania*; and his foragers having found in *Apulia* about 4000 colts, *Hannibal* ordered them to be broke; and with them he remounted his *African* horsemen. These were all his exploits during the whole campaign.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 20.

Y. R. 539.
B. F. Chr.

213.
238 Conf.

Livy, B. 24.
c. 19.

But whilst the *Carthaginian* was on his march to *Tarentum*, *Fabius* besieged *Casilinum*, and sent to *Marcellus* to come with some legions and cover the siege, apprehending an attack from the *Capuans*. The garrison in the place consisted of 2000 *Campanians* and 700 *Carthaginians*; and they made so vigorous a defence, that *Fabius*, by the daily slaughter of his men, was much discouraged. He would have raised the siege, if *Marcellus* had not represented to him, *That a wise General should well consider all the difficulties of an enterprize before he undertakes it; but that, when it is once undertaken, he ought to go through with it: and that to desist now from the siege, would much lessen the credit of the Republic among her allies.* Upon this *Fabius* renewed his attacks with more ardour than ever; and the *Campanians* were so intimidated by it, that they sent to him an offer to quit the place if they might retire in safety to *Capua*. *Fabius* consented; but *Marcellus* taking his opportunity, before fifty of them were come out of the city, seized the gate, entered the place, and put all who opposed him to the sword, without distinction*. The prisoners he sent to *Rome*. After the taking of *Casilinum*, *Marcellus* returned to *Nola*, and *Fabius* marched into *Samnium*, laid waste the country, and took several towns.

Plut. life
of Fabius.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 40.

Hannibal still depended upon his alliance with the king of *Macedon*, and indeed *Philip* began to

* This story ill agrees with the character given by the historians of *Marcellus*, but well with his after behaviour at the siege of *Syracuse*.

draw towards *Italy*. He first besieged *Apollonia*; but not succeeding in this enterprize, he turned his arms against *Oricum*, and took it. The inhabitants sent notice of their misfortune to *Lævinus* at *Brundisium*, who in two days after the news, arrived before the place. The king had left a small garrison in it, and was returned to the siege of *Apollonia*. *Lævinus* easily took *Oricum*, and, while he was there, deputies came to him from the people of *Apollonia*, begging assistance against the *Macedonians*. He sent thither 2000 foot under the command of *Q. Nævius Crista*, who got into the town without being perceived by the enemy. *Nævius* soon after understanding that the *Macedonian* camp was very negligently guarded, broke into it in the night, and, if his soldiers had abstained from slaughter, might have taken *Philip* prisoner; but the groans of the dying waked others, who carried off the King half naked to his ships. He returned into *Macedon*, and the *Roman* fleet wintered at *Oricum*.

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.
213.
238 Conf.

C H A P. XXV.

Transactions in Sicily. The Carthaginian interest prevails in Syracuse. Marcellus besieges it, but soon turns the siege into a blockade.

HANNIBAL made himself some amends for his disappointment on the side of *Macedon*, by the troubles he found means to raise in *Sicily*. *Hippocrates*, and *Epicydes*, two brothers of *Syracusan*

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.
213.
238 Conf.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 23. &
seq.

cusian extraction, whom he had sent to conclude the treaty with *Hieronymus*, had worked themselves into that Prince's favour, and, at the time of his death, commanded a body of 2000 *Syracusians*. Upon the news of the King's assassination, these Generals, being abandoned by their soldiers, repaired to *Syracuse*, as thinking this the safest place for them in the present conjuncture. At their arrival they found that the heads of the conspiracy, who were favoured by the people, had come to an accommodation with *Andranodorus*, the late King's uncle-in-law, and chief of the royalist party, and that he, *Themistus*, and those leaders, had been chosen Prætors to govern the state with the assistance of a Senate. The two *Hannibalists*, doubtless believing that this change of government had changed the dispositions of the *Syracusians* with respect to *Hannibal*, to prevent all suspicion of their designing to raise disturbances, applied themselves to the Prætors, and by their means obtained an audience of the Senate. They spoke to this effect. "We came hither on the part
" of *Hannibal* to treat with his friend *Hieronymus*.
" We have only obeyed the commands of our
" General, and desire now to return to him ;
" but as our journey is not like to be with
" safety to our persons, the *Roman* forces so
" much infesting *Sicily*, we request that we may
" have a convoy as far as *Locri* in *Italy*." Their
suit was easily obtained ; for the assembly had
no unwillingness to be rid of these Generals of
the late King, men extremely bold and enter-
prising

prising, of great ability in war, and of narrow fortunes. The Senate however were too dilatory in executing their own desires; and the brothers took advantage of the delay. Sometimes to the soldiers, with whom they were very intimate and familiar, sometimes to the deserters from the *Roman* fleet, and occasionally to the meanest of the populace, they whispered calumnies against the senators and other principal men of the city, accusing them, that under colour of renewing the league with *Rome*, they designed to betray *Syracuse* to her, in the view, that their own faction, having the sole merit of the pretended new alliance, might lord it over the rest.

These rumours being spread and believed, and drawing every day crowds of people to *Syracuse*, gave not only *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes*, but also *Andranodorus*, who at the pressing instances of his ambitious wife *Demarata*, the daughter of *Hiero*, aimed at the royalty, good hopes of changing the government, and effecting their several designs. *Andranodorus* having concerted his scheme with *Themistus*, the husband of *Harmonia*, *Hieronymus's* sister, unadvisedly imparted the secret to *Aristo*, a tragedian, who discovered it to the Prætors. *Aristo's* profession was not dishonourable among the *Greeks*: He was a man well descended, and of a good estate, and the Prætors therefore had no reason to reject his testimony; and it being confirmed by several corroborating circumstances, they, in concert with some of the oldest senators, placed guards at the door of the senate-house, who slew *Andranodorus*.

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.
213:
238 Conf.

Y. R. 539.

Bef. Chr.

213.

238 Conf.

dranodorus and *Themistus* as soon as they entered. This extraordinary action, most of the senators being ignorant of the cause of it, raised a great commotion and terror in the assembly. *Aristo* put an end to their fears. Being introduced by the Prætors, he informed the Senate, "That a plot had been laid to cut off all the chiefs of the republic, and to seize ^b *Ortygia* in the name of *Andranodorus*, and that this was to have been executed by the help of the *Spanish* and *African* mercenaries, who had served under *Hieronymus*." He then entered into the particulars of the conspiracy, declaring the names of all the conspirators, and the several parts they were to have acted. His evidence obtained full belief, and the assembly passed a decree, pronouncing the death of *Andranodorus* and *Themistus* no less just than that of *Hieronymus*. In the mean time the people without doors had taken the alarm at this proceeding; and it was necessary to quiet them. The Senate therefore deputed *Sopater*, one of the Prætors, to harangue the multitude.

This orator began with invectives against *Andranodorus* and *Themistus*, as if he had been accusing them at the bar, charging them, as the tutors and counsellors of *Hieronymus*, with all the injustices, oppressions, and cruelties, committed by the order or authority of that King, and with many other atrocious crimes perpetrated since his death. In the conclusion of his speech

^b A well fortified island to the South of *Syracuse*, and joined to the town by a bridge.

he intimated that they had been spirited up by their wives, the ambitious daughter and granddaughter of *Hiero*, to aspire to royalty by the destruction of the people's liberty. At this the whole multitude cried out, that neither of those women ought to live, nor any one of the royal race be suffered to remain on the earth. The Prætors, taking advantage of the people's present fury, immediately put it to the vote, and it was no sooner proposed than carried, *that all who were of the royal family should be destroyed.* In pursuance of this decree certain officers, commissioned by the Prætors, quickly dispatched *Demarata* and *Harmonia*. There was another daughter of *Hiero*, named *Heraclea*, the wife of *Zoippus*, who had been sent ambassador by *Hieronymus* to King *Ptolomy*, and had chosen to continue at the *Egyptian* court in a voluntary exile from his country, rather than be a spectator of its miseries. This lady with her two daughters the same executioners inhumanly murdered, and with so much expedition, that an express from the magistrates (who on second thoughts relented) came too late to save them. But now the people also began to repent of their own precipitation, and to pity the fate of the dead. Their pity soon turned into rage against the first authors of the cruelty. They furiously called out for an election of Prætors in the room of *Andranodorus* and *Themistus*; an election that was not like to be to the satisfaction of those already in power.

When, on the day appointed, the assembly was formed, it happened beyond all expectation, that somebody

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.
213.
238 Conf.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 27. &
seq.

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.

213.

238 Conf.

somebody from the farther end of the crowd named *Epicyles*, and another a little after named *Hippocrates*, and strait almost the whole multitude joined their suffrages for these two agents of *Hannibal*. The Republic, being very young, no method was yet settled for voting; all were indifferently admitted into the voting place, citizens, strangers, and *Roman* deserters. The magistrates in vain opposed the people's choice. Fearing a sedition they gave way to numbers, and *Hippocrates* and *Epicyles* were declared Prætors.

The two *Hannibalists* did not immediately discover their intentions. They were much dissatisfied, that deputies had been sent to *Appius Claudius* to renew the antient alliance between *Rome* and *Syracuse*, yet they thought it best to conceal their dissatisfaction till a more favourable opportunity should present to embroil affairs. *Appius* was then at *Murgantia* with a fleet of a hundred ships, waiting to see what the revolutions among the *Syracusians* would produce.

At *Rome* it had been resolved, from the apprehension that a dangerous war might arise in *Sicily*, to send the Consul *Marcellus* to take upon him the direction of affairs in that island. He was just arrived in his province; and *Appius* referred the *Syracusan* deputies to him for a final answer. The Consul approving the conditions, dispatched ambassadors to conclude the treaty with the Prætors at *Syracuse*. But those ambassadors found the state of things there very different from what they had expected. A *Carthaginian* fleet had appeared off *Cape Pachynum*, and
Hippocrates

Hippocrates and *Epicydes* had laid hold of this advantage to attempt something in favour of *Carthage*, by infusing anew into the minds of the people a jealousy of the Partisans of *Rome*, a suspicion of their intending to betray *Syracuse* to the *Romans*. This jealousy was the more readily entertained, as *Appius* to encourage the *Roman* party in the town was come with his fleet to the mouth of the port. The populace ran tumultuously to hinder the *Romans* from landing in case they should attempt it.

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.
213.
238 Conf.

In the perplexity occasioned by these commotions, the magistrates thought it proper to call an assembly of the people. The multitude were for some time divided in opinion. At length *Apollonides*, one of the chief citizens, with great calmness, and as a man unbiaſſed by any private or party views, represented to them “ the necessity of unanimously adhering to the one or
“ the other of the rival Republics. The choice,
“ *he said*, was of much less importance than unanimity in choosing: yet in his opinion, they
“ had more encouragement to follow the example of *Hiero* than of *Hieronymus*, and to prefer a treaty with *Rome*, whose friendship they
“ had happily experienced for 50 years, to the uncertain advantages of an alliance with *Carthage*, who, in times past, had not proved very
“ faithful to her engagements. Nor was it a consideration of small moment, that they must
“ have immediate peace with the *Romans*, or
“ immediate war with them; whereas should
“ they reject the friendship of the *Carthaginians*,

“ a war

Y. R. 539.
 Bef. Chr.
 213.
 238 Conf.

" a war with *them* might yet be at a great distance." The more dispassionate *Apollonides* appeared, the greater weight his advice had with the people; and as they were in no condition to support a war with *Rome*, it was in conclusion agreed, that the treaty with that Republic should be renewed, and a deputation sent to *Marcellus* for that purpose.

A few days after, the *Leontines* having demanded of the *Syracusians* a body of troops to defend their frontiers, the government thought this a favourable opportunity to get rid of a multitude of soldiers and officers, who were very turbulent in the city; and it was determined that *Hippocrates* should march to the assistance of the *Leontines* at the head of 4000 men, most of them deserters or mercenaries. This *Prætor*, glad of an opportunity to create disturbances, readily accepted the commission, and, soon after his arrival among the *Leontines*, began to make stolen incursions into the *Roman* province, laying waste the country. *Appius*, informed of these hostilities, sent a body of soldiers to protect his allies. Those troops *Hippocrates* openly attacked, and put most of them to the sword. Hereupon *Marcellus* ordered deputies to *Syracuse* to complain of the infraction of the treaty, and to remonstrate, that a firm and lasting peace between *Rome* and *Syracuse*, was not to be hoped for so long as *Hippocrates* and *Epicyles* continued in *Sicily*. The latter, fearing to be accused in the absence of his brother, and desirous of having some share in exciting a war, repaired in all haste to *Leontini*.

There,

There, in conjunction with *Hippocrates*, he represented to the inhabitants, " that *Syracuse*, while " she provided for her own liberty, had expressly " covenanted with the *Romans*, that she should have " dominion over all the cities formerly subject to " *Hieronymus*: But that the *Leontines* had as good " a right to liberty as *Syracuse*; and that they " ought therefore to refuse acceding to her treaty " with *Rome*, unless *that covenant* were taken " out of it." The multitude was easily persuaded; so that when deputies from *Syracuse* complained of the slaughter made of the *Roman* troops, and desired the *Leontines* would concur with the *Syracusians*, to banish *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* out of the island, the citizens haughtily answered, " that they had given no commission " to the *Syracusians* to make a peace for them " with *Rome*, nor were they bound by a treaty " concluded without their participation." The *Syracusians* acquainted *Marcellus* with this answer, and at the same time declared, that they would not only adhere steadily to their engagements with the *Romans*, but would join with them in besieging *Leontini*, on condition that this city, after its reduction, were restored to the dominion of *Syracuse*. *Marcellus* agreed to the proposal, assembled all his forces, sent for the Prætor *Appius* to come to his assistance, and prepared to attack *Leontini*.

About this time, a great company of those *Roman* soldiers who had fled from the battle of *Canne*, and who had been condemned, by a decree of the Senate, to serve in a separate corps in

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.
213.
238 Conf.

Plut. life
of Marcellus.
Liv. B. 25.
c. 5, 6, 7.

Y. R. 339.
Ref. Chr.

213.
238. Conf.

in *Sicily* as long as the war should last in *Italy*, came, with the permission of their commander *Lentulus*, and earnestly begged of the Consul to be incorporated in his legions. *Marcellus* wrote to *Rome* in their favour: The Conscript Fathers returned answer, that it was their opinion, the Republic ought not to put any confidence in the courage of soldiers who had deserted their companions at the battle of *Cannæ*; yet if *Marcellus* thought otherwise, he might act in this matter as he pleased, provided none of them ever received any military rewards, or were suffered to return to *Italy* before the end of the war.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 30. &
seq. Plut.
life of
Marcellus.

Leontini was taken upon the first assault, but *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* made their escape to *Erbessus*. A body of 8000 Men from *Syracuse*, under the command of *Sofis* and *Dinomenes*, two of the Prætors, marching to join *Marcellus*, were met at the river *Mylas*, by a man who told them, that *Leontini* had been sacked, and all, without distinction, able to bear arms, put to the sword. This false story (occasioned by the execution of 2000 deserters, whom *Marcellus* had taken in the place) made such an impression on the soldiers, that their officers could not prevail with them to proceed to *Leontini*, but were forced to turn aside and lead them to *Megara*. From this place the Prætors marched them soon after towards *Erbessus*, believing, that the seditious spirit among them would be easily quelled, if *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes*, the true authors of all the late disturbances, were destroyed, or driven out of the country.

The

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.213.
238 Conf.

The brothers found themselves now reduced to extremities ; yet having some hope in the good-will of the soldiers, with whom they were well acquainted, and this hope being favoured by the recent report of the massacre at *Leontini*, they left *Erbesius*, in the resolution to yield themselves up to the soldiers at discretion. It happened luckily for them, that a body of *Cretans*, which had formerly served the *Romans* as auxiliaries, and, being taken prisoners at the battle of *Thrasymen*, had been set at liberty by *Hannibal*, and had since served under *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* in the reign of *Hieronymus*, was marching in the van of the army. To these they addressed themselves in a suppliant manner, presenting them olive branches, and imploring their protection, " That they might not be left at the mercy " of the *Syracusians*, who would quickly deliver " them up to be slain by the *Romans*." The *Cretans* immediately cried out to them, to take courage, and promised to defend them : So that when *Sosis* and *Dinomenes*, informed of what passed, came in haste and ordered the *Hannibalists* to be seized, they found no obedience from their troops, but rather a disposition to revolt. In this perplexity they gave orders for returning to *Megara*, and sent an account to *Syracuse* of what had happened. During the march of the army, a letter forged by *Hippocrates*, but pretended to be written by the Prætors at *Syracuse* to *Marcellus*, and intercepted, was produced and read to the soldiers by the contriver of it. It was to this effect. " the Prætors of *Syracuse* to the Consul

Y. R. 539.
 Bef. Chr.
 213.
 238 Conf.

“ *Marcellus*, health. You have done justly and
 “ prudently in sparing none at *Leontini*. All the
 “ mercenaries deserve the same fate. Nor will
 “ *Syracuse* ever be in peace while any foreign
 “ soldiers remain either in the city or the army.
 “ Turn then your arms against those who are
 “ with our Prætors at *Megara*, and by their de-
 “ struction restore us to perfect liberty.” This
 letter kindled such a flame among the soldiers,
 and their sudden loud clamours so terrified *Sofis*
 and *Dinomenes*, that they galloped away in all
 haste to *Syracuse*. Their flight did not quiet
 the commotion: The mercenaries fell upon the
Syracusan soldiers that were in the army, and
 would have put them all to the sword, if the
Hannibalists had not interposed in their defence,
 desiring to make use of them as hostages, and
 also hoping by their means to gain friends in
Syracuse. Thither they instantly sent a soldier,
 who had been in *Leontini* when it was taken,
 to spread the false story of the massacre of its
 inhabitants. The artifice had the desired effect,
 even upon the Senate and the chief men in the
 Republic. They thought it necessary to shut the
 gates and guard the city against the *Romans*, as
 against an enemy whose avarice and cruelty
 would spare nothing. Scarce was this done,
 when *Hippocrates* and *Epicyles* appeared before
 the walls at the head of the mercenaries, and,
 by the assistance of the multitude within (who
 would not be restrained by their magistrates)
 broke open one of the gates and entered the city.
 The Prætors retired with the *Syracusan* soldiery
 into

into that quarter of the town, which was called *Acbradina*, hoping to defend themselves there; but the *Hannibalists* being joined by the mercenaries, the deserters and all the soldiers of the late King, took it at the first assault. Those of the Prætors who could not escape in the first confusion of the conflict were massacred, together with many of the citizens; and the next day, liberty being granted to all slaves and prisoners, the mixed multitude declared *Hippocrates* and *Epicydes* their Prætors.

Marcellus, upon the news of this revolution, advanced with his army to *Syracuse*. Before he began hostilities, he sent deputies to the *Syracusians*, to assure them, he did not come to make war upon *them*, but assist those of their fellow-citizens who, having escaped the slaughter in *Acbradina*, had taken refuge in his camp, and those who suffered yet greater wrongs in the city, from tyranny and oppression: That what he therefore insisted upon was, that the refugees under his protection should be restored to their possessions and privileges, the authors of the disturbances given up, and *Syracuse* put in a condition to enjoy peaceably her laws and liberty: And he threatened war against whoever should oppose these demands. The brothers, not thinking it safe to let the deputies enter the town, gave them audience without the walls; and when the latter had made their demands, *Epicydes* spoke to this effect: "If you had brought any message to us, we would have returned an answer. You may now go back; and when

Y. R. 539.
Bef. Chr.
213.
238 Conf.

Y.R. 539.

Bef. Chr.

213.

238 Conf.

“ the government of *Syracuse* is in the hands
 “ of those to whom you have orders to ad-
 “ dress yourselves, you may come again. If
 “ *Marcellus* is for war, he will find the siege of
 “ *Syracuse* an enterprize somewhat different from
 “ the siege of *Leontini*.” The Consul, upon the
 return of his deputies, invested the place by sea
 and land.

Syracuse stood on the south-east side of *Sicily*,
 and was properly five cities in one; *Ortygia*,
Acbradina, *Tyche*, *Neapolis* and *Epipolæ*. *Ortygia*
 was a small island, very near the continent, and
 might be called the citadel of *Syracuse*; it was
 joined to *Acbradina* by a bridge. All the at-
 tempts of *Marcellus* to carry the town by assault
 were frustrated by the surprizing inventions of
Archimedes. This great man is said to have once
 told King *Hiero*, that he could move the globe
 of the earth, provided he had another earth to
 stand upon. And he now contrived machines
 which cast stones of so prodigious a weight, as
 to break in pieces all the battering engines of the
Romans. Nay, he invented a sort of iron crows
 fastened to chains, which being let fall upon the
Roman gallies (that were brought close to the wall
 of the town) stuck fast in the prows of them,
 drew them up, by means of a counterpoise on
 that part of the machine which was within the
 rampart, and set them on one end, or overturned
 them: Insomuch that the *Romans* were utterly
 discouraged, and *Marcellus* obliged to remove to
 a further distance. It was resolved in a council
 of

of war, to attack the place no more, but shut up all the avenues of it, in order to reduce it by famine.

C H A P. XXVI.

SIXTH YEAR of the War.

The Roman arms prosper in Italy. Syphax a Numidian King. is gained by the Scipios to make war upon the Carthaginians in Africa. The blockade of Syracuse is continued, while Marcellus reduces some other towns in Sicily.

AT Rome, Q. Fabius Maximus, the son of Fabius Cunctator, and T. Sempronius Gracchus, were chosen Consuls for the new year, and appointed, in concert with the Prætorian armies in Italy, to conduct the war against Hannibal. Marcellus continued in Sicily, and had the government of the country formerly subject to Hiero. Lentulus, with the title of Pro-Prætor, commanded the Roman province in that island, and T. Otacilius Crassus guarded the coast with his fleet. The two Scipios, Lævinus and Scævola managed the affairs of Rome in the respective countries of Spain, Greece and Sardinia. And the Republic employed this year, in her several armies, twenty-one Roman legions, besides the troops of her allies.

All the regulations necessary for beginning the campaign being dispatched, young Fabius set out from Rome, and took upon him the com-

Y. R. 540.
Bef. Chr.
212.
239 Cons.

Y. R. 540.
Bef. Chr.

212.

239 Conf.

Liv. B. 24.
c. 45.

mand of the army at *Suessula*. His father served under him.

While the *Fabii* continued here, *Defius Altinius*, one of the chief men of *Arpi*, who had engaged that city to revolt to *Hannibal*, came and offered, for a reward, to restore it into the hands of its former masters. The affair being brought before a council, some were for treating the villain as *Camillus* had treated the school-master of *Falerii*; but old *Fabius* represented to them, that though such traitors ought never to be trusted as friends, yet in the present circumstances of the Republic, no discouragement should be given to those of the rebels who were disposed to return to their former obedience; and he advised, that *Altinius* should only be kept in an easy confinement till the end of the war, when it would be time enough to judge whether he had made sufficient amends for his revolt. This advice was followed, and the traitor sent to *Cales*, where in the day-time he was suffered to walk abroad with a guard, but confined close prisoner at night. As soon as he was missed at *Arpi*, the inhabitants sent notice of it to *Hannibal*. The *Carthaginian* was in no manner of pain at the news; he had long considered *Altinius*, as a man in whom he could place no confidence, and was glad of this pretext to seize his riches, which were very great. But that he might appear to act rather from the motive of revenge than avarice, he sent for the wife and children of *Altinius*, and having put them to the torture, partly to discover the traitor's designs, but chiefly to learn what

what money he had left behind him, he ordered them to be burnt alive.

Y. R. 540.
Bef. Chr.

212.
239 Conf.

The *Fabii* opened the campaign with an assault upon *Arpi*, in which was a garrison of 5000 men. The *Romans* in a dark rainy night surprised and entered the place on the strongest side, where it was least guarded. Nevertheless the garrison, assisted by 3000 of the townsmen, whom, through suspicion of them, they placed in the front, made a stout defence. At length the citizens, and, after their example, 1000 *Spaniards*, went over to the *Romans*. The *Spaniards*, according to *Livy*, bargained that the rest of the garrison should have leave to depart in safety, which they accordingly did, and joined *Hannibal* at *Salapia*.

In the mean time 112 of the chief men of *Capua* having, under the pretext of pillaging the enemy's lands, got permission to leave the town, went to the *Roman* camp above *Suessula*, and yielded themselves to the Prætor *Fulvius*, upon a promise of being restored to their estates, when *Capua* should be reduced to the obedience of the Republic.

Nothing further of great moment happened in *Italy* this campaign. The Prætor *Sempronius Tuditanus* took *Aternum* by assault, and in it 7000 prisoners, and a good deal of money. *Sempronius* the Consul had several slight skirmishes with the enemy in *Lucania*, and reduced a few towns, but none of any note. Two petty nations of *Bruttium* returned to their former obedience. *Hanno* the *Carthaginian* defeated a Præ-

Liv. B. 24.

c. 47.

Liv. B. 25.

c. 1.

Y. R. 540.

Bef. Chr.

212.

239 Conf.

Liv. B. 24.

c. 48.

fect of the *Roman* allies in that country, and cut off almost all his army, which consisted of raw undisciplined men. *Hannibal* marched from *Salapia* to *Tarentum*, in hopes of having that city betrayed to him. He spent the summer near it to very little purpose, only some inconsiderable towns of the *Salentini* revolted to him.

In *Spain*, the two *Scipios* not only made considerable progress there, but extended their views even to *Africa*. They engaged *Sypbax* King of *Masæsyliæ* (the western part of *Numidia*) to take arms against *Carthage*: And *Statorius*, one of the three officers, whom the *Scipios* had sent upon the negotiation, continued with the *Numidian* King at his request, to discipline his troops. On the other hand, the *Carthaginians*, alarmed at the motions of the *Masæsylian*, prevailed with *Gala* King of *Masyliæ* (the eastern part of *Numidia*, and the nearest to their territory) to join with them, to divert the threatened storm. *Gala* gave the command of his forces to his son *Masiniissa*, a youth of about 17 years of age, who, in conjunction with the *Carthaginian* army, defeated *Sypbax* in a great battle, and slew 30,000 of his men. The vanquished King retired into *Mauritania*, and made new levies there, intending to pass the streights, and join the *Scipios* in *Spain*: But *Masiniissa* following him close, kept him so employed in *Africa*, that he had no leisure to cross the seas.

Liv. B. 24.

c. 55.

In the mean while the blockade of *Syracuse* continued. *Marcellus*, not thinking all his forces necessary for that purpose, left two thirds of the army

army before the place under the command of *Appius Claudius*, and marched with the remainder, to reduce some towns of *Sicily* which had gone over to the *Carthaginians*. *Pelorus* and *Erbessus* surrendered to him, and *Megara* he took by force and plundered. About this time *Himilco* arrived from *Africa*, with an army of 25,000 foot, 3000 horse, and 12 elephants, and soon made himself master of *Heraclea* and *Agrigentum*. Upon this news, *Hippocrates* left his brother *Epicyles* to command in *Syracuse*, and sallying out of the town with 10,000 foot and 500 horse, broke through the *Roman* lines in the night, and marched to join *Himilco*. This detachment *Marcellus* surprized, as they were pitching their camp near *Acrille*, and he cut in pieces the infantry: But *Hippocrates* escaped with the cavalry, and, joining *Himilco*, turned against the Pro-Consul, in hopes of overtaking him before he could reach his camp at *Syracuse*. Disappointed in this expectation, and not daring to attack *Marcellus* in his entrenchments, the *Carthaginian* Generals employed their forces to reduce the *Sicilian* cities that were in the interest of *Rome*. *Murgantia* opened her gates to them, and betrayed the *Roman* garrison into their hands. *L. Pinarius*, the Governor of *Enna*, dreading the like fate, massacred all the inhabitants of that town, and pillaged it. *Marcellus* approved the fact, and granted the plunder of *Enna* to the soldiers of the garrison. The news of this barbarity, committed in a city held in great veneration all over the island, and sacred to *Proserpine* (whom *Pluto* was said to have carried off

from

Y. R. 540.
Bef. Chr.
212.
239 Conf.

Y. R. 540.
Bef. Chr.

212.

239 Conf.

from that neighbourhood) alienated the minds of the *Sicilians* from *Rome*; and many of their towns embraced the party of the *Carthaginians*. Winter approaching, *Marcellus*, having dismissed *Appius Claudius*, who had a mind to stand for the Consulship, gave the command both of the fleet and the army before *Syracuse* to *Quintilius Crispinus*, and took up his own quarters about five miles from the town.

Liv. B. 25.
c. 1.

During these transactions in *Sicily*, all was peaceable at *Rome*: Only religion suffered by the introduction of foreign Gods and foreign rites, which the superstition of a multitude of people from the country, driven by poverty and fear to shelter themselves in *Rome*, had, in this uncertain state of things, made them prone to receive. Foreign priests and diviners had dispersed among them books, containing prophecies, forms of prayer, and particular methods of sacrificing. The antient worship was almost forgot. It seemed, says *Livy*, as if a new set of Gods were, on a sudden, come into being; or that a new species of men was risen. The evil became at length so general, that the *Conscript Fathers* were forced to interpose. The *Prætor* having assembled the people, read to them a decree of the Senate, and, in conformity thereto, his own edict; which commanded all persons, who had books of divination or prayers, or containing instructions about the rites of sacrifices, to bring them to him before the first of April; and forbade all persons to offer sacrifice in public, or in any sacred place whatsoever, according to any new or foreign ceremonies. Thus were the innovations

novations suppressed, and religion settled again upon the antient footing.

C H A P. XXVII.

SEVENTH and EIGHTH YEARS of the War.

The city of Tarentum betrayed to Hannibal.

He besieges the citadel. Capua besieged by the Romans. Syracuse taken by Marcellus. Hannibal marches into the neighbourhood of Rome; retires thence; defeats a Roman army; and marches to Rhegium. Capua surrenders to the Romans. They gain some advantages over King Philip in Greece.

THE time for the elections drawing on, and the present *Consuls* being both engaged abroad in the war, one of them nominated *C. Claudius Centho* Dictator, to hold the *Comitia*. And there *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, and *Appius Claudius Pulcher*, were chosen *Consuls* for the new year. It was thought fit to add two legions to the twenty-one already on foot; a surprising multitude of soldiers, to be all raised out of the citizens of *Rome*, and exclusive of the troops of the allies, which were at least as numerous as the *Roman* legionaries! But the making these new levies was interrupted, and the departure of the *Consuls* delayed for some time, by an incident, which revived the hatred of the people to the publicans.

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.

211.
240 Conf.

Liv. B. 25.
c. 3.

It

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.

211.

240 Conf.

It has been observed before, that the publicans undertook to supply the *Roman* armies in *Spain* with provisions; and the Senate had agreed to indemnify them, in case of losses at sea. *Posthumius*, an avaricious wretch, took advantage of this condition to practise rogueries, and impose upon the public. He placed to their account many shipwrecks which had never happened; he also put small quantities of goods of little value on board old shattered vessels; which, after he had brought off the seamen in boats ready for that purpose, he sunk; and then pretended the cargoes had been extremely rich. By this means he made his losses run very high, and demanded great sums in consideration of them. But his knavery was at length discovered, and two Tribunes of the people threatened to have him fined 200,000 *asses* of brass: in order to which they cited him to appear and take his trial before the *Comitia by Tribes*. Hereupon the friends of the accused applied themselves to *Servilius Casca*, a relation of *Posthumius*, and one of the Tribunes: But *Casca* not daring, through shame and fear of the people, to protest against the proceedings of his colleagues, the publicans, who were all interested in the affair, had recourse to violence, and insulted both the people and their magistrates. And they were just ready to come to blows, when the Consul *Fulvius* said to the Tribunes of the commons, *You see how little respect is shewn to your persons, If you do not dissolve the assembly, the affair will end in sedition*; the Tribunes followed his advice;

645l. 16s.
3d, Ar-
buthnot.

Liv. B.
25. c. 3.

vice; and, being afterwards authorised by the Senate, changed the nature of the process, and made the affair capital. *Posthumius*, and the other publicans who assisted him in the riot, were cited to appear as criminals before the *Comitia by Centuries*. Some were dragged to prison, for want of the sureties required of them; others went into a voluntary banishment; *Posthumius* left his bail and fled; and *Rome* was delivered from a gang of bold and avaricious villains.

In the end of the winter *Hannibal* had surprized *Tarentum*. The inhabitants of this place had long been disaffected to the Republic, and lately provoked by the cruel execution of some hostages, they had sent to *Rome*, and who had attempted to make their escape. Thirteen of the principal citizens entered into a plot to deliver up the city to the *Carthaginian*. *Nico* and *Philomenus* were at the head of them. They made hunting their pretence for night-excursions. The game they brought home, and with which they furnished the table of *Livius*, the commander of the *Roman* garrison, pleased him so much, that without the least suspicion he allowed them the liberty of going out and coming in at pleasure. By this means the conspirators had frequent conferences with *Hannibal*, and having engaged him to promise, *That when he should become master of Tarentum, the inhabitants should enjoy their laws, liberties, and estates, without infringement; that they should not be subject to pay any tribute, or to receive a Carthaginian garrison, without their own consent; and that the effects of*

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.
211.
240 Conf.

Polyb. B. 3.
c. 19.
Liv. B. 25.
c. 8.

Y. R. 541.
Ref. Chr.

211.

240 Conf.

the Romans only should be given up as free booty to his troops, they undertook to bring him into the town. *Hannibal* was at the distance of three days march from *Tarentum*, and feigned himself sick in his camp, that his long stay there might not occasion suspicion. At length *Philomenus* gave him notice, that a favourable opportunity offered to put their project in execution. The *Carthaginian* came away with a detachment of 10,000 men, and concealed himself in a valley fifteen miles from the city. Hither *Philomenus* brought him word, that the next night the Roman Governor was to be at an entertainment, and would probably drink to excess; and that when he was fast asleep, it would be the proper time for the attempt.

Polyb. B.
8. c. 24.

All preparations being made by the conspirators, both within and without the city, *Hannibal*, conducted by *Philomenus*, approached the walls about midnight. The *Carthaginian*, then giving a part of his forces to the *Tarentine*, silently drew near with the rest to the gate *Temenides*, and gave the appointed signal to *Nico*, who at the head of his party in the town, without much noise made himself master of the gate, slew the guard, and admitted the *Carthaginians*. The General, for the greater security in case of accidents, left 2000 horse without the gate, and advancing with the rest of his troops into the Forum, took possession of it. In the mean time, *Philomenus* had marched with 1000 *Africans* to another gate, at which he used to be admitted when he returned from hunting. He was followed

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.

211.

240 Conf.

lowed by two young men carrying a wild boar of an enormous size, and when the wicket was opened, and the centinel upon guard stood examining the beast, *Philomenus* ran him through with a hunting spear. Then 30 *Carthaginians* entered in an instant, broke down the gate, and let in their companions, who, as had been agreed upon, joined *Hannibal* in the Forum. After this the general seized the principal posts in the town, sent parties of men into the different quarters, and with each of them several of the conspirators. His view in this was, that the inhabitants might be distinguished and preserved, while all the *Romans* were put to the sword. To draw these out the more effectually, some men, prepared on purpose, sounded a charge in the theatre with *Roman* trumpets, and after the *Roman* manner. The slaughter continued all that night and part of the next day; but *Livius* with his domestics, in the beginning of the tumult, escaped in a bark to the citadel, which was strongly fortified, and where all that remained of the garrison took refuge.

In order to secure the *Tarentines* against all attacks from the *Romans*, *Hannibal* proposed to cast up a rampart over-against the wall of the citadel, and as he knew the enemy would endeavour to hinder the work, he prepared to receive them. The rampart was no sooner begun, than the *Romans* made a vigorous sally. *Hannibal* defended himself but faintly till he observed that the greatest part of the garrison was got over their ditch: then falling furiously upon them, he drove them

Y. R. 541.
 Bef. Chr.
 211.
 240 Conf.

them with such slaughter within their walls that they did not think proper to attack him a second time; and he had leisure to carry on his works. Besides the rampart abovementioned, he ordered a ditch to be drawn, and another rampart to be raised upon the brink of it, and within that a wall, so that the inhabitants might, without the assistance of the *Carthaginians*, easily defend their town against all attempts from the citadel. Having left a part of his troops to finish and guard the works, in conjunction with the *Tarentines*, he encamped with the rest of his army on the banks of the *Eurotas* (otherwise called *Galesus*) five miles from the city. When the fortifications were completed, he returned and besieged the citadel in form; but the garrison having received a reinforcement from *Metapontus*, a *Roman* city on the gulph of *Tarentum*, sallied out, burned his machines in the night, and made him lay aside the thoughts of reducing the place by assault.

However, it was necessary to secure the *Tarentines* a free passage to the sea, which was at present cut off by the citadel, that stood at the entrance of the port. No vessel could safely go out, or come in; and this made the *Tarentines* apprehend a scarcity of provisions. *Hannibal*, who was not to be discouraged by difficulties, formed a scheme (which the antients have much admired) to remedy this evil. There were a good number of ships in the haven of *Tarentum*; and he caused them to be transported to the sea by land, on carriages made for that purpose. These vessels anchored before the mouth of the haven; so that the

the citadel, which before commanded the sea, could now receive no provisions that way; and the city was supplied. After this, *Hannibal* returned to his winter quarters, leaving the citadel blocked up by sea and land.

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.
211.
240 Conf.

The Consuls *Fulvius* and *Appius*, when their affairs at *Rome* were dispatched, took the field, and marched with joint forces into *Samnium*. As the *Capuans* expected to be besieged by them, and began already to feel the miseries of famine (for the *Roman* armies had not permitted them to sow their lands) they sent a deputation to *Hannibal*, then near *Tarentum*, to beg he would order them a supply of corn from the towns in their neighbourhood, while the roads were yet open. The *Carthaginian* sent *Hanno* with an army from *Bruttium* to their relief. *Hanno* having pitched his camp near *Beneventum*, gave notice to the *Capuans*, to send their waggons to fetch the corn, which he had collected for them in vast quantities. So indolent and lazy were these effeminate wretches, that they sent but four hundred carts, and a few mules. The *Carthaginian* could not forbear expressing his indignation at such intolerable negligence, and fixed a day when a greater number of carriages should come to remove the rest of the corn. In the mean time the Consuls had notice of what was doing, from the people of *Beneventum*; and *Fulvius* with his troops marched thither with all expedition. He entered the town in the night, and the next morning appeared by break of day before the enemy's camp, while *Hanno* was absent foraging with a part of

Liv. B. 25.
c. 13.

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.

211.
240 Conf.

Livy, B. 25.
c. 14.

his army. Two thousand *Capuan* carts were arrived there, and the carters and peasants mixing with the soldiers caused a good deal of disorder. Nevertheless, as the camp was situated upon an ascent, it was very difficult to take it by assault; the *Roman* soldiers signalized their bravery on this occasion, beyond the expectation of their General, who was for quitting the enterprize, or at least suspending it, till his colleague should come to his assistance. One *Vibius*, who commanded a cohort of the *Peligni*, and, after his example, *Pedanius* a Centurion of the third *Roman* legion, threw each a standard over the enemy's rampart, to excite the soldiers to recover them. The stratagem succeeded, the *Carthaginian* entrenchments were forced, and the slaughter was great. As for *Hanno*, having lost his camp, he was forced to return to *Bruttium* with the remainder of his army; and the *Capuans* sent a new deputation to *Hannibal*, to press him to come to their assistance, being now more than ever apprehensive of a siege. The *Carthaginian* answered, that he would take care of *Capua*; and for the present sent them 2000 horse to defend their territory from the enemy's incursions. He had still hopes of reducing the citadel of *Tarentum* by famine; but a convoy of provisions having forced its way through the *Tarentine* gallies, entered the place, and disappointed his expectations. His design upon *Thurium* succeeded better. *Hanno* and *Mago* defeated the Prætor *Atinius*, who sallied out of the place; after which the inhabitants opened their gates to the conquerors. The *Metapontines* also, when

Chap. XXVII. *Second Punic War.*

415

when left by the *Roman* garrison, which went to the relief of the citadel of *Tarentum*, submitted to the *Carthaginians*.

Y. R. 540.
Bef. Chr.
210.
238 Conf.

During these things, the Consuls entered the territory of *Capua* with a design to besiege the city in form; and believing undoubtedly, that *Hannibal* would come to its relief, they ordered *Sempronius Gracchus* to leave *Lucania*, and draw near to *Capua*, with his horse and light armed infantry, that they might be the better able to withstand the enemy's cavalry. *Sempronius* having left his legions under the command of *Cn. Cornelius*, his Quæstor, was preparing for his march, when one *Flavius*, a *Lucanian*, and hitherto zealous in the *Roman* interest, changed his inclinations on a sudden, and in order to recommend himself to the *Carthaginians*, betrayed the Pro-Consul to them. He pretended to *Sempronius*, that the heads of the *Carthaginian* faction in *Lucania* were disposed to a reconciliation with the Republic, and only desired a private conference with him. The *Roman*, not suspecting any deceit, suffered himself, attended only by his lictors and a troop of horse, to be led by the traitor into an ambush, where *Mago* with a body of *Carthaginians* surrounded them; and then *Flavius* went over to the enemy. The Pro-Consul, seeing himself betrayed, dismounted, and wrapping his left arm in his paludamentum, for want of a buckler, rushed sword in hand to the place where he saw *Flavius*, in hopes to kill the traitor before he fell himself; but he perished in the attempt, though the *Carthaginians* endeavoured to take

Livy B.
25. c. 16.

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.

211.
240 Conf.

Liv. B. 25.
c. 18.

him alive. The body of this brave Pro-Consul was carried to *Hannibal's* camp, who erected a funeral pile for him, and did honour to his memory.

While the Consuls were pillaging the country about *Capua*, *Mago* with his cavalry and some of the *Capuans* fell upon the *Romans*, of whom he slew 1500. Upon this news *Hannibal* advanced towards the city and offered battle to the enemy. *Appius* and *Fulvius* accepted the challenge, and the engagement was begun, to the disadvantage of the *Romans*, when *Cn. Cornelius* appeared with the *Volones* which had been commanded by *Sempronius*. Each side apprehending, that assistance was coming to the other, immediately founded a retreat. The Consuls, to draw *Hannibal* from *Capua*, decamped in the night, divided their armies, and marched the one into *Lucania* and the other towards *Cumæ*. The *Carthaginian* next day set out for *Lucania* in pursuit of *Appius*, who had taken that road, but the latter, fetching a compass, returned by another way to the neighbourhood of *Capua*. There happened to be at this time in *Lucania* one *M. Centenius Penula*, who by the credit of the Prætor *Cornelius Scylla*, and by promising great things, had obtained of the Senate the command of a body of 8000 men, which he had encreased to near double that number. *Hannibal*, missing the Consul *Appius*, turned his arms against *Centenius*, entirely defeated him, and cut off almost all his whole army. The *Carthaginian* then marched into *Apulia*, and attacked the Prætor *Fulvius*, who

who commanded 18,000 men in that country. The victory was complete, 16,000 of the *Romans* being slain, and their camp taken. And to add to the misfortunes of the present campaign, the *Volones* disbanded themselves. Notwithstanding these discouragements the Consuls were busy at *Casilinum*, preparing all things necessary for the siege of *Capua*. They sent for the Prætor *Claudius Nero*, with the forces he commanded at *Suesfula*; and the three Generals with their united armies besieged *Capua* in form.

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.
211.
240 Conf.

During this siege, *Marcellus* made himself master of *Syracuse*. He took the opportunity of a festival, when the soldiers and citizens had drunk plentifully, to make a detachment scale the walls of *Tyche*, in that part of it which was nearest to *Epipolæ*, and which was ill guarded^a. He presently after possessed himself of *Epipolæ*; whereupon the inhabitants of *Neapolis*, as well as *Tyche*, sent deputies to him, and submitted. *Marcellus* granted life and liberty to all of free condition, but gave up those quarters of the city to be plundered.

Livy, B. 25.
c. 23. & seq.

Notwithstanding this, there was a great deal yet to do. *Acbradina* and *Ortygia*, which were strongly fortified, still held out; *Hippocrates* and *Himilco* arrived with their troops to the relief of the besieged; and the *Romans* were forced to ex-

^a Though this account be taken from *Livy*, yet he afterwards tells us, in two or three places, that *Sosis* a Brazier let *Marcellus* into *Syracuse* by night. *Liv. B. 26. c. 21, 30 and 31.*

Y. R. 547.

Bef. Chr.

211.

240 Conf.

ert all their bravery and skill to maintain the advantages they had gained.

But now a plague made terrible havock in both armies. At the first breaking out of the pestilence, the *Sicilians*, who served under *Hippocrates* and *Himilco*, disbanded themselves, and returned to their respective homes; but all the *Cartbaginian* soldiers perished, together with those two Generals. The *Romans* suffered less by the infection, because, having been a long time before *Syracuse*, they were seasoned to the air and water of the country.

About this time *Bomilcar* arrived on the coast of *Sicily* from *Cartbage* with a fleet of 130 gallies and 700 ships of burden, but was long hindered by contrary winds from doubling the cape of *Pachynum*. *Epicides*, fearing the *Cartbaginian* might sail back to *Africa*, left the command of *Acbradina* to the Generals of the mercenaries, and went to *Bomilcar*, in order to persuade him to fight the *Roman* fleet. The Admiral would not engage, but sailed away to *Tarentum* with all his gallies, ordering his ships of burden to return to *Africa*. *Epicides*, thus frustrated of his hopes, and knowing himself unable to defend a city already half taken, retired to *Agrigentum*; whereupon the *Syracusians* massacred the commanders appointed by him, chose new *Prætors* to govern in the town, and sent deputies to *Marcellus* to treat of peace. In the mean time the deserters, fearing to be given up to the vengeance of the *Romans*, persuaded the mercenaries that they also would have the same fate,

fate. Instantly the soldiers ran to arms, put to death the new Prætors, together with many of the *Syracusians*, and plundered part of the city. After this slaughter, they chose six Generals, three to command in *Achradina*, and three in *Ortygia*. Upon the return of the deputies from *Marcellus*, the mercenaries finding that their case was different from that of the deserters, and that there was no design against their lives, became perfectly satisfied, and the negotiation went on. During the course of the treaty, *Marcellus* found means to corrupt *Mericus*, a *Spaniard*, one of the six Generals chosen by the soldiers, and engaged him to admit the *Romans* into that part of the city where he commanded. *Mericus*, the better to accomplish this design, feigned an extraordinary zeal for the preservation of the place; pretended not to like, that deputies should have leave to go out and in at pleasure; and proposed, that for the greater security of the town, each General should have a distinct quarter assigned him, and be responsible for any neglect of duty in it. The motion was agreed to, and, upon the division, that district of *Ortygia*, which extended from the fountain of *Arethusa* to the mouth of the great port, fell to his care. *Marcellus*, informed of what was done, took his measures accordingly. He sent a body of troops to that side where *Mericus* commanded, and the *Spaniard* admitted them at the gate of *Arethusa*. At the same time the Pro-Consul ordered a false attack to be made on *Achradina*, which drawing almost all the soldiers of the garrison thither, *Ortygia* was in a man-

Y. R. 541.
Bef. Chr.

211.

240 Conf.

Y. R. 541.
 Bel. Chi.
 211.
 240 Conf.

ner left defenceless. Foreseeing this, he had detached another party of soldiers to take advantage of it. These entered *Ortygia* almost without fighting; upon which the deserters made their escape, the *Romans* giving them way; and the *Syracusians* in *Acbradina*, thus delivered from the fear of the deserters, immediately opened their gates to *Marcellus*, who thereby became master of the whole city.

And now the conqueror, who is said to have wept, during the siege, with compassion for the inhabitants, gave up both *Ortygia*, and *Acbradina*, to be plundered by his army, after he had secured the late king's treasures for the use of his Republic, and the statues, paintings, and principal ornaments of *Syracuse* to illustrate his triumph. The soldiers had orders to spare the lives of the citizens; but they were cruel in their avarice, slew many of them, and, among the rest, the incomparable *Archimedes*. He was very intent on a demonstration in geometry, and calmly drawing his lines, when a soldier entered the room and clapped a sword to his throat. "Hold! (said *Archimedes*) One moment, and my demonstration will be finished." But the soldier, equally regardless of his prayer and his demonstration, killed him instantly. There are different accounts of the manner of his death; but all agree, that *Marcellus* regretted it extremely, and shewed singular favour to his relations for his sake.

The consular year being ready to expire, the Senate ordered, that one of the Consuls should come from *Capua* to hold the *Comitia* for the great

Plut. life
 of Marcellus.

Chap. XXVII. *Second Punic War.*

421

great elections. *App. Claudius* repaired to *Rome*, and presided in the assembly, which transferred the fasces to *P. Sulpicius Galba*, and *Cn. Fulvius Centumalus*. *Apulia* was to be their province; while the late Consuls were in quality of Pro-Consuls to continue the siege of *Capua*. But as these proposed to reduce the place rather by famine than force, they turned the siege into a blockade.

Y. R. 542.
Bef. Chr.
210.
241 Conf.

At *Rome*, *Cn. Fulvius*, the late Prætor, was called to account for the defeat he had suffered in *Apulia*. One of the Tribunes of the people cited him to appear before the *Comitia*, purposing only to get him fined for his cowardice and ill-conduct. When the witnesses came to be examined, the charge appeared so heavy, that all the people cried out, *The process ought to be made capital*; and a day was appointed for the trial. *Fulvius* sent to his brother, the Pro-Consul before *Capua*, urging him to come to *Rome* and employ all his credit to avert the impending storm. The Pro-Consul would willingly have complied; but the *Conscript Fathers* thinking it a case wherein the publick interest was greatly concerned, absolutely refused him leave to come: So that the accused, having no hopes, went into exile without waiting for his sentence; and the *Comitia*, after his departure, condemned him to banishment.

Liv. B. 26.
C. 2.

In the mean time the *Capuans*, greatly distressed for want of provisions, sent a messenger to acquaint *Hannibal* with their present situation. A *Numidian* horseman had the address to pass undiscovered through the *Romans* in the night, and

c. 4.

Y. R. 542.
Bef. Chr.

210.
241 Conf.

Polyb. l. 9.
c. 3. & seq.

Liv. B. 26.
c. 7. & seq.

carried the message to the *Cartbaginian* General. Upon this advice, leaving the greatest part of his baggage behind him, he marched away with all expedition, arrived before *Capua*, and pitched his camp near the *Roman* entrenchments. At first he endeavoured by skirmishes to provoke the enemy to a battle, but this not succeeding, he almost besieged them in their camp, frequently assaulting it with bodies of infantry, which relieved one another, while some troops of horse covered them, and threw darts upon the enemy. All his attempts to draw the *Romans* to a battle, or to break into the town, proved ineffectual: Nor was it possible for him to stay long in the neighbourhood of *Capua* for want of forage; because the enemy, foreseeing his coming, had ruined the country all around. Add to this, that there being several armies in the field against him, he feared lest they should join and attack him, or cut off his provisions, and so reduce him to extremities. Convinced that it was impracticable to raise the siege by force, he formed a design, much extolled by the antient writers. He resolved to leave his camp silently, march with all expedition, and appear before the walls of *Rome*. By this means, he hoped the affright of the citizens might produce some accident in his favour, perhaps might give him an opportunity of surprizing the town: If that should not happen, the Pro-Consuls, he thought, would either quit the blockade of *Capua*, or at least divide their army, and send a part of it to the defence of the capital. In this last case he did not doubt but he should have an
easy

easy victory, both over those that staid before *Capua*, and those that marched away. Before he put this scheme in execution, he took care to acquaint the besieged with his intention, lest upon his departure they should in despair surrender the town. Every thing being ready for his expedition, he set out in the night, and, to deceive the enemy, left fires burning in his camp. Having marched through *Samnium*, he crossed the *Anio*, and pitched his camp within five miles of *Rome*, designing to attack the city next day, if practicable. The *Romans*, terrified at his approach, for he had never been so near their walls before, at first imagined he had made his way thither by the slaughter of their army at *Capua*. Their fears however did not lessen their resolution; and it happened luckily for them that the Consuls had already raised one legion, which was to rendezvous at *Rome* that very day, and had also called together the citizens in order to select from amongst them another legion: By which means there was very seasonably a great concourse of men in the town. *Sulpicius* and *Fulvius*, the Consuls, marched out with an army, and encamped before the walls. *Hannibal* seeing the *Romans* prepared to make a stout defence, lost all hopes of being able to take the town^a; and

^a *Livy*, says that when *Hannibal* was before the walls of *Rome*, the ground on which his camp stood was sold at the full price; which so provoked the *Carthaginian* that he put up to sale the bankers shops that were round the *Roman Forum*. The account which the *Latin* historian gives of this expedition differs in many particulars from that of *Polybius*, which is followed in the text.

therefore

Y. R. 542.
Bef. Chr.

210.

241 Conf.

therefore fell to pillaging the country. The Consuls boldly advanced, and encamped within ten furlongs of him. The *Carthaginian*, to secure his booty and execute the remaining part of his scheme, decamped in the night, and passed the *Anio* at a ford, the bridges being all broken down. In his passage he was attacked by the *Romans*, and though the *Numidians*, and the rest of his cavalry, covered his retreat, so that he suffered no great loss, yet the enemy regained a part of the spoil, and took about three hundred prisoners. *Sulpicius* and *Fulvius*, thinking that *Hannibal* fled before them, followed him, but kept to the hills, for fear of a surprize. He, on the other hand, marched at first in great haste, to intercept any forces that, on occasion of his march to *Rome*, might have been sent from *Capua*, or in their absence to attack the *Roman* entrenchments before that city. Finding that none of the besiegers had stirred, he turned against the Consuls that were pursuing him, fell upon their camp in the night, and took it with great slaughter. Next morning he saw those that had escaped posted upon a hill, which was very difficult of access; and he would not lose time in attacking them, having formed a project of greater moment. Despairing to raise the siege of *Capua*, he hoped to surprize *Rhegium*. And though it was situated in the remotest corner of *Italy*, he marched with such rapidity through *Apulia*, *Lucania*, and *Bruttium*, and appeared so unexpectedly before the place, that he took prisoners many of the inhabitants

tants who were walking securely without the walls; and was very near getting possession of the town.

Y. R. 542.
Bef. Chr.
210.
241 Conf.

Hannibal's departure left *Capua* without hope of relief. The *Pro-Consuls* signified to the inhabitants, that they would spare the lives of all those of them who would repair to the *Roman* camp; but not one *Capuan* accepted the offer. The commanders of the *Carthaginian* garrison wrote letters to *Hannibal* full of reproaches, and pressing him not to abandon them to the cruelty of the *Romans*. These letters were committed to the care of some *Numidians*, who pretended to desert, and then sought an opportunity to escape to *Rhegium*. One of them being followed to the *Roman* camp by his mistress, to whom he had disclosed the secret, she betrayed it; and above seventy of the *Numidians* were seized, whipped, had their hands cut off, and were driven back to *Capua*.

Liv. B. 26;
C. 12.

The sight of these maimed wretches threw the city into the utmost consternation. The people forced the chief of the Senators, who had for some time withdrawn themselves from public affairs, to assemble with the rest in the Senate-house; where the greatest part were for sending a deputation to the *Pro-Consuls* to capitulate: But *Vibius Virius*, one of the authors of the revolt, opposed this motion, and made a speech, the whole strain of which was rage and despair. Having represented the implacable hatred of the *Romans* to *Capua*, and exposed the folly of hoping for any favour from them, he thus concluded. *Death is our only refuge. I have prepared an enter-*

tainment

Y. R. 542.
 Bef. Chr.
 210.
 241 Conf.

tainment at my house. When we have finished our repast, a cup shall go round, that will end our days and our misfortunes together. Let all those who are weary of life, or despise it, or despair of preserving it, follow me. Funeral piles are already prepared to burn our bodies. A glorious death will gain us esteem from our enemies; and the perfidious Hannibal will lament the loss of allies, who did not deserve to be thus deserted and betrayed. Twenty-seven of the assembly followed Virius, accepted the entertainment to which they were invited, and closed all with a cup of poison.

As to the terms of the treaty, which the rest of the *Capuans* made with the *Romans*, we can only guess at them by what followed. As soon as the latter were in possession of the place, they seized the soldiers of the garrison and the *Capuan* Senators. These they conveyed to their camp to be tried by the *Pro-Consul*. They were first made to discover all their treasures, which amounted to seventy pounds weight of gold, and three thousand two hundred pounds weight of silver; and then fifty-three of them were sent in custody to two *Roman* cities in separate companies; and it was resolved to determine their fate before any thing was decreed concerning the rest of the inhabitants. *Appius* inclined to clemency, *Fulvius* to severity; and the dispute grew warm between them. The former, to put an end to it, wrote to the Senate, and referred the matter to them; but his colleague, without waiting for the Senate's decree, went with two thousand horse, first to *Teanum*, whither twenty-eight of
 2 the

the *Capuan* Senators had been transported, and he caused them to be beaten with rods, and then beheaded by the *Lictors*. Thence he hastened to *Cales*, and treated with the same rigour the twenty-five Senators who had been conveyed thither, though he might well have spared them, having just before the execution received letters from *Rome*, with orders to suspend it; but he put the letters in his bosom, and would not read them till all was over. Nor did the Republic ever blame him for this instance of severity, being doubtless pleased to have revenge, without incurring the odium of inhumanity among her allies. This charge fell only upon *Fulvius*.

Y. R. 542.
Bef. Chr.
210.
241 Conf.

And the impression of this Pro-Consul's cruelty became yet stronger in the minds of the people, by the following incident. One *Jubellius Taurea*, a man, among his own party, reputed brave, had come from *Capua*, and had been present at the late massacre of the Senators. Pierced with compassion, and full of indignation, he thus addressed himself to the *Pro-Consul*, just as he was going to dismiss the assembly: *Stay one moment, Fulvius, and command me to be murdered; and then thou mayest boast of having killed a braver man than thyself.* *Fulvius* (who had published the Senate's decree) replied, *You come too late to be punished, and are mad with rage. What!* said *Jubellius*, *have I lived to see my country reduced to slavery! Have I stabbed my wife and children to preserve them from insults and dishonour; and when I am come hither, to have my blood mixed with that of my friends and countrymen, do my enemies,*
after

Liv. B. 26.
c. 15.

Y. R. 542.
 Bef. Chr.
 210.
 241 Conf.

after all, deny me death? My own arm shall put an end to this bated life: As he ended these words he stabbed himself with a dagger he had brought under his robe, and fell dead at the foot of the Tribunal.

Liv. B. 26.
 c. 24.

In Greece, the Pro-Prætor *Lævinus* had, in order to keep *Philip* of *Macedon* employed at home, endeavoured (with the approbation of the Senate) to draw some of the *Greek* States into the interest of *Rome*. He began with the *Ætolians*, who were much discontented, because *Acarnania* had been by *Philip* dismembered from the body of their state, and he assured them that he would reduce it again under its antient government and jurisdiction. These promises of the *Roman* General were confirmed to the people by *Scopas* their chief magistrate, and by *Dorimachus* a noble *Ætolian*, who with less modesty, and stronger asservations, magnified the grandeur, power, and majesty of the people of *Rome*. The main motive however with the *Ætolians* was the hope of recovering *Acarnania*. Articles were therefore drawn up and agreed to, expressing the conditions on which these *Grecians* entered into an alliance with the *Romans*; and a clause was added, *That the Eleans, the Lacedæmonians, Attalus King of Pergamus in Asia Minor, Pleuratus, a King of Thræce, or perhaps of a part of Illyricum, Scerdiloædus, King of the east part of the last mentioned country, should if they pleased be comprised and included in the treaty.* Polybius tells us, that the *Ætolians* sent ambassadors to these several States and Princes, to solicit them to join in a confederacy against *Philip*; and he

he has transmitted to us the speeches made in the Senate of *Lacedæmon*, by *Cblæneas* an *Ætolian*, and *Lyciscus* an *Acaranian*, two orators, the first an advocate for the *Ætolians*, the second for *Philip*. *Cblæneas*'s harangue consisted chiefly of invectives, displaying *the tyranny, oppression, and usurpations exercised in Greece by the Kings of Macedon, from the time of Philip the father of Alexander, to the present King*; and in the close of his speech he urged *the safety the Lacedæmonians would find in joining themselves with so powerful a confederacy as that formed against Philip*. *Lyciscus* on the other hand endeavoured to clear the *Macedonian Kings* from the charge brought against them; mentioned several of their laudable actions; loaded the *Ætolians* with the guilt of many violences, outrages, and sacrilegious abominations; and in conclusion represents *the danger of making alliances with Barbarians; that these defenders of the Ætolians would soon become their conquerors, and, in time, of all Greece*. These apprehensions were not unreasonable; but the *Lacedæmonians* did not at this time look so far forward: it seemed safest for them, at present, to come into the alliance proposed by the *Ætolians*; and they declared for that side.

The articles of confederacy between the *Ætolians* and *Romans* ran thus. *The Ætolians shall forthwith enter into a war with King Philip by land, and the Romans shall assist them by sea with a fleet of twenty quinqueremes at least. All the cities that shall be conquered between the confines of Æto-*

Y. R. 542.
 Bef. Chr.
 210.
 241 Conf.

lia and Corcyra shall, as to the walls, houses, and lands belonging to them, be possessed by the Ætolians; but the Romans shall have the moveable goods and plunder. The Romans shall use their endeavours that the Ætolians may again possess Acarnania. If at any time the Ætolians make a peace with Philip, they shall insert a clause, that the same shall be of no force until such time as Philip shall have withdrawn his forces employed against the Romans, or any of their allies. And in the same manner if the Romans treat with the Macedonian King, they shall make the like provision for the security of the Ætolians and their allies. Though these articles were not signed till two years after, the confederates immediately began hostilities against Philip. Lævinus took the island of Zacynthus, and also two cities of Acarnania, which he replaced under the dominion of the Ætolians; and having thus kindled a war in Greece against the King, and found him sufficient employment at home, to hinder his assisting the Carthaginians, he retired with his fleet to Corcyra, and there wintered.

The news, that the Ætolians were in motion, was brought to Philip as he lay in his winter quarters at Pella. Resolving to invade Greece in the spring, he first turned his arms against *Illyricum*, that by the desolation and destruction he should cause there, he might intimidate the rest of his neighbours from attacking *Macedon* in his absence. From thence he marched his troops into *Thrace* against the *Mædi*. In the mean time the Ætolian army entered *Acarnania*, where they found that the people of the country

try were come to the most desperate resolutions for their defence: For, sending away their wives and children, and all who were above sixty years old, into *Epirus*, the rest engaged themselves by a solemn oath never to return from the field but with victory: And they laid the heaviest curses on those of their own nation, who should harbour or relieve any who were vanquished and fled. These desperate measures, together with the approach of *Philip*, whom the *Acarnanians* had earnestly pressed to come from *Thrace* to their assistance, so terrified the *Ætoli-ans*, that they retired into their own territories, and there continued quiet, till *Lævinus*, coming in the spring with his fleet to *Naupactus*, put them again in motion. In conjunction with the *Pro-Prætor*, they besieged *Anticyra*, (a city of the *Locrenses*, in the neighbourhood of *Ætolia*) by sea and land, and reduced it. But *Lævinus*, after this, by reason of a dangerous sickness, was obliged to continue there a great while unactive.

Winter now approached, and *Marcellus* returned from *Sicily* to *Rome*, for the first time since the taking of *Syracuse*. He demanded a triumph at his arrival: But having, pursuant to orders, left his army in *Sicily*, and it not being the custom for Generals to triumph when their army was not present to give testimony to their exploits, he was granted only an ovation by the Senate. To do himself justice therefore in the best manner he could, he decreed himself a triumph on *The Hill of Alba*, for which there

Y. R. 542.
Bef. Chr.
210.
241 Conf.

Livy, B.
26. c. 21.

Y. R. 542.
Bef. Chr.

210.

241 Conf.

Plut. life
of Marcellus.
Author of the
lives of illustrious
men.

were some precedents in such cases. Next day he had a very magnificent ovation. A plan of *Syracuse*, statues and paintings of an exquisite taste, costly vases, and immense quantities of gold, silver, and brass, were carried on biers before him. Eight elephants, and all sorts of military engines, used in sieges, made a part of the show. It was at this time that *Marcellus* introduced among the *Romans* a refined taste for paintings, and sculptures; which made some of the old *Romans* uneasy. They feared it would gradually destroy the people's love of husbandry and war, and would be a means to soften and inverate them.

C H A P. XXVIII. .

The NINTH YEAR of the War.

Marcellus's conduct complained of before the Senate, by the Sicilians.

Fulvius accused of cruelty by the Capuans. The fate of their city is determined.

The fortune of the campaign in Italy various.

The reduction of Sicily completed.

Y. R. 543.
Bef. Chr.

209.

242 Conf.

Livy, B.
26. c. 22.

THE time for electing new magistrates drawing on, *Fulvius Centumalus* was recalled to *Rome*, to preside in the *Comitia*. The first *Century* that voted, named *T. Manlius Torquatus*, and *T. Otacilius*, for *Consuls*. It was not doubted but the rest of the *Centuries* would join in the nomination; and a multitude of people

Y. R. 543.
Bef. Chr.209.
242d Conf.

ple flocked round *Manlius*, to congratulate him upon his election. But he approaching the Consul's tribunal, begged that he would call back the Century that had just given their votes, and allow him to speak a few words. While all were in expectation of what he would ask, he excused himself, on account of a weakness in his eyes, from accepting the dignity offered him. "A man, *said he*, must be very shameless " to desire to be a pilot or a general, and to " have the lives and fortunes of multitudes com- " mitted to his care, when he knows that in " every thing he does, he must make use of " other men's eyes." He therefore entreated the president of the assembly to order the prerogative Century to give their votes anew, and desired of them, that in their choice they would have regard to the circumstances of the Republic, remember that the war was still in *Italy*, and that *Rome* was scarce recovered from the terror caused by the late insult of the enemy at her gates. Notwithstanding this remonstrance, the Century, with repeated cries, insisted upon the choice they had made. "No, *said Man-* " *lius*, neither can I bear your manners, nor " you my government. Return into the voting " place, and consider that *Carthage* is making " war in *Italy*, and that *Hannibal* is her General." The Century finding these words applauded by all who stood round *Manlius*, and having a real respect for him, made no longer any difficulty to comply with his desire, and *Marcellus* the

Y. R. 543.
Bef. Chr.

209.
242d Conf.

fourth time, and *Lævinus* the second time, were raised to the consular dignity.

Lævinus was still lying sick at *Anticyra* in *Greece*. *Marcellus* entered upon his office on the Ides of *March*, and according to custom assembled the Senate that day, but declared he would bring no matters relating to the Republic before the Fathers till the arrival of his colleague. He complained that there were numbers of *Syracusians* in *Rome*, who spread reports about the city to his disadvantage; that *M. Cornelius Cethegus*, the Prætor of *Sicily*, had not only sent over many of these to accuse him, but had also asserted in his letters, that the war was far from being finished in the island [no untruth, as will appear by and by] that he might have the greater glory, in putting an end to it. The Consul added, that he himself would immediately give his enemies an opportunity of laying their accusations before the Senate, were it not that he understood, they affected to be afraid of accusing him in the absence of his colleague; and that, as soon as *Lævinus* should arrive, he would take care they should be heard.

As *Lævinus* passed through *Campania*, in his return to *Rome*, the inhabitants of that country crowded about him, and implored his protection against the tyranny and cruelty of the Pro-Consul *Fulvius Flaccus*. *Lævinus* ordered them to follow him to *Rome*; which when he drew near, the company of *Sicilians*, who were to accuse *Marcellus*, joined him likewise; and he suffered them to enter the city with him. However, before

Liv. B. 26.
c. 27.

fore he procured them an audience from the Senate, he gave the Conscript Fathers an account of his own conduct, and the state of affairs in *Greece*. And the next thing to be done, was to assign the Consuls, and the rest of the Generals of the *Roman* armies, their respective provinces, for the ensuing campaign. *Italy* fell by lot to *Levinus*, and *Sicily* to *Marcellus*. This was no sooner declared, than the *Sicilians*, who were present at the ceremony, made a horrible outcry, and expressed as much terror and consternation as they had done at *Syracuse* when *Marcellus* surprized it. They dressed themselves in mourning, ran to the houses of the Senators, and there declared, they would never return home, rather than be again subject to *Marcellus*: And that it would be better for *Sicily* to perish in the flames of *Ætna*, than to be given up as a prey to her implacable enemy. The affair was mentioned in the Senate, and the Consuls were asked to consult the Fathers about an exchange of provinces. *Marcellus* answered, that, had the *Sicilians* been already heard, perhaps he should not think that motion so equitable; but now, lest it should be said, that fear restrained them from accusing a man who must shortly be their Governor, he was very willing to exchange provinces with his colleague, provided he agreed to it; but begged the Senate would not give him the mortification of interposing a judgment of theirs in the matter; for, said he, if it would have been unjust to give my colleague his option, without casting lots, how much more un-

Y. R. 543.
Bef. Chr.

209.
242d Conf.

Fast. Cap.
Livy, B. 26.
c. 28.

Y. R. 543.
Bef. Cnr.
209.
242d Conf.

just, nay, what an indignity would it be to me, to transfer my lot to him? The Senate did not interpose their authority, and the exchange was made by the Consuls themselves. Then the *Sicilians* were admitted to bring their complaints against *Marcellus*. Their accusation turned upon his pretended cruelty at *Leontini*, his having sacked *Syracuse*, and his having stripped the citizens of every thing, though (as the accusers protested) it had been by compulsion, that the *Syracusians* had sided with the *Carthaginians*; and they prayed, that what had been taken from them, and could be recovered, might be restored,

Liv. B. 26.
c. 30.
Plut. in
Marcel.

When the *Sicilians* had done speaking, *Marcellus* left the *Curule* chair, and went to the place where persons accused were wont to make their defence. He fairly laid before the house the matters of fact (as they have been related) and then withdrew, to give the Senators more freedom in their debates. A great many of the Fathers, and among the rest *T. Manlius Torquatus*, were of opinion, that the war ought to be considered as having been carried on against the tyrants *Hippocrates* and *Epicyles*, equally the enemies of the *Romans* and *Syracusians*. After a long debate, the majority voted the proceedings of *Marcellus* to have been regular; but added to their decree, that the Senate would take care of the *Syracusians*, and recommended it to the Consul *Levinus*, to consult their interest, as far as it was consistent with that of the Republic.

When

When the *Sicilians*, being called in, had heard the decree read, they threw themselves at the feet of *Marcellus*, and begged he would forgive whatever, with a view to set forth their miseries and move compassion, they had said against him; and would receive them into his protection. The Consul granted their request; and, in gratitude to him, the people of *Syracuse* ordered, that whenever he or any of his family set foot in *Sicily*, the people should crown themselves with garlands, and celebrate the day with sacrifices; and *Syracuse* was, ever after, under the patronage of the *Marcelli*.

Y. R. 543.
Bef. Chr.
209.
242d Conf.

The cause of the *Campanians* came on next. Their pleading consisted wholly of a pathetic representation of their miseries. When they had finished their complaint, they were ordered to withdraw. And then *M. Attilius Regulus*, who had served in the army at the taking of *Capua*, was examined, as to the facts. This Senator could say little to the advantage of the *Capuans*; but he moved that the Senate might not determine the affair, till it had obtained the consent of the Tribes; because the *Capuans*, being *Roman* citizens, could not legally be judged by the Senate, without the approbation of the people. Accordingly, a Tribune of the commons was desired to summon the Comitia by tribes; and request them, to empower the Senate to pronounce sentence on the *Capuans*. He complied. The Comitia answered in that authoritative stile which shewed their sovereignty: *What the majority of the Senate now sitting, after being sworn,*
shall

Livy, B. 26.
c. 33.

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shall determine, that we will and command. The Senate, thus authorised, pronounced judgment: and when the sentence came to be executed, *Campania* was stripped of all the monuments of its grandeur; *Capua* was no longer a city; it had neither Senate, Comitia, nor Magistrates of its own; *Rome* sent a Præfect thither annually, to preserve order in the place, and to hear causes. Its former slothful and effeminate inhabitants were transplanted elsewhere, and succeeded by *Roman* colonies of laborious and industrious husbandmen.

Liv. B. 26.
c. 35.

And now the Consuls applied themselves wholly to the preparations for the approaching campaign. As the navy wanted great repairs, and the public treasury was exhausted, they published an edict, ordering every man, according to his census, to furnish pay and provisions for thirty days to a certain number of sailors and rowers, agreeably to a precedent on the like occasion. This falling heavy on the poorer citizens, already drained by taxes, since *Hannibal's* invasion, it had like to have caused an insurrection. The people threatened to do themselves justice, if the edict was not revoked in three days. In that time the Consuls, to make matters easy, proposed in the Senate a method which gained them great applause. They moved, that all the dignified persons in the state, and the Senators, should give a good example of zeal for the Republic, by voluntarily carrying in to the treasury their superfluous gold, silver, and brass. All present approved the mo-

c. 36.

tion ;

tion; and the Knights and common citizens so readily followed the example of the Consuls and Senators, that there was an emulation who should first enter their names in the register of the contributors. Thus were the *Roman* fleets recruited; and *Rome* put into a condition to support the war on all sides.

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When *Marcellus* and *Levinus* set out for their provinces, there were in the town of *Salapia* in *Apulia* two men of great authority, *Dafus* and *Blafus*; the latter was in the *Roman* interest, and had entered into a negotiation with the Consul to betray the town to him. As this could not be done without *Dafus's* consent, the traitor ventured to open his mind to him, and solicit his assistance, though he knew him to be a zealous *Hannibalist*. *Dafus* immediately informed the *Carthaginian* of the affair, who thereupon cited both to appear before him. But the accuser not being able to bring any proof to support his charge, *Hannibal* imagined the accusation to have proceeded entirely from jealousy and hatred; and would take no farther cognizance of it. After this, *Blafus* gained over his colleague, and they took measures together for the surrendry of the place. *Marcellus* on a sudden appeared before it, and was admitted into the town; and then the *Carthaginian* garrison, which consisted of 500 brave *Numidian* horse, finding themselves betrayed, resolved to sell their lives dear. They quitted their horses, which were of no use to them, and fought on foot, till they were all killed except fifty, who yielded themselves

Liv. B. 26.
c. 37.

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themselves prisoners. This, if we may credit *Livy*, was so great a loss to *Hannibal*, that in all the battles he afterwards fought in *Italy*, his cavalry never gained the superiority over the enemy, as in former engagements.

Liv. B. 26.
c. 39.

The *Carthaginian* had still hopes of taking the citadel of *Tarentum*, which he kept blocked up. On the other hand, the *Romans* sent a squadron of ships to supply the garrison with provisions: But this fleet, before it could enter the port, being obliged to come to an engagement with the *Tarentine* fleet, was utterly defeated, and the Admiral of it killed in the action.

Plut. life
of Marcellus.

Liv. B. 27.
c. 1.

Marcellus took two more cities in *Samnium*, and in them about 3000 *Carthaginian* prisoners, together with a great quantity of grain. *Fulvius Centumalus*, who commanded as Pro-Consul in *Apulia*, being ambitious of imitating the Consul, without his abilities, drew near to a city called *Herdonea*, in hopes to reduce it by force, or by treaty, but was surprized by *Hannibal*; and though the *Romans* behaved themselves bravely, they were totally defeated, their camp taken, and the General, with eleven Legionary Tribunes slain in the engagement.

Plut. life
of Marcellus.

Liv. B. 27.
c. 2.

So complete a victory recovered the affairs and credit of *Hannibal* for some time, and greatly discouraged the people at *Rome*, whose only hopes were now in *Marcellus*. This Consul, knowing how much the people were terrified, wrote to the Senate, in these terms. *I am the same man that I was after the battle of Cannæ. I am going to meet the same conqueror, and have*

reason to expect the same success. The joy that now swells the mind of the Carthaginian will not be of long duration. He then marched towards *Hannibal*, and came up with him near *Numistro*, in *Bruttium*. The Carthaginian did not decline a battle. The engagement was bloody; and the night alone put an end to it. At sunrise *Marcellus* offered him battle again; but *Hannibal* would not accept the challenge. He decamped; and the Consul followed him from place to place. So that these two great Generals spent the rest of the campaign, the one in seeking for an opportunity to come to a general action, the other in endeavouring to avoid it, and to draw his enemy into an ambush.

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In the mean time, *Fulvius Flaccus* was busy in managing the affairs of the Republic in *Campania*. And the Senate ordered a great quantity of corn to be bought up in *Hetruria*, and carried to the citadel of *Tarentum*. Two thousand men were likewise commanded to the relief of the garrison; and this convoy had a happier passage thither than the last.

Liv. B. 27.
C. 3.

From the Consul *Levinus* the Senate received news of the total reduction of *Sicily*. *Agrigentum* had long held out for the Carthaginians. *Hanno* had commanded there a numerous garrison; but having through jealousy disobliged, and even broke, a brave *Numidian* officer, named *Mutines*, much esteemed among his countrymen, and who having been sent by *Hannibal* into *Sicily*, to supply the place of *Hippocrates*, had done the Carthaginians signal service in that island, the
proud

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proud *African* could not brook the affront. To revenge himself, he entered into a correspondence with the Consul; and having engaged a body of the *Numidians* in the conspiracy, they opened one of the gates to the *Roman* troops. *Hanno*, with *Epicydes*, and a few more officers, escaped in a small vessel; but the rest of the garrison were all cut in pieces. After this, twenty towns were betrayed into the hands of the *Romans*, six taken by force, and the rest, to the number of forty, surrendered voluntarily.

Liv. B. 27.
 c. 4.

Levinus, having settled all affairs in the island, (which from this time became the granary of *Rome*) received an order from the Senate, to return home, to hold the *Comitia* by centuries: For though *Marcellus* was nearer, it was dangerous to interrupt his pursuit of *Hannibal*. However, *Levinus* was hardly arrived, when he found himself obliged to go back again, to take care of his province, an express coming from *Valerius Messala* (who commanded a fleet in *Sicily*, and had been ravaging the coast of *Africa*) with an account, that the *Carthaginians* were preparing a naval armament, to re-conquer *Sicily*.

The Senate hastened the departure of *Levinus*, and ordered him to name a Dictator to hold the *Comitia* for the new elections. The Consul did not refuse to obey; but that he might continue the longer in the supreme dignity, insisted upon deferring the nomination till he should arrive in *Sicily*; and he promised that he would then name *Messala*: But it being contrary to antient custom, for a Dictator to be named elsewhere

elsewhere than in *Italy*, the Conscrip Fathers passed a decree, requiring *Lævinus* before he left the city to petition the people to recommend a proper person for the Dictatorship, and enjoining the Consul to name that person; and the decree provided also, that in case the Consul refused to petition, as before mentioned, the Prætor of *Rome* should do it; and if he likewise refused, the Tribunes of the Commons should bring the matter before the Comitia. *Lævinus* was obstinate, and forbade the Prætor to offer any petition to the people. Upon this, the Tribunes assembled them; and it was determined, that *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, then at *Capua*, should be nominated Dictator. But *Lævinus*, the night before the holding of the Comitia, had set out for *Sicily*, so that the Fathers were obliged to write to *Marcellus* to name the Dictator the people had recommended. *Q. Fulvius*, being thus raised to the Dictatorship, named *P. Licinus Crassus*, the Pontifex Maximus, to be his General of horse.

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End of the Fourth Volume.

